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ABSTRACT   
The Garinagu, who are commonly referred to by the name of their language, Garifuna, emerged 
out of the historical geographical processes of colonialism and capitalism on Saint Vincent 
Island in the Lesser Antilles.  Exiled by the British to New Spain’s Captaincy General of 
Guatemala in 1797, the Garinagu formed communities and cultural bonds to the land, namely, 
but not exclusively, along the north coast of the territory that would become part of the 
Honduran nation-state in 1821.  Today, the Garinagu are rapidly becoming a landless population.  
Since the mid-1970s, the Honduran government has pursued the expansion of tourism on the 
north coast against the Garinagu’s opposition.  By the early 1990s, the Honduran government 
and oligarchs expanded cattle ranching and palm oil monoculture plantations into the area.  
Using critical ethnography, I chart the contradictions created under capitalism by the state and 
elite-led socio-economic reproduction of Honduras’ north coast.  I apply geographical concepts 
of place, race, and the politics of identity to show that place is a repository of tensions, conflicts, 
and practices since it is in place that human form social relations (e.g. class, gender, race, 
identities).  These concepts help to explain the fragmentation of the Garinagu from a self-
sustaining and closely bonded communal society into a fragmented and landless society.  I refer 
to the Garinagu in this manner because the new state and elite-shaped social relations on 
Honduras’ north coast and the cultural values assimilated from the Garinagu migration to the 
United States have undoubtedly transformed the Garifuna society’s relationship with place.  My 
central research question asks: how has the Honduran government’s ideology of economic 
development and the global economic forces fragmented the Garifuna society?  I investigate the 
economic policies implemented by the Honduran government which are connected to global 
economic forces and political economy to illustrate how the Garinagu’s historical land struggle 
xi 
 
and the construction of race have shaped their experience, identity, and relationship with place.  
Moreover, I analyze how the Garifuna leaders and the Garinagu in general have responded to 
these economic and political forces.  In sum, my analysis adds to the examination of the 
Garinagu’s cultural politics and state-sponsored violence that has historically accompanied 
economic development in Honduras. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Research Background 
 
  I became interested in my research topic for several reasons.  First, as a person of African 
descent and of Garifuna ethnicity who was born in Honduras and grew up in the United States, I 
have straddled racialized geographies throughout my life.  In Honduras, the dominant culture 
defines me by the pejorative terms morena or negra (colonial definitions of a black person).  In 
the United States, some people generally referred to me as Hispanic or Latina.  Many Spanish 
speaking people and other ethnic groups have referred to me as Afro-Latina, morena, or negra.  
My experiences and those of other Garinagu in these racialized geographies, the influence of the 
African American struggle for liberation (e.g. slavery, Civil Rights Movement), and the 
Honduran state’s and elites’ demeaning ways of describing the Garinagu as lazy in relation to 
working the land are the reasons why I examine race in this project.  Second, I was born in a self-
sustaining Garifuna community.  I recall collecting fresh laid eggs from my family’s hen house 
in the mornings, accompanying my grandmother to her farm, swimming in the sea and nearby 
rivers, washing clothes in the clean river, and taking breaks to eat fried fish and ereba (grilled 
cassava) prepared by the women in the community.  I recall watching the elders in the 
community prepare food for a lemesi (mass) and watching men drumming while women helped 
neighbors cover their family’s home with wet colorful adobe plaster.  My purpose in mentioning 
these cultural practices is not to romanticize place.  Rather, it is about establishing the reason 
why I still wanted to address the land struggle in this project, although the 2009 coup d’état 
prevented me from carrying out ethnographic fieldwork on Honduras’ north coast.  This is the 
reason why I conducted my fieldwork solely in the United States.  
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 Third, as an undergraduate student, I became interested in examining scholarship about the 
Garinagu
1
 produced by researchers, most of whom bell hooks would call “the privileged 
interpreter-cultural overseers” and uncovering how this knowledge has shaped the Garinagu’s 
self-perception (1990:9).  Cultural critic and gender theorist bell hooks’ examination of cultural 
politics helps me to understand cultural processes and to recognize matters defining certain 
cultural geographies.  Speaking of what shaped her intellectual development, hooks states that it 
happened by “merging critical thinking in everyday life with knowledge learned in books and 
through study . . .” (1994:2).  Precisely the convergence of “theory and practice” that hooks 
references that I am most interested in because critical thinking challenges “systems of 
domination: racism, sexism, class elitism” (1994:2).  Hence, hooks’ work is most prominent in 
this dissertation. 
 Lastly, I became interested in examining the convergence of cultural politics, power 
relations, place, and race in relation to the global economy.  To understand this process, I began 
to probe how the Garinagu, as an oppressed group, fit into this convergence and how race and 
class shaped this process.  This last question is important because prior to embarking on my 
research, I believed that I would be researching a social movement struggling for land rights.  
Instead, I found myself researching a society fragmented along class divisions, conflicting 
regional and political ideologies, and divergent economic interests. 
Purpose of Study 
 The purpose of this study is to understand the social fragmentation of the Garinagu.  This 
fragmentation is evident in the split between the Garinagu who conform to the state’s economic 
development efforts and of those who maintain and defend their territory and their cultural 
                                                          
1
 I use Garifuna (singular) which refers to the language and a person or Garinagu (plural) not to set Garinagu apart 
from their black counterparts, for Garinagu are black people.  I use both terms as a form of ethnicity. 
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practices (e.g. fishing, farming), practices which are denied through the privatization of beaches.  
To situate these processes, I examine how various Garifuna groups’ cultural, political, and 
economic practices intersect with changes that have been created on Honduras’ north coast 
including the nearby Bay Islands and Cayos Cochinos, although most of my analysis of the 
Garinagu’s land struggle will focus on Honduras’ north coast.  I will refer to the Bay Islands and 
Cayos Cochinos as area islands hereafter. 
 To understand how the various Garifuna groups function, first I focus on educated Garinagu 
and the Garifuna leaders, most of whom were either born, raised, or have been longtime urban 
residents, in one of Honduras’ cities or in the United States, because they see themselves as 
comprising the middle class.  Their self-conceptions derive from assimilating the national 
dominant group’s values and social relations.  As demonstrated by their social practices in the 
borough of the Bronx in New York City, they organize galas in making an all-out effort to 
become part of the political power structure in the United States reflecting their adopted values.  
In Honduras, the Garifuna middle class endeavors to balance their professional quasi-activist 
careers with conformance to the dominant culture.  In assimilating new values, the Garifuna 
middle class have also reshaped their socio-cultural identity and developed different economic 
interests as reflected in their goal to become shareholders in Honduras’ tourism industry and 
seeking to establish assembly plant industries and a host of other profit-driven economic 
endeavors.  Thus, middle class and educated Garinagu including leaders both in Honduras and in 
the United States, see Honduras’ north coast as a place to be commodified rather than a Garifuna 
cultural hearth.  In borrowing Cornel West’s words, I refer to this group as the “working class 
with a bourgeois identity” (1990:100).  The second group I examine is the oppositional group 
which includes The Black Fraternal Organization of Honduras (Organización Fraternal Negra 
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Hondureña, OFRANEH).  This group struggles to defend place by organizing marches and 
denouncing local government repression domestically and abroad.  The Garifuna middle class 
practices complicate OFRANEH’s land organizing in Honduras because they are disengaged 
from the land struggle and uphold a different relation with place.  The socio-economic 
reproduction of Honduras’ north coast has fragmented the Garifuna society and generated 
Garinagu’s baündada (struggle) in every aspect of this community’s life. 
Research Statement 
 In this dissertation, I chart the contradictions created under capitalism in the socio-economic 
reproduction of Honduras’ north coast by exploring how the concepts of place, race, and the 
politics of identity help explain the transformation of the Garinagu into a fragmented and 
landless society.  My central research question asks: how has the Honduran government’s 
ideology of economic development and the global economic forces fragmented the Garifuna 
society?  I refer to the Garinagu in this manner because the new state and elite-shaped social 
relations on Honduras’ north coast and the cultural values assimilated from the Garinagu 
migration to the United States have undoubtedly transformed the Garifuna society’s relationship 
with place.  The economic transformation of Honduras’ north coast, global economic forces, 
together with the Garinagu’s assimilation encouraged me to use the past tense fragmented or the 
noun fragmentation in defining the Garifuna people cultural, political, and economic breakdown.  
In answering my research question, I endeavor to show two things.  First, owning land means the 
Garinagu have control over resources and place.  Having control means that they enjoy some 
level of autonomy, although socially they are subjected to Honduras’ laws.  Second, the Garifuna 
middle class’s focus on social mobility signals a departure from pursuing community 
empowerment and substituting it with individual needs.  In applying the geographical concepts 
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of place, race, and the politics of identity in understanding the Garinagu’s land struggle and 
fragmentation, I will show first that place is a repository of tensions, conflicts, and practices 
since humans form social relations in place (e.g. class, gender, race, identities).  Humans do not 
conceive social relations in an imaginary bubble, but construct them as the outcomes of social 
interactions and activities.  Second, these geographical concepts will also help to explain the 
fragmentation of the Garinagu from a self-sustaining and closely bonded communal society into 
a fragmented and landless society.  Neglecting these processes would limit our understanding of 
the geographical scope and source of Garinagu’s baündada (struggle) against oppression, 
domination, and cooptation.  
 Place therefore offers a fundamental way by which we can recognize material practices of 
human quotidian lives, which are not independent of each other, but are characterized and 
comprised by a host of interrelated social practices.  These practices, in my view, define the 
complexity of place.  Using critical ethnography which offers a basis for challenging 
conventional scientific practices and identifying injustices and social conditions that influence 
human struggles, I use theorist and feminist geographer Doreen Massey’s concept of the 
reproduction of place to show how and why place is continually reproduced through the 
introduction of new economies that generate different social relations, tensions, and conflicts 
(1991:323).  Complementing Massey’s theory are theorists and geographers David Harvey’s, 
Bobby M. Wilson’s, and Andy Merrifield’s analyses of the construction of power relations and 
socio-spatial conditions.  I also borrow anthropologist Arturo Escobar’s concept of the “defense 
of place” (2001:139) to show that regardless of the Honduran government’s repression, many 
Garinagu use local resources or “jump scale” to defend what remains of their communities on 
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Honduras’ north coast (Smith 1992:60).  These concepts help to grasp the centrality of place in 
relation to the social construction of race and the politics of identity. 
Chapter Outline 
 This dissertation is organized into eight chapters.  Chapter 1 introduces this project.  A 
literature review in Chapter 2 highlights the significance of three geographical concepts: place, 
race, and the politics of identity.  This literature review situates my work about the Garinagu 
within a critical theoretical framework.  Concentrating on these geographical concepts helps to 
contextualize the oppressive geographies that the Garinagu straddle in Honduras and the United 
States.  These concepts also reveal the Garinagu’s relationships with place and perspective of 
place.  Central to this contextualization are global economic forces that have transformed many 
Garinagu’s social, political, and economic relationships with place.  To situate my work, I use 
the geographical works of Wilson (2005, 2002, 2000) and geographer and scholar of gender 
studies Katherine McKittrick (2007) on race and place.  Although their works do not directly 
focus on the Garinagu, they look at the construction of power relations and hegemonic socio-
spatial conditions of blacks in the United States which resonates with my work on the Garinagu.  
Geographer Sharlene Mollett’s work on the Garinagu offers a good angle from which I can draw 
some inspiration as well (2006, 2010, 2013).  Mollett’s work is important because 
anthropologists have generated the most scholarly work about the Garifuna people.  
Anthropological studies on the Garinagu by Keri Vacanti Brondo (2013) and Sarah England 
(2006, 1999) are also foundational to my research.  
Chapter 3 discusses the significance of critical geography as a methodology in examining 
the Garinagu’s relationship to their land and land struggle as a whole.  At the heart of my 
approach is a call, as several critical and seasoned voices have done before me, to vigorously 
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interrogate the colonial gaze using theories of positionality and situated knowledge.  Situated 
knowledge holds that knowledge is not absolute, but partial.  Since knowledge is partial, scholars 
must not define themselves as experts about the Other’s behavior, meanings, and practices 
whether cultural, economic, or political.  I use this approach because it complements 
geographical inquiry, encourages researchers to acknowledge the Other’s position, and draws 
from post-colonial works or any work that challenge racist practices.  My work therefore uses an 
interdisciplinary approach. 
Chapter 4 shows how the Garinagu have long organized against oppression in Honduras in 
defense of place.  Their organizing has been underscored by the formation of organizations in 
Honduras and also in the United States where they are part of a segmented labor market.  This 
chapter delves into their historical social trajectory in Honduras and the United States.  In 
exploring their trajectories, I show how the Garinagu have struggled to retain their communities 
on Honduras’ north coast while occupying a marginalized position in Honduran society.  In 
exploring the importance of a host of Garifuna organizations, I also address ideological 
differences and politics that have contributed to the fragmentation of the Garinagu.  Addressing 
these differences is not intended to create conflicts among the various groups nor favor one 
organization over another.  The intent is to examine the politics and practices of these 
organizations’ leaders and supporters, their impacts on the Garifuna organizing, and their 
consequences on the Garifuna communities.  
The second point explored in Chapter 4 is how the formation of the Garifuna organizations 
has transformed most Garinagu residing in the United States, their relationship with the land, and 
the land struggle in Honduras.  Central to my examination is to show how the Garifuna 
organizations have responded throughout the years to global economic forces and how most 
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Garifuna middle class and the Garinagu in general in Honduras and the United States have 
gradually abandoned the land struggle in Honduras as indicated by most of their organizational 
activities in the United States.  As the Garifuna cultural hearth, the Honduras’ north coast is 
where they say they belong, though domestic and foreign capitalists and some Garinagu’s 
collusion in land sales undermine this sense of belonging.  Malcolm X denounced nationally and 
abroad African Americans sense of belonging, place, and socio-conditions in the United States.  
In examining several of his speeches, he spoke about African Americans working conditions, 
denial of education, equal protection under the law, political disempowerment, access to public 
spaces (e.g. restaurants, hotels etc.),  and how African Americans contested these conditions (see 
Malcolm X 2001; Shabazz1991).  Paraphrasing Malcolm X, geographer James Tyner states, 
“belonging was not a matter of choice” for people of African descent “but rather a matter of 
contestation” (2006:5).  It is precisely this contestation that must also be incorporated into 
analysis of the Garifuna organizations in deciphering the various strands of their organizing.  
In Chapter 5, I examine the geography of race in the Garifuna experience between 
Honduras and the United States.  To situate their experience, I begin my analysis with the 
development of the banana plantation industry in the late nineteenth century on Honduras’ north 
coast where the Garinagu, West Indians, and mestizo workers converged.  Underpinning the 
development of the banana plantation industry were land concessions, tax breaks, and several 
other incentives the Honduran government offered foreign investors from the United States in 
exchange for modernizing Honduras.  As these capitalists gained a foothold in the Honduran 
economy and political system, Honduran politicians resorted to racist practices to regain their 
power.  Paralyzed by this development, Honduran politicians instituted a range of immigration 
policies and created a national symbol, Lempira.  These politicians characterized Lempira to be a 
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valiant indigenous who fought against the Spanish colonizers, and they in turn made him a 
national currency (Euraque 2003:229).  The reason behind this project was an attempt to 
homogenize Honduran society and national identity and exclude the Garinagu from their land.  
Excluded from this national imaginary were the Garinagu who became one of the main groups to 
face the wrath of the Honduran government and elites’ racist practices.  Contrary to racist 
practices in Honduras, in the United States, the Garinagu face similar yet different socio-spatial 
patterns.  The United States is similar to Honduras in having socio-spatial patterns comprised of 
“order and meaning much of which is racial in origin and design” (Davis and Donaldson 
1975:1).  It is different from Honduras because the Garinagu are part of the segmented labor 
force. 
The different geographies the Garinagu straddle have shaped their self-perception and 
relationship with Honduras’ north coast.  Focusing on these aspects of the Garifuna society does 
not constitute romanticizing cultural differences, praising exoticism, or adhering to buzz words 
such as transnational identity or resilience.  Instead, I treat the Garinagu as social actors having 
agency.  My work explores a gap in knowledge by examining the Garinagu disparate racial 
discourse.  Drawing from Merrifield’s analysis, I argue that their discourse is couched in the 
construction of place under capitalism (1993b:520).  These forces have molded the worldviews 
of the Garifuna middle class and the Garinagu in general in the United States as they move, in 
borrowing bell hooks’ words, from “one set of class values to another” (1990:1).   Hence, the 
Garifuna middle class have become indifferent to the Garinagu’s land struggle in Honduras 
because they see land simply as a commodity.  The Garifuna middle class’s outlooks illustrate 
the Garifuna fragmentation as a culture along class lines.  Presided over by a patriarchal 
capitalist society, the Garifuna middle class outlooks on race also promotes and rewards the 
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diffusion of certain ideologies that replace racist practices with assimilation, diversity, and 
multiculturalism – terms the dominant culture constructed to create the illusion of inclusion.  In 
fact, the deployment of these terms belies socio-economic conditions, racialized landscapes, and 
mutes progressive ideas or any form of sustainable or critical racial discourse among the 
Garinagu as a whole. 
Chapter 6 explores the Garifuna middle class’s economic, political, and social practices in 
the United States and its disconnection from the Garinagu’s land struggle in Honduras.  Their 
disconnection speaks of their new identities but also of the politics of place produced by the local 
political landscape in which they reside.  To illustrate, they organize galas in upscale venues, 
voter registration drives, political fundraisers, and civic meetings.  They also pursue business 
partnerships in Honduras and in the United States because they believe that the Garinagu 
integration into the national and global economy is unavoidable.  It is this globalized society that 
the Garinagu seek to join.  Engaging in different practices from their counterparts in Honduras 
has shifted the Garifuna middle class’s relationship with the Honduras’ north coast, meaning 
some do not see it as the Garifuna cultural hearth.  Instead, some see and promote New York 
City as being the Garifuna’s cultural hearth.  In other words, they do not attach their cultural 
practices and identity solely to Honduras’ north coast.  Instead, some have aligned them with 
their place of residence.   
In Chapter 7, I discuss Honduras’ geography and land tenancy to situate contemporary 
land-related conflicts.  Second, I address the political and economic environments within which 
the government conceived its plans for tourism and other national economic policies.  Third, I 
examine the laws implemented that have made the Garinagu a landless society.  In the early 
1990s, the Honduran government of Rafael Leonardo Callejas Romero (1990-1994) instituted a 
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host of neoliberal policies.  These policies included the Modernization and Development of the 
Agricultural Sector Law (Ley para la Modernización y Desarrollo del Sector Agrícola, LAM) for 
the expansion of cattle ranching, agribusiness, and monoculture palm oil plantations and the Law 
of Municipalities (Ley de Municipalidades) designed to empower local governments.  As a result 
of the implementation of these policies, the Callejas’ government and several other 
administrations that followed gutted key articles of the Honduran constitution.  
In recent years, the Honduran government pursued other national economic plans.  
Conceived by economics professor Paul Romer and touted by President Porfirio “Pepe” Lobo 
Sosa (2010-2014) in the post-coup d’état period as a solution to uplift over 50 percent of 
Honduras’ unemployed workers, architect (Romer) and enforcer (Lobo Sosa) designed charter 
cities to shift greater political power from the central government to a municipal governing 
system.  Another key element of the charter cities plan is natural resource extraction such as oil 
drilling.  The Honduran government granted multinational company British Gas Group an 
exploration license to drill petroleum in a 35,000 square mile area surrounding the Moskitia 
coast (Palencia, 2014; OFRANEH, personal communication, December 2, 2013).  Chevron has 
lined up to secure a concession as well (“Chevron dialoga acuerdo en el país,” 2014).  This 
economic move razes the few places which the Honduran government has not privatized.   
Lastly, I examine how the Garifuna activists and middle class have responded to the 
Honduran government national economic policies.  Included in this examination is the Garifuna 
middle class’s contradictory outlook of Honduras’ north coast and the role they continue to play.  
Also included is how the Garifuna middle class’ position has complicated organizing efforts by 
oppositional groups such as OFRANEH.  Many members of the Garifuna middle class believe in 
the inevitability of capitalism and endorse any economic policy the Honduran government 
12 
 
implements as long as they are financially rewarded and they are able to maintain their careers as 
quasi-professional activists.  
In Chapter 8, I reflect not only on what has been discussed throughout this dissertation but 
also address other important points.  To do so, I enter into a discussion that has significant and 
broader implications.  First, the Garinagu fragmentation and landlessness are directly tied to the 
global economic forces that produced them as a culture.  Second, the various political 
perspectives and personal interests most Garinagu manifest have engendered disunity among the 
Garifuna leaders  in pursuing concrete and aggressive strategies in challenging the violence 
synonymous with capitalism.  Instead, they have been coopted to embrace values and customs 
produced under this economic system.  Lastly, the Honduran government tries to mask its 
violence with spurious nationalism.  For example, the government’s recognition of the Garinagu 
as an indigenous group and the annual celebration of their presence in Honduras in April 12 are 
some of the practices that in part inform belonging into the nation-state.  However, the Garinagu 
land dispossession, commodification of their culture and bodies, and the Honduran government 
and the elites’ racist practices suggest that the Garinagu belonging is simply an illusion.  The 
Garinagu must therefore reassess their alliance to a racist and violent society.  I also discuss my 
work contribution to the vast scholarship generated about the Garinagu. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 The Significance of Place 
With the emergence of radical scholars in the mid-1960s, the field of geography began to 
experience partial decolonization.  Some progressive scholars questioned the field’s lack of 
social commitment and its emphasis on environmental determinism, humanistic geography, and 
quantitative-spatial geography.  This period coalesced with the Civil Rights Movement in the 
United States, the Vietnam War, Puerto Ricans’ and Native Americans’ activism, women’s 
movement, decolonization in Africa, and the Cold War geopolitics and its impact on the so-
called Third World countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, and a host of other 
developments (Peet 1998:67; 1969:1).  Among those calling for change were Clark University 
graduates Bobby M. Wilson and Herman Jenkins who asked: “can geography, as a set of 
concepts and tools, be of relevance in solving the problems of the Black American community?” 
(1972:1).  Raising this question meant interrogating the field of geography’s “white 
epistemological framework,” (Wilson & Jenkins 1972:1) a framework “contaminated with this 
most jingoistic prejudice” (Blaut 1969:1).  The field, after all, was “born and raised in the 
homelands of imperialism” (Blaut 1969:1).  Some socially conscious geographers began to 
address “profound social problems” (Donaldson 1969:1).  From these developments, critical 
students and faculty at Clark University in Worcester, Massachusetts formed Antipode: A 
Radical Geography Journal. 
The creation of Antipode and the paradigmatic shift in geography sought to challenge 
“quantitative-spatial geography, including modification like behavioral geography” (Peet 
1998:74).  From this movement emerged radical geography.  By 1974, David Harvey produced 
his seminal work Social Justice and the City, which marked a departure from his 1969 book 
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Explanation in Geography and its role in geography’s quantitative revolution (Peet 1998:75).  In 
Social Justice and the City, Harvey laid out his argument about the Marxist theory of historical 
materialism by examining land use in urban areas and providing concepts for understanding 
human-environmental interaction and its relation to the formation and representation of social 
practices.  In other words, Harvey addressed the production of the geography of difference in 
exploring political economy in relation to the environment.  Thus for Harvey “the proper 
conceptualization of [place] is resolved through human practice with respect to it” (2009:13).  In 
other words, Harvey contends, there are no “philosophical answers to philosophical questions 
that arise over the nature of [place] – the answers lie in human practice” (Harvey 2009:13).  
Harvey’s work provided the foundation for progressive scholars searching for a viable social 
theory.  Like Harvey, William Bunge also abandoned quantitative spatial geography in 1969 and 
published his work Fitzgerald: Geography of a Revolution in 1971.  In this book, he began to see 
the urban sphere (e.g. Detroit, Michigan) critically and dialectically.  Similar to Bunge’s work, 
Brazilian geographer Milton Santos’ Geography, Marxism, and Underdevelopment (1974) was 
certainly important in presenting an examination of urban development and developing nations.  
Many female scholars also made their marks in the partial decolonization of the field of 
geography.  Canadian Alison Hayford’s The Geography of Women: An Historical Introduction 
addresses women’s invisibility in geography and the social sciences which have been mainly 
concerned with “[white] man” history (1974:1).  Doreen Massey focused on labor and uneven 
development in her 1974 work, Towards a Critique of Industrial Location Theory.  In her book 
Space, Place, and Gender, she states that geography matters to the “construction of gender, and 
the fact of geographical variation in gender relations, for instance, is a significant element in the 
production and reproduction of both imaginative geographies and uneven development” (1994: 
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2).  Harvey and Massey focus primarily on the city, while Bobby Wilson and James M. Blaut 
focus on race and place.  Blaut did not limit his work to race and place; he also explored 
nationalism (1987).  These are some of the works that influenced the direction of geography in a 
more critical direction.  It is within this critical approach that my work is situated because it 
looks at political, social, and economic processes found in place which define social relations 
and give geographical expression to human activities.  It is through this lens that I try to weave 
the threads between the Garifuna activities and practices in the United States and in Honduras. 
An examination of geographical scholarship about place offers a robust debate concerning 
the meaning of place.  David Harvey contends that the term “place” possesses multiple meanings 
such as “milieu, locality, location, locale, neighborhood, region, territory, city, village, town, 
megalopolis, community, and nations” (1996:208; also see Massey 1994:1; 1991:321).  Many 
scholars across a broad range of political spectrum have dissected the multiple meanings of 
place.  However, this dissertation adheres to a critical and not to a humanistic approach.  For 
humanistic geographer Edward Relph’s “sense of place” thesis considers the notion of place and 
belonging (1976:63).  Relph defines sense of place as “may be authentic and genuine, or it can 
be inauthentic and contrived or artificial.  These notions of authenticity and inauthenticity are 
taken from phenomenology, but they are ideas which have, under a variety of slightly different 
guises had long currency” (1976:63).  For Relph, authentic sense of place should be understood 
to be a “direct and genuine experience of the entire complex of the identity of places – not 
mediated and distorted through a series of quite arbitrary social and intellectuals fashions about 
how that experience should be, nor following stereotyped  conventions” (1976:64).  Authentic 
sense of place, Relph concludes derives from a “full awareness of places” (1976:64).  Every 
culture has a sense of place and awareness of place.  However, such understanding varies 
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according to a culture practices and interaction with the environment.  Without further engaging 
into a lengthy discussion of Relph’s thesis, I strive to show that he divorces the tensions and 
contradictions that exist in place.  Although the Garinagu have a sense of place, they continue to 
be brutally driven and displaced from their territories and communities suggesting that the global 
economy, the Honduran governments, and the oligarchs are the ones defining the Garinagu 
belonging.  Under global economic forces, powerful groups create these conditions because they 
are seeking to “dominate the organization and production of [place] . . .” which includes land use 
and territory (Harvey 1990:222; see also Savage, Longhurst, & Bagnall 2005).   
By the 1980s, radical geographers such as Doreen Massey challenged humanistic 
geographers’ ideas about place.  Massey’s analysis of sense of place, for example, can be used as 
one way of questioning Relph’s localized analysis of place (1994:146).  Massey asserts that in an 
era of globalization, a process that involves substantial movement of goods and people, capital, 
and the transformation of cultural practices, it is difficult to define “what we mean by ‘places’ 
and how we relate to them” (1994:146).  Massey, therefore, asks how can people “retain any 
sense of a local place and its particularity” amid the current “fragmentation and disruption” of 
society produced by global forces (1994:146).  Under the conditions Massey describes, it is hard 
to maintain a sense of place when societies such as the Garinagu are dispossessed from place to 
make way for tourism and other economic ventures. 
Regardless of place’s multiple definitions Harvey argues, place reveals much about “social, 
political, and spatial practices in interrelation with each other over time” (1996:208; see also 
Merrifield 1993a:522).  Some of the implications found in the multiple meanings of place are 
“how we ‘place’ things and how we think of ‘our place’” (Harvey 1996:208).  Harvey’s analysis 
is grounded on the social production of time and space (history and geography) concepts which 
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“affect the way we understand the world to be” (1996:208).  These concepts also provide a 
“reference system” concerning our “’situatedness’ and ‘positionality,’” meaning where does a 
society or group situates itself in relation to place and how does place in turn shape a society 
cultural practices (1996:208; see also Massey 1994:1).  Implicated in this situatedness is what 
humans refer to as “‘a place called home,’” which provides an individual with a sense of place 
(Massey 1994:1).  Place naming can be situated within the confines of social practices.  Garifuna 
writer Victor Virgilio López García states that the Garifuna people name for Tornabé is 
Afulurijani (1991:64).  Tornabé as a name originates from ‘Turn-Bay,’ a name American 
capitalists created during the zenith of the banana plantations in the area (1991:64).  Durúbuguti 
Beibei is Garifuna for San Juan and Dubugati is Garifuna name for Punta Piedra.  All these 
places are located along Honduras’ north coast.  
The Garinagu’s practices on the north coast and the nearby islands of Cayos Cochinos and 
Roatán also shape their positionality because they adapted to their environment and formed 
communities.  Their adaptation allowed them to maintain existing cultural practices such as such 
as fishing, subsistence agriculture, and use of plants for medicinal and spiritual purposes.  
Throughout the years, the Garifuna people’s cultural practices have experienced a host of 
changes due to the Honduran state and elite-shaped social relations of Honduras’ north coast and 
the cultural values assimilated by the Garinagu.  Because of the Garifuna people’s cultural bond 
to the land and cultural practices, Honduras’ north coast represents who they are as a culture.  
The Garifuna people’s cultural practices inform their sense of place.  Yet, these cultural practices 
are in peril because the Honduran government and local elites, foreign investors (mainly from 
the United States and Canada), and various members of the Garifuna middle class  in Honduras 
and in the United States share these groups’ values and economic policies.  The Honduran 
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government’s economic policies and local elites’ and foreign investors’ practices have expanded 
the tourism industry, agribusiness, and monoculture palm oil plantations.  Many members of the 
Garifuna middle class see their social mobility contingent upon the development of these 
economies, chiefly tourism, and their connection to the Garinagu in Honduras through this lens.  
These developments have undoubtedly defied the Garinagu’s idea of Honduras’ coastline and 
area islands.  Most Garinagu believe that their communities have a specific character and 
“rootedness” to borrow Massey’s analysis of place and people (1991:319).  The various 
dominant groups have rendered the Garinagu’s cultural bond to the land meaningless since the 
north coast represents the circulation of capital.  Diverging ideas of place show that political 
struggles are, therefore, “based on place” and not on some imaginary social interaction (Massey 
1991:319).   
In the United States, European colonizers confined Native Americans to an open prison 
called Reservations.  As law professors Vine Deloria, Jr. and Clifford M. Lytle point out, the 
federal government enforced the expansion of its reservation policies in the 1880s “to help the 
Indians organize a government through which they could be governed” (1984:28; see also 
LaDuke 1997).  In Honduras, the Garifuna people rapid dispossession from their land by the 
state and elite-led socio-economic reproduction of Honduras’ north coast is achieving two things.  
First, it is creating a reservation for the tourism industry through the commodification of the 
Garifuna people’s bodies and culture.  Second, it has accelerated the Garinagu migration to the 
United States in recent years and thus increasing their number in the segmented labor force in 
this country.  The Honduran state and local elite are, therefore, systematically freeing place to 
carry out their economic endeavors and in turn sever some form of autonomy the Garifuna 
people enjoyed in the past.  
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Place also upholds a host of “metaphorical meanings” (Harvey 1996:208; see also Massey 
1994:1).  These metaphorical meanings reside in the construction of power relations and socio-
spatial conditions implicated in the placing of “people, events and things in their ‘proper’ place” 
(Harvey 1996:208).  This is evident in the creation of spatial barriers, place (s) description, and 
denial of access to educational, political, or social institutions.  In Honduras, mestizos describe 
the Garifuna communities on the north coast by the pejorative morenales, which roughly 
translates to communities of people with black skin.  According to Euraque, many Garifuna 
intellectuals in the 1950s and 1960s used the term to refer to the Garifuna communities 
(2004:182).  However, Euraque does not explore how the Garifuna intellectuals came to use the 
term morenales, or their understanding of its colonial root.  In returning to mestizos’ usage of the 
term, the intent in using morenales and other pejoratives is to denigrate and to “stigmatize” a 
place’s inhabitants (Cox 2002:148).  Another form of stigmatizing the Garinagu in the mestizos 
description is to construct an image of the Garinagu as believers in black magic, as Garifuna 
come pescado (fish eating Garifuna), lazy, and as practitioners of backwards agriculture (M. 
Miranda, personal communication, March 17, 2011; Mollett 2006:90).  Stigmatizing and 
denigrating the Garinagu is a political ploy which coincides with the effort to remove them from 
the north coast.  Consequently, the Honduran elites are rebuilding the north coast as a new place 
by privatizing beaches and denying the Garinagu in Honduras and those visiting from the United 
States access to their traditional spaces and to a space that everyone must access.  The Garinagu 
engaged in fishing are also denied access to this cultural trait, which is no different from what the 
Miskito also in Honduras continue to experience.  Anthropologist Keri Vacanti Brondo states 
that conservation endeavors such as the 2004 Cayos Cochinos Marine Protected Area (CCMPA) 
Management Plan “restricted” the Garinagu access to the area whereas “mestizo elite and 
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foreigners” access to the area is not restricted (2013:6; M. Miranda, personal communication, 
September 19, 2013).  The objective of the Honduran government and elites is to make places 
unlivable for the Garifuna people. 
In the United States, on the other hand, the Garifuna population centers are largely located 
in spatially segregated areas, referred to as ghettos, inner-city or crime-ridden areas.  Yet, most 
Garinagu residing in these locations see themselves as members of an emerging middle class. 
Entrance into this group requires assimilating capitalistic values and practices regarding the north 
coast-economic development.  Accepting these economic beliefs, the middle class oriented its 
relationship with and perception of Honduras’ north coast.  As a result, they prefer to be aloof 
from the Garinagu land-rights activism, viewing it as being antithetical to their middle class 
identity and aspirations.  Similar to Harvey, Doreen Massey holds that “places are shared spaces” 
(Massey 1994:137).  She derives her approach from the interplay of a host of social relations 
which generate “internal tensions and conflicts” (1994:1; 1991:323).  In articulating this 
relationship, Massey addresses the contradictions found in place showing the centrality of 
geography in our understanding of human activities.  More importantly, she challenges how 
people think about place in their quotidian life by seeking alternative to conceptual paradigms of 
place (Massey 1994:1).   
For political geographer Kevin Cox, social relations are inevitable connections between 
humans regardless of the inequities built into them (2002:148).  Cox goes on to say that in order 
for humans to relate “people have to make contact, they have to connect.  At the same time, they 
may come to know their place, in quite literally geographic as well as social terms” (2002:147-
148 emphasis in original).  Ultimately, however, how this connectivity is defined rests upon 
social practices – what a particular culture does and how it does it.  In the Garinagu’s case, their 
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connectivity to the mestizo is dictated by oppression and subordination.  This is evident with the 
Garinagu dispossession from their land on Honduras’ north coast to make way for a new socio-
economic reproduction.  Local and foreign capitalists are constructing a new place on the 
coastline with specific social relations demonstrating that places are continually “reproduced” or 
reconstructed under capitalism (Massey 1991:323; see also Harvey 1996:295).  The continual 
reproduction of place that occurs under capitalism does not only homogenize the “economy,” 
“culture, “or “anything else;” it is also another source of uneven development and alteration of 
the “uniqueness of place” (Massey 1994:156).  Each place is unique because it develops specific 
“local social relations” (Massey 1994:156).  The reproduction or construction of place creates 
“power differentiation” which is a central feature for the functioning of any economy (Harvey 
1996:320).  When producing power differentiation and specific local social relations, 
disregarding existing ones, a struggle generally follows because place’s history and “specificity” 
are fragmented (Massey 1994:156).  The Garinagu challenge the Honduran government, local 
elites, and foreign capitalists’ mixture and insouciance of local social relations because many 
beaches are privatized and land taken away.  Hence, the Garinagu are rapidly becoming a 
landless culture and a consumption-based society. 
The production of power differentiation and specific local social relations fits into Andy 
Merrifield’s argument of the material landscape.  He argues that the “material landscape and 
practices of everyday life occurring in different places under capitalism are inextricably 
embedded within the global capitalist whole” (1993b:520).  In other words, there is a flow of 
people, capital, goods, and social production spatially.  The global economic forces certainly 
apply to our understanding of the Garinagu’s land struggle because capitalism does not reside in 
some abstract space.  It is mobile as in the case of assembly plant industries or maquiladoras and 
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“‘place-bound’” as in the case of agribusiness (Merrifield 1993b:521; 1993a:103).  Placed-bound 
does not mean that capitalism begins and ends in a place.  What Merrifield means is that once a 
company relocates its production to a specific place, it becomes placed-bound and seeks certain 
accommodations from the local government.  Because it is placed-bound, Merrifield argues 
capitalists do not foresee contradictions.  This is a practice used by multinational corporations 
globally.  For example, in Honduras the banana plantation workers challenged their salaries and 
working conditions starting in the late nineteenth century whereas the plantation owners secured 
the government’s protection by supporting corrupt presidents and controlling the country’s 
political apparatus (Euraque 1996:7; Laínez & Meza 1973:17; Nieto 2003:107).  
A recent example of what Merrifield addresses is that the Honduran government passed a 
host of laws weakening certain segments of Article 107 of the Constitution in the early 1990s 
and ultimately amending it in 1998.  Altering this article paved the way for foreign buyers to 
own land on the north coast.  Some members of the Garifuna middle class in Honduras and in the 
United States with connection to this process coaxed the Garinagu to secure private land titles for 
communally-owned land without consulting their respective communities.  The Garifuna middle 
class argued that the land could then be used as collateral in business transactions.  In addition, 
some members of the Garifuna middle class from the United States encouraged other Garinagu 
to become shareholders in the tourism industry rather than suggesting ways in which Garinagu in 
Honduras can protect their land and communities against the Honduran government and local 
elites economic policies.  Besides securing legal protection, companies rely on the local 
government to shield them from any local rebellions.  The Honduran national police force in 
Honduras’ capital, Tegucigalpa, deals with the Garifuna activists protesting the usurpation of 
their land.  Another point to make is that Honduran capitalists, too, such as Miguel Facussé 
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Bargum, who owns the agribusiness and palm-oil firm Dinant, also demand certain 
accommodations from the local authorities, that is, their ability to usurp the Garinagu land 
without any legal consequences (“Raíces históricas de la fortuna de Miguel Facussé Barjum,” I. 
Chávez, personal communication, April 24, 2010).  What the capitalists’ politics and local 
government economic policies and the Garinagu’s response demonstrate is that place “emerges 
through social struggle and imposes itself as a potential barrier for capital to overcome” 
(Merrifield 1993b:103).  Place is therefore an embodiment of tensions and conflicts.  
Reflecting on the connection between place and the internalization of capital, Massey 
argues that place “is not concrete, grounded, real, but rather that space – global space – is so too” 
(2004:7 emphasis in original).  Massey articulates what she defines as “power-geometries,” that 
is, relations between the local and global economies (2004:11; 1991:317).  In evoking power-
geometries, Massey endeavors to explore the “politics of place” (2004:12).  By this, she means 
that “local places are not simply always the victims of the global; nor are they always politically 
defensible redoubts against the global.  For places are also the moments through which the global 
is constituted, invented, coordinated, produced.  They are ‘agents’ in globalization” (Massey 
2004:11).  Massey’s assertion challenges literature that places emphasis only on locality rather 
than also incorporating global economic forces.  Implicit in Massey’s analysis is the exclusion of 
some groups from the power structure.  
While lending institutions and governments from advanced capitalist nations impose 
conditions on the Honduran government to adhere to certain economic policies (i.e. 
neoliberalism), Honduran politicians and elites continue to build an economic and political 
infrastructure based on inequity, oppression, and racism because they want to gain leverage in 
the power-geometries.  That said, it does not mean that they were not racist or oppressive before. 
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It simply means that their practices exacerbated under the new economic conditions.  The 
Garifuna middle class in the United States and in Honduras seek a better position in the power-
geometries because they conceptualize it to mean inclusion.  On this ground, they cease to 
defend the place that is Honduras’ north coast.  Instead, they embrace capitalist values grounded 
on individualism, consumerism, and cultural homogeneity.  These specific values inform their 
discourse and politics of sustainable agriculture.   
In addition to Massey’s assertion that place is globally interconnected, she also borrows 
anthropologist Arturo Escobar’s concept of “a defense of place” (2001:139).  Escobar argues that 
a defense of place may constitute both a theoretical framework and “political action” in 
examining placed-based movements to be “multi-scale, network-oriented subaltern strategies of 
localization” (2001:139).  Focusing on place, Escobar declares, does not mean disbarring space 
as a “domain of resistance and alterity, since both place and space are crucial in this regard, as 
they are in the creation of forms of domination” (2001:141).  Escobar’s position is to question 
the “privilege accorded to space in analysis of the dynamics of culture, power, and economy” 
(2001:141).  Escobar’s call for the centrality of place is his way of affirming the significance of 
place in people’s lives (2001:140).  Indeed, place must be central in our understanding of culture, 
power, economy, and conflicts because they are interconnected to the global economic forces 
which are persistently reproduced in place as Massey asserts.  During the Honduran 
government’s implementation of neoliberal policies beginning in the 1980s and in subsequent 
years, the Garifuna leaders responded (“The Inspection Panel,” 2007; Anderson 2009:161).  
They challenged the local government’s economic policies with local street marches but also by 
connecting with some Garinagu in New York City.  With the help of the Garifuna leaders in New 
York City, the Garinagu from Honduras addressed their concerns to the United Nations 
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demonstrating that although place-based conflicts are interwoven into global economic forces, 
they also galvanize local residents to take action in the defense of place accessing and using a 
host of resources.   
Contrary to Escobar, Massey claims that defending place may be challenging or, as she 
phrases it, “not defensible” due to the “construction of that place . . . power relations, and the 
way its resources are mobilized” (2004:12 emphasis in original).  Place may not be defensible for 
the Garifuna middle class in Honduras and in the United States because of its values and politics 
but for the Garifuna activists in both countries who believe that their cultural identity and culture 
region is defined by place, they defend it regardless of government oppression.  In the end, 
Honduras’ north coast and area islands have become bases for capitalists to feed their material 
practices.  Many Garinagu, on the other hand, resist such practices.  These processes do not leave 
room for romantic notions about human geography and activities; rather, they place these 
processes and material practices at the center of analysis, making the concept of place 
multifaceted and complex. 
 Place is thus central in understanding processes because there is a “permanent tension 
between the free appropriation of [place] for individual and social purposes, and the domination 
of [place] through private property, the state, and other forms of class and social power” (Harvey 
1990:254).  For example, as a result of the privatization of many beaches, many Garinagu see 
themselves in a constant struggle in asserting their position over place.  Yet, some members of 
the Garifuna middle class in the United States and Honduras do not see the privatization of 
Honduras’ north coast to be disempowering the community.  To the contrary, many members of 
the Garifuna middle class believe that privatization is empowering.  The reason for this is 
because they have assimilated attitudes, values, and visions of place from the powerful 
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discourses of bureaucrats, politicians, and developers.  Within this analysis, I situate the 
Garinagu fragmentation since many activists in this community, mostly in Honduras but also in 
the United States, mobilize in defense of place.  In the meantime, most members of the Garifuna 
middle class are disengaged from activism centering on land struggle.  The permanent tension 
that Harvey addresses destabilizes not a person but a whole culture region since each social actor 
upholds a different view of and relationship with place.  
Race and Place 
As Harvey and Massey declare, place is riddled with metaphorical meanings.  The socially 
constructed concept of race is at the center of this process.  Prior to the 1960s, geographers were 
not prominent in addressing race and racism critically (Gilmore 2002:17; Jackson 1987:3). 
Agreeing with geographers David Harvey, Don Mitchell, Peter Jackson, and Jan Penrose, 
geographer and activist Ruth Gilmore notes that in the twentieth century, geographers followed 
three main frameworks in addressing race: “environmental determinism, areal differentiation, 
and social construction” (2002:17).  All these approaches Gilmore explains adhered to two 
assumptions: “(1) social formations are structured in dominance within and across scales; and (2) 
race is in some way determinate of sociospatial location” (2002:17).  Blaut expands on Gilmore's 
analysis noting that the various theoretical frameworks employed in the early nineteenth century 
were a “biblical argument grounded in religion” while from 1850 to 1950 there was a “biological 
argument, grounded in natural science” (1992:290).  Yet, while radical geographers in the 1960s 
sought to understand social inequity, Bobby M. Wilson argues that they “marginalized or under 
theorized race in its analysis of social formation” (2002:34).  In order to have these pre-1960s 
practices revamped, Wilson concludes, geographers must tackle race historically to “reveal [its] 
real structure,” meaning where it derives (2002:33). 
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Contextualizing race historically in relation to place is thus vital because it is implicated in 
“the production and reproduction of social relations in the sense that particular territorial forms 
both produce and reflect particular social process” (Jackson 1987:4).  Implicated in this historical 
knowledge are geographical variations for every place develops its own racist practices.  
Drawing from critical feminists’ analysis in the field of geography, and also anthropology and 
the humanities, who have affected social and political changes, and “existing knowledge,” helps 
to understand racialized places in which the Garinagu exist (Moss & Al-Hindi 2008:1).  The 
insights of geographers Audrey Kobayashi, Linda Peake, Katherine McKittrick, Sharlene Mollett 
and several other scholars are invaluable because their analysis of race and place is universal in 
its application, although race and place are products of specific “historical geographies, varying 
across place according to process such as colonialism, migration, labor markets, and built 
environments . . .” (Kobayashi & Peake 2000:392; see also McKittrick, 2007; Mollett, 2006 and 
2010).  In the United States, for instance, scholars cannot engage in social analysis without 
tackling the “geographies of whiteness” (Kobayashi & Peake 2000:393).  Geographical interest 
in the geographies of whiteness emerged in the 1980s and is part of “a genealogy of engagement 
with issues of ‘race’ and racialization” (Shaw 2006:851).  Contrary to the United States, in 
Honduras, there is the mestizaje framework which the dominant culture constructed during the 
post-colonial period and western scholars studying Honduran society adopted.   
In the mid-1920s, Honduran politicians with the support of intellectuals constructed 
mestizo to mean a mixture of Europeans and Indians.  For historian Andrew Juan Rosa, “Simply 
put, the mestizo is a sterile, static, and monolithic racial mixture of Indian, European, and African 
ethnicity” (1996:276 emphasis added).  Professor of Spanish Richard Jackson considers this 
“ethnic and cultural fusion,” to be “the physical, spiritual, and cultural rape of black people” 
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(1976:1).  Yet, in Honduras, as it is the general practice in Latin America, the dominant group 
defines mestizo to mean the union between Spanish and Indians.  Other terms included mestizaje 
or miscegenation and indigenismo for indigeneity.  For Honduran politicians, their mestizaje 
framework represented whitening their society as they imagined a new place.  It also 
reinvigorated their already existing racist practices.  What Honduran politicians produced was 
the “geography of difference” (Harvey 1996:334).  It is within this geography of difference and 
racialized places that the Garinagu, in drawing from Audrey Kobayashi and Linda Peake’s 
analysis, are “identified, given stereotypical characteristics, and coerced into specific living 
conditions, often involving social/spatial segregation and always constituting racialized places” 
(2000:393).  The Honduran elites labeled the Garinagu using the pejoratives of moreno or negro 
signaling to the Garinagu that they are “‘outsiders’” or the Other (Euraque 2007:84).  The 
Garinagu challenge these labels by resorting to multiple identities such as “Afro-Honduran,” 
reaffirming their ethnicity of the Garifuna, but also using “indigenous.”  In so doing they 
position themselves as citizens of Honduras yet occupying a marginalize position. 
The Garinagu deployment of indigenous is rooted in the presumed collective rights 
accorded to them in the 1990s by the Honduran government in which it recognized nine groups 
within the country as being indigenous (Hooker 2005:286).  I believe that the recognition of the 
Garinagu as indigenous was a discursive ploy designed to maintain existing social hierarchy and 
obscure its “oppressive social relation” in borrowing geographer Gillian Rose’s words (1994:46).  
What is evident is that racialized places are the “legacy of uneven geographies” (McKittrick and 
Woods 2007:2).  These geographies are a source of incessant struggle as evident with the 
Garinagu contesting a history of marginalization and oppression highlighting racist practices.  In 
their analysis of racism in the twenty first century,  Kobayashi and Peake state that “whiteness” 
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is “a set of cultural practices and politics based upon ideological norms that are lived but 
unacknowledged” (2000:394).  Their analysis on racism provides a good angle by which to 
tackle race in the Garifuna experience.  
In the United States, the Garinagu fall under various labels because besides speaking their 
mother tongue, Garifuna, they also speak Spanish, and their surnames are generally Spanish.  
The Garinagu so-called otherness is compounded by their “accent,” although every culture has 
an accent.  To challenge this otherness while pursuing social mobility, the Garifuna middle class 
began using the descriptor Garifuna American.  Undoubtedly, the Garifuna middle class racial 
identity in the United States aligns with place-specific signifiers (African American, Italian 
American etc.).  Hence, the transformation of place under capitalism supports Merrifield’s 
argument that the material landscape and quotidian life are embedded in the global economic 
forces (1993b:520).  Global economic forces are therefore place-driven.  The forces of capitalism 
(1993b:516) that Merrifield speaks of together with the set of values that hooks discusses in her 
analysis of African American middle class in the United States support my view that these forces 
have molded the Garifuna middle class’s racial discourse in the United States (1990:1).  The 
Garifuna middle class has become indifferent to the land struggle in Honduras despite the fact 
that geographically most Garinagu in the United States are concentrated in spatially segregated 
areas.  In other words, they do not live in affluent neighborhoods such as Riverdale in the Bronx.  
They live in areas primarily populated by working class African Americans, Latinos, and 
Caribbean.  Thus, in some small ways, Honduras is similar to the United States.  Speaking of the 
United States, geographer and gender scholar Katherine McKittrick states that it is imbued with 
racialized spaces making history a “geographic story that is . . . a story of material and 
conceptual placements and displacements, segregations and integrations, margins and centers 
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and migrations and settlements” (2006:xiv).  Honduras adheres to similar patterns.  These 
geographic binaries underscore “the classificatory where of race” (McKittrick 2006:xiv emphasis 
in original).  It is the where of race, which McKittrick and geographer and urban scholar Clyde 
Woods put forth that informs the geography of race in the Garifuna experience and place (2007).  
The Politics of Identity 
Massey argues that “individuals’ identities are not aligned with either place or class; they 
are probably constructed out of both, as well as a whole complex of other things, most especially 
‘race’ and gender” (1994:137 emphasis in original).  Indeed, in challenging what he calls 
“essentialist thinking,” Karl Marx, and neo-Marxists exclude the concept of race from their 
analysis, Wilson agrees with Massey’s assertion that class is not the only factor that must be 
taken into account when analyzing individuals’ identities (2000:65).  For Wilson, “even at the 
point of production, workers are just not workers; they have other identities (e.g., racial, ethnic, 
religious, gender).  Identities other than class can take center stage, forming the basis for new 
politics” (2000:65; see also Cox 2002:147).  Class then is not the only unifying force among 
workers; race must be filtered into discussions because as geographer Laura Pulido argues “our 
class experiences are always racialized and our racial experiences are always classed” (2002: 
763).  On these grounds, difference in time and space generate geographical variations in terms 
of “racial meanings attached to various groups” (Pulido 2002:763).  In keeping with Massey’s, 
Wilson’s, and Pulido’s observations, the concept of the politics of identity, then, is a loaded term.  
For Kobayashi, it refers to the racially and historically marginalized groups’ social movements 
seeking to gain recognition (2009:282).    
Some geographers refer to the politics of identity as a “politics of difference” whereas 
David Harvey describes it as the “geography of difference” (1996; Jackson & Penrose 
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1993:104).  Interest in the politics of identity in the field of geography originated in the late 
1960s during the partial decolonization of the discipline.  Some scholars viewed geographer 
William Bunge’s brief collaborative research with African American leaders in Detroit, 
Michigan as a significant period because it altered his view of the urban sphere (Kobayashi 
2009:282).  Yet, an adequate geographic framework about the politics of identity as a whole but 
also in regards to revolutionary groups remains elusive (Kobayashi 2009:83).  However, there is 
ongoing debate about it.  Kobayashi’s analysis thus will also play an important role in my 
examination of race in the Garifuna experience because her inquiry is broad in scope. 
Citing sociologist Manuel Castells and geographer Nigel Thrift, Don Mitchell contends that 
identity is not “rooted to place” but it is in flux (2000:274).  Although it is in flux, Mitchell 
explains, identity “exists as a nexus” because regardless of what means are employed whether by 
conquest or global economic changes, identities are “radically transformed” (2000:276).  Social 
theorist, Stuart Hall agrees that identity is constantly in flux.  Hall therefore advises that “we 
should think . . . of identity as a ‘production,’ which is never complete, always in process, and 
always constituted within, not outside, representation” (1990:222).  However, in the end, Halls 
simply says “cultural identity . . . is a matter of ‘becoming’ as well as ‘being.’  It belongs to the 
future as much as to the past . . . Cultural identities come from somewhere, have histories.  But, 
like everything which is historical, they undergo constant transformation” (1990:225).  Place is 
therefore where “everyday life is situated” and where all sorts of social practices develop 
(Merrifield 1993b:522).  It is within these dialectical parameters that I situate the Garinagu’s 
identity. 
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Situating Work within the Existing Literature 
Wilson’s works connect examination of conflicts in place to the economic structure 
wherein racist practices derive.  Wilson contends that capitalism ascribes “differences to race, 
gender, class, regions, nations . . . in ‘brute fashions’” (2000:5).  This is where his exhausting 
analysis of race and place and the politics of identity reside, which I incorporate into my analysis 
of the Garinagu.  Drawing from Wilson’s analysis on Black experience in the United States, I say 
that the Garinagu have adopted a “new individual and collective identity,” bringing “racial 
identity into politics” (2000:7).  Their articulation of the term indigenous, which itself is one of 
the legacies of colonialism, is an ascribed identity debated and articulated by the United Nations, 
although not one single “system body” of the United Nations has ever adopted it (“Secretariat of 
the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues,” 2004:1).  Although the Honduran government 
recognizes “nine” ethnic groups including the Garinagu, its move does not imply an inclusive 
and heterogeneous society (Anderson 2007:389).  This recognition simply means the illusion of 
inclusion.  Yet, administrators of the Garifuna organizations such as OFRANEH generally 
invokes the term indigenous, which has shaped its politics in its land struggle.  It invokes this 
term because there is a myth attached to it, that is, the Garinagu are Honduran citizens.  Indeed, 
they are, but their treatment suggests that they are not.  In using the word myth, I am questioning 
the Garinagu’s belonging.  On one hand, the government recognizes them as citizens of the 
nation-state.  On the other hand, they are increasingly dispossessed from their land, they 
experience daily racism, and the Honduran government denies them their human rights.  The 
Garifuna people though are not the only group denied their human rights in Honduras.  The 
masses and dissenting voices experience similar oppression as well.  
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Judging from the political, economic, and social marginalization and blatant racism they 
experience daily, the Garinagu are in fact outsiders as Euraque states (2007:84).  As another 
Garifuna organization in Honduras, ODECO, utilizes the concepts of Garifuna and Afro-
descendant (see Anderson 2007:387).  ODECO’s longtime director, Celeo Álvarez Casildo 
began articulating this concept in the early 2000s.  OFRANEH and the Garifuna middle class in 
Honduras and in the United States, however, reject the Afro-descendant categorization because 
as I learned during my ethnographic fieldwork, they associate it with being African rather than 
with being Honduran.  The Garinagu in the United States employ the concept Garifuna but some 
also employ Hispanic,
2
 Latino(a), and Garifuna American.  Their usage of these terms implies 
that they see themselves as part of the country’s political and economic integration.  The 
Garinagu political identity then, regardless of geography, is connected to the dominant group’s 
racist practices and history, practices linked to “real structure” – meaning the economic 
infrastructure (Wilson 2002:33).  In Honduras, the colonizers constructed race during the 
colonial era and carried it over to the post-colonial era.  Colonizers in the United States, 
“(re)constructed” race at different historical moments: “Reconstruction, post-reconstruction, the 
Great Depression” (Wilson 2002:33).  Generally, scholars describe the existence of 
Reconstruction between 1863 to 1877 and the beginning of the Great Depression with the “stock 
market crash of 1929” (Alexander 2010:35; Zinn 2005:386).  These historical moments shaped 
race-connected practices because each period has produced specific racist practices.  
                                                          
2
 Under President Richard Nixon’s (1969-1974) administration, the U.S. Census Bureau coined the term Hispanic.  
According to the U.S. Census Bureau, it was not until “the 1970 census that the concept of reporting on Hispanics as 
a distinct group existed and then only in a 5 percent sample of the census questionnaires distributed” (2012). The 
diffusion of the term Hispanic “‘official’” usage began in 1973 in which the government “‘applied’” it to the 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare for the purpose of “developing racial and ethnic categories which it 
could use for data-gathering purposes” (United States Census Bureau, 2012).  The term “‘Hispanic’ encompassed 
Mexican, Puerto Rican, Central Americans, South American, Caribbean, and Spanish peoples who share some 
common cultural values” (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012; see also Miranda 1997:150).  According to historian Malvin 
Lane Miranda, not all “Hispanics” welcomed the term, but the media popularized it (1997:150).  
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Katherine McKittrick uses an approach similar to Wilson’s.  In assessing blacks’ historical 
trajectories, she finds “how black human geographies are implicated in the production of [place]” 
(2007:4).  One of the trajectories McKittrick addresses is how black people’s sense of belonging 
is constructed through a host of exclusionary practices in shifting power relations and 
displacement (2007:4).  McKittrick draws a parallel between black subjects’ oppression and 
domination and the fact that they are rewarded for “consuming, claiming, and owning things,” 
meaning black subjects “are rewarded for wanting and demarcating ‘our place’ in the same ways 
that those in power do”  (2007:5).  She, therefore, advises that black subjects must reflect on the 
relationship between consumption and “conquest” in order to gain control over their lives (2007: 
5).  For people of African descent, place is different.  They have “a different sense of place” 
which is determined by race and class (McKittrick 2006:x).  I apply the same analysis to my 
understanding of the Garifuna people’s social, economic, and political exclusion, particularly in 
Honduras but also in the United States.  
Wilson’s and McKittrick’s work explores the tensions that underscore black geographies 
and the convergence of race and place.  These tensions underpin the incessant struggle rooted in 
disempowerment and displacement of black people diasporically.  Wilson and McKittrick’s 
works are certainly important in my examination of the Garinagu because their works speak of 
the underlying oppression black people continue to experience.  We must consider geographical 
variations when theorizing or understanding black subjects’ lived experiences and 
disempowerment.  This is one significant contribution of my work.  It does not provide a general 
assessment of black people; it looks at a specific group relationally, meaning it examines local 
and global economic forces in relation to hegemonic spatial practices and draws a comparative 
analysis with similar groups in other regions.   
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Geographer Sharlene Mollett’s works (2005, 2010, and 2013) on racialized places and the 
Garinagu-Miskitos land struggle in the Departamento of Gracias a Dios in Honduras are 
important in situating my work because her usage of geographical concepts such as race and 
place position my understanding of the politics of race and place in Honduras.  Mollett illustrates 
this in her examination of contested places in Gracias a Dios in the Honduran Río Platano 
Biosphere Reserve and Mosquitia coast.  Underpinning Mollett’s argument is that the Garifuna-
Miskitos and colonos land conflict is the “longstanding state nationalist project of ‘whitening’ 
where racial imaginaries are encoded in environmental arrangements and ascendant conceptions 
of suitable and unsuitable land use practices” (2010:43).  Therefore, the land struggle of 
contemporary Garinagu and other indigenous groups in Honduras is not simply about “land and 
territory; rather such struggles seek to counter the idealization of whiteness as a racial and 
cultural project and the premise of mestizo citizenry” (Mollett 2013:1230 emphasis added).  
Drawing from ethnographic fieldwork and historical data and linking her findings to racial and 
post-colonial studies and political ecology, Mollett incorporates race into her analysis of political 
ecology since this theoretical frame “rarely addresses the significance of race in natural resources 
conflicts” (2006:78).  Also, through these theoretical frames, Mollett consistently looks at two 
social actors, the Garinagu and Miskitos, but also includes the Honduran government and local 
land invaders such as the ladino colono.  Mollett’s work also highlights place and identity in 
examining the Garinagu and Miskito discourses.  For both groups and other indigenous, place 
represents their heritage or “ancestral” land because they engage in subsistence economy 
(2013:231).  Mollett situates the Honduran government’s role in the Garinagu and other 
indigenous land struggle within the confines of the colonial racial construction, indigenous 
spatial marginalization in contemporary Honduran society, and the inability of state institutions 
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such as the National Agrarian Institute (Instituto Nacional Agrario, INA) to properly establish 
clear land ownership boundaries (2013:1231). 
While Mollett raises important points in her work, she, perhaps deliberately, excludes very 
crucial details that I believe must be included in examining the Garinagu’s land struggle.  She 
does not include how the laws implemented in the early 1990s impact the Garinagu land 
ownership in Honduras.  In addition, she does not take into account the expansion of the 
monoculture plantation and agribusiness controlled by the Honduran oligarch Miguel Facussé 
Bargum.  Instead, the underlying premise of her analysis is intraethnic conflict.  Indeed, there is 
an intraethnic element in the conflict.  However, in Honduras this must be situated within a 
broader process, meaning that the land conflict is widespread in Honduras, and it is attached to 
the global economy.  My work fills in this gap and contributes to existing scholarship because it 
re-evaluates the complexity of the Garinagu’s land struggle by linking it to the Garifuna middle 
class’s politics in the United States and in Honduras.  
I also situate my work within anthropologists Keri Vacanti Brondo’s and Sarah England’s 
studies.  Brondo’s recent work, Land Grab: Green Neoliberalism, Gender, and Garifuna 
Resistance in Honduras, provides a useful platform for my work.  Departing from a research 
question, “can ‘freedom,’ understood as well-being, be achieved under the structure of 
neoliberalism?,” Brondo seeks to “unearth the structural causes of inequalities, and the means by 
which power impinges on the abilities of some actors to shape the future of resources use and 
management” (2013:9).  Her targeted groups are mainly the Garinagu and “mestizo” women but 
also include what she refers to as “expats,” mainly Canadians (2013:9 emphasis added).  Brondo 
conducted her ethnographic fieldwork in various Garifuna communities in Honduras such as 
Sambo Creek, Rio Esteban, Cayos Cochinos, and several others.  Positioning the Garinagu’s land 
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struggle under the rubric of neoliberalism in shaping their access to and control over natural 
resources, Brondo examines the different forms of tourism and legislative framework established 
by the Honduran government in conjunction with multilateral lending institutions such as the 
World Bank and International Monetary Fund.   
To address the Honduran government’s legislative framework, Brondo discusses the 
political boundaries that redefine the Garifuna communities’ spatial boundaries.  Brondo points 
out that the municipality of Jutiapa asked Garinagu residing in the community of La Louba, 
meaning on the other side, to “pay taxes” since they were separated from Sambo Creek which 
falls under the political jurisdiction of La Ceiba’s municipality (2013:74).  Brondo estimates that 
“about 50 Garifuna individuals in nine houses live in La Louba, all descendants of an 86-year-
old Garifuna woman who inherited the land from her mother and now holds a private title” 
(2013:74).  According to Brondo’s findings, these are the families the municipality of Jutiapa is 
“asking” to pay taxes (2013:74).  Brondo traces the Garinagu’s land conflicts to the early 1970s 
when in the aftermath of Hurricane Fifi in 1974 “60 percent of Honduras' agricultural 
production, and the banana companies abandoned many more of their plantations” and landless 
peasants’ occupied “unused lands” (2013:36).  Because of these processes, “landless and jobless 
mestizo peasants” settled on the north coast (Brondo 2013:36).  As the number of landless and 
jobless peasants increased, the Garinagu began to legalize their land by the early 1980s as 
“individual private owners” (Brondo 2013:37).  Compounding these changes were a host of 
neoliberal legislative laws, which put the Garifuna leaders and communities under considerable 
pressure.  As a result, the Garinagu held marches in the country’s capital, Tegucigalpa.  
Brondo places her work within the feminist political ecology framework and she speaks of 
the Garinagu “matrilineal inheritance” and the Garinagu knowledge of place and space, although 
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she does not directly articulate these concepts (2013:76).  Citing the Latin American studies 
scholar Diana Deere, Brondo forwards the argument that women’s access to land positions them 
as contributors to food security, access to “credit and other services,” and empowers women in 
their household and relationships (2013:80).  While this may be the case for mulatas women 
under neoliberalism, what exists in the Garifuna society is a traditional gender division of labor 
where women work the land and men fish and hunt, although some women fish and men do 
work the land.  Growing up in a Garifuna community, I witnessed that women did not use 
working the land as a bargaining chip in their relationships.  This practice is commonly equated 
with Western societies.  The Garinagu’s land struggle is not linked to women’s dispossession 
from their land.  The dispossession impacts the whole community.   
Brondo’s work offers useful points in situating my work because it explores the laws 
established beginning in the 1970s and beyond which created the legal structure affecting the 
Garinagu.  However, there are several shortcomings in her analysis.  Brondo’s work does not 
directly examine the significance of place in the lives of the Garinagu.  In order words, she does 
not bring place to the forefront of her analysis.  In addition, she does not explore the Garifuna 
middle class’s politics.  My work tackles Brondo’s shortcomings in that it examines the 
production of place within hegemonic spatial practices.  
Contrary to Brondo, Sarah England’s 2006 work, Afro Central Americans in New York 
City: Garifuna Tales of Transnational Movements in Racialized Space, is also where I situate my 
work.  Using transnational migration and ethnic social movements as her theoretical framework, 
England bases her argument on “redefinitions of citizenship, human rights, and national 
belonging” (2006:xi).  Yet, England contends that the Honduran government and elites’ 
appropriation of the Garinagu’s land for agribusiness and other economic ventures undermined 
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the Garinagu’s citizenship, human rights, and national belonging.  Consequently, the Garinagu 
are “virtually landless, dependent on neighboring cities for employment in a poorly renumerated 
service sector and on remittances” from the United States (England 2006:4-5).  For England, the 
Honduran government’s economic activities ignited the Garinagu’s movement locally and 
abroad.  To situate the Garinagu’s social movements broadly, England’s analysis centers on 
“networks of relationship,” meaning family and community experiences within “larger structures 
of inequality in which they are embedded” and grassroots organizations “strategies and 
ideologies” (2006:6).  Using ethnographic fieldwork, England examines these networks of 
relationship by researching the Garinagu organizing in Limón, Honduras and in New York City 
(South Bronx, Harlem).  
Besides examining the Garinagu’s networks of relationship with respect to their grassroots 
mobilizing, England also speaks of changes of their identity that includes black, indigenous, 
Latino, and Garifuna.  England refers to identity spaces that the Garinagu straddle to be a “border 
zone” (2006:7).  She places her work within a “racialized and gendered global labor force” by 
examining the Garinagu migration patterns (2006:8).  Guiding her study is Arturo Escobar’s and 
Sonia E. Álvarez’s approach of a “new way of ‘doing politics’” in Latin America in which the 
mestizo male is no longer the one setting the rules of power change (2006:9 emphasis added).  
For England, this power shift seems to also include groups such as the Garinagu.  Escobar’s and 
Álvarez’s approach adheres to Foucault’s argument that “social movements are both economic 
struggles and struggles over meaning and representation” (2006:9).  On this ground, England’s 
main argument is that the Garinagu’s “collective identities and political strategies” are 
intrinsically connected to the ways the Garifuna “experience and envision their place in the 
individual division of labor” (2006:9).  At the heart of England’s work is the border zone which 
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conceptualizes a convergence of different identities and ideas (2006:7).  Space of convergence is 
thus occupied by the Latino(a), Garifuna, black, and Afro Latino(a).  For England, each of these 
factors is distinct, but they come together through international labor.  In essence, while her work 
is invaluable, England uses space metaphorically not physically.  Although England’s 
examination of networks of relationships is useful, my work takes this thought a bit further by 
looking at material practices within a global economy and the Garifuna middle class’s role in the 
landlessness of the Garinagu in Honduras.  
My work shows the centrality of place in understanding economic and political processes 
because tension is embedded in the appropriation and control over place as Harvey argues 
(1990:254).  In addition, my work offers a different approach in examining the Garinagu 
spatially and relationally.  This critical approach challenges existing literature that is most often 
supported by the idea of the Garifuna people as a unique culture in Central America.  My work 
problematizes such a perspective and situates the Garinagu not only as people of African descent 
in spaces of oppression and domination, but also as social actors. 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Research Design 
This research employs multi-sited critical ethnographic fieldwork and triangulated mixed-
methods comprised of cross-section and semi-structured interviews, collaborative ethnography, 
and participant observation.  Before entering discussion about the various methods use in this 
dissertation, I am first defining ethnography.  Geographers Kevin St. Martin and Marianna 
Pavlovskaya point out that ethnography is “the direct observation and documentation of some 
group or community, their practices and habits, and, primarily, aspects of their culture” 
(2009:370).  For professor of education and social research Martyn Hammersley and sociologist 
Paul Atkinson, ethnography is another method within the social sciences with multiple meanings 
which include “‘qualitative inquiry,’ fieldwork,’ ‘interpretive method,’” (2007:2).  Martin and 
Pavlovskaya explain that although ethnography is embedded with anthropology, as positivism 
waned in the 1970s, ethnography emerged as central to cultural geography and its “critical 
response to positivist and structural forms of explanation” (2009:370).  As I pointed out in 
chapter two, critical scholars trace their reaction to positivism to inspirations they drew from the 
tradition of Marxism, non-European scholars’ rebellions, and a host of national and international 
movements taking place during that period.  It is from these processes that critical geographies 
evolved.  
Geographer Gillian Hart states that critical ethnographies “offer vantage points for 
generating new understandings by illuminating power-laden processes of constitution, 
connection, and dis-connection, along with slippages, openings, and contradictions, and 
possibilities for alliance within and across different spatial scales” (2006:982).  Hart’s usage of 
spatial scales is connected to sociologist Michael Burawoy’s analysis of “global ethnography” 
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(Hart 2004:5).  Contrary to Hart, for communication scholar D. Soyini Madison, critical 
ethnography is an “interpretive or analytical method” (2005:12).  Critical ethnography is all of 
the above because it offers a basis for challenging conventional scientific practices and 
identifying injustices and social conditions that influence struggles.  This method is thus 
appropriate in explaining the political and economic forces both domestic and global which are 
producing a new place on Honduras’ north coast and fragmenting the Garinagu’s lives in so 
many different ways.  Critical ethnography aligns with my research because it helps to explain 
the relation between “structure, agency and geographic context” (Herbert 2000:550).  I use 
critical ethnography in this dissertation as a way of challenging representations made by the 
European colonizers, Honduran elites, and some scholars of the Garinagu and examining 
national and global political and economic forces and their impact on the Garifuna communities.  
Collaborative ethnography is another method used in my research.  I view this method to 
be an extension of what anthropologist Charles R. Hale defines as “activist scholarship” also 
known as “action research,” “participatory action research,” “grounded theory,” “public 
intellectual work,” and “engaged research” (2008:3).  According to Hale, activist scholarship 
methods “embody a politics, which the authors affirm and critically explore; this affirmation, in 
turn, far from an admission of ‘political bias,’ is a step toward deeper reflection on the 
entanglement of researcher and subject and, by extension, toward greater methodological rigor” 
(2008:8).  Collaborative ethnography allows researchers to engage in political practices 
developed within a specific group and in the “production of ethnographic text” (Hale 2008:3; see 
also Lassiter 2005:83; see also Rappaport 2008:2).  I strive for this methodological rigor.  
Although scholars have used collaborative ethnography since the early nineteenth century, its 
growing appeal in the last few years has been to engage researchers in a more productive and 
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progressive dialogues with the oppressed communities (Lassiter 2004:2).  Anthropologist Joanne 
Rappaport suggests that collaborative ethnography should serve as a constructive “alternative 
research” (2008:2) tool outside of the academic milieu because it departs from traditional 
approaches and it engages in “‘political culture’ carved out of the background of cultural domain 
within a given society” (Escobar 1992:405; see also Touraine 1992:127).  Like any other 
method, collaborative ethnography has its downsides.  “Intimate” relationships forged between 
researchers and the interlocutors can be productive, but they can also generate friction (Lassiter 
2005:115).  Indeed, at times using collaborative ethnography could become somewhat awkward 
for distrust could arise between interlocutors and the researcher.   
To illustrate a case of distrust, some interlocutors revealed to me weeks after interviewing 
them that they had withheld information from me because they realized that they could write 
their own book.  Several interlocutors did not speak English preventing me from providing them 
with dissertation chapters to read.  I suspect that if they had read some of the chapters, they 
would have provided their own particular input about their relationship and perception with and 
of place (Shurmer-Smith 2002:126).  In other words, because the interlocutors uphold different 
perspectives of places and spaces, their input can greatly enhance the narrative written by the 
writer.  The second reason for considering their input is to show that “knowledge and power” in 
the construction of “meanings of words and images” are not a researcher’s exclusive domain 
(Shurmer-Smith 2002:128).  The interlocutors maintain certain interpretations about the 
meanings of words and images.  Other Garinagu, however, appreciated the fact that I reminded 
them of some details about the Bicentennial commemoration of the Garinagu’s ancestors’ arrival 
to Honduras held in Washington, D.C. in 1997.      
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In addition to collaborative ethnography, I used multi-sited ethnography because 
ethnographies are not “local” or “global” activities (Hart 2006:982).  They are representations of 
human mobility.  Researchers using this approach follow biography, migration, and Diasporas.  
Multi-sited ethnography is far from being a complete representation of people and places.  
Instead, anthropologist George Marcus proposes, “any ethnography of a cultural formation in the 
world system is also ethnography of the system” (1998:83).  Consequently, we cannot apprehend 
it “only” as single-sited ethnography.  Rather, we should understand it as a spatial linkage.  
Positioning the Garinagu within the global economies, the reproduction of place, and the 
introduction of a new social relation explain this spatial linkage because place is an integral force 
and a significant feature in how this process affects social relations of a society.  Multi-sited 
ethnography applies to my work because it looks at geographical processes.  For example, the 
Garinagu in East New Orleans experience significant spatial barriers than their counterparts in 
the Bronx.  One contributing factor to these spatial barriers is the availability of good public 
transportation in New York City.  Access to public transportation allows the Garinagu to attend a 
host of activities including meetings.  In addition, they can connect with many grassroots 
organizations.  Second, New York City’s economy offers more opportunities in comparison to 
New Orleans.  Most Garinagu I met in New Orleans work in the service industries (e.g. hotels or 
motels).  Others work in primary industries (e.g. oil extraction).  In New York City, a large 
number of Garinagu work in building maintenance, media, as public servants, in financial 
institutions, and nonprofit organizations.  
I experienced some setbacks with multi-sited ethnography; I did not spend sufficient time 
in a place to connect or reconnect with the Garifuna community.  Instead, I saw myself simply as 
a bill collector, meaning just spending enough time to collect the data and then leave.  In this 
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sense, I over-stretched myself.  Consequently, I made the Bronx, New York the central site and 
East New Orleans, Louisiana and Houston, Texas peripheral sites.  I moved out of the Bronx in 
2004 to pursue my Master’s degree in Connecticut and from there I moved to Baton Rouge in 
2007.  Although I would periodically visit the Bronx while residing in Connecticut, and I 
embarked in fieldwork research in Honduras for two months in 2006, I realized during my 
ethnographic fieldwork in 2009 and 2010 in the Bronx that the Garifuna community has changed 
demographically, socially, politically, and economically.  These changes posed a challenge since 
even people I knew before shied away from me, although being away from a number of years 
does not, in my view, warrant rejection.  East New Orleans, on the other hand, was the only 
place where I spent more time because of its geographical proximity to Baton Rouge and 
relatively sustained activities regarding the land struggle on Honduras’ north coast.  
Despite recent debates about multi-sited ethnography, anthropologists Simon Coleman and 
Pauline von Hellermann still believe on its “salience” (2011:2).  Sociologist Pablo Lapegna, 
however, takes issue with multi-sited ethnography.  Juxtaposing multi-sited ethnography and 
what he refers to as global ethnography, Lapegna argues that one of the key aspects of the 
“’broader context’ of an ethnographic research is the use of ethno-history, a strategy at odds with 
the MSE [multi-sited ethnography] perspective” (2009:11).  Citing Marcus, Lapegna states that 
Marcus “takes issue with historical-ethnographic explanations because they ‘. . . are not 
produced or given within the frame of ethnographic work itself but by the contextualizing 
discourses in which the ethnography comes to be embedded’” (2009:11).  Although multi-sited 
ethnography lacks historical explanations as Lapegna contends, I still find it a useful tool with 
minor imperfections.   
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For data collection, I used triangulated mixed-methods, which employs a combination of 
“several data-collection techniques (typically interviews, observation, and documentary 
evidence) to investigate the same question” (Blee & Taylor 2002:111).  Agreeing with Norman 
K. Denzin, Katheleen M. Blee and Verta Taylor note that triangulation “increases the amount of 
detail about a topic . . .” (2002:111).  I used cross-section and semi-structured interviewing, oral 
and life histories, telephone interviews, and participant observation.  Semi-structured 
interviewing has been successfully used as a significant tool in providing greater breadth and 
depth of information in understanding “mobilization” (Blee & Taylor 2002:92).  Through its 
usage, researchers can gain access to the groups’ “motivations and perspectives” as well as 
“meaning” and “identities” - that is, changes and self-perception (Blee & Taylor 2002: 92).  
Semi-structured interviews also ensure that “human agency” assumes center stage in the 
examination of a group because it allows researchers to gain insight into the activists’ quotidian 
lives (Blee & Taylor 2002:92-93).  Contrary to quantitative fieldwork, in semi-structured 
interviewing “analysis and interpretation are ongoing processes” because it demands that 
researchers begin “analyzing data as it is being collected” (Blee & Taylor 2002:110).  Another 
aspect in analyzing semi-structured interviews is that researchers try to “clarify concepts and 
categories through successive, alternating waves of data collection and interpretation” (Blee & 
Taylor 2002:110).  I incorporate the same approach into oral history analysis.  
As a subtype of semi-structured interviews, oral histories function as a “technique of 
bridging, seeking to understand social contexts through stories of individual experiences and to 
comprehend experiences of the past through stories told in the present” (Blee & Taylor 2002: 
102).  In other words, oral histories are “personal windows on struggles” revealing what archival 
sources may not reveal (Blee & Taylor 2002:103; Brodkin 2007:54).  This is an appropriate 
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method for examining the Garinagu’s political and cultural practices because their oral histories 
are openings through which to scrutinize some of the root causes of their struggles.  Life 
histories, on the other hand, are “oriented toward understanding the activist experiences of 
individual respondents over time” (Blee & Taylor 2002:103).  Thus, the combination of oral and 
life history narratives provide insight into the Garinagu’s ideological and political practices.    
In this research, I also engaged in participant observation, which allowed me to observe 
what is happening at a specific place and time.  I conducted participant observation by attending 
regular meetings and social gatherings.  Using field notes, I recorded my observations and wrote 
questions about them.  I also noted ideas about my research while in the field.  These notes 
provide “accounts of people, places, interactions, and events” experienced as a participant-
observer (Lichterman 2002:121).  I achieved this by examining settings where the Garinagu held 
their events, how they dressed, what they ate, the music they listened to, and what they said and 
how they said it. To take field notes requires the participant-observer to be informed about a 
“theme” or “concept” (Lichterman 2002:127).  For example, before attending a meeting, I called 
or e-mailed the organizer(s) in advance to find out what agenda items they will discuss during 
the meeting.  Once researchers record themes, concepts, theories, and expectations, they must 
elaborate on their “experiences during the first contacts with a field site” (Lichterman 2002:127).  
This process helps to identify key people and relationships.  Participant observation is well-
regarded by sociologists because: (1) it “produces rich descriptive accounts of everyday life;” 
and (2) it is “the prime method for building on the edifice of interactionist sociology” 
(Lichterman 2002:121).  To facilitate the coding and analysis process, participant-observers must 
have a clear idea before going to the field of what they are observing and through what lens are 
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they are observing it.  The same analytical method that can be used for semi-structured 
interviewing may also be used for participant observation.  
Another method used in my research was gathering archival material at the Howard-Tilton 
Memorial Library at Tulane University in New Orleans, which houses a collection of banana 
plantation owners’ records from Honduras.  Although the archival information did not yield 
useful material on the Garifuna people’s land ownership, it introduced me to the spatial relation 
between Honduran politicians and elites and plantation owners in New Orleans.  Information 
obtained also addresses workers’ demand for higher wages.  However, I secured some relevant 
information from my interlocutors, although in some cases they did not provide concrete 
historical information.  My longtime membership in a Garifuna internet listserv also helped me 
to stay informed on a range of land related-developments in Honduras.  
Using a voice recorder, I conducted twenty-seven interviews between 2009 and 2013.  In a 
spreadsheet, I created a participant profile, which includes the interlocutors’ name (pseudonym), 
location of interview, age, gender, place of birth, place of residence, education, occupation, and 
proficiency to speak Garifuna.  Out of the twenty-seven interlocutors interviewed ranging in age 
from their early twenties to mid-seventies, ten were females and seventeen males.  Four 
interlocutors were between the ages of 20 and 29, six between the ages of 30 and 39, seven 
between the ages of 40 and 49, five between the ages of 50 and 59, three between the ages of 60 
and 69, and two between the ages of 70 and 79.  Educationally, eleven are college graduates, 
three of which are females and eight males.  Out of seven with some college credits, three are 
males and four with some trade that include females.  In terms of place of birth, nineteen were 
born in rural Honduras and eight in urban settings in Honduras.  As for place of residence, 
twenty-four reside in the United States and three reside in Honduras.  Information on their place 
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of residence assisted me in assessing their political, cultural, and economic practices.  
Linguistically, twenty-one interlocutors speak Garifuna fluently while the remaining had some 
understanding.  The older population demonstrated more interest on discussing language and 
land, which they associate with preserving the Garifuna culture.  Some graduates from Cuba’s 
Latin American School of Medicine (Escuela Latinoamericana de Medicina, ELAM) showed 
significant interest on the language and linked it to the preservation of the Garifuna’s culture and 
their territory on Honduras’ north coast.  Some people in their mid to late forties residing in the 
United States and actively involved in the land struggle envision starting a commercial business 
endeavor (e.g. aquaculture) when they return to Honduras.  
With the exception of the Garinagu who came from Limón, Honduras that I interviewed in 
East New Orleans, most interlocutors came from different communities in Honduras.  Most were 
born in Garifuna communities whereas one-third grew up in middle class families in major 
Honduran cities such as La Ceiba and Puerto Cortés.  Out of the twenty-seven interviews, I 
conducted four by telephone.  Among those interlocutors, two resided in Florida, one in the 
Bronx, one in Honduras, and one was visiting the United States.  The remaining interviews were 
face-to-face.  In the Bronx, I completed eleven personal interviews, which mostly took place at 
Casa Yurumein community center, where most Garinagu converge.  In East New Orleans, I 
interviewed four persons in private homes.  In Houston, I interviewed six people, two in a 
restaurant and the remainder in private residences.  In Seattle, Washington, I conducted an 
interview at an interlocutor’s apartment.  Conducted mostly in Spanish with a few in English and 
Garifuna, interviews lasted an average of two hours.  I secured over 90 percent of my interviews 
through gatekeepers.  However, I also secured interviews at social gatherings.  Each interlocutor 
signed either a Spanish or English agreement.  I translated and transcribed information compiled 
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from Spanish and Garifuna or both into English.  Because some of the interviews did not yield 
useful information, I transcribed only twenty interviews.  I listened to the interviews that I did 
not transcribe to ensure I did not exclude useful information.  Once I transcribed the interviews, I 
edited them to ensure that there were not any grammatical errors or misspelling and provided a 
copy to each interlocutor who requested to receive one.  I never received comments or feedback 
from any interlocutor on any transcript. 
Next, I coded and logged the interviews to identify themes or similarities in the 
collaborators’ answers and to extract the most relevant information.  The coding process is about 
“creating a point of view or statement” and organizing passages in interviews descriptively 
which help organize a researcher’s analysis (Madison 2005:37).  Some of the key themes I coded 
were identity, land struggle strategy, race and racism, gender, political perspectives, place, 
cultural practices, and capitalism.  I selected these themes based on the content of the 
interlocutors’ narratives.  Because my interlocutors both travel to and have families in Honduras 
and state-sponsored violence against Garinagu in Honduras is a common occurrence, I assigned 
each interlocutor a pseudonym.  The only time their real name is disclosed is when I received 
documents or videos circulated on the Garifunalink internet listserv or found the same 
information on the internet or YouTube.  Otherwise, I ensured that their identity, rights, and 
safety of all interlocutors are fully protected in keeping with Louisiana State University’s 
Institutional Review Board research guidelines.   
During the initial preparation, I designated Honduras as my fieldwork site.  Due to the 
country’s 2009 coup d’état, I decided that it would be a perilous undertaking for a Garifuna 
woman to conduct research on the land struggle in Honduras.  Hence, I switched my fieldwork 
site to the Bronx in New York City, Los Angeles, California, and New Orleans, Louisiana.  In 
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view that no one from Los Angeles responded to my request for interviews, I proceeded to carry 
out my fieldwork in the Bronx, East New Orleans, and Houston, Texas.  Because I had lived in 
the Bronx since my early teens, I am familiar with its geography, was active in some Garifuna 
cultural organizations, and was able to make contacts in the larger Garifuna community.  My 
work in New York City centered on the South Bronx.  I chose East New Orleans and Houston 
because of their geographic proximity to Baton Rouge, and I learned that land organizing efforts 
were active in each city.  I spent a little over a week in Houston, in part, because most of my 
contacts there were not interested in talking about the land struggle in Honduras or had a 
different reason for not wanting to talk which I may never know.  Instead, what I found out in 
Houston was that there is a growing Garifuna evangelistic community in the Fifth Ward.  These 
evangelists are members of the Liguilisi Garifuna Lugudemehabu Bungiu (Christian Garifuna 
Mercy of God Church) founded by its pastor, Braulio Valerio.  
Pastor Valerio allowed me to speak about my research to his congregation.  At the end of 
the mass, I spoke with Pastor Valerio about granting me an interview.  Instead, he provided me 
with a Garifuna children’s book written in Garifuna.  Another person I interviewed was trying to 
organize the Garinagu in Houston around the land struggle in Honduras.  However, throughout 
the interview, he was busy showing me pictures taken with Panamanian born and former 
Honduran President Ricardo Rodolfo Maduro Joest (2002-2006) rather than talking about 
organizing and mobilizing.  The only individual who granted me a useful interview is involved in 
gaining ownership of his family land in La Ceiba to build luxury hotels.  The remaining 
interlocutors’ information was not useful.  Although I secured many useful interviews in the 
Bronx, similar to Houston, in the Bronx, a growing conservative religious Garifuna group is not 
interested in land and the land struggle in Honduras.  At Saint Augustine Church in the 
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Morrisania neighborhood in the South Bronx, the Catholic Garifuna congregation granted me 
five minutes to talk about my project.  After speaking, their mestizo Colombian priest wished me 
good luck and focused on his Adam and Eve sermon.  No one ever granted me an interview.  
Instead, one of the leading “sisters,” shared with me that they were exploring ways of having 
their congregation, which conducts masses in Garifuna and Spanish, to be recognized by the 
Pope (field notes, June 6, 2010).  I share this information for two reasons.  First, it is intended to 
show geographical variations in different sites where I conducted my research.  Second, the 
Garifuna people’s cultural practices have been spatially transformed.  
Theoretical Issues 
In this project, I examine the concepts of positionality and situated knowledge to 
contextualize how scholarship produced by many anthropologists has informed the Garinagu’s 
self-perception and representation and how these scholars’ findings have empowered them.  For 
example, most Garinagu decry their ancestor’s first point of departure: Africa because their 
frame of reference has been informed by narratives the European colonizers produced and most 
western scholars follow.  As for scholars empowering themselves, what I refer to is the 
commodification and production of knowledge or what geographer James Sidaway defines as 
“academic competition and marketization” which centers on their “whiteness, maleness . . . [and] 
class affiliations” (2000:260-1).  My examinations of various sources such as Audrey Kobayashi 
(1994), geographers Kim V. L. England (1994), Gillian Hart (2001), Andy Merrifield (1995), 
Gillian Rose (1997), and feminist theorist and philosopher of science and technology Donna 
Haraway (1988), reveal that positionality is embedded in ideology and power, meaning it shapes 
how scholars see the Other and how they maintain power over the production of knowledge and 
the representation of the subjects they study.  
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Critical feminist scholars in the field of geography have deconstructed positionality by 
examining the politics of hierarchy within the discipline.  Kobayashi calls for dismantling “the 
guardians of the discipline” (1994:73), meaning white male patriarchy or “disrupting the 
‘whiteness’ of fieldwork in geography” (Abbott 2006).  In so doing, Kobayashi contends that 
marginalized voices would be “erasing the circle, and redefining scholarly endeavors, as a means 
not only of interpreting, but also of affecting social change” (Kobayashi 1994:74).  One of the 
preferred consequences of Abbott and Kobayashi’s assertions would be to incorporate critical 
curriculum into ethnographic courses before students go into the field.  In addition, faculty and 
administrators in the field of geography and social science, in general, must reflect the needs of 
the population that they serve and research.  A balance between scholars and subjects would 
avoid what Abbot and Kobayashi criticize.  In creating a balance, it would minimize the colonial 
gaze the Garinagu have been subjected to. 
Non-European scholars, such as bell hooks, Audre Lorde, Gayatri Spivak, and others, have 
put middle class white women’s power on trial as well because some members of this group, in a 
way that is similar to their white male counterparts, has come to be the designated voice of the 
oppressed.  White female researchers have become the privileged interpreter or cultural 
overseers of the Other despite the fact that women occupy a marginal position in the social 
hierarchy.  This does not mean that some white male and female geographers have not produced 
“exceptional work,” but more diverse geographers, chiefly non-Europeans, are needed to 
“enhance our disciplinary discourse on race in several ways” (Pulido 2002:45).  Kobayashi states 
that non-European women works have kept sexism and racism under “a critical ‘gaze,’” 
“enriched our theoretical agenda,” and have transformed our “ethnography fieldwork practices 
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by challenging positionality and relationship with the community research” (1994:74).  Hooks’ 
extensive work among other scholars featured in this project speaks of the critical gaze.   
In deconstructing the significance of cultural criticism in African Americans’ life, hooks 
states that it has generally operated as a “force promoting critical resistance, one that enabled 
black folks to cultivate in everyday life a practice of critique and analysis that would disrupt and 
even deconstruct those cultural productions that were designed to promote and reinforce 
domination” (1990:3).  For example, hooks states that although black people watched serial 
dramas or humorous programs on televisions in the past that did not represent them, they still 
enjoyed viewing these programs while concurrently critiquing them.  Most Garinagu grow up 
watching Mexican or Venezuelan soap operas, serial dramas that enforce the dominant culture 
practices and degrade black people since black people always play the role of servants and 
minstrel characters.  However, the Garifuna people in Honduras and in the United States, similar 
to many Spanish speaking viewers, remain a loyal audience.  In fact, an elder Garifuna woman in 
Houston, Texas informed me not to come to her apartment to interview her during certain time 
because it interferes with her favorite soap opera schedule.  I grew up watching soap operas and I 
do not remember any member of my family critiquing the depiction or absence of black people 
from these programs.  Instead, my family concerned itself with discussing betrayals, the elites’ 
cultural practices, religion, and other elements that define Spanish speaking soap operas.  Hooks’ 
work is thus vital in my assessment of the Garifuna people, particularly in my assessment of race 
and their politics. 
In addition to enhancing the field of geography’s racial discourse, hooks declares that anti-
racist white scholars “understand the need, at least intellectually, to alter their thinking.  Central 
to this process of unlearning white supremacist attitudes and values is the deconstruction of the 
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category ‘whiteness’” (1992:12).  These attitudes and values are entrenched in safeguarding the 
patriarchal system.  Hooks states that although men have created the patriarchal system, in the 
end the relationship between men and women is not about oppressor (men) and women (victims) 
because even the most oppressed women “exercise some power” (1984:90).  The oppressor and 
victim binaries prevent women from creating “different value systems” (hooks 1984:86).  In 
creating different values, women must counter prevailing thoughts that “women are different 
from men; think and act differently; conceptualize power differently; and therefore have an 
inherently different value system” (hooks 1984:86).  To counter these prevailing thoughts, we 
must include a critical understanding of how people have been taught to socialize, cultural 
practices, and values learned, particularly in a capitalist system.  These factors remain integral in 
shaping an individual or a group frame of reference, which in turn informs their worldviews.   
Despite what hooks and other scholars assert about white supremacy and the patriarchal 
system, there is an underlying assumption in the field of geography that the field is “neutral” and 
that research can be conducted through a homogenized approach while disassociating the 
“practice from its historical role in imperialism” (Abbott 2006:326).  Many middle class white 
women, also marginalized in their respective fields, carry their whiteness into the fieldwork.  
Some scholars describe anthropologist Nancie González as the “leading Garifuna ethnohistorian” 
(Brondo 2013:20) or “the most prominent ethnographer” (Euraque 1998:156).  Although 
González has certainly generated considerable work about the Garifuna people, it does not mean 
that scholars must not scrutinize her work.  For instance, no one has put González’s definition of 
the Garifuna people’s ethnogenesis as “esoteric,” “foreign,” “obscure” (González 1988:xii).  No 
one has questioned her 1975 conversation with biology anthropologist, Michael H.  Crawford 
who states that González was “interested” in anthropological genetic studies of Garinagu 
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fertility, diet, mating, skin color, molecular system, and education (1984:viii).  I cite one sample 
of such work carried out by anthropologists Pamela J. Byard, Francis C. Lees, John H. 
Relethford.  Using “any number of biological characters (morphology, dentition, serology, etc.),” 
in 1976, Byard, Lees, and Relethford sought to answer the first question which concerned the 
“physical distinctiveness of the Garifuna relation to neighboring groups of African extraction, 
known locally as Creoles [in Belize]” (1984:149).  Byard, Lees, and Relethford are basing their 
research on González’s 1969 findings.  González states,  
In physical appearance the Carib differs little, if any, from other Negroid 
peoples in the area.  Most non-Caribs who have lived in the area for any length 
of time insist that they can distinguish Caribs merely by looking at them.  
Some claim that the Carib is slightly lighter in color, that he has higher check 
bones, that he is somewhat shorter and stockier than the Negro. (1969:25)  
 
Byard, Lees, and Relethford second “concern” focuses on “skin color variability within the 
population, due to sex, age, and local difference” whereas their third concern is to “estimate the 
admixture proportions of various ancestral groups to the present-day Garifuna based on skin 
color measurements . . .” (1984:149-150).  Byard and her cohorts similar to González “carry with 
them the marks of their own histories and cultures” in their representation and imagining the 
Other (Haraway 1989:2).  Their representation and imagining of the Other suggest that they did 
not concern their study with understanding cultural differences, but instead their concern was 
with maintaining the colonial gaze. 
For Madison, ethnographers must assess their “positionality” by engaging in self-
evaluation and recognizing their “own power, privilege, and biases just as [they denounce] the 
power structures that surround [their] subjects” (2005:6-7).  Donna Haraway’s analysis is 
certainly important in exploring positionality and the production of knowledge because she 
focuses on researchers’ vision in what she refers to as visual metaphors characterizing their 
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knowledge.  It is this visual metaphor Haraway defines as “persistence vision” or the narrow 
perceptions that some Western researchers have of oppressed peoples as a result of being 
influenced by the dominant ideologies of race and patriarchy (1988:581).  This persistence of 
vision emphasizes that a self-reflective consideration of race and the impacts of racism must be 
applied when studying the Other or oppressed communities.   
For Haraway, “The eyes have been used to signify a perverse capacity-honed to perfection 
in the history of science tied to militarism, capitalism, colonialism, and male supremacy-to 
distance the knowing subject from everybody and everything in the interests of unfettered 
power” (1988:581).  Her rationale for making this declaration is that the subjugated people are 
not exempt from the colonial gaze since they are not in position to refute scientific inquiry.  On 
the contrary, they welcome it because  
they are knowledgeable of modes of denial through repression, forgetting, and 
disappearing acts-ways of being nowhere while claiming to see 
comprehensively.  The subjugated have a decent chance to be on to the god 
trick and all its dazzling-and, therefore, blinding-illuminations.  ‘Subjugated’ 
standpoints are preferred because they seem to promise more adequate, 
sustained, objective, transforming accounts of the world.  But how to see from 
below is a problem requiring at least as much skill with bodies and language, 
with the mediations of vision, as the ‘highest' techno scientific visualizations. 
(1988:584) 
 
The Garinagu continued to be placed under this “direct, devouring, generative, and unrestrictive 
vision . . .” that Haraway speaks of, making their so-called exoticism a career maker for many 
scholars (1988: 582).  Many white middle class’s access to the Garinagu and other cultures is a 
result of European colonialism and many have in turn kept the colonial gaze and practices.  
White women, Haraway contends, adopted some of the practices and values of the 
patriarchal society in terms of how they view the Other both in and outside the field (1988:586).  
Science is therefore a “contestable text and a power field; the content is the form” (Haraway 
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1988:577).  I return to Nancie González’s work to illustrate what Haraway points out in which 
González betrays her obvious Eurocentric views in denigrating statements such as: 
today, my Carib/Garifuna friends often ask me, ‘Why are you doing this?’ 
They find it strange that an American white woman of English descent should 
devote so much of her life to studying an obscure, relatively small, foreign 
black population with an unwritten language (at least until the 1960s) and an 
esoteric religious system. (1988:xii)  
 
Is this what her alleged friends really think of González or what she actually thinks of her 
friends?  For González, researching the Garinagu to develop a deeper understanding of their 
culture seems to have less importance than reflecting and challenging her Eurocentrism and 
whiteness.  It is about what she construes to be a position of power afforded by her intellectual 
faculties.  Clearly by the choice of her words, González seems to forget that the Garinagu, 
similar to many colonized groups, behave as whites want them to behave: adoring the master and 
hating themselves.  González’s words as a white academic researching a historically oppressed 
black people shows how cultural hegemony is preserved.  Drawing from Haraway’s analysis, 
González’s statement represents the “persistence of vision” or the narrow perceptions some 
Western researchers have of the Other as a result of being influenced by dominant ideologies of 
race and patriarchy (1988:581).  This persistent vision emphasizes that a self-reflective 
consideration of race and the impacts of racism must be applied when studying the Other or 
oppressed communities.  
As for what González’s friends think of her, I can only say that she fails to acknowledge 
the devastating impacts European colonialism and slavery had on the Garinagu.  To challenge 
the colonial gaze, it is helpful to follow bell hooks who urges to look into the representation of 
“whiteness in the black imagination” (1992:170).  To do so hooks suggests that blacks “appeal to 
memory;” in other words, blacks and other colonized people must return to the historical 
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processes that created them as the Other, that shaped their experiences, and that informs their 
lives today (1992:170).  Several Garinagu I have encountered articulate whiteness in the black 
imagination when they assert their desire not to be objects of study or subjected to the European 
gaze.  However, because of colonialism and slavery, others feel empowered by the incessant 
attention they receive from white scholars (Haraway 1988:584). 
The convergence of race, class, and gender as illustrated with González’s statements that 
shapes her frame of reference speak of “fieldwork experiences and most importantly the 
production of knowledge” (Sundberg 2003:186).  Scholars must continue to speak out against the 
politics of the fieldwork because in geographer and feminist scholar Juanita Sundberg’s view it 
creates the “conditions so crucial to masculinist forms of objectivity: namely, distance, 
disinterest, and disembodiment” (Sundberg 2003:186-188).  Overcoming and exposing power 
relations in any fieldwork, requires that researchers remember that their “subject position is 
constituted in spaces of betweenness or a position that is neither inside nor outside” (Katz 
1994:72).  Geographers Lynn A. Staeheli and Victoria A. Lawson state that feminist fieldwork 
has been important because it is concerned with “relations and processes” that have “opened up 
gender relations and patriarchies as crucial structural forces in society” (1994:97).  This is why I 
couched my project in a principle of pedagogy that includes “an engagement in theory, fieldwork 
methodology, and ethics” that has “the potential to foster the production of academic knowledge 
that is aware of and reflexive about its own assumptions, questions, and categories and therefore 
more responsible for its biases” (Sundberg 2003:187).  
Field Experience 
I faced significant barriers during my ethnographic fieldwork.  The first was gender.  Out 
of twenty-seven Garinagu I interviewed, seventeen were men some of whom were leaders of an 
60 
 
organization.  Some of these men referred to me as “young lady” not as a researcher and another 
interviewed me first before I could interview him.  Another one was more concerned with his 
personal feelings for me rather than granting me an interview.  However, the most contemptible 
interview was interviewing an interlocutor while he massaged his genitals.  Undaunted by his 
activities, I looked at him directly into his eyes throughout the duration of part one of the 
interview which lasted for an hour and an half.  For part two of the interview, I brought my 
husband who noticed this man’s fixation with his genitals.  I am sure that my experience is far 
from unique.  Geographer and feminist Cindi Katz states that an ethnographer goes into the field 
as a “kind of ‘stranger’” (1994:68).  Indeed, I was because I met Garinagu I have never met 
before.  However, I went into the fieldwork secure in my conviction that my prior involvement 
with the Garifuna social organizations in the Bronx prepared me for the misogynism and 
patriarchal hegemony found in the Garifuna society as is the case in other societies.  
As I reflected on the collaborator’s preoccupation with his genitals, I carried out the 
interview because it took place outside of his house in broad daylight and I wanted to show that 
his activities did not intimidate me.  Yet, he wanted to continue to define my position and role.  
While attending a meeting, without any prior consultation, he assigned me to read his 
organization’s constitution.  Although I had spoken with him as the president of the group about 
my role, he consistently challenged my position (field notes, August 1, 2010).  This 
collaborator’s actions signal that my body was out of place and it needed to be returned to its 
proper place.  His behavior underscores “masculinit[y] in action” (Hyndman 2001:262).  
Reflecting on geographer and professor of gender studies Linda McDowell’s observation, Kim 
V. L. England states that because women “may be perceived by men . . . as ‘unthreatening or not 
‘official,’ confidential documents [are] often made accessible, or difficult issues broached 
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relatively freely” (1994:85).  This may be the case, but what about challenging the patriarchal 
system.  How does a female researcher (whether beginner or seasoned) defies the patriarchal 
system?  
The second barrier I faced in the field was race.  While attending a tribute to the Garifuna 
songwriter and singer Marcelino Fernandez, also known as Don Marasa, in the South Bronx, a 
white male journalist writing about the number of languages spoken in New York City 
approached me.  He asked me if I was Garifuna and if I spoke Garifuna to which I replied “yes.” 
He proceeded to treat me as an interviewee, but I informed him that I was researching the 
Garinagu.  After learning about my status, his questions about my research went from general to 
personal.  Realizing that he was dealing with an uncooperative subject, he approached a Garifuna 
male who I knew and who only several minutes earlier declined my request to interview him.  
However, standing behind me, the white journalist and the Garifuna man talked for nearly an 
hour as if they were old friends (field notes, May 29, 2010).  Since they were standing directly 
behind me, I heard their conversation.  Listening to the journalist introducing himself and his 
work indicated to me that they did not know each other.  I also understood the difficulties I face 
as a black woman researching a black group that continues to be gazed namely by middle class 
white scholars and journalists’ unrestrictive vision.  Thus, non-Europeans but mostly black 
women in particular certainly encounter barriers to gain access to spaces that considered 
normally exclusive for European scholars or Garifuna men. 
The last barrier I faced in the field was the insider/outsider binary and positionality.  Before 
embarking in ethnographic fieldwork, I understood that ethnographic fieldwork is firmly 
grounded in an “empirical methodology that is devoted to the analysis of research data acquired 
by means of first-hand interactions with members of a local community over a substantial period 
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of time” (Mullings 1999:337).  Despite understanding what Beverly Mullings is saying, I began 
struggling with the insider/outsider binary and positionality that accompanied these interactions.  
I felt that these concepts overlap because in the final analysis I was dealing with positionality.  
For instance, as an insider/outsider, do I racialize or culturalize my relationship with my 
interlocutors?  Sociologist and race and gender theorist France Winddance Twine suggests that 
being an insider can generate problems because “insiders are expected to conform to cultural 
norms that can restrict them as researchers” (2002:12).  As a black insider/outsider, on the other 
hand, Twine suggests that it can be advantageous because it reveals “different – not better – 
kinds of knowledge” (2000:13).  However, she warns that racializing researchers assume that 
“racial subordinates have a particular worldview” because they understand the subalterns 
oppression (Twine 2000:14).  Twine believes that this is not the case.  Citing race critic and 
gender scholar Philomena Essed, Twine declares, “people have ‘multiple identifications’” 
(2000:15).  Thus, it is not race that determines good or bad research.  For Twine, prevailing 
dominant ideologies and racialization limit researchers.  She also asserts that researchers’ class 
privilege, which includes education, can mitigate the assumption of “insider” or subaltern status. 
To illustrate prevailing ideology concerning race, I cite two examples.  In assessing the 
Garinagu’s identity in the United States, anthropologist Sarah England states, 
if he [Don Miguel – one of her collaborators] is walking and talking with 
someone else from his natal village, however, a passerby might believe that he 
is from Africa.  This is because he will most likely be speaking in Garifuna, the 
language that was created by his ancestors over 400 years ago on the island of 
St. Vincent when African maroons mixed with Island Carib to form the ethnic 
group to which don Miguel belongs: the Garifuna (also known as the Black 
Carib). (2006:1) 
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Is this what a pedestrian would think or what England thinks?  And is England aware that she is 
reinforcing a myth about the Garinagu ethnohistory in questioning their African origin?  She is 
indubitably doing so.  
Another example I cite is that of anthropologist Adrienne Pine.  Describing her 1997 
fieldwork experience in Honduras, Pine states, “my interactions with Hondurans were colored by 
the identities we assigned to each other.  My elite status as white North American anthropologist 
was both a help and a hindrance to my research” (2008:6).  Pine invokes her class status but also 
her whiteness in defining her interaction with Hondurans.  Certainly, Honduran mestizos 
welcome the arrangement because they decry their blackness and ascribe to whiteness.  Citing 
Gerrit Huizer and June Nash, anthropologist Faye V. Harrison observes that ethnographers are 
only “successful” in their work in “reconciling differences, combating internalized racism and 
the privileges of Whiteness and affluence, and struggling to build a common ground” (2010:89).  
To be successful as Harrison argues, ethnographers must continuously assess their values and 
beliefs, factors that, in my view, shape their frame of reference, as is the case for all people. 
Contrary to Twine, Beverly Mullings asserts that outsiders may likely have “a greater 
degree of objectivity and ability to observe behaviors without distorting their meanings” 
(Mullings 1999:340).  While that might be the case, scholarship about the Garinagu indicates 
otherwise as I show with England’s analysis of Don Miguel in the previous page.  To her credit, 
Mullings also points out that the insider/outsider debates are “less than real because they seek to 
freeze positionalities in place, and assume that being an insider or outsider is a fixed attribute.  
The insider/outsider binary in reality is a boundary that is not only highly unstable but also one 
that ignores the dynamism of positionalities in time and through space” (1999:340).  The fluidity 
of the insider/outsider binary explains why initially I asked myself how these concepts apply to 
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me when I am Garifuna?  In various occasions, I told myself that although I am using critical 
methodology in my assessment of the Garinagu, I would not treat them like González or other 
scholars had done.  I also realized that I do not have all the answers; otherwise, I would not be 
researching the Garinagu.  In this context being Garifuna makes me an insider on the basis of 
cultural affiliation and personal experiences as a Garifuna.  However, I wholeheartedly believed 
that I am an outsider.  Before embarking on ethnographic fieldwork, I realized that I have 
changed and that I have to rethink my ideas about myself as a Garifuna and the Garifuna 
community rather than walking into the fieldwork with a set of assumptions.  It also meant 
reassessing what I saw and how I saw it.   
To illustrate what I mean by what I saw and how I saw it, I elaborate on my experience 
attending New Horizon Investment Club’s tenth anniversary gala event at the Eastwood Manor 
Catering on May 22, 2010.  The color themes of the event were blue, white, and silver.  I arrived 
to the event wearing a black dress, natural hair, and was unaccompanied whereas every other 
guest’s outfit reflected the theme of the event, they wore relaxed hair styles or wigs and most had 
a companion.  I tried to convince an acquaintance to accompany me to the event, but she was not 
interested.  At the event, some people I greeted rebuffed me whereas others responded warmly as 
the Garinagu generally do.  An entry in my field note states, “I felt rejected” (May 22, 2010). 
Then, I began to question my positionality in relation to my perceived rejection.  Did they reject 
me or was my definition of rejection in reality attributed to the fact that these people have not 
seen me around?  
Most of the attendees at the event did not know who I was.  I quickly realized that the 
reason for attending the event was twofold.  First, I was there to study this group and second to 
reconnect with this community.  However, the first reason superseded the second reason.  I thus 
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came to terms with the fact that most attendees perhaps believed that I was just another guest.  I 
do not know what they thought of me because they never told me.  I thus refuse to sail on the 
boat of assumptions since this is when researchers concoct their own interpretations of what the 
Other thinks or what the Other behavior means. 
Qualitative methodologies have a long connection with “cultural and social and feminist 
geographies, in part as a reaction to quantified social geography” (Crang 2002:648).  This does 
not in any shape or form imply that we must confine qualitative methodologies to female 
scholars only and hence labeled it as women’s domain.  We must see it as a major breakthrough 
and contribution by women in advancing the social sciences and in redefining academic inquiry 
and its commitment to society and social change.  Although some academic works have made 
significant contributions, we must also reassess whether or not qualitative methodologies must 
continue adhering to the “listening” approach (Crang 2002:648).  How does listening help the 
group (s) researched and where do researchers draw the line without compromising their work 
and safety and the safety of those groups they study?  It is a slippery road that requires further 
examination.  Although I am not providing an answer to this difficult question, I am borrowing 
from investigative journalist Jeremy Scahill’s analysis to provide some input.  In the bonus 
section to his 2013 documentary, Dirty Wars, which examines the United States’ global military 
activities, Scahill shares his perspectives of what it means to be a good journalist.  He states that 
journalists must “stop thinking of [themselves] as a protected class that you don’t have to have a 
human stake in the lives of the people that let you into their homes.  When you dismiss that you 
say I’m going to approach them not as a [scholar] but as a fellow human [being] . . .” (2013).  
Researchers are somewhat like investigative journalists and as such they must treat their subjects 
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first and foremost for who they are: a fellow human being with different cultural, political, 
social, and economic practices.   
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CHAPTER 4 
THE FORMATION OF GARINAGU ORGANIZATIONS 
 
Early Struggles and Influences 
This chapter explores how the Garinagu have long organized against oppression in 
Honduras in defense of place as demonstrated with the formation of organizations in Honduras 
and also in the United States.  In delving into their organizations’ historical social trajectory, I 
also explore ideological differences and politics that have contributed to the fragmentation of the 
Garinagu.  The second point explored in this chapter is how the formation of the Garinagu 
organizations has transformed most Garinagu residing in the United States, their relationship 
with their territory, and the land struggle in Honduras.  I therefore initiate this discussion with a 
brief narrative of the Garinagu’s early engagement in Honduras formation as a nation-state.  The 
Honduran elites’ plan for independence from Spain engaged the Garinagu in the eighteenth 
century.  Juan Francisco Bulnes, a Garifuna by a Vincentinian name of Walumugu, served as a 
general during Francisco Morazán’s fight for independence (J. Espinosa, personal 
communication, September 23, 2011; see also Centeno García 2004:90-91).   
Morazán, a son of a French Creole
3
, was born in Tegucigalpa in 1799 (Koch 2013:133).  
Heading a regime of “2,000 Garinagu in a community called Pueblo Nuevo [New Place],” 
Walumugu and his troop fought along Morazán.  In return for his efforts, Morazán “gave Bulnes 
control of the whole territory of the north coast” (J. Espinosa, personal communication, 
September 23, 2011; López García 1991: 43).  Due to limited information available on Bulnes, it 
                                                          
3
 In the United States, the term creole refers “exclusively to the people and culture of lower Louisiana” who “tend to 
be a mixture of French, Spanish, Caribbean, and African Cultures” (Nerad and Washington 2014:91; Hall 
1992:157).  However, in other parts of the Americas (Central and South) it has “broader” meanings (Hall 1992:157).  
Originating from the Portuguese word “creoulo, meaning a slave of African descent born in the New World,” the 
term was given multiple meanings depending on geography (Hall 1992:157 emphasis in original).  European 
colonizers used the term in the nineteenth century to refer to those people born in Louisiana of at “least partial 
African descent, and slave and free, and was used to distinguish American-born slaves from African-born slaves 
when they were listed on slave inventories” (Hall 1992:157).  The most widely accepted definition is a “person of 
non-American ancestry, whether African or European, who was born in the Americas” (Hall 1992:157).   
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is difficult to further elaborate on his background and to expand on the territory of the north 
coast Morazán awarded him.  Yet, this piece of history, many Garinagu claim, is nowhere to be 
found in Honduras’ historical narrative.  It is this omission that some members of a new 
generation of Garifuna activists invoke in their land struggle in Honduras and that has 
encouraged them to form institutions such as the First Garifuna Hospital.  I therefore dedicate a 
considerable part of this chapter to the Garifuna people’s political and socio-spatial conditions in 
their struggle over place.  
In 1957, the Garinagu formed Renovación (Renewal) in the city of La Ceiba only to be 
replaced in 1958 by La Sociedad Abraham Lincoln (The Abraham Lincoln Society), which was 
named in honor of the U.S. President Abraham Lincoln who “abolished slavery” in the United 
States (J. Ávila & T. Ávila 2008:300).  It is important to note that although the Emancipation 
Proclamation of January 1, 1863 “as a strategy against the South, freed only blacks enslaved to 
Confederate states that were in rebellion at the time, [it] nevertheless marked the beginning of a 
series of profound and irrevocable legal and societal shifts away from the barbarity of white 
domination and toward the democratic equality promised by the American Revolution” (Lusane 
2011:27; see also Bennett 2007:6).  As historian Lerone Bennett, Jr. contends, President Lincoln 
“was not ‘the great emancipator’” he is defined to be (2007:6 emphasis in original).  Yet, he has 
been labeled to be one.  African American’s spurious emancipation seemed to have resonated 
with the Garinagu in Honduras.  Identifying with their black counterparts’ socio-spatial 
conditions in the United States, La Sociedad Abraham Lincoln demanded changes to the 
“political and social policies for the black community of Honduras through the pursuit of social 
justice” (J. Ávila & T. Ávila 2008:300).  They linked their thirst for social justice to their socio-
spatial conditions.  
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In Honduras, the racist state and culture denied the Garinagu “access to public parks and 
pressed them into menial labor such as clearing the street of dead dogs” during part of the 
twentieth century (Anderson 2004:391).  By the 1950s and 1960s “overt” racist practices “were 
dismantled,” but institutionalized racism prevail (Anderson 2004:391).  For example, in 1961, 
members of Nueva Juventud Limoneña (Limoneña New Youth) met with President Ramón 
Villeda Morales’ (1957-1963) secretary to send doctors to Limón where many Garinagu were 
suffering from gastrointestinal problems.  Villeda Morales’ secretary informed them that he had 
“sent five doctors to that community and nobody wanted to go.  However, the first Garifuna 
doctor [Dr. Alfonso Lacayo Sánchez] would be graduating soon” (Sambulá 1998:43).  Dr. 
Sánchez graduated in 1967 and had delivered medical services throughout numerous Garifuna 
and mulatos’ communities before and after he graduated (Sambulá 1998:55 emphasis added).  
By 1962, several Garinagu participated in the Communist Party of Honduras to address a host of 
issues ranging from socio-economic conditions in Honduras to Latin America’s political milieu 
(J. Ávila & T. Ávila 2008:301).  The October 3, 1963 military coup d’état headed by General 
Oswaldo López Arellano (1963-1971 and 1972-1975) ousted “self-styled urban petty bourgeois 
reformer” President Villeda Morales from power (Euraque 1996:70).  For the “leadership of the 
San Pedro Sula bourgeoisie,” Villeda Morales’s removal represented “the reentrenchment of 
traditional Tegucigalpa-based caudillo politics” and “a slap to the regional identification of San 
Pedro Sula elites with the Villeda Morales presidency” (Euraque 1996:75).  Villeda Morales’ 
ouster derailed the Garinagu’s struggle against racism.  In fact, Euraque points out that the 
Garifuna activist Moises Moreira “died in 1965 after being persecuted as a member of the 
Communist Party of Honduras” (2004:182).  Despite the Honduran government repression, the 
Garifuna activists still sought political empowerment.  
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The Garifuna communities of the Departamento of Colón drafted socially conscious Dr. 
Sánchez (1926-1985) in 1963 to become the deputy of the region under the Liberal Party.  
Accompanied by several Garinagu, he campaigned throughout Colón’s municipalities and visited 
various Standard Fruit Company sites organized by the workers’ union president Hector Acosta 
Romero.  As a former banana worker, Dr. Sánchez identified with the workers’ plight across 
ethnic groups and they supported him (Sambulá 1998:56-57).  Realizing that Dr. Sánchez had 
become a rival, the military regime accused him of “upholding leftist ideas” (Sambulá 1998:57).  
Based on this accusation, the military regime incarcerated him and tortured several of his friends 
and family members (Sambulá 1998:60).  Since Dr. Sánchez refused to join the military regime’s 
political machine, the regime forced him out of Limón where he had built a clinic with the help 
of the Garifuna community including The Society of Brothers (La Sociedad los Hermanos) in 
1962.  The community of Limón centralized existing organizations then under Patronatos
4
 for the 
development of the community.  In Limón, existing organizations at that time were Nueva 
Juventud Limoneña (Limoneña New Youth), La Sociedad los Hermanos (The Brothers Society), 
Consejos de Maestros (Teachers Council), Organización de Danzas Folkloricas 500 
(Organization of Folkloric Dances 500), and Cinco Estrellas (Five Stars) (Sambulá 1998:46).  
The Garinagu in Limón expanded their geographical outreach.  The Garinagu in Tegucigalpa, 
San Pedro Sula, Tela, Atlántida, and in New York City organized Patronatos to support the 
Limoneños’ efforts (Sambulá 1998:46).  The Garinagu’s efforts in Limón suggest that they were 
pursuing ways to develop their community and territory on Honduras’ north coast.  In 1965, Dr. 
Sánchez established a clinic in San Marcos de Colón in the Departamento of Choluteca located 
                                                          
4
 Patronatos function as councils that address each community’s needs.  I asked several Garinagu about the origin of  
  Patronatos.  Most do not know, but some state that the Honduran government formed them in the 1980s.  Judging    
  from my findings, I believe that Garinagu formed Patronatos and that perhaps the government altered their  
  autonomy in the 1980s.   
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in southern Honduras, where he resided until he moved to La Ceiba in 1971.  It is within this 
volatile political environment that the Garinagu formed their organizations in Honduras, 
experienced the early fragmentation of the Garifuna culture, and started their incessant struggle 
over place.  The various Garifuna organizations mentioned here were the precursors to 
OFRANEH.  In the United States, the Garinagu formed the Carib American Association, Inc. 
over sixty years ago and Fenix Social Club, Inc. over fifty years ago (J. Ávila, 2009).  There is 
not much written about the early organizations the Garinagu formed in the United States.  
Therefore, it is difficult to discuss these organizations activities.  
Eighteen years after La Sociedad Abraham Lincoln’s formation, the Garinagu and English 
speaking blacks formed OFRANEH (S. Iriona, personal communication, March 13, 2013).  
Influenced by the African American Civil Rights Movement, Black Nationalist leaders such as 
Malcolm X, and Black Power organizations like the Black Panther Party which “influenced” the 
Puerto Rican Young Lords, the Garifuna activists embraced some of these organizations’ 
principles which did not seem to include land (Jones and Jeffries 1998:36).  Longtime Garifuna 
political activist, black cultural nationalist, and OFRANEH co-founder, Sara Iriona states that 
before enrolling at New York University in 1968, her father brought her magazines about 
Malcolm X and Dr. Martin Luther King from the United States to Honduras.  Iriona’s 
introduction to the ideas of Malcolm X and King, and her experiences in New York City during 
the late civil rights movement, sparked a realization in her that the oppression of black people in 
Honduras was no less different to that of their counterparts in the United States and elsewhere in 
the world (S. Iriona, personal communication, March 13, 2013).  
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Her consciousness along with that of several other people of African descent (the Garinagu 
and English-speaking blacks)
 5
 in Puerto Cortés, Honduras propelled OFRANEH’s formation in 
1975.  At least ten people began meeting at Iriona’s home to discuss the socio-spatial conditions 
of black people in Honduras and OFRANEH’s formation.  This group concluded that 
OFRANEH’s mission must be to unite “Blacks in Honduras and change the political and 
economic dynamic” in the country (S. Iriona, personal communication, March 13, 2013).  
Veteran activist, Isidro Chávez contends that OFRANEH’s formation came about to extirpate 
“discrimination in Honduras” (personal communication, April 24, 2010).  Despite the various 
versions offered on OFRANEH’s original mission, the election of Clifford Clarence Clark 
Brooks’ wife (both founding members) as OFRANEH’s first female president reflected a pan-
African unity which the organization’s early founders pursued (S. Iriona, personal 
communication, March 13, 2012).  Iriona underscores this unity by the fact that the Clarks “gave 
prominence to the Garifuna’s culture because they understood that it was an authentic, dynamic 
culture and always contributed to that to be the main point” (personal communication, March 13, 
2012).  Her assertion seems to suggest that the Garinagu’s ethnicity placed them above their 
Criollos counterparts hence the Garinagu should play a central role in OFRANEH’s development 
whereas the Criollos’ role must be peripheral.  There was therefore an imbalance entrenched in 
this unity.  However, it seems this arrangement suited both groups.  Despite this imbalance, the 
Garinagu recognize the Clarks’ contributions and many Garinagu celebrate and respect this unity 
(J. Rochez, personal communication, March 17, 2012).  Following Clifford’s demise in early 
2013, countless Garinagu circulated e-mails in Garifunalink listserv recognizing him as a pioneer 
of black people causes in Honduras.   
                                                          
5
 Garinagu also refer to this group as Criollos or Creole.  
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Because the Garifuna intellectuals such as Dr. Sánchez resided in the city of La Ceiba, 
OFRANEH’s leaders formally registered the organization there in 1976, where it was 
headquartered until its relocation in November 2012 to Sambo Creek, Atlántida, which is a 
Garifuna community located east of La Ceiba (S. Iriona, personal communication, March 13, 
2012).  The unity that OFRANEH achieved in 1975 in Puerto Cortés seemed to have been 
rejected by the Garinagu in the city of La Ceiba since the organization became exclusively 
Garifuna.  In this city, former OFRANEH’s secretary Armando Dosanto explains that the 
Garinagu “invaded” OFRANEH thus effectively disengaging with the Criollos’ community 
(personal communication, December 20, 2013).  This is important to point out to show that there 
might have been a struggle for power within OFRANEH as a black organization.  Many 
Garinagu in La Ceiba joined OFRANEH as affiliates.  Dosanto purports that the driving force 
behind the Garinagu’s interest in the organization was “the attitude that derived from the 
majority of the members” (personal communication, March 29, 2012).  He further claims that it 
was difficult to get organized in urban areas (A. Dosanto, personal communication, March 29, 
2012).  Although he does not explain why, a possible reason is that perhaps the Garinagu did not 
engage the Criollos.  Either way, many Hondurans and foreigners recognize OFRANEH as one 
of the leading Garifuna organizations in Honduras.  I say Garifuna because OFRANEH primarily 
addresses issues concerning the Garinagu and has relocated to a primarily Garifuna community, 
although it is being invaded today by tourists.  As I learned during my research, throughout 
OFRANEH’s formative years, it was not engaged in any organizing related to their territory on 
the north coast despite the fact that the Garinagu’s land ownership remained precarious.  Instead, 
OFRANEH was primarily focused on combating racism and pursuing other political goals.   
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Some Garinagu relocated OFRANEH’s mission geographically during its formative years.  
The Garinagu founded a branch in Tegucigalpa but also in the United States.  In 1978, 
OFRANEH’s geographic scale of activism expanded when Iriona and other Garinagu co-
founded a branch in New York City.  Although OFRANEH only lasted in New York City at least 
for two years, its founders addressed the political persecution of Garinagu and non-Garinagu 
activists in Honduras (S. Iriona, personal communication, March 13, 2012).  In 2012, the 
Garinagu in New York City revived OFRANEH in the South Bronx (J. Rochez, personal 
communication, May 5, 2012).  Sponsored by The Honduran Active Society in New York (La 
Sociedad Hondureña Activa en Nueva York, SHANY), it seems OFRANEH’s return marked a 
renewed commitment to its mission and vision in the United States.  Exactly what role 
OFRANEH in New York City will play this time around, particularly in relation to the 
Garinagu’s land on Honduras’ north coast, remains unclear. 
In view of the short 1970s lifespan OFRANEH’s branch experienced in New York City, 
the Garifuna activists explored other avenues.  Their activism was a continuation of the 
Garinagu’s engagement in geopolitics and not concerned with the Garifuna’s land ownership.  
Formed in 1969, Honduran United Front (Frente Unida Hondureña) became a Garifuna’s 
umbrella organization, which Iriona describes as a “solidarity group” since it included various 
Garinagu and non-Garifuna activists’ organizations from Latin America (personal 
communication, March 29, 2012).  In Brooklyn, Our Lady of Mercy Church provided these 
solidarity groups with a space to carry out their work and training.  Their training was related to 
the Cold War and not to land ownership matters.  These groups established linkages with the 
Information Center of Honduras (Centro de Información de Honduras) formed in Boston in 1982 
by Honduran ladinos.  During the period of the Garifuna’s political activism, global geopolitics 
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dominated by the Cold War between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics (USSR) was at its climax.  Likewise, in 1979 the Sandinista National Liberation Front 
in Nicaragua removed the United States’ backed-dictator, Anastasio Somoza Debayle, from 
power.  By the 1980s, the United States had thrown its support behind the Nicaraguan Contras 
who were “guerilla forces attempting to destabilize and overthrow what the American 
government regarded as a communist threat in ‘its own backyard’” (Painter 1995:130).  
Therefore, nations asserting their sovereignty, and groups challenging the global struggle for 
hegemony between the United States and the USSR surely perceived the two superpowers as 
creating “‘disorder’” rather than “‘order’” (Painter 1995:134).  Those who questioned or, in 
many instances, did not question this disorder, their very existence, security, mobility, resources, 
and everyday lives were trodden on by the direct or indirect actions or ideology of either of the 
superpowers but chiefly the United States.  The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) agents 
received instructions to maintain the United States’ hegemony in Latin America, the Caribbean, 
and elsewhere in the world generally but not exclusively using “covert paramilitary operations” 
(Kornbluh 2004:3). 
Given the geopolitical milieu, dissenting voices and revolutionaries struggling to overthrow 
economic, political, and social inequality and oppression throughout the Americas, the 
Caribbean, Africa, Asia, parts of the Middle East, and Europe amplified the Garinagu’s 
geopolitical activism (S. Iriona, personal communication, March 13, 2012).  Not surprisingly, the 
Honduran government labeled the Garifuna activists in New York City as “terrorists” and 
accused them of receiving funding from the USSR, Cuba, and the Sandinistas (S. Iriona, personal 
communication, March 29, 2012).  In fact, it was the Honduran government and its henchmen 
trained at the United States School of the Americas (SOA) located at Fort Benning, Georgia, 
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renamed Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC) in 2001 that were 
financially benefiting from the Cold War activities (School of the Americas Watch, 2014; 
Hassan, 2004).  Despite the despotic government paranoia, the Garinagu’s international political 
activism persisted throughout the 1980s (S. Iriona, personal communication, March 29, 2012).  
As the Cold War drew to an end with the collapse of the USSR in 1991, the Garifuna’s activism 
also changed by shifting attention to the land struggle that has been unfolding in Honduras. 
CONDECOGA’s Origins and Perspectives 
Scholars researching the Garinagu have either purposely ignored some organizations or are 
unaware of them.  The National Coordination for the Development of the Garifunas 
Communities (La Coordinación National para el Desarrollo de las Comunidades de los 
Garifunas, CONDECOGA) is one of these organizations.  It is vital to address CONDECOGA’s 
activities because it exposes a different type of the Garifuna’s political activism in relation to 
place.  By the 1980s, the United States’ persistent Cold War policies in Central America 
expanded the region’s military power and violence.  For example, President Ronald Reagan’s 
(1981-1989) Cold War policies toward El Salvador and Nicaragua but also in Honduras “resulted 
in massive violence and violations of human rights” in these countries (Ronniger 2010:34).  
Reagan’s policies consisted of funneling funds to tyrannical groups in countries such as El 
Salvador (Ronniger 2010:34).  As a result of the violence that had persisted in the region 
throughout the Cold War, many dissenting voices and political activists disappeared and many 
others secured asylum abroad.  Several educated Garinagu fled to the United States in the late 
1970s and several important developments took place among the Garifuna activists associated 
with OFRANEH (S. Iriona, personal communication, March 29, 2012).  First, using Kobayashi’s 
observation of the Black Panther’s formation, I draw a parallel to show that there was an 
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“emerging forms of radical identity politics” among the Garinagu in Honduras, who have not 
been seen since this period (2009:283).  Second, CONDECOGA’s members challenged power-
geometries or power structure that excluded the Garinagu as integral members of the Honduran 
society.  Third, the Garinagu seeking some form of self-determination used their racial and 
ethnic identity, in borrowing Kobayashi’s analogy of blacks’ social movement in the United 
States, to be “fundamentally irreconcilable with the larger nation” (2009:282).  They therefore 
sought to form a separate nation.  
Several Garinagu who formed CONDECOGA met covertly every Sunday for a year at 
Benjamin Manaisa Lacayo’s residence in Honduras.  Some of CONDECOGA’s members were 
former OFRANEH’s members (A. Dosanto, personal communication, March 29, 2012).  Formed 
in the country’s capital, Tegucigalpa, CONDECOGA’s main objective was to form a nation 
using the Native American model of reservation in the United States (A. Dosanto, personal 
communication, March 29, 2012).  For CONDECOGA’s members, emulating this model meant 
remaining part of Honduras but having complete autonomy over their communities’ affairs.  
However, as I explained in chapter two using law professors Vine Deloria, Jr. and Clifford M. 
Lytle’s assessment, the United States federal government created reservations to rule Native 
Americans, but also to dispossess them from their land to make way for European settlers.  
Hence, Native Americans do not enjoy full-fledged autonomy as CONDGECOGA’s members 
seem to believe.  CONDECOGA’s members based their nation-building project on the fact that 
the Honduran government did not understand black people’s “idiosyncrasy” and they strived to 
separate from the dominant group’s imposition and oppression (A. Dosanto, personal 
communication, March 29, 2012).  CONDECOGA’s members’ actions suggest that they were 
attempting to exercise autonomy on the basis of cultural commonalities but not based on 
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economic exigencies.  Based on cultural traits, CONDECOGA’s members took their nation-
building project to the Honduran Supreme Court.  Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court told them 
“to change everything from the principles and objectives because it was a medium of creating a 
nation within a nation” (A. Dosanto, personal communication, March 29, 2012).  Fearful of 
state-sponsored violence, which remains entrenched in the country’s political structure, 
CONDECOGA’s members rapidly disbanded and some joined OFRANEH, while others such as 
Dionisio Guevara fled to Brazil, and Salvador Suazo fled to Nicaragua where he finished his 
education (A. Dosanto, personal communication, March 29, 2012).  I tried to find out if other 
Garinagu have attempted to form a nation before in Honduras.  However, because it is difficult to 
gain access to Honduras’ archival resources electronically, I am unable to present such 
information.   
After CONDECOGA disbanded, some of its members joined OFRANEH and tried to steer 
it in a different direction that avoided confrontation with the Honduran state.  However, 
CONDECOGA’s members quickly abandoned this strategy.  Instead, they sought to undermine 
state-sponsored forms of Garinagu’s activism directed by the Honduran government; in other 
words, they tried to overthrow the Honduran government’s influence over the Garifuna 
organizations.  One of CONDECOGA’s co-founders, Armando Dosanto, maintains that the 
Honduran state formed what he calls Garifuna non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in 
communities such as Corozal located east of La Ceiba.  Dosanto offers several reasons for the 
formation of these NGOs in the 1980s and early 1990s.  First, the proliferation of NGOs had 
much to do with “the attitude of the Honduran government to control the lives of the 
communities of the interior to impose the only representation before the government of 
Honduras” (A. Dosanto, personal communication, March 29, 2012).  Second, it was the only way 
79 
 
the Garifuna communities could “negotiate directly with governments, and I mean inside and 
outside of the country” (personal communication, March 29, 2012).  In other words, “it was a 
way for the Garinagu to incorporate into this style of organizing – to directly have support come 
to the communities” (A. Dosanto, personal communication, March 29, 2012).  Judging from 
CONDECOGA’s members’ discourse, it seems that the Honduran government realized that 
forming NGOs meant dividing and fragmenting the Garifuna communities and curtailing the 
organization’s members’ activism and aspirations in gaining control over the Garinagu’s land 
and place. 
CONDECOGA and OFRANEH’s members regarded the formation of The Advisory for the 
Development of Ethnic Groups in Honduras, (La Asesoria para el Desarrollo de las Étnias de 
Honduras, ASEPADE) by the Honduran state as confirmation of their suspicions.  Formed in the 
late 1970s according to Armando Dosanto, the Honduran government created ASEPADE to 
advise OFRANEH on economic development (personal communication, December 20, 2013).  
Heading ASEPADE were Juan Ramón Martínez an “intellectual” from Olancho, his wife, Nora 
Midence Martínez, and two additional staff, who the state presented simply as advisors to the 
Garifuna organizations (Euraque 2004:235; A. Dosanto, personal communication, December 20, 
2013).  However, CONDECOGA’s members were suspicious of ASEPADE’s activities and its 
goals.  They believed that the government was trying to curtail the Garifuna’s activism, 
undermine Garifuna organizations’ autonomy, and prevent them from demanding specific 
projects for their communities (A. Dosanto, personal communication, March 29, 2012).  
CONDECOGA’s members rapidly confirmed their suspicions.  
Financed by various private financial institutions, under the watchful eyes of the Honduran 
government, the Solidarity Group Programs came into existence in the 1970s as an umbrella 
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organization.  Its name suggests that this was a grassroots effort pulling different organizations 
from so-called developing nations together to improve the lives of the region’s inhabitants.  In 
fact, the Programs’ underlying premise was that “poor” and low-income women namely in rural 
areas can only prosper if they have access to credit (Otero 1993:3).  Under Accion’s (Action) 
guidance, a “premier microfinance organizations in the world” founded in 1961, the Honduran 
state formed ASEPADE in 1984, a date which contradicts the one given in Dosanto’s account 
(“Our History,” n.d.).  By March 1987, the “‘Second International Conference Solidarity Group 
Programs’” took place in Honduras according to economist Maria Otero, Accion/AITEC 
“representative” in Honduras at the time of this conference (Otero 1993:iv).  Dosanto did not 
view micro-credit groups favorably.  In fact, he defines them as “not good” and “dangerous” 
(personal communication, December 20, 2013).  According to a United Nations report, 
microfinance emerged because of the “formal” financial institutions failed to extend financial 
assistance to the poor who includes women (2009:ix).  The failures of the financial institutions 
paved the way for some organizations to “redress gender inequality” so that women can access 
credit (United Nations 2009:ix).  Organizations involved in microfinance use myriad of methods 
in lending money to the poor.  Some use “group-based approaches to service provision” while 
others combine “group and individual lending” because it can become a barrier on more 
“successful entrepreneurs” (2009:ix).  Despite the availability of microfinance, debates are 
abundant about how effective and sustainable this economic system has been in empowering 
women, the United Nations report also points.  The report further indicates that “while there is 
evidence that microfinance has a positive impact on income, there are limits to the income gains” 
(United Nations 2009:ix).  Since microfinance organizations formation in the 1970s and 1980s, 
they have become a staple in developing nations’ economies.  Microfinance can be therefore 
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included in Harvey’s “accumulation by dispossession,” which entails among other things the 
commodification and privatization of “public assets” (2005:160).  These practices are entrenched 
in neoliberal state economic policies.  Adherence to these policies has resulted in “uneven 
geographical development” and “contradictory political form” built into the system (Harvey 
2005:64).  In my view, commodification and privatization have further widened the gender 
inequality gap and poverty.  
The struggle between CONDECOGA and ASEPADE persisted.  Increasingly, 
OFRANEH’s director at that time, Tomás Álvarez, solely relied on ASEPADE’s input.  
Álvarez’s dependence signaled that ASEPADE’s administrators were steadily overturning 
OFRANEH’s directorship, hijacking the organization, and ruining the Garinagu’s “individual 
creativity” (A. Dosanto, personal communication, December 20, 2013).  Second, Garinagu 
Mario Fermin Nuñez and Lionsia Solorzano worked for ASEPADE in 1980.  Nuñez and 
Solorzano’s involvement with ASEPADE may suggest that they did not or may not have been 
interested in the state’s motives.  Some Garinagu interpreted the Honduran government activities 
as an imposition of the dominant group’s corrupt practices (S. Iriona, personal communication, 
March 29, 2012).  Dosanto believes that the Honduran government’s ultimate objective was to 
derail the Garifuna’s social relations and replace them with a style of leadership that agreed with 
the state (personal communication, March 29, 2012).  Generally, the Garifuna communities 
organize around specific issues affecting their respective communities.  Thus, their activism is 
tied to and guided by their respective cultural and political practices, but not by the government.  
They continue to challenge government’s oppression or on occasions seek its assistance because 
they are bonded to place and they have adopted certain practices from the dominant culture.   
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As a final assault on the government’s efforts to derail the Garifuna organizations, 
CONDECOGA’s member, Armando Dosanto, confronted ASEPADE’s administrators for 
seeking projects on behalf of the Garifuna community without the designated community’s 
knowledge.  Dosanto failed to explain what these projects were (personal communication, March 
29, 2012).  Realizing what was happening, CONDECOGA’s members knew that it was their 
responsibility to curb the Honduran government’s influence over OFRANEH.  Hipólito 
Centeno’s election as OFRANEH’s director in the 1980s stabilized the organization.  
CONDECOGA’s and OFRANEH’s members had every right to resist the Honduran 
government’s intrusion.  By the mid-1980s, “organizations directed by Honduran professionals 
had emerged in the name of the indigenous” people (Anderson 2009:121).  One of these 
professionals – meaning those with a higher education – is Garifuna Tulio Mariano Gonzaléz.  
According to Dosanto, after Midence Martínez (mestiza) divorced her husband, educated 
Hondurans formed the Honduran Advisory Council for the Development of Autochthonic Ethnic 
Groups (Consejo Asesor Hondureño para el Desarrollo de las Etnias Autóctonas, CAHDEA) in 
1988.  OFRANEH administered CAHDEA with Gonzaléz as CAHDEA’s director (A. Dosanto, 
personal communication, March 29, 2012).  Similar to its predecessor, the Honduran Council of 
Indigenous Promotion (COHPI), CAHDEA was in charge of expanding the indigenous 
“framework to include groups understood in racial terms as Black – Garifuna and Creoles” 
(Anderson 2009:121).   
CONDECOGA’s members’ actions suggest that because the Honduran Supreme Court 
forced them to withdraw their nation-building project, they continued to challenge power 
relations in a different way.  Kobayashi cautions that scholars must not confine identity politics 
solely to “territorial oppression” for not all identity politics are territory-oriented (2009:283).  
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Citing the Black Panthers’ activism and formation in Oakland, California as an example, 
Kobayashi maintains that this group struggled to gain control of African American communities 
in Oakland and in many other cities in the United States where they were economically, 
politically, and socially marginalized and experienced state-sponsored violence.  
CONDECOGA’s members sought similar but yet different path.   
Happy Land and the New Organizations 
In the United States, a tragedy spurred the formation of the Garifuna organizations in 1990.  
On March 25, 1990, the Garinagu’s presence in New York City was thrust into the national 
spotlight when Cuban Julio González set fire to the Happy Land Social Club, a dance hall 
located at 1959 Southern Boulevard in the South Bronx.  Frequented by poor Central Americans 
and a few African Americans, the fire claimed eighty-seven lives, fifty-nine of whom were 
Garinagu from the South Bronx (Ávila n.d.:1).  The Happy Land fire was the second deadliest 
fire in New York City after the March 25, 1911 Triangle Shirtwaist Company fire which claimed 
the lives of 146 people, most of whom were young immigrant women (United States Department 
of Labor, n.d.).  In the aftermath of the Happy Land tragedy, the Garinagu held a town hall 
meeting with then Mayor David N. Dinkins.  Two years later during a Catholic mass at St. 
Thomas Aquinas Church, Dinkins informed members of the Garifuna community of the 
allocation of land “south of Happy Land” to build a Garifuna recreation center (Li, 2010).  
Mayor Dinkins’ office would secure the funds from Jay Weiss’s (Happy Land’s lessor at the 
time of the fire) $150,000 fine.  Additional funds offered by the Honduran President Callejas 
Romero and the Archdiocese of New York would pay for the center’s construction (Li, 2010).  
The irony of Callejas Romero’s gesture is that during this very same period he was introducing 
neoliberal economic policies in Honduras, which threatened the Garinagu’s territories, and 
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communities in this country.  Perhaps, he viewed the Happy Land fire as an opportunity to shift 
the Garifuna leaders’ attention away from what was unfolding in Honduras.  Two decades later, 
“two-thirds of the land” allocated for the Garifuna’s community center in the South Bronx 
“remains vacant while the remaining third was converted into an apartment building” (Li, 2010).  
Some Garinagu believe that the center was never built because sectarianism distracted the 
Garifuna organizations and individuals involved in the process from the task at hand and instead 
“started fighting for preeminence” (R. Armenia, personal communication, January 23, 2011).  
This suggests that individual Garifuna and organization leaders were mostly concerned about 
building their personal power and public image rather than unity. 
In the aftermath of the Happy Land tragedy, “more than 20 groups were formed to serve 
the needs of Hondurans,” which critics describe as counterproductive (J. Ávila n.d.:1).  Critics 
maintain that instead of forming new organizations, the Garinagu should have built upon existing 
Garifuna solidarity groups formed years earlier (S. Iriona, personal communication, March 29, 
20112).  In 1991, a year after the tragic fire in the South Bronx, the Garifuna leaders organized 
three Intercontinental Garifuna Summit Meetings to promote their economic and political 
advancement.  Most of the early the Garifuna activists did not participate in these meetings.  As a 
cross-border endeavor attended by the Garinagu from Central America and from throughout New 
York City’s boroughs, the first summit meeting took place from July 4 to 6, 1991 in Brooklyn’s 
Medgar Evers College “to adopt a bold and decisive challenge to seriously and collectively begin 
to focus on our Garifuna culture, and to mobilize all Garinagu to seek meaningful solutions to 
our varied problems” (J. Ávila & T. Ávila 2008:22).  This event attracted public attention when 
the New York Amsterdam News, an African American owned newspaper published an article 
about the summit meeting.  This summit meeting focused on culture, as illustrated by its theme 
85 
 
“Uwala Busiganu, Garinagu Wagia or Don’t Be Ashamed, We Are Garifuna.”  The summit’s 
motto “Garinagu’s Path to the 21st Century” reflected a long-term objective (J. Ávila & T. Ávila 
2008:22).  
The summit’s objectives outlined in 1991 were to promote the Garinagu’s political, 
economic, and social empowerment, internationalize the Garifuna culture, and establish 
economic bonds among the Garinagu in the Diaspora.  Promoting these objectives also meant 
joining hands not only with white ethnic groups but also African Americans, Caribbean, 
Hispanic, and other ethnic groups that form part of the economic and political milieu in New 
York City.  The Ávilas twins, who gained prominence after the Happy Land Social Club tragedy, 
note several accomplishments of the summit: the creation of a Garifuna student club bearing the 
name of Libaña Baba (Father’s Grandchildren) at City College of New York (CCNY), the 
Lumalali Garifuna radio program (The Garifuna Voice) hosted by Felix Miranda, and HIV/AIDS 
workshops (A. Ávila & T. Ávila 2008:30 emphasis in original).  The Garifuna leaders held a 
follow-up summit meeting in Los Angeles from July 3 to 5, 1992, but a third envisioned meeting 
never materialized.  In Los Angeles, attendees included members of the Honduran Black Society 
of California (SONOHCA).  Although the Los Angeles meeting was a continuation of the first 
summit, its theme “Afareinraguni, Awaraüguni, Agibudaguni Liadun Aban or Separation, 
Dispersion, Reunification” reflected the dislocated black body reconfiguring space and engaging 
more concretely in international counter hegemonic practices (A. Ávila & T. Ávila 2008:30 
emphasis in original).  Several organizations emerged from the summit meetings.  
In 1990, the Garinagu formed the now defunct Federation of Honduran Organizations of 
New York (Federación de Organisaciones Hondureña en Nueva York, FEDOHNY) as an 
umbrella organization with a “$210,000 settlement from a lawsuit against Happy Land’s 
86 
 
landlords” (Dooley, 1995:n.p.).  Some of FEDOHNY’s founding members included longtime 
activist and now deceased Dionisia Amaya Bonilla, who also co-founded Women on the Move 
Pro-Education (Mujeres Garifunas en Marcha Pro-Educación, MUGAMA), and Sara Iriona.  
Mirtha Colón served as FEDOHNY’s board member and Antonieta Máximo as the 
organization’s president.  As José Francisco Ávila states, Garinagu formed FEDOHNY as an 
“umbrella organization of Honduran groups and the result of the first real attempt to put together 
a pressure group was formed as a direct response to the Happy Land fire” (n.d.:1).  However, 
FEDOHNY did not serve as an umbrella organization, since most people involved were more 
concerned with pursuing their own personal interests. 
In 1994, FEDOHNY’s administrators named Walter L. Krochmal as its executive director. 
A son of a mestiza woman from Honduras and an Eastern European Jew, Krochmal was born in 
the United States and spent part of his young life in Honduras.  Krochmal had worked with the 
Garifuna community prior to joining FEDOHNY (“Roots in Eastern Europe and Honduras,” 
n.d.).  Headquartered at the New York/New England Exchange (NYNEX) building on East 175
th
 
Street in the Bronx, Krochmal gathered Happy Land fire victims’ names for the Department of 
Parks and Recreation (“Happy Land Memorial,” n.d.).  Tasked with organizing classes to teach 
English and computer skills, he also organized reproductive health-related workshops for 
women, entrepreneur training programs, and focused on “creative writing and other subjects, 
with more than 100 community members receiving certificates at the program’s peak” 
(“Federation of Honduran Organizations in New York, Executive Director,” n.d.).  In addition, 
Krochmal translated “the New York City Boiler Manual into Spanish for Building 
Superintendency Program participants and organized study groups for the exam, resulting in 
90% of participants passing the test, and many still holding superintendent positions to this day” 
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(“Federation of Honduran Organizations in New York, Executive Director,” n.d.).  Highlighting 
Krochmal’s contributions to FEDOHNY does not mean the organization could not have been 
successful without his efforts.  The intent is to name some of the social actors involved in 
FEDOHNY’s formation, growth, and decline.  
Difference in style and vision between Máximo and Krochmal led to his departure in 1995. 
Three years after his departure, Hurricane Mitch devastated Honduras and several other Central 
American countries in late October 1998.  FEDOHNY collected nonperishable items for 
hurricane victims; however, it did not address the Honduran government’s seizing of the 
Garinagu’s land following Mitch’s devastation.  During my brief involvement with FEDOHNY, 
there was no indication of any interest in the land struggle in Honduras.  Instead, under 
Máximo’s leadership, FEDOHNY ceased to exist as an organization.  Máximo was seemingly 
more concerned with interviewing Honduran bureaucrats, poets, religious leaders, and other 
people she deemed important rather than overseeing the organization’s day-to-day operations.  
With FEDOHNY’s collapse, other Garifuna organizations sought to replace it.   
By 1992, also in the Bronx, Garinagu founded Hondurans Against AIDS, Inc. headed to 
this day by Mirtha Colón, a social worker.  Housed in Casa Yurumein community center which 
the Garinagu formed in 2008, Hondurans Against AIDS, Inc. educates and conducts workshops 
namely but not exclusively in black communities in Honduras, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Costa 
Rica, and Panamá which have been devastated by AIDS.  On June 5, 2010, I attended an event 
that Hondurans Against AIDS, Inc. advertised as the Fulton Street Festival (Festival de la Calle 
Fulton), which also celebrated Casa Yurumein’s second anniversary.  Casa Yurumein’s members 
organized the event as a block party.  An event flyer created by Hondurans Against AIDS, Inc. 
indicated that HIV/AIDS testing would be offered along with education on several other health 
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related issues.  However, the only activities that took place at the event were several Garinagu 
vendors, musicians, and an information table for Martin Munitz’s law firm.  Event organizers did 
not even distribute the fifty-seven page booklet about HIV/AIDS written by Colón and 
anthropologist Alfredo González, suggesting a lack of consistency in disseminating information 
to the public or lack of funding in hiring more staff to perform public outreach tasks.  Eager to 
learn about the statistical information compiled by Hondurans Against AIDS, Inc., I visited the 
organization’s website, which was a Facebook site.  The site did not contain statistical 
information about HIV/AIDS in black communities much less a narrative about the transmission 
of HIV/AIDS.  Instead the site featured several pictures of workshops Colón conducted in 
Central America, pictures of her attending an AIDS conference in Ethiopia in 2011, a flyer 
announcing Casa Yurumein’s Baruada Award event, and an advertisement for Garifuna art class. 
Lacking basic information at least about the transmission of HIV/AIDS, may suggest that there is 
inconsistence among the Hondurans Against AIDS, Inc. staff in disseminating information to the 
public.  The site is significant because the Garifuna leaders and the Garinagu in general access to 
technology have influenced communication with members of the community and with the world.      
By January 1993, The Garifuna Council of New York came into existence.  Its mission was 
to prepare the community for twenty-first century challenges (J. Ávila n.d.:2).  However, it 
seems that this organization did not prepare anyone for the challenges ahead, for it ceased to 
exist, although it is hard to verify when (J. Ávila n.d.:2).  By the late 1990s, members of 
MUGAMA, some of whom also co-founded FEDOHNY, founded Garifuna House Committee, 
to provide day-care services, and establish an adult education learning center among other 
services (J. Ávila n.d.:2).  On February 1, 1998, Garifuna House Committee founders met at 
Hunter College and “the organization registered the organization on March 1, 1999, as a New 
89 
 
York Not-for-Profit Corporation, under the name Garifuna House, Inc.” (J. Ávila n.d.:2).  Similar 
to FEDOHNY, Garifuna House, Inc. existence was short.  On May 9, 1998, a group of Garinagu 
formed Garifuna Coalition USA, Inc. (GCU) to serve as a Garifuna advocacy organization, and 
officially incorporated it in 1999 (T. Ávila 2008:285).  GCU’s mission is to serve “as an 
advocate for Garifuna issues and a united voice for the Garifuna community in New York City.  
It promotes the autonomy and unification of the New York Garifuna community through 
grassroots organizing and community development” (Garifuna Coalition USA, Inc. 2014.).  
Although it is described as a coalition, the only organization I have seen affiliated with GCU is 
New Horizon Investment Club, formed in 2001.  While initially headquartered at an apartment 
on Unionport Road in the South Bronx, in 2009 GCU relocated to 149
th
 Street in the South 
Bronx where the Garifuna organizers opened Garifuna Coalition Advocacy Center (GCAC).  
Both organizations have slightly different functions.  GCAC operates six days a week and 
functions as an information clearinghouse.  The organization states on its website,  
Like other working poor, Garifuna families have significant social service 
needs. Through an agreement with Phipps Community Development 
Corporation, a 35-year-old multi-service provider of educational, vocational 
and community development programs, the Garifuna Advocacy Center makes 
referrals and avails community members of English-as-a-Second. (Garifuna 
Coalition, USA, Inc. 2014) 
 
Although I inquired about the annual number of Garinagu receiving services from the 
organization during my May 2010 visit, a staff member informed me that a Garifuna woman had 
just received a MetroCard (public transportation card) to secure much needed services from 
PHIPPS Community Development Corporation.  It is therefore difficult to quantify the number 
of people that GCAC serves.  While the services that GCAU delivers to the Garifuna community 
are important, one observation is that GCAC did not invent the wheel, since it is delivering 
similar services once delivered by FEDOHNY.  Today, GCU is under the leadership of José 
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Francisco Ávila also the co-founder and president of New Horizon Investment Club.  Another 
observation is that judging from GCU’s administrators’ actions, they focus on promoting cultural 
and political activities in the United States more so than addressing land ownership and the land 
struggle in Honduras, which some members addressed before.  
According to Mario Moran, who is linked to GCU, in 1986, he began to understand “what 
will happen with the north coast of Honduras (personal communication, May 25, 2010).  He 
rapidly began advising the Garinagu about the impending development of Honduras’ north coast.  
By 1996, Moran began joining forces with Garifuna activist Dionisia Amaya, who was the 
founder of MUGAMA and co-founder of FEDOHNY.  Moran “forecasted that the north coast of 
Honduras was going to become the most value property in Honduras and that unless we get 
involve two issues were going to take place: tourism is one.  And when tourism [develops], the 
Garinagu were going to start losing the land and that’s when I raised – basically what I said was 
we need to start taking action to legalize the ownership of our land – getting titles” (personal 
communication, May 25, 2010).  Moran’s reasons for forecasting impending development in 
Honduras’ north coast was because of his involvement in real estate (personal communication, 
May 25, 2010).  As a result of his “vision” of what would happen with Honduras’ north coast, he 
became involve with GCU and Casildo (M. Moran, personal communication, May 25, 2010).  In 
fact, Moran claims that he produced the documents used in the land struggle (personal 
communication, May 25, 2010).  In the end, Moran “withdrew” from the land struggle (personal 
communication, May 25, 2010).  However, he became more interested in investing in the tourism 
industry in Honduras and empowering the Garinagu politically in New York City. 
In recent years, some Garinagu focused on integrating their community into the Bronx’s 
political landscape.  As his GCU’s predecessor did before him, José Francisco Ávila carried the 
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baton.  In 1999, José Francisco Ávila’s twin brother, Tomás Alberto Ávila, wrote his first 
proposal calling for the creation of The Garifuna Nation, Inc., which would serve as an umbrella 
organization focusing on the Garinagu’s economic, social, and political advancement.  
Functioning as a “civic clearinghouse” in New York City, The Garifuna Nation would channel 
the Garinagu’s political concerns to officials at local, state, and federal levels (Ávila 2008:92).  
To expand the Garinagu’s political activities, on May 10, 1999 Tomás Alberto Ávila submitted 
his second proposal titled “Garifuna Political Action Committee” (GAPAC).  GAPAC’s mission 
was “to influence the political process in the state of New York in order to improve the quality of 
life of Garinagu and urban communities” (J. Ávila & T. Ávila 2008:35).  To achieve this, he 
envisioned voter registration drives to encourage Garinagu to participate in the electoral process.  
Neither The Garifuna Nation, Inc. nor GAPAC materialized.  However, by 2010, GCU held its 
first “The Garifuna Voter Education and Registration Project” (Garifuna Coalition, USA, Inc. 
2014.).  The project’s objective was to “register and mobilize 12,000 new Garifuna voters for the 
2012 general election and the 2013 New York Local Elections!” (Garifuna Coalition, USA, Inc. 
2014).  To register Garinagu voters, GCU set-up tables with two staff members at Ferry Point, 
Bill Rainey, and Crotona parks in the Bronx, and at Linden Park in Brooklyn.  In addition, 
GCU’s organizers with The Garifuna Voter Education and Registration Project held workshops 
at Casa Yurumein and The Garifuna Advocacy Center in the South Bronx, and the Biko 
Transformation Center in Brooklyn (Garifuna Coalition, USA, Inc. 2014).  
José Francisco Ávila revived GAPAC in 2004 as the Honduran American Political Action 
Committee (HAMPAC).  On February 9, 2004, he authored a press release defining HAMPAC’s 
mission as focusing “on voter education, grassroots organizing, issue advocacy, and candidate 
endorsement” (2004:1).  A month after forming HAMPAC, José Francisco Ávila announced that 
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it would participate in the New York State Assembly Puerto Rican/Hispanic Task Force and 
attended the Annual Legislative Conference, better known as Somos el Futuro.  By 2009, the 
Garifuna leaders selected Guatemalan born Garifuna Jerry Castro-Cayetano, GCU’s former 
executive director who had held various low-level political posts in New York City, as a viable 
candidate to fulfill their political aspirations.  For these Garifuna leaders, Castro’s participation 
exposed Garinagu as a powerful and recognizable cultural “brand” (M. Moran, personal 
communication, June 8, 2009).  To their dismay, and seemingly without providing a reason, 
Cayetano vanished and resurfaced in Houston, Texas.  For Moran, the Garifuna’s identity 
symbolizes a marketing tool for political integration into New York City’s political landscape 
and an entrance into the capitalist metropolis.  Positioning Garinagu as a recognizable brand also 
means establishing political alliances, as GCU has done with Puerto Rican politicians such as 
Reverend and New York State Senator Rubén Díaz, his son and current Bronx Borough 
President, Rubén Díaz, Jr., his son’s predecessor Adolfo Carrión, or with African American New 
York State Assemblyman Eric A. Stevenson (M. Moran, personal communication, May 25, 
2010).  The new Garifuna leaders and middle class’s political engagements in New York City 
are, in their view, a means of attaining both political and social legitimacy in their place of 
residence.  Judging from these developments, their political engagements in New York City 
suggest that they are disengaged from their homeland on Honduras’ north coast. 
While GCU and a host of other Garifuna organizations had been formed in the United 
States, the Garinagu simultaneously conceived several organizations in Central America.  In 
1994, the Garifuna leaders in Belize invited various Garinagu and other black people from 
Central America to attend a meeting in Dangriga, Belize (T. Ávila & J. Ávila 2008:39).  
Following this meeting, in 1995 they formed the Central American Black Organization 
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(Organización Negra Centroamericana, ONECA).  Comprised of members from Guatemala, 
Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panamá, Honduras, and Belize, and with at least twenty-eight affiliates in 
Latin America, ONECA’s mission was “to establish a platform of unity, and organization as the 
basis for the identification and ultimate solution to the problems of the Central American(s) 
Black community” (T. Ávila & J. Ávila 2008:39).  Its annual assembly meetings are held in 
different Central American regions and in the United States.  Conceived as a unifying entity for 
people of African descent in the region, and headquartered in La Ceiba, ONECA’s existence, 
along with other Garifuna organizations, underscores the cross-border organizing efforts of 
people of African descent.  Although it is difficult to assess ONECA’s impact on the Garinagu 
and black people in Central America in general, it seems that it is still addressing relevant issues.  
An e-mail announcing ONECA’s General Assembly event held in Dangriga, Belize from 
December 2 to 5, 2009 outlines themes such as “land, territorial boundaries, food security, and 
land titles, traditionally Garifuna land” included in the assembly program.  Incorporating these 
issues into ONECA’s program suggests that there is a real concern with addressing the 
usurpation of the Garinagu’s land (Organización de Desarrollo Étnico Comunitario, personal 
communication, November 6, 2009).  Given my limited information about ONECA, it would 
require further research to ascertain its efficacy.   
Besides focusing on forming organizations since the Happy Land tragedy, the Garifuna 
leaders in the United States also focused on cultural concerns that they discussed in their various 
1991 and 1992 summit meetings.  For example, in commemorating their ancestors’ 1797 arrival 
to Honduras, on October 4, 1993, Tomás Alberto Ávila prepared a proposal calling for the 
creation of a bicentennial committee.  On June 10, 1995, the Bicentennial Committee Pro-
commemoration met at St. John Baptist Church in the South Bronx and assigned titles and duties 
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to the leadership.  This effort would be geographically connected because ODECO, OFRANEH, 
and other Garifuna organizations in Honduras participated in organizing the event (J. Ávila & T. 
Ávila 2008:25-28).  A year after the Bicentennial Committee Pro-commemoration met in New 
York City on March 24, 1996, various Garinagu met in La Ceiba.  
Several organizations sent representatives including Fred Batiz of The Organization for the 
Improvement of Punta Gorda (Organización Pro-mejoramiento de Punta Gorda), Tulio Mariano 
González of the Independent Center for the Development of Honduras (Centro Independiente 
para el Desarrollo de Honduras), ODECO’s Casildo, and OFRANEH’s Horacio Martinez Calix 
“to discuss the creation of a National Black organization which would coordinate all the issues 
dealing with the Black community and seek their solutions from the government” (J. Ávila & T. 
Ávila 2008:42).  The group formed a committee to address the bicentennial project and also 
sought to establish unity among the Garifuna leaders which eventually never materialized.  
Instead, Iriona states that the bicentennial project drove a wedge between ODECO and 
OFRANEH in Honduras.  Casildo prepared and submitted a proposal to the Honduran Minister 
of Cultural Affairs and to the National Congress on April 11, 1996.  In the proposal, the 
committee requested $500,000 to cover the cost of the event.  President Carlos Roberto Reina 
Idiáquez (1994-1998) supported the proposal (J. Ávila & T. Ávila 2008:42). 
On May 30, 1996, the Honduras National Congress passed Decree Law 70-96 declaring 
1997 the “year of Garifuna Bicentennial” and April 12 as Garifuna Day.  By June 14, 1996, the 
state issued commemorative postage stamps featuring a Garifuna drum and a Garifuna John 
Canoe dancer wearing a mask.  Reina Idiáquez’s presumed social inclusion and unwavering 
support culminated with the passage of executive Decree Law 017-96 on October 2, 1996 calling 
for the formation of a presidential commission to oversee the bicentennial event.  Seemingly 
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jubilant over the state’s recognition, on October 25, 1996, the bicentennial committee financed 
Casildo’s trip to New York City and lavished him with a reception.  Casildo also spoke at 
Howard University’s Ralph J. Bunche International Affairs Center, where he focused on 
Garinagu’s presence in Honduras and the “status of Blacks in Honduras” (J. Ávila & T. Ávila 
2008:43-45).  For the Garinagu involved in the organizing of the bicentennial project, socializing 
with government bureaucrats and securing state recognition may have been a significant 
milestone.  
Judging from the Garifuna leaders’ reception of the Honduran government’s actions, it 
appears that they perceived their spatially connected cultural activism as yet another significant 
victory in defying spaces of oppression.  Perhaps blinded by their presumed victory, they ignored 
that the political regime in Honduras must have viewed the Garinagu’s bicentennial 
remembrance projects as an ideal distraction from neoliberal policies that dominated the 
country’s economic and political scene and the Garinagu’s dispossession from their land.  The 
political regime may have been using the Garinagu to organize the cultural event as something 
that would attract visitors to their tourism project.  In his examination of money, consumption, 
and tourism, geographer Luke Desforges states that it has become important in recent years in 
understanding the significance of “places and people” in tourism geography in relation to the 
formation of new economies (2001:353).  The Honduran government and local oligarchs have 
been pursuing such endeavors using the Garifuna’s culture as their commodity.  These so-called 
exotic beings (Garinagu) delivered and they are still delivering.  In drawing from professor of 
pedagogy and African American studies, Nagueyalti Warren’s analysis of black leaders in the 
United States, the spatial interconnectivity of the Garifuna’s cultural activism did  “little to 
eliminate economic and political oppression” which has only worsened (1990:26).  It also failed 
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to unite the Garifuna leaders as initially intended or to open the eyes of the middle class.  Instead, 
OFRANEH and ODECO, the most visible Garifuna organizations in Honduras, grew further 
apart.  Consequently, today the Garinagu’s remembrance has become a contentious issue among 
the Garifuna leaders in Honduras, as each seeks to outdo the other for attention.  In the meantime 
Rosa Armenia observes, “the enemy is watching us,” meaning the Honduran politicians and 
elites, as most Garifuna leaders seek to maintain their quasi activism and visibility while 
neglecting their landlessness status (personal communication, January 23, 2011).  It also appears 
that the Garifuna leaders in the United States have distanced themselves from the remembrance 
event in Honduras.  The Garinagu held an event advertised as Baruwa Garifuna (Garifuna 
Nation) at Casa Yurumein on April 12, 2014.  In attendance were the Garinagu from New 
Orleans, Los Angeles, and from other regions.  What this development signals is that the 
Garifuna community in the Diaspora has redefined its relationship with place – that is Honduras’ 
north coast.  
ODECO’s Formation and Practices 
Some former OFRANEH’s members formed ODECO in 1992.  Dosanto affirms that 
ODECO’s formation is a “product of [the Honduran] government [’s] initiatives” (personal 
communication, December 20, 2013).  In 1991, former president of the Honduran Medical 
Employees Union, Celeo Álvarez Casildo attended one of the summits that the Garinagu had 
organized in New York City (Ávila, n.d.).  A year later, Casildo, who was also a former 
OFRANEH’s member, together with other Garinagu in Honduras formed ODECO to address the 
needs of people of African descent in Honduras.  As stated on ODECO’s blog site, its mission is 
to, 
reduce economic, social, political, cultural violations and environmental 
exclusion of Afro-Hondurans communities and population through advocacy, 
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awareness, training and the defense of human rights with a clear vocation to 
support the processes of integration and democratization of the Central 
American descendant civil society. (Organización de Desarrollo Étnico 
Comunitario, n.d.)  
 
Considered to be the youngest labor leader in Honduras, Casildo needed bodyguards for 
protection during his years as a labor activist (S. Iriona, personal communication, March 13, 
2012).  In 1992, on the eve of Columbus Day or the “‘Day of the Race’” as it is named in 
Honduras, Casildo organized a demonstration in La Ceiba called the Peaceful March of 
Resistance: Indigenous, Black, Popular, in which different social actors participated (e.g. 
Garinagu, labor activists, environmentalists, and religious leaders) (Anderson 2009:125).  
Despite ODECO’s early activism, Mollett states that ODECO’s formation interrupted existing 
cooperative relationships between the Garinagu and Miskitos because the Garinagu turned their 
attention to “their rights to communal village land titles” whereas Miskitos stripped the Garinagu 
from their claim as an “indigenous group” (2006:95).  According to Mollett, the Garinagu and 
Miskitos comprised the grassroots organization named Comité Vigilente de Tierras (Vigilant 
Land Committee) today known as RAYAKA in the community of Belén (2006:95).  Yet, in spite 
of the conflicts ODECO’s formation created among the Miskitos and the Garinagu in Honduras, 
in the United States, the Garifuna activists began cooperating with ODECO.  Iriona frequently 
traveled to Honduras in the early 1990s to work for ODECO as a consultant (personal 
communication, March 13, 2012).   
We can trace the building of Casildo’s image and power to the Garifuna bicentennial 
remembrance in 1997.  Positioning himself as the Garinagu’s only spokesperson with culturally-
oriented rhetoric, for most Garinagu today Casildo is part of the very culture he sought to 
initially undermine in his early years as a labor activist in Honduras.  The Garinagu’s conflicting 
relationship with Casildo suggests why many of them view him as a paradoxical figure.  In 
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Honduras, Casildo aligns himself with the Honduran government and elites.  He also maintains a 
base among mostly educated urban Garinagu.  Moreover, he enjoys broad support from the 
Hondurans Against AIDS, Inc. and to a certain degree GCU.  Since Casildo attracts sizeable 
international funding, there is a consensus too among his critics that he is a shrewd, organized, 
and focused person (R. Armenia, personal communication, January 23, 2012; R. Contreras, 
personal communication, February 20, 2011; I. Chávez, personal communication, April 24, 
2010).  
Casildo’s critics also accuse him of banning critical voices from ODECO.  For example, 
seasoned activist Isidro Chávez “asked him [Casildo] why a new person cannot be selected to 
oversee ODECO” (personal communication, April 24, 2010).  Casildo did not answer Chávez’s 
query.  Instead, Casildo never invited Chávez back to another ODECO meeting.  Given 
Casildo’s tactics and the fact that he has been ODECO’s president since the organization’s 
inception in 1992, Chávez explains that Casildo “created an organization for his own survival 
because it is said, that to see him nowadays, one must make an appointment.  Well, that is 
ODECO” (I. Chávez, personal communication, April 24, 2010).  It seems that Casildo’s survival 
is based upon conformity with the Honduran government and elites since he has ceased to 
challenge the power structure; instead, he has become part of it.  For Chávez, making an 
appointment to see Casildo signifies a departure from the Garinagu’s social interaction.  In other 
words, it signifies that different forms of social relations that contradict their traditions mediate 
the Garinagu’s socialization in the city.  In Garifuna communities, one does not call someone to 
meet.  A person just stops by and chats with that person because the Garinagu’s interaction is 
generally ruled by certain types of spatial proximity.  This interaction has been fragmented since 
many Garinagu in their respective communities now own cell phones and televisions and have 
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internet access.  As I learned during my fieldwork in 2006, access to the internet has been 
facilitated by the businesses that the Garinagu residing in the United States have established in 
their respective communities in Honduras as evident with the satellite dishes shown in figure 4.1.  
Among the Garifuna elders, access to this technology has fragmented the Garifuna society.  
Thus, making an appointment is viewed by many of them to be a socio-spatial barrier that has 
ruptured cultural practices such as gathering around the community elders to listen to stories 
about what happened at the farm or while fishing or travelling overseas.  
 
                   Figure 4.1 Satellite Dishes in Tibiniriba (Rio Esteban)  
                                            Departamento of Colón 
                          Source: Doris Garcia, 2006 
 Throughout my ethnographic fieldwork, several Garinagu provided me with telephone 
numbers to other Garinagu to interview.  During each exchange not a single Garifuna indicated 
that they would first contact that person.  The reason for this is because Garinagu’s social 
interaction is still governed by certain cultural practices.  Thus, even if their social interaction is 
subjected to substantial changes under different social relations, they still are resisting certain 
practices, though they may not be aware of it.  Don Mitchell defines resistance as an “attempt to 
redefine or break down the structures of power that govern resister’s lives” (2000:148).  
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Although Mitchell is primarily referring to large groups such as labor groups, one can apply the 
same principle to individuals.  Chávez engages in small-scale resistance as he seeks to maintain 
the Garinagu’s social interactions, which in his view the urban Garifuna middle class refutes.  
These urban Garifuna middle class, like their counterparts in New York City, adhere to 
different social relations that fit their elitist-oriented politics, bourgeoisie identity, status, and role 
however nominal their position and power are in the broader social structure.  Roberto Contreras 
echoes Chávez’s sentiment.  He states that Casildo “has so many contacts, so many connections 
with all the governments, but sadly comrade those contacts only benefit him personally, to 
strengthen him economically, and the little group that surrounds him, but not the people, not the 
people” (R. Contreras, personal communication, February 20, 2011).  Others are more 
diplomatic about what they say about Casildo.  Armando Dosanto states that politically Casildo 
is “well with any president that is in power and that is good, that’s his politics; the only way he 
can achieve what he wants or what he needs by which he can help the communities, and that is 
not bad.  The problem is that we spend time critiquing that” (C. Casildo, personal 
communication, March 29, 2012).  To probe into what these Garinagu are claiming, I examined 
organization documents which ODECO circulated on the Garifunalink listserv and archived on 
its internet blog site. 
I will not list all of the documents Casildo circulated in Garifunalink or archived in 
ODECO’s blog site, but will only cite a few.  One of Casildo’s e-mails announced the graduation 
of eighth participants of a school for training for Afrodescendant leaders in human rights (C. 
Casildo, personal communication, June 19, 2009).  Gaining knowledge about human rights in 
Honduras is a much needed skills and very important training.  Unable to locate the 2009 
program, I turned my attention to the 2011 training literature.  The module lists “Afro-
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descendant population in the Americas, philosophical conception and national and international 
laws for the Protection of the Human Rights, the experience and struggle of people of 
Afrodescendants and the defense of their communities rights: Garifuna people’s case” 
(Organización de Desarrollo Étnico Comunitario, 2011).  This is certainly a promising module 
because it addresses the oppressed people’s concerns.  Forty-seven people, mostly blacks from 
Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Honduras, and one Miskito attended the training headed by Dr. 
Marco Antonio Sagastume Gemmel from the Universidad San Carlos de Guatemala, another 
faculty member from the Regional University Center of the Atlantic Coastline (Centro 
Universitario Regional del Litoral Atlántico, CURLA), a regional branch of the National 
Autonomous University of Honduras (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Honduras, UNAH), 
and a Costa Rican faculty member (Organización de Desarrollo Étnico Comunitario, 2011).  
Most participants were in their late teens to early twenties, but there were also three adults in 
their forties, including a Garifuna activist from the United States.  
The training spanned four months and each week participants traveled to and lodged in 
ODECO’s facility.  ODECO conducted the training, fed participants, and transported them to 
different communities to view hospitals or schools conditions (B. Cayetano, personal 
communication, December 6, 2013).  ODECO also reimbursed participants for their commute.  
Several organizations sponsored ODECO’s training including the Ford Foundation (B. Cayetano, 
personal communication, December 6, 2013).  Two questions must be asked: what information 
did the facilitators present to the participants and how did the facilitators frame the information. 
If the facilitators informed participants that Honduras is a country of laws and that they must 
learn these laws to understand what is happening in their respective communities or nationally, 
that is good.  For example, Article 68 of the Honduran Constitution states, “Every person has the 
102 
 
right to have his physical, mental, and moral integrity respected” (Honduran Const. art. 68).  
However, judging from the rampant human right violations against Hondurans, it is difficult to 
believe that the country has laws when the government does not follow or apply them fairly.   If 
participants learned that the state policies are in part the cause of the endemic poverty, murder, 
and violence against grassroots organizations and human right activists, then the training served 
its purpose in addressing oppression and inequality in Honduras.  I asked Brigido Cayetano from 
the United States about what he learned about human rights after attending the training.  He 
replied, “the training was formidable.  I learned about Malcolm X, Nelson Mandela, Rosa Parks, 
Joseph Satuye and many other black heroes” (B. Cayetano, personal communication, December 
6, 2013).  I asked Cayetano to elaborate about his understanding of human rights.  He replied, 
“you have the right from the time you are in your mother’s belly to freedom of speech.  This is 
why the United Nations wrote human rights [The Universal Declaration of Human Rights] in 
1948” (B. Cayetano, personal communication, December 6, 2013).  Lastly, I asked Cayetano if 
he thought that having over half of the population living in poverty with high unemployment and 
illiteracy rates is a violation of human rights, he did not answer.  Instead, he praised the training 
and ODECO, and wondered how much ODECO paid for each participant since it provided them 
with lodging and food throughout the duration of the training.  
Again, while ODECO’s training is important, Cayetano’s accolades and understanding of 
human rights suggest that the facilitators may have used a non-critical frame.  Cayetano’s stance 
also reflects Casildo’s politics.  I asked various veteran Garifuna activists how these trained 
young men and women helped the Garifuna communities overcome displacement from their 
lands in Honduras or address the endemic violence?  They all agreed that they do not see the 
usefulness of these trainings because they believe they are “very much supported by the 
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government” since it is not “subversive” (A. Dosanto, personal communication, March 29, 
2012).  In other words, such human rights training does not pose a threat to the status quo 
because it is not critical of state oppression and terror carried out against Garinagu and any other 
Honduran who pose a threat to the power structure.  It is therefore Casildo’s accommodationist 
approach that resonates with the Honduran state and elites, which maintains his power and what 
some Garinagu refer to as his “castle” a reference to Satuye Cultural Center where ODECO is 
headquartered in La Ceiba (A. Dosanto, personal communication, March 29, 2012).  
Politically, Casildo launched the Campaign Pledge (Compromiso de Campaña) in 2001 
with the presidential election of Maduro Joest, a Panamanian-born right-wing National Party 
member.  Every four years since then, presidential candidates, regardless of their political 
affiliation, have visited ODECO’s office to sign the pledge designed to “improve the political, 
economic, social, cultural, technical, and scientific and environmental conditions of the 
Afrohonduran people and their communities” (Organización de Desarrollo Étnico Comunitario, 
personal communication, April 17, 2009).  In the aftermath of the June 28, 2009 coup d’état 
which ousted democratically elected President José Manuel Zelaya Rosales, a Liberal Party 
member, and installed de facto President Roberto Micheletti, right-wing National Party member 
Lobo Sosa apparently won the presidential election of November 2009 with the U.S. 
government’s consent.  Lobo Sosa signed ODECO’s pledge, which was in his best interest since 
ODECO’s blackness contributed to legitimatizing the illegitimate government.  
Promising to govern in a “humanist” and “Christian” way, meaning the bible in one hand 
and the gun in the other, Lobo Sosa put his approach to work (“Honduras Nov 29, 2009.  Porfirio 
Lobo Sosa Presidente Electo!”).  He first severed “dialogue with ethnic activists” and dismissed 
“indigenous professionals from government institutions for their political affiliations” (Anderson 
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2012:54).  Next, Lobo Sosa carried out repressive policies against dissenting voices such as 
journalists and activists in general.  Yet, despite Lobo Sosa’s actions, through the Legislative 
Decree 203-2011 of October 12, 2010, his government formed The Secretary of State for the 
Development of Indigenous Peoples and Afro-Honduran (La Secretaría de Estado para el 
Desarrollo de los Pueblos Indígenas y Afrohondureños, SEDINAFROH) (La Secretaría de 
Estado para el Desarrollo de los Pueblos Indígenas y Afrohondureños, n.d.).  SEDINAFROH’s 
vision is “to improve the quality of life of the indigenous and Afro-Honduran population through 
economic, cultural, political and social productive development” (La Secretaría de Estado para el 
Desarrollo de los Pueblos Indígenas y Afrohondureños, n.d.).  
Headed by former ODECO’s treasurer Luis Green Morales, SEDINAFROH is a result of 
“Campaign Commitment signed by the constitutional President of the Republic, Don Porfirio 
Lobo Sosa with ODECO March 19, 2009 as part of the Second National Solidarity Conference 
held in Tegucigalpa” (Secretaría de Estado en los Despachos de Pueblos Indígenas y  
Afrohondureños, n.d.).  SEDINOFROH’s formation upset many indigenous groups in Honduras 
because they felt that the Garinagu would be afforded more attention than them, meaning 
indigenous population such as the Pech, Lenca, and other groups.  In reality, this was not the 
case.  Facilitated by ODECO, I believe the Lobo Sosa government used Garinagu as a stabilizing 
group, although they were equally targeted by state-sponsored violence under the Michelitti’s 
regime as evident with the closing of the First Garifuna Hospital (“Medical Education 
Cooperation with Cuba,” 2009).  In visiting SEDINAFROH’s website to find out about projects 
carried out in any community, not a single one is listed (Secretaría de Estado en los Despachos 
de Pueblos Indígenas y Afrohondureños, n.d.).  Yet, the Garifuna organizations or individuals in 
the United States did not voice concerns or perhaps inquired about what projects SEDINAFROH 
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pursued and completed.  Instead, they seem to have interpreted tokenism as Garinagu forming 
part of the power structure.  In fact, the formation of SEDINAFROH is just another way of 
creating the illusion of inclusion.  Albeit nominally, Casildo has become part of the caudillismo 
(authoritarian power) in Honduras.  It is this system imposed on him by the Honduran state, 
which he embraces, that allows him to form part of the political economy.  In turn, Casildo 
speaks out on issues he and the state deem appropriate and retrieves when necessary.  Case in 
point, Casildo did not utter a word about the 2009 coup d’état.  It is thus Casildo’s positionality 
that matters to him rather than the Garinagu people’s dispossession from their land and their 
struggle against oppression and domination. 
 Collectivism or Individualism? 
We have seen thus far that the Garinagu formed different organizations with dissimilar 
specialties both in the United States and in Honduras.  It is therefore appropriate to discuss how 
their organizations helped the Garinagu defend place during the early stages of neoliberalism in 
Honduras.  I will elaborate on neoliberalism’s consequences in chapter seven.  In this segment, I 
focus on the Garifuna’s behaviors as they responded to global economic forces.  Did they operate 
collectively or individually?  In the period after the Happy Land Social Club tragedy, the 
Garifuna activists in Honduras and the United States engaged in a sustained land struggle 
movement.  By the early 1990s, the Garinagu’s dispossession from their land became central to 
OFRANEH’s activism and in framing its discourse.  OFRANEH linked Garinagu’s removal 
from their land with racism.  It also denounced Honduran state-sponsored violence against the 
Garinagu.  In the United States, the Garifuna activists collected signatures to send to the 
Honduran government and organized meetings to raise consciousness about the Garinagu’s land 
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usurpation.  Iris Cristales defines her duty to mobilize as a way of defending “Garifuna 
patrimony” (personal communication, June 7, 2010). 
While the Garinagu organized in New York City, a more vigorous struggle developed in 
Honduras.  On October 11, 1996, OFRANEH and ODECO organized The March of the Drums 
(La Marcha de los Tambores) to Honduras’ capital, Tegucigalpa denouncing land usurpation.  I 
elaborate on this matter more extensively in chapter seven.  By the late 1990s, as the Honduran 
government pressed on with its neoliberal economic policies, ODECO’s cohorts in the Bronx, 
Casildo, and staff traveled widely denouncing the growing land violations in Honduras.  In 
Honduras, OFRANEH mounted its own struggle separate from ODECO.  To denounce land 
violations in Honduras, in the late 1990s, Pabla Trujillo, a member of the ODECO’s camp, along 
with several others visited the United Nations, the Washington Office on Latin America 
(WOLA), and the Organization of American States (OAS) in Washington, D.C.  During one 
meeting with OAS members, Trujillo and company were informed, “you have to solve things 
first with your government; you have to sit down with them and solve it. And if they don’t do 
anything and the problem continues, then you have to bring us like what you did in trying to 
negotiate with them” (P. Trujillo, personal communication, May 24, 2010).  Contrary to OAS 
assertions, Trujillo states that the United Nations representatives informed Garinagu petitioners 
that “within the whole human rights component there is no land . . . there is nothing that will 
protect your land during this time” (personal communication, May 24, 2010).  The United 
Nation’s seemingly dismissive words do not reverberate with its earlier reception of Lombardo 
Lacayo Sambula, one of the leading and revered leaders of the Garifuna land struggle in 
Honduras in the early 1990s who came to the United Nations to denounce the Garinagu’s land 
usurpation in the village of Limón.  I elaborate on this development at length in chapter seven. 
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After futilely lobbying INGOs in the United States, ODECO’s cohorts met with the 
Honduran government, but without success.  They then hired a lawyer from Arizona State 
University to represent the Garinagu in Honduras, but again to no avail (P. Trujillo, personal 
communication, May 24, 2010).  Meanwhile, OFRANEH’s representative, too, traveled to the 
United Nations to address the land conflict issue with the help of Garinagu in New York City.  
As stated by veteran activist Rosa Armenia, OFRANEH’s representatives were more concerned 
with keeping leadership of the organization than fostering an inclusive movement.  Casildo’s 
actions reflected a similar position on power-sharing.  According to Armenia who participated in 
organizing the meetings for the Garifuna leaders, Casildo declared himself to be the Garifuna 
community’s sole spokesperson (personal communication, May 24, 2010).  Regardless of the 
approach each camp employed, it is clear that both sides organized domestically and 
internationally to draw attention to the land struggle in Honduras, a conflict embedded in global 
economic structural forces.  The Garinagu’s international activities reveal that their activism was 
a result of global economic and political forces resulting from the spatial mobility of capitalism 
and its concomitant geographical differences such as class, gender, and ethnicity.  
The intensification of these processes generates a struggle over place between local people, 
state, global financial institutions, and multinational corporations.  Through the Garinagu’s 
international activism and with a common strategy in forming collective action, they came to the 
United Nations’ doorsteps.  More significantly, it was their defense of place that also motivated 
them.  I am complementing Escobar’s analogy of the defense of place with geographer Sally 
Marston’s concept of “domesticating the state” (2004:178).  Speaking of the United States 
government, Marston explains that women’s organizing played a significant role in pressuring 
the state to take a more proactive role in “increasing responsibility for public and social welfare” 
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(2004:178).  The Garifuna leaders sought to domesticate the Honduran government by applying 
political pressure through the United Nations to protect their territory, resources, and 
communities on Honduras’ north coast.  Among the Garinagu’s international activists, the 
common theme that brought them together was dispossession, meaning the loss of all form of 
rights such as land, human and environmental rights (Harvey 2005:178).  Yet, the Garifuna 
leaders engaged in intraorganizational feuds caused by two factors.  First, the Garifuna leaders 
did not see their international exposure contributing to existing ideological divisions because 
they were more concerned with safeguarding their popularity.  This lack of vision put their 
international activism at risk. 
Absence of vision, combined with difficulties in maintaining their international activism, 
complicated the work of new Garifuna leaders and suggested that international activisms “are 
hard to construct, are difficult to maintain” because each group promotes its own specific ideas 
about how leadership should be shaped (Tarrow 2001:2).  Yet, the urban-based emerging 
Garifuna leaders “encouraged” accessing INGOs because they provide “opportunities and 
incentives for actors . . .” (Tarrow 2001:2).  Second, although differences reflected in the 
Garinagu’s intraorganizational conflict speaks directly to the difficulties in maintaining cross-
border activism, it also informs us that solidarity adopts its own particular set of boundaries, 
boundaries that are grounded in specific individual interests and political allegiances that can 
fundamentally divert activism or weaken it structurally.  What we see here is that activism is not 
geographically isolated.  Activism is spatially mobile because colonialism transformed human 
geography and capitalism altered social relations as evident with migration.  Those Garinagu 
residing in the United States provided activists in Honduras with the resources to mobilize in 
defense of place.   
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Specific boundaries, individual interests, and political allegiances fracturing the Garinagu’s 
spatial activism did not derail their efforts.  In Brooklyn, they held a Garifuna Leadership Retreat 
from May 7 to 9, 1999 at one of their comrade’s home.  Attended by Central Americans and 
Garinagu residing in New York City, the retreat theme was Leadership for the Next Millennium. 
Prominent in the meeting’s agenda were the Garifuna land crisis and Article 107 of the 
Honduran Constitution.  Attendees might have considered the retreat to be a regional preparatory 
meeting for the July 2001 United Nations World Conference Against Racism (WCAR) held in 
Durban, South Africa, during which an estimated fifteen Garinagu from Honduras, including 
Cristales from the Bronx and ODECO’s group, attended.  Members of OFRANEH also attended 
the conference.  At WCAR, the Garinagu broadened their platform by framing their discourse 
around human rights.  Drawing from political scientist and human rights activist Kwame Dixon’s 
analysis of black people organizing tactics in Latin America, Garinagu’s discourse gave rise to a 
“black identity-based organizing” (2008:85).  The Garifuna leaders’ discourse while attending 
WCAR must be included in Dixon’s analysis because they contextualized land dispossession and 
injustice they continue to experience in Honduras over a decade later.  Interestingly, two months 
prior to WCAR, on May 18, 2001, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) held its first Proclamation of Masterpieces of the Oral and Intangible 
Heritage of Humanity in Paris recognizing nineteen endangered ethnic groups as a “cultural 
heritage,” among the Garinagu (“United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
People,” n.d.).  This recognition came about because of the intense organizing of various 
Garifuna organizations from Belize and with support from Nicaragua, Honduras, and Guatemala 
(“United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People,” n.d.).  
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UNESCO’s proclamation outlined threats to the Garinagu’s cultural survival and included 
an action plan tackling a host of social problems the “Garifuna Nation” faced, especially land 
rights and racism (“United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People,” n.d.).  
UNESCO’s recognition is revered by Garifuna organizations.  For example, OFRANEH defines 
this recognition as a “distinction that possesses a nominative weight” (Organización Fraternal 
Negra Hondureña, n.d.).  From OFRANEH’s vantage point, this validation epitomizes 
belonging.  UNESCO’s recognition is also included in The People’s Garifuna Dictionary.  
Evidently, UNESCO’s recognition appears to be a “global brand whose seal is slapped on 
[people] . . .” (“Is Unesco Damaging the World's Treasures?” 2009).  Perhaps, black people in 
Latin America, as may be the case elsewhere, see UNESCO’s recognition as an affirmation of 
their existence as social actors living in an oppressive and racist society, and as a way of 
emerging as subjects in their struggle.  For the Garifuna activists, UNESCO’s recognition may 
represent a means by which to connect with INGOs, defy local government, and underpin their 
activism in the face of incessant economic and state violence.  While largely symbolic, in many 
ways, UNESCO’s recognition remains the weapon of choice among new Garifuna leaders in 
framing their discourse and in internationalizing their land struggle.  Though the Garinagu’s 
recognition by the United Nations serves as another resource in addressing their land struggle, 
racism, and other related socio-spatial conditions, the reality is that it does not curtail Honduran 
government repression or exploitative global economic forces.  The recognition has become an 
additional tactical strategy that the Garinagu can use in challenging oppression.   
The Garinagu’s international activists also sought to counter global neoliberal forces by 
devising their own economic plans.  For instance, during ONECA’s third annual general 
assembly meeting in 1998 in Bocas del Toro, Panamá, an area populated by poor indigenous 
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people and people of African descent, ONECA embraced the “La Playita” tourism project, an 
economic endeavor developed by Panamanians in response to the tourism efforts dominating 
Honduras’ economic policies.  The Garinagu developed the La Playita project during their 
January 1999 meeting held at GCU.  At the time, GCU vice-president Mirtha Colón designated 
attendees José Francisco Ávila and Tomás Alberto Ávila “to lead the development of the 
Tourism Master Plan for the Garifuna Communities of Honduras” because of their real estate 
background and “commitment to the economic development of the Garifuna communities” 
(Ávila n.d.:15).  The Ávilas assembled a team comprised of Garinagu, Panamanians, and an 
American.  José Francisco Ávila wrote a report identifying, among other things, the geographical 
concentration of Garifuna communities.  Following several revisions, Dionisia Amaya Bonilla 
hand-delivered the report to Casildo in La Ceiba in 1999.  Casildo rejected the report.  José 
Francisco Ávila believed that Casildo rejected it because he disagreed with the “inclusion of 
[other] Garifuna organizations, since . . . ODECO should be the only organization included” 
(Ávila n.d.:16).  
Conflicts in perspective between Ávila and Casildo led to Ávila’s departure.  Despite his 
leaving, ONECA used Ávila’s report for its “Central American African Descendants Integrated 
Sustainable Development Master Plan” presented at the 2000 Intercontinental African 
Descendants Summit held in La Ceiba, Honduras (Ávila n.d.:16).  Due to a lack of information, 
it is difficult to assess the efficacy of this plan.  Some Garinagu also focused on devising a 
tourism plan in the Garifuna communities.  Within their strategies, there were noticeable changes 
unfolding.  Many Garifuna activists construed Honduras’ north coast as the cradle of their 
identity and culture, but were yielding to unprecedented global economic forces which were 
altering “the local . . . place, labor, and tradition” and substituting it with spectacle of 
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consumption (Escobar 2001:141).  Most Garinagu did not show much interest in the tourism plan 
discussions, but Garifuna activists, including Iriona and Casildo, worked with Panamanians of 
African descent employed by The Church Center for the United Nations to find a solution to the 
land violations taking place as a result of the tourism development projects being vigorously 
pursued by the Honduran government (S. Iriona, personal communication, March 29, 2012). 
Internal conflicts seething within the international nexus unquestionably began to rupture 
the new Garifuna leaders “imagined communities” (Anderson 1991:xi).  Although Benedict 
Anderson’s usage of this concept refers to national identity, I am borrowing it and modifying its 
meaning to refer to the Garifuna leaders’ values.  Within this group, different ideological camps 
developed as they struggled for supremacy and material interests.  Concern with power thus took 
precedence over devising a robust strategy to confront the local and global scale of capitalism, 
and to defy its impact on the Garinagu and their communities.  In their quest to safeguard their 
imagined community, the Garifuna leaders, particularly those representing ODECO and GCU, 
ignored tensions developing within their organizing.  This was due to the fact that they saw their 
educational background, mechanisms in resolving the Garinagu’s plight, and engagement with 
INGOs and the state as shared values that sheltered them as a group in position of leadership.  
Rather than devising a more inclusive approach, they consolidated their power with Casildo as 
their leader.  As the Garifuna leaders from the United States withdrew, the Garinagu’s land 
usurpation only escalated.  Their withdrawal does not imply that it was the root cause for the 
escalation.  What it implies is that it fragmented the unity that they could have formed.  
As the Garifuna leaders in the United States withdrew, some Garifuna leaders in Honduras 
continued the struggle.  In 2000, OFRANEH president Gregoria Flores brought Garifuna land 
activist Alfredo López Álvarez’s case before the Inter-American Human Rights Commission. 
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The Honduran police detained López Álvarez on April 27, 1997 and “jailed [him] for seven 
years on trumped-up drug charges” (Ryan, 2008; Inter-American of Human Rights Commission, 
n.d.).  The new generation of Garifuna activists has not ignored OFRANEH’s activism.   
ELAM’s graduates follow OFRANEH’s philosophy.  For these activists, OFRANEH is the 
organization they respect most and support today in the struggle because they “want more real 
struggles, struggles very much linked to the community reality, but struggles that respond to 
what is happening in our communities and which requires a spokesperson of the organization in 
denouncing what is really happening today in our black communities” (J. Espinosa, personal 
communication, September 23, 2011).  For these new activists OFRANEH represents the needs 
of black people and the real struggle.  They along with veteran activists see OFRANEH as their 
“base organization – the organization that truly represents the demands of our Garifuna people.  
It gives us the advantages that we can elevate our voices, we can transcend internationally with 
our demands, and we can one way or another carry out our actions of community mobilization” 
(J. Espinosa, personal communication September 23, 2011).   
Today, OFRANEH, headed by Miriam Miranda, is considered by veteran Garifuna activists 
to be “vigilant of any violations; it is the one which jumps and tells the government to stop that” 
(A. Dosanto, personal communication, March 29, 2011).  OFRANEH’s vigilance has earned its 
followers a place on the Honduran government’s and elites’ target list, figuratively speaking.  On 
May 30, 2005, former OFRANEH’s director Gregoria Flores suffered gunshot wounds in broad 
daylight while “collecting testimony to present before the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights” (“Garífuna Indigenous Activists Under Attack in Honduras,” 2005).  On March 28, 
2011, the Honduran national police shot Miriam Miranda in the stomach with a tear gas canister 
and illegally detained her (personal communication, March 29, 2011).  Since OFRANEH’s 
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members prevented the Honduran government’s control over their organization in the 1980s, 
unlike ODECO, OFRANEH has become the oppositional black organization in Honduras.  
Embedded in social and spatial contradictions, the Garifuna’s international activism resulted 
from powerful global economic and political forces.   
The Garifuna Nation 
 The significance in addressing the Garifuna Nation is to show how the Garinagu in the 
United States have drifted away from the land struggle in Honduras.  Their actions suggest that 
nationhood is not based on land.  It is based on the Garinagu’s spatial dispersion.  Their 
distribution is more in line with Anderson’s notion of the role of imagined communities in 
defining nations.  Citing British historian and political scientist George Hugh Nicholas Seton-
Watson, for Anderson nations “are imagined because the members of even the smallest nation 
will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the 
minds of each lives the image of their communion” (1991:6 emphasis in original).   As for 
communities, Anderson contends that they “are to be distinguished, not by their 
falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined” (1991:6).  In the Garinagu’s 
case, I question the motive of their action, but not the falsity of their action because it suggests a 
cultural fragmentation and disconnection from Honduras’ north coast. 
The notion of nationhood is in vogue among most Garinagu today.  In September 2013, 
José Francisco Ávila attended and addressed a four day Regional Reparations Conference in St. 
Vincent.  At the conference, “attorneys, government representatives and representatives of the 
reparations commissions will consider legal options [against Britain] . . . the Chairpersons of the 
National Reparations Committees will select a Regional Reparations Commission Chair” 
(Caribbean Community Secretariat, 2013).  The Regional Reparations Commission is seeking 
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reparations based on the enslavement of Africans.  In an interview with The Vincentinian 
newspaper, Ávila spoke of his willingness to work with the Caribbean Community and Common 
Market (CARICOM) Reparations Commission, “along with Garifuna representatives from the 
Diaspora, ‘in seeking justice for the crime of genocide committed against our ancestors by the 
British’” (King, 2013).  Ávila states that this is an auspicious time to organize Garinagu 
diasporically “into the Garifuna Nation” (King, 2013).  Ávila also states that he has been 
exchanging ideas with Los Angeles Garifuna leader Ruben Reyes about the Garifuna Nation and 
addressing the British’s genocide against Garinagu in the late eighteenth century.   
In keeping with the September 2013 conference in St. Vincent, José Francisco Ávila from 
New York City representing GCU, Wilbor Guerrero and Ruben Reyes from Washington and 
California are mobilizing to form what they call the Garifuna Nation.  On September 26, 2013, 
Ávila e-mailed a draft for the creation of the Garifuna Nation to over fifteen people, including 
me.  According to the draft, the Garifuna Nation’s mission is “to transform the current social, 
cultural, political and economic environment in the Garifuna communities into one of [a] 
partnership support system, promoting participation, activism and awareness through the existing 
infrastructure of the existing organizations located in each Garifuna Community in the Diaspora” 
(J. Ávila, personal communication, September 26, 2013).  To fulfill this mission, the Garifuna 
Nation will “conduct applied research, policy analysis, and advocacy, providing a Garifuna 
perspective in five key areas – civil/human rights, education, employment and economic status, 
and health” and assist its affiliates operating regionally (J. Ávila, personal communication, 
September 26, 2013).  The Garifuna Nation’s declaration indicates that regardless of the 
Garinagu’s spatial distribution, they “represent a single, united ethnic community known as the 
Garifuna Nation” (J. Ávila, personal communication, September 26, 2013).  Besides ethnicity 
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uniting members of the Garifuna Nation, this organization “has basic rights to autonomy and 
self-determination and the right to preserve Garifuna language and culture” (J. Ávila, personal 
communication, September 26, 2013).  
The central concerns of the Garifuna Nation are: “Advocacy and Empowerment, Language 
and Culture in Education, Land, Health, Economic Development, and Social Issues” (J. Ávila, 
personal communication, September 26, 2013).  Also included is working with CARICOM’s 
Reparations Commission in “seeking justice for the crime of genocide committed against our 
ancestors by the British” (J. Ávila, personal communication, September 26, 2013).  Lastly, the 
architects of the Garifuna Nation would “build on José Francisco Ávila’s experience in 
negotiating the seven percent [shareholder] participation in Los Micos Beach Resort with the 
Honduras Ministry of Tourism, on November 25, 2005” (J. Ávila, personal communication, 
September 26, 2013).  Governed by a board of directors and a paid “chief administrative head,” 
among some of the Garifuna nation’s member organizations in New York will be GCU, 
Hondurans Against AIDS, Inc., the Council of Evangelical Garifuna Churches, Inc. and several 
other organizations from Chicago, Detroit, and Houston (J. Ávila, personal communication, 
September 26, 2013).  Organizations from Honduras feature ODECO, OFRANEH, and the 
Martin Luther King Foundation (Fundación Martin Luther King) (J. Ávila, personal 
communication, September 26, 2013).  The Garifuna leaders list numerous Central American 
and Caribbean countries as participants as well. 
In response to Ávila’s and his cohorts’ initiative, former GCU executive director Jerry 
Castro Cayetano, and Cheryl Noralez, president and founder of Garifuna Heritage Foundation in 
Los Angeles, voiced their distrust of both Reyes and Ávila’s initiative.  Responding to 
Guerrero’s congratulatory e-mail to Ávila for generating the Garifuna Nation draft, Rosita 
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Álvarez stated that Ávila, Reyes, and Guerrero were simply re-inventing “the wheel,” since 
Garifuna cultural nationalist Theodore Aranda from Dangriga, Belize initiated an identical 
project in the 1990s for which he delivered a speech at Our Lady of Victory Church in the Bronx 
(R. Álvarez, personal communication, September 30, 2013).  Distributed at the meeting was 
Aranda’s writing about reparations.  Álvarez thinks that Ávila and his brother attended the event 
and obtained a copy of the information that he seems to be duplicating (personal communication, 
September 30, 2013).  England’s findings perhaps corroborate Álvarez’s claim.  Her findings 
show that during the 1997 Garifuna’s Bicentennial celebration of their ancestors’ arrival to 
Honduras in 1797, the Garifuna organizers of the event purport that “the Garinagu constitute a 
single ethnic ‘nation – unified by their common language, culture, and origins in St. Vincent – 
despite their current geographical dispersion and fragmented citizenships’”  (1999:8).   England 
goes on to say that “their politics emphasizes the historical reality of displacement, exile, 
mobility, and multiple communities, but also the possibility that the Garifuna Diaspora may be 
re-united across national-state borders as the Garifuna Nation . . .” (1999:8).  Aranda’s 2003 
writing maintained the politics of identity alive.    
Indeed, referring to himself as “Paramount Chief,” Aranda’s article “World Garifuna 
Organization (WGO) in Brief” published on September 30, 2003 defines WGO as a “registered 
Non-Government, Non-Profit Organization, established April 12, 2000, to pursue the 
Unification, Cultural Preservation and Economic Development of Garifuna People” (Aranda, 
2003).  Members of the WGO include the Garifuna people residing in the “six nations” 
comprising Honduras, Nicaragua, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Belize, the United States, and 
Guatemala.  Outlined as Aranda’s objectives are the “’Consecration of Balliceaux into a Sacred 
and Holy Site’” and organizing a “Summit for next year 2004, in ‘Education’ and ‘family to 
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directly impact black economy social concerns and education.  WGO’s central objective is the 
development of a “Black Consciousness’ . . . ‘Unity’” and to be “connected locally, regionally, 
and internationally . . .” (Aranda 2003:3-4).  In other words, Aranda is seeking to unify the 
Garinagu in the Diaspora.  What would this black consciousness be?  In examining Aranda’s 
speech delivered at the Belize Black Summit in 2003, he seems to interrogate the representation 
and histories of black people, Western epistemology, and the function and commitment of local 
institutions in Belize to black people and other oppressed groups.  For instance, he states, “the 
Church and State have both kept the black people ignorant of their history and ancestral 
achievements, leaving them naked to the onslaught of colonialism” (Aranda 2003:2).  In 
challenging European epistemology, Aranda also interrogates the description of Greece as the 
cradle of civilization and knowledge.  Instead, he argues that Africa is the cradle (Aranda 
2003:2).  In thinking of a new beginning, it seems that the narrative emanating from Belize, at 
least from Aranda, may have been adopted from African American cultural nationalists like 
Amiri Baraka, Malcolm X, and many others, since he secured his doctorate in the United States. 
In assessing Ávila’s Garifuna Nation language and comparing it against Aranda’s writing, 
it is clear that Ávila and his cohorts may have duplicated Aranda’s ideas with the exception that 
they use Garifuna Nation instead of World Garifuna Organization.  Álvarez is possibly correct 
that Ávila and his cohorts are re-inventing the wheel.  In Álvarez’s response to my inquiry about 
the Garifuna Nation, she states, “Dr. Theodore Aranda founded World Garifuna Organization in 
the 1990’s in order to begin and lay the foundation to a Garifuna Nation” (personal 
communication, October 1, 2013).  Álvarez asserts that Ávila and his cohorts’ initiative was a 
direct result of Aranda’s early efforts (personal communication, October 1, 2013).  Second, one 
noticeable common strand among Aranda, Ávila, Reyes, and Guerrero is that they are all 
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creating a bureaucratic umbrella organization and position of authority for themselves.  
However, in Ávila’s case, he is also promoting his own ideas such as pushing the 7 percent 
shareholding in Honduras’ tourism project, which I discuss in chapter seven.  Each social actor 
then is competing for the “Paramount Chief” position.  Although listed as a Paramount Chief, a 
reference to eighteenth century Garifuna leader, Joseph Satuye, who struggled against the British 
in St. Vincent, is Aranda, I believe that each of the remaining people see themselves as such.  
Their affinity for chiefdomhood is that “for men of African descent to strive for male power over 
and above Europeans or in collusion with European males, by definition leaves women out on 
the margins.  [Black men] in past or contemporary history have not mounted a campaign to 
destroy the capitalist system, but to share power within the existing paradigm” (Lake 1998:9).  In 
the meantime, each of those Garifuna men aspiring to be paramount chiefs do not take into 
account that the Garifuna organizations are not homogenous since geography and social relations 
shape their politics and organizing practices.  The Garifuna Nation organizers’ narrow sighted 
suggests that in centralizing the Garifuna organizing, individual organizations power will be 
diminished.  
In probing into reasons behind the creation of the Garifuna Nation, Brigido Cayetano, who 
supports Ávila’s, Reyes’, and Guerrero’s endeavor, stated that OFRANEH was simply focusing 
on domestic issues in Honduras but it does not speak for the Garinagu everywhere (personal 
communication, December 6, 2013).  Though their politics and positions certainly differ, both 
OFRANEH and ODECO are visible and OFRANEH focuses on the Garinagu’s land struggle.  
Third, the Garinagu’s articulation of reparation concepts certainly introduces an important 
discourse.   I asked Álvarez if the Garinagu modeled their reparations movement after the 
National Coalition of Blacks for Reparations in America (N’COBRA), which African Americans 
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formed.  She replied, “due to the pain, suffering and death the Garinagu endured during the long 
journey on the high seas to Roatán, our case for reparations is a Garifuna advantage.  We are 
seeking reparations for the injustice and crime committed against our Garifuna people by the 
British” (R. Álvarez, personal communication, October 1, 2013).  
Judging from the Garinagu’s discourse about reparations, it is clear that most leaders have 
not come to terms with slavery.  If they did, they would link the cultural formation of the 
Garinagu to colonialism.  If they participate in the CARICOM Reparations Commission, as 
Ávila says, the Garinagu must step back and reassess their language and understanding of 
slavery and the Garinagu’s historical narrative.  If they participate, exactly what role would the 
Garinagu play in this movement?  Are the Garinagu from New York City partaking in this 
movement to get publicity?  Have they studied other reparations movements?  While these 
Garinagu may not be truly in sync with CARICOM’s Reparations Commission ideologically, 
historically, and perhaps politically and vice versa, it must be noted that the Garinagu are 
beginning to see place and space differently and may be articulating a new Garifuna’s 
historiography.  It is also important to ask if the CARICOM reparations movement is a 
grassroots effort or an establishment organization led by politicians and notable people.   
Conclusion 
As I have discussed in this chapter, differences in affiliation and loyalty generate 
different ideologies that can generate instability as leaders lose sight of their initial goals and 
make themselves the center of attention (Gecas 2000:99).  These factors, in part, have hindered 
unity among the new Garifuna groups.  Implicated in the Garifuna’s intra-cultural dispute is the 
new leaders’ thirst for personal visibility and attention to specific individual politics.  
OFRANEH in the meantime struggles to reclaim the Garifuna cultural hearth in Honduras.  This 
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is why the Honduran government continues to target this organization.  The government, 
however, does not target ODECO because this organization conforms to the very forces it 
struggled against during its early existence.  This is why the state rewards Casildo in so many 
different ways, and why he reciprocates equally.  It is through this symbiotic relationship that he 
secures access and resources.  This “fatal coupling of power and difference,” in borrowing 
Gilmore’s word, is at the center of Honduran social relations (2002).  Contrary to the Garifuna 
leaders in Honduras, in the United States, the Garifuna leaders’ politics is that they will “support 
those organizations [in Honduras] that are carrying the struggle and are dealing with the land 
right issue.  But, [they] will not have an active participation in that part” (M. Moran, personal 
communication, May 25, 2010).  It is this politic that is governing individual interests, 
acculturation, and eternal thirst for social mobility that informs the Garifuna leaders’ outlooks 
toward their territory on Honduras’ north coast and the land struggle.  
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CHAPTER 5 
THE GEOGRAPHY OF RACE IN GARIFUNA EXPERIENCE  
Constructing a New Place 
Similar to the United States, Honduras is a place “imbued with racialized histories and 
geographies” (Mollett 2013:1229).  Differences, however, exist in their construction and 
maintenance since the slave “institution varied considerably” culturally and structurally in Latin 
America and also in the United States in spite of “the outward cultural uniformity of the slave-
holding group” (Patterson 1977:418).  Slavery in Honduras existed since the 1540s when “the 
first sizable cargo of 1,000 to 1,500 enslaved Africans [were] brought to the region of Olancho . . 
. to mine gold for the Spanish” (Chambers 2010:4).  Besides existing in the “mining regions of 
central Honduras,” African captives were also found in several areas along the “North coast, 
particularly Trujillo, Puerto Caballos (later Puerto Cortés), and San Pedro Sula, where some gold 
deposits were found.  Slavery was officially abolished in 1824” (Chambers 2010:4).  Comprising 
Honduras’ enslaved population were “African-born, creoles, and those imported from other 
regions of the Americas” (Chambers 2010:4).  Citing nineteenth century missionary G. Feurig, 
anthropologist Edmund T. Gordon states that the term “‘Creole’ was used primarily to designate 
English Creole speakers of African descent; however, it also named persons of European 
Amerindian descent who spoke English Creole and were born on the Coast” (1998:40).  On 
Honduras’ north coast “slavery was instituted sporadically” because the region lacked a large 
plantation economy and was heavily populated by “indigenous groups, Maroon communities, 
and European (mostly Dutch and English) pirates” (Chambers 2010:4; see also Gordon 1998:33).  
Due to the absence of a large plantation economy, the Spanish colonizers marginalized the 
region.  
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During Latin America’s colonial period, Spaniards, like Portuguese, placed an emphasis on 
“racial ‘purity’ or unpolluted whiteness,” in shaping their presumed racial and culture superiority 
(Jackson 1976:7), an approach also used in the United States to “normalize the social relations of 
domination” (Quijano 2005:56).  As the colonial regime’s underlying principle, it also 
constructed a “three-level system” comprised not only of blacks and whites, but also of various 
“mixed” groups such as Zambos which was a racial category for the offspring of African and 
Miskito, ladino, and mulato in Honduras (Wade 1986:1).  Although initially the Spanish Crown 
used “ladino” as a term “to label subjects of the empire who ‘spoke rudiments of the official 
languages [Castilian Spanish or Vulgar Latin],’” post-colonizers construed it to represent the 
mestizo identity (Euraque 1998:154).  
For sociologist Aníbal Quijano, racial segmentation was simply a way of controlling and 
exploiting indigenous and African people in the form of slavery, indentured servitude or 
commodity production (2005:57).  The mixed groups which the colonial regime invented and 
recalibrated since the colonial era confined blacks to the lower social strata and elevated the 
social status of Indians who were initially deemed uncivilized at the onset of colonialism.  In 
geographer David Delaney’s assessment of the construction of race in the United States, he 
explains that the colonial regime’s practices illustrate the “centrality of “‘place,’ or geography” 
in the construction of race and the formation of racial boundaries (1998:3).  The Garinagu were 
thrust into this process as well.  Accounts of the Garinagu’s ethnogenesis hold that their 
ancestors, led by Chief Joseph Chatoyer, struggled fiercely against the British colonizers on St. 
Vincent rather than submitting to slavery.  Chatoyer, whose name is also commonly spelled as 
Satuye, was killed in battle in March 1795 while “fighting against the English on Dorsetshire 
Hill” (Young 1971:107).  With Chief Chatoyer dead, in 1797 the British removed approximately 
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2,000 Garinagu from St. Vincent to Balliceaux and then transferred them to their final 
destination on Roatán Island, a Caribbean island twenty miles off Honduras’ north coast 
(Anderson 2009:3).  It is the Garinagu’s forced removal from St. Vincent in the eighteenth 
century that explains their presence on Honduras’ north coast and that subjected them to the 
racism that prevails in this country.  In Latin America, European descendants, at least those who 
see themselves as such, judiciously carried out their forebears’ racist practices in, most notably, 
their unremitting “war on blackness” (Andrews 2004:118) or “ethnic lynching, the process of 
restoring whiteness by bleaching out black people . . .” (Jackson 1976:1).  Guided by their 
presumed ancestral and cultural superiority, “whites” in Latin America systematically excluded 
blacks and the indigenous populations from the civilized nation they sought to construct during 
the post-colonial era because they were not “aesthetically pleasing” (Jackson 1976:7).  Similar to 
other black subjects in other once-colonized regions, the Garinagu are still experiencing such 
exclusion.  
Part of the elites’ nation-building project in Honduras entailed injecting, figuratively 
speaking, white blood into the country’s perceived black blood in the late nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries despite the fact that by this period a multitude of identities comprised 
Honduran society.  Luring Europeans to Latin American was the elites’ attempt to whiten the 
population (Andrews 2004:119) and once and for all “throw off the burden of that corporeal 
malediction” of blackness (Fanon 1986:84).  The whitening or blanquiamiento process found 
followers among many Latin American intellectuals and nationalists, most of which believed that 
the indigenous people vanished through mestizaje or miscegenation.  The whitening project 
Quijano states was a way to “’Europeanize’” Indians and “black” (2005:63; see also Mollett 
2013:1230).  The whitening project was, therefore, a new way of constructing place and seeing 
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the land.  Given these processes, Americas’ identities “cannot always be so easily disentangled 
as locally discrete moments;” it necessitates our understanding of places as “geographical and/or 
figurative points of contact in this fictive discourse” (Spillers 1991:9).  Honduras’ society was 
not impermeable from these processes.  In fact, it is the result of these processes. 
Black people have been present on Honduras’ shores since the sixteenth century despite the 
elites’ efforts to deny their presence in the country’s poorly recorded historiography, 
demography, and human geography.  The denial of their presence is especially evident in the 
country’s economic narratives even though African captives free labor but also indigenous 
generated the conqueror’s wealth.  Drawing from Merrifield’s analysis of place, economically, 
Honduran politicians in alliance with capitalists from the United States constructed a material 
landscape “imbued with meaning in everyday place-bound social practices” and continued their 
forebears’ project (1993b:520).  Stemming from this mutual landscape construction was a post-
colonial modification of the colonial socio-spatial hierarchy in which capitalists introduced the 
racial ideologies of mestizo, mestizaje, and indigenismo (Euraque 1998:155; Hooker 2005:300; 
see also Mollett 2013:1230).  These ideologies produced disparate racial discourse and racial 
categories during the formation of the banana plantation in the late nineteenth century and 
beyond. 
Using racist discourse as a means of balancing power relations, historian Darío A. Euraque 
argues that during the 1920s Honduran oligarchs sought to regain power both politically and 
economically from American capitalists, “at least in the ideological sphere, by asserting a 
national unity based on a homogenous Honduran mestizo race and excluding, in particular, the 
West Indian immigrants brought in by the banana companies but also the indigenous north coast 
Garifuna populations [and Criollos]” (1998:152 emphasis added).  While Euraque’s argument is 
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indubitably useful, it is important to recalibrate it because he is not challenging Honduran 
oligarchs’ racist practices per se.  Instead, he examines Honduran oligarchs’ alienation from the 
power structure as a cause for their relentless racist practices and discourse.  These practices 
occur because of the contradictions built into capitalism which began during colonialism.  Thus, 
Honduras’ local oligarchs during the post-colonial era continued existing racist practices 
constructed during colonialism.  Honduran oligarchs were, therefore, already engaged in racist 
practices prior to the advent of American capitalists from the United States. 
The Development of the Banana Plantation 
Contemporary scholars such as historians Glenn A. Chambers, John Soluri, Darío A. 
Euraque, political scientist Elisavinda Echeverri-Gent, and several others, have examined the 
development of the banana plantation economy in Central America.  I would therefore not 
belabor the various points on the development of the banana plantation in Honduras.  Instead, in 
this segment, I provide a brief background to situate the Garinagu’s experience in the 
development of the banana plantation in relation to place, land, and race.  In 1804, the schooner 
Raymond sailed to New York from Cuba to deliver a cargo of Cuban Red bananas (Soluri 
2003:51 emphasis in original).  By 1850, J & T Pearsall became one of the main traders 
importing bananas and other goods from Cuba to the North Atlantic seaports (Soluri 2003:51).  
American importers also bought bananas from the Dominican Republic (Echeverri-Gent 
1992:277).  In the aftermath of the United States’ Civil War “the number of banana traders 
increased significantly and Jamaica began to displace Cuba as the main” supplier (Soluri 
2003:51).  American importers bought their bananas from “native growers either by contract or 
on an informal open market” (Echeverri-Gent 1992:277).  By 1837, traders carried a different 
type of banana from Martinique to Jamaica, and later to Panamá and the rest of Central America 
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called Gros Michel (Musa acuminata) (Soluri 2003:52).  In Honduras, Gros Michel cultivation 
began on the Bay Islands and the north coast toward the end of the nineteenth century (Chambers 
2010:27).  Chambers estimates that from 1860 to 1900, “local growers” controlled the banana 
cultivation and “independent farmers descended from migrants from the department of Olancho” 
who were geographically concentrated on Honduras’ north coast in the city of La Ceiba 
(Chambers 2010:27).  The farmers “cultivated the banana and sold the fruit to North American 
merchants who had access to seafaring vessels” (Chambers 2010:27).  The Garinagu were also 
among the local growers. 
In my conversations with some Garinagu, they indicated that the banana industries rented 
land from some Garinagu in Honduras.  As I began to probe into the historical development of 
the banana industry in Honduras, some secondary sources revealed that as early as the 1870s 
several Garinagu were “banana growers and urban and rural landowners” (Euraque 2003:238).  
In fact, Euraque’s findings point out that Tela’s archival records state that from the 1910s to 
1920s several Garinagu banana planters such as Pascual Valerio “were considered ‘capitalists’” 
(2003:238).  Euraque also states that the Valerios “owned much of the lands occupied by 
Garifuna and West Indians in the only black neighborhood in Tela, Barrio Las Brisas” 
(2003:238; 2004:192).  Besides some Garinagu becoming “capitalists,” some of them became 
middle class as a result of working in the banana plantation industry as machinists (S. Iriona, 
personal communication, March 13, 2012).  Since there were Garifuna landowners, how did land 
concessions, which became central in the Honduran government’s economic policy, impact their 
status and communities on the north coast?  Since the Garinagu are referred to as capitalists, 
where did they secure the financial capital to purchase land?  Did the Garinagu’s political 
alliance with the Liberal Party in the 1930s, and the massacre of Garinagu in San Juan, Tela on 
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March 14, 1937 by Honduran soldiers by orders of the Dictator Tiburcio Carías Andino (1933-
1948), a National Party member, prompted the Garinagu’s reaction to economic development in 
Honduras?  These are important questions requiring further exploration. 
Local growers control over the banana production began to change between 1870 and the 
early part of the twentieth century when Honduran politicians’ attention “centered on 
establishing banana plantations on the North Coast” (Chambers 2010:22).  The looming political 
economy shift in Honduras developed when New Yorker Minor C. Keith was operating Tropical 
Trading and Transport Company in Costa Rica and The Colombian Land Company and Snyder 
Banana Company in Panamá.  In the early 1890s, “hurricanes destroyed several Boston Fruit Co. 
in Jamaica,” “droughts destroyed other [banana] plantations in Cuba and the Dominican 
Republic,” and “floods ruined Keith’s plantations in Costa Rica” (Echeverri-Gent 1992:277-8).  
Faced with financial crisis, Keith and Bostonian Andrew W. Preston of the Boston Fruit 
Company joined forces and merged their businesses on May 30, 1899 and formed the United 
Fruit Company (UFCO) (Echeverri-Gent 1988:46-48; 1992:278).  Keith’s economic scheme also 
reached Guatemala.  In Guatemala, the government conceived the International Railroad of 
Central America in 1877.  Historian John F. Dosal points out that the United Fruit “built its 
Guatemalan empire . . . during the first phase of the Liberal reform,  when Generals Justo Rufino 
Barrios (1873-1885), Manuel Lisandro Barillas (1885-1891), and José María Reyna Barrios 
(1892-1897) “pursued a modernization program that served the interest of the coffee planters” 
(1993:17).  Faced with substantial foreign debts, in 1904 the government reached an agreement 
with Henry F. W. Nanne, administrator of Keith’s Costa Rican Railway.  Under this agreement, 
Keith’s company invested and carried through the construction of the railroad line while the 
Guatemalan government retained ownership of “the railroad tracks” (Opie 2009:13).  Part of the 
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concession also involved Keith’s company securing the labor force.  Keith procured his workers 
from “the United States, Jamaica, China, Italy, Germany, England, Ireland, France, El Salvador, 
Honduras, Nicaragua, and Mexico, and local Guatemalan” meaning mulatos and the Garinagu 
(Opie 2009:17; see also Echeverri-Gent 1988:43).  Migrant workers to Guatemala included 
European Americans and African Americans from Louisiana, Alabama, Texas, Missouri, Ohio, 
California, the Carolinas, Kentucky, Atlanta, Georgia, and Mississippi.  African Americans 
migrated to escape “gang labor, sharecropping, or plantation work,” Jim Crow or just seeking a 
new place to settle (Opie 2009:19).  
Because of land concessions, in 1899, UFCO chose Honduras as an ideal place for its 
banana production.  Hence, Honduras, along with other Central American countries, became a 
favored place for banana production when compared to Jamaica where securing land concessions 
was difficult due to the land ownership system established under the British colonial structure 
(Echeverri-Gent 1992:278).  Credited with pursuing the policies that led to attracting foreign 
capital to Honduras is President Marco Aurelio Soto (1876-1883).  His economic and political 
efforts did not alter the legacy of “social and cultural structured based on a hierarchy” 
established by the colonial regime which prevails today (Chambers 2010:22).  It simply 
safeguarded it.  Soto’s successors retained the land concession policy he pursued during his 
administration.  Historians Lester D. Langley and Thomas D. Schoonover state that President 
Manuel Bonilla (1903-7 and 1911-1913) “fostered alliances with foreign capitalists and 
envisioned Honduran development as a partnership of the country’s land and labor with foreign 
capital and know-how” (1995:56).  Thus, from the late nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth 
century, land concessions dominated the country’s economic policies.  
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Bonilla’s government “signed Decree No. 99 awarding land concessions to Victor Camors 
in the Departamento of Colón and on the north coast, which was later transferred to Trujillo 
Railroad Company a subsidiary of United Fruit Company” (Laínez and Meza 1973:17).  From 
1900 to 1930, out of fifty-seven land concessions received by the banana industries, “thirty-
seven were granted between 1910 and 1920; half of the remaining concessions were given after 
1920 and half before 1910” (Euraque 1996:7).  UFCO and several foreign-owned banana 
industries in the region seized the opportunity to acquire land.  By 1914, the banana plantation 
owners “owned 416,500 hectares of land [roughly about 1,029,194 acres]” (Laínez and Meza 
1973:20).  The cities of Tela and La Ceiba in the Departamento of Atlántida, and Trujillo in the 
Departamento of Colón, became the major “banana towns on the Caribbean” areas where high 
concentrations of Garifuna communities resided (Euraque 2003:232).  Joining the banana 
plantation economic bonanza was archaeologist, Doris Zemurray Stone’s father (Harrison 
2013:53), the Russian Jew immigrant Samuel Zemurray, who had settled in Mobile, 
Alabama(Chambers 2010:28) and established the Hubbard-Zemurray Company in 1902 which 
was later renamed Cuyamel Fruit Company (Bucheli 2005:48).  Zemurray bought UFCO’s 
shares (shareholding) in 1907 (Euraque 1996:7).  As a major leader of the banana plantations, 
Zemurray wielded considerable influence on Honduras’ politics.  
Euraque claims that Zemurray’s financial support of Honduran politicians in 1911 led to 
President Miguel Dávila’s ouster from power.  Zemurray rewarded Dávila’s rival, General 
Manuel Bonilla, with $100,000 (Euraque 1996:7).  Joining the crowd of banana tycoons at the 
turn of the twentieth century were the Italian brothers, Lucas, Felix, and Joseph Vaccaro.  The 
Honduran government awarded “the Vaccaro Brothers and Company a concession in 1905 to 
export fruit from La Ceiba in exchange for a promise to build canals in the region served by the 
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Salado and Porvenir Rivers” but also “jetties, docks, and structures necessary for the 
development of the region” (Chambers 2010:28).  The Vaccaros established Vaccaros Brothers 
& Company later renamed the Standard Fruit and Steamship Company headquartered at the 
American Bank Building in New Orleans, Louisiana.  Through their company, the Vaccaros 
exported bananas from the city of La Ceiba to their operational base in New Orleans.  Besides 
the Vaccaros involvement in the banana trade, they were also involved in mahogany production 
(Lloveras 1945:1).  Ultimately, the Vaccaros were selling land in Honduras.  In 1945, they sold 
“one piece known as El Desprecio (The Scorn) consisting of 5,350 manzanas,” which only had 
about “100 [mahogany] trees” and another “piece, known as ‘Palma Real,’ which consists of 
1,408 manzanas” (Loveras 1945:2).  Apparently, Palma Real (Real Palm) had 16,000 mahogany 
trees before logging began.  However, most of them were “exported and quite a number have 
been burned” (Loveras 1945:2).  The Vaccaros also built Banco Atlántida, Hospital D’Antoni, 
beer breweries, and several other businesses.  By the 1960s, the United Fruit Company, “the 
quintessence of United States imperialism” controlled Honduras where the “largest landholder” 
was the banana plantation owner (Nieto 2003:107).  From the 1870s to 1970s, many “observers” 
in the United States considered Honduras to be the “‘banana republic’ par excellence” (Soluri 
2005:2).  Coined by the United States writer William Sydney (pseudonym, O. Henry) in his 1904 
novel, the “banana republic” nation has become synonymous with corruption, 
underdevelopment, drug trafficking, poverty, violence, and political instability (Soluri 2005:2). 
In Honduras as elsewhere in Central America, “land [became] a means of production in the 
sense that a production process literally flows through the soil itself.  Under capitalism, this 
means that the soil becomes a conduit for the flow of capital through production  . . .” (Harvey 
1985:91 emphasis in original).  The exchange value which land gains under capitalism demands 
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certain conditions, namely political access and a labor force.  Facilitating access in Honduras was 
a weak state marred by political instability as demonstrated by frequent coup d'états and 
corruption.  Given the flagrant corruption entrenched in the Honduran political system, collusion 
with local officials, and the host of dictators running the country, the United Fruit system 
established,  
dependent economies with semicolonial characteristics. “‘The Octopus,’” as 
the company was known in the region, manipulated governments at will, 
meddled in their political fights, provided financial assistance to candidates of 
its choice, and fixed the scales of favor of whoever offered it the most 
attractive conditions.  It was a state within a state. (Nieto 2003:108)  
 
These conditions yielded favorable results for American capitalists such as “concessions and 
privileges outside the law: tax exemptions, evasion of tariffs and duties, free import and export 
of earnings, and the payment of a minuscule percentage of its multimillion dollars in profits”  
(Nieto 2003:108; see also Euraque 1996:6-7; see also Timms 2007:67).  The weakening of the 
state became advantageous for American capitalists.  The building of Banco Atlántida and 
Hospital D’Antoni by the Vaccaros modernized Honduras and politically paralyzed Honduran 
elites.  Capitalists used this practice in Honduras throughout the early twentieth century and 
beyond.  The northerners (Keith and Preston) and southerners (Vaccaros brothers and Zemurray) 
understood Honduras’ political disorder and benefitted substantially from land availability and 
many other incentives as noted by Nieto but also echoed by Euraque and geographer Benjamin 
F. Timms.  I consider the presence of American capitalists in the region to be an extension of 
economic imperialism following the decline of the plantation economy in the southern United 
States as a result of the abolition of slavery in 1865.  The Honduran government’s national 
economic policies together with global economic forces shaped the reproduction of Honduras’ 
north coast and the fragmentation of Garinagu culture. 
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 The banana plantations, which Honduran capitalists initially ignored because of their focus 
on the New York and Honduras Rosario Mining Company became an integral component of the 
country’s economy mostly in the early twentieth century (Euraque 1996:5).  This suggests that 
the “construction and transformation” of place explains how the interconnection between social 
relations and the material landscape is responsible for the expansion of capitalism across space 
and the socio-conditions created within this system (Merrifield 1993b:520).  For Honduran 
capitalists, the construction and transformation of place tilted the power structure and intensified 
their already racist practices because they saw themselves economically and politically 
marginalized as Euraque argues.  Therefore, they perceived their nation-building project to be 
meaningful and necessary and their racial discourse central to achieving their goals.  Massey’s 
argument of relational construction of place and its interconnection to the global power-
geometries then assures us that “local places are not simply always the victims of the global; nor 
are they always politically defensive redoubts against the global.  For places are also the 
movements through which the global is constituted, invented, coordinated, and produced” 
(Massey 2004:11 emphasis in original).  This was true during the epoch of the banana plantations 
and later and it is true today.  The production of local places also created what David Harvey 
calls the “geography of difference,” which in this case consisted of the convergence of different 
excluded ethnic groups (1996:334). 
The Geography of Difference 
Echeverri-Gent argues that West Indians comprised the majority of the banana plantation 
labor force in Honduras whereas the involvement of the Garinagu workers was smaller 
(1992:279).   However, Euraque maintains that the Garinagu were the “first stable black 
population employed by the banana companies” and that this group “remained critical to banana-
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company employment much later than many commentators suggest” (2003:239; see also Mollett 
2006:90).  Euraque’s observation but also Mollett’s seems sensible for several reasons.  First, the 
Garinagu in Guatemala have been exposed to American capitalists who were undoubtedly better 
aware of the Garinagu’s geography in Honduras than were the Honduran government and local 
elites (Euraque 1998:162).  Second, in Honduras, the Garifuna communities were strategically 
located in areas where the banana plantations flourished.  Third, the banana plantation owners 
preferred Garinagu because of their “industriousness” (Anderson 1997:30) a notion “rooted in 
racial ideologies that encourage black workers in tropical environments” (Mollett 2006:90).  Yet, 
the Honduran government described the Garinagu as “‘perpetually indolent and lazy’ with 
regards to farming their own land” (Mollett 2006:90).  The representation of the Garinagu was 
another way of pushing them from their land, a practice very familiar to them.  According to 
Mark Anderson, the British colonizers’ “rhetoric of representation” in St. Vincent “seized upon 
the blackness of the Garifuna to question their purity and legitimacy-their nativeness . . .’” 
(1997:31).  England states that the British used this representation “to justify attempts to remove 
them [the Garinagu] from their lands on the windward side of the island, resulting in the Carib 
War of 1796 in which the Garifuna were defeated” (1999:10).  The Honduran government and 
elites use similar tactic. 
In addition to the Garinagu, another group of black people in Honduras who formed an 
integral part of the banana plantation labor force are the Criollos who have populated the Bay 
Islands since the seventeenth century (George 1952:359).  Joining the Garinagu and the 
remaining black workers were ladinos, mestizos, or mulatos, all of whom share the same 
physical characteristics.  Foreign workers already employed in the railroad project in Guatemala 
received notification that “they could find work on railroad construction projects in Honduras, 
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Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Costa Rica” (Opie 2009:21).  This spatial mobility suggests that 
there was a disposable labor surplus from which planters recruited without necessarily drawing 
from the pool of workers located abroad.  However, planters might have engaged in continual 
recruitment because of workers’ persistent strikes throughout the banana plantations.  It is well-
documented that working conditions on railroads and banana plantations were inhumane.  
Banned for many years in Honduras, Ramón Amaya Amador’s novel Prisión Verde or Green 
Prison, sketches a vivid picture of working and living conditions in the banana plantations 
ranging from overcrowded living quarters, hazardous exposure to agrochemicals, poor wages, 
and racism (2006;see also Soluri 2005). 
To illustrate one of many examples of what Amaya describes as inhumane working 
conditions in the banana industry, I cite an interview with a 70-year-old Garifuna woman I met 
in Guadalupe, Honduras in 2006.  Catalina Sanabria is an illiterate woman who worked for 20 
years in the empacadora or packing plant in the banana industry in Olanchito and Coyoles, 
Colón.  Two Garinagu women including Catalina and several mestiza women washed and 
weighed bananas (C. Sanabria, personal communication, August 18, 2006).  According to 
historian John Soluri, the United Fruit Company began “using women” in packing plants in 
Honduras in the early 1960s (2005:187).  The banana industry assigned women to sort out the 
bad bananas from the good ones.  Companies such as Chiquita refer to the good or unblemished 
ones as “‘specials’” (Soluri 2005:187).  The workers treated the special ones with “chemicals to 
prevent fungal rots before being weighed, stickered, and packed into boxes” (Soluri 2005:187).  
Some of the chemicals the banana companies such as United Fruit Company used were Dithane.  
It then added chlorine “to the water tanks” in 1965 to control fungus and switched to a 
“systematic fungicide (Thiabendazole)” in 1968 (Soluri 2005:187).  Neither the union 
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representatives in Honduras pressured the banana industry owners to provide their workers with 
protective gears nor the owners made a gesture to do so (Soluri 2005:187).  At the time of my 
interview with Catalina, she reported that she suffers from headaches.  She also lost movement 
on three fingers.  She only has movement in her thumbs and one index finger.  When she retired 
from the banana company she worked for, which name she did not disclose, the company gave 
her 3,000 Lempiras ($142).  Because the company did not give her a pension, she survives with 
help from her sons (C. Sanabria, personal communication, August 18, 2006). 
Besides the inhumane working conditions, black people faced blatant racism from whites 
and the Central American mulato population.  Honduran oligarchs resented black people 
receiving “preferential employment,” and competition for wages increased as the number of 
West Indians recruited by the banana companies from British colonies burgeoned (Euraque 
1998:159).  Originating from “Barbados, British Guiana, Grand Cayman, St. Vincent, St. Kitts, 
Leeward islands, Trinidad and British Honduras,” by 1929 there were “10,000 West Indian 
workers” laboring on banana plantations in Honduras (Echeverri-Gent 1988:60;1992:283).  The 
banana plantation owners inserted a wedge between the local and West Indian workers in that 
they used the latter as “strike breakers or scabs, thus facilitating an enduring suspicion of and 
animosity toward West Indian labor by Hondurans” (Chambers 2010:8).  Culturally, West 
Indians’ identity differed from ladinos and the Garinagu and they “fought to maintain their 
identities as fruit company workers, Protestants, and English speakers” (Chambers 2010:12).  
Their “outsider” status challenged the notions of “‘white only’” immigrants, and escalated the 
ruling class’ existing racist practices (Chambers 2010:12).  Thus, the anti-black sentiment that 
unfolded in Honduras in the 1920s and later, “which traditionally targeted the Garifuna and other 
Afro-mestizo populations, was the initial reason for the tense relations among locals and West 
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Indians” (Chambers 2010:3).  Certainly, the economic conditions and hostile environment 
created by the Honduran politicians pitted the various ethnic groups against each other, fomented 
distrust, and prevented them from understanding the root causes of the tense relations that 
Chambers addresses.   
The ethnic segmentation Chambers addresses resonates with what  professor of law 
Michelle Alexander’s observation in the aftermath of the Bacon’s Rebellion6 in 1675 in the 
United States when members of the plantocracy “extended special privileges to poor whites . . . 
to drive a wedge between them and black slaves” (2010:25).  This wedge Alexander points out 
“effectively eliminated . . . future alliances between black slaves and poor whites” (2010:25).  In 
Honduras, the wedge the Honduran politicians created between the Garinagu and West Indians 
did not always work.  For example, West Indian dock workers and black activists Roy Gayle 
Green and Lloyd Sentine’s important role in the “local committees” of the 1954 strike challenges 
the tense relations that Chambers talks about (Euraque 2004:204).  Their activism suggests that 
the Honduran politicians and intellectuals social scheme was not completely fulfilled since there 
was some degree of cultural intercourse taking place among the various groups. 
Working and living conditions, demands for back wages, and the provision of health 
services were the central reasons for the workers’ strikes.  The convergence of various ethnic 
groups, the Garinagu, ladinos, and West Indians undoubtedly contributed to the diffusion of 
political ideas that ignited the workers’ movement.  Influenced by the formation of the Universal 
Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) which Jamaican black nationalist Marcus Mosiah 
Garvey formed in 1914, and regional leftist groups such as the Frente Democrático 
                                                          
6
 The Bacon’s Rebellion refers to  a rebellion carried it out by Nathaniel Bacon, a “white property owner in 
Jamestown, Virginia, who managed to unit slaves, indentured servants, and poor whites in a revolutionary effort to 
overthrow the planter elite” in 1675 (Alexander 2010:24). Uniting this group was part of Bacon’s scheme “to seize 
Native American lands . . . to acquire more property” (Alexander 2010:24). When members of the plantocracy 
“refused to provide militia support” to Bacon, he fought back (Alexander 2010:24). 
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Revolucionario Hondureño (The Honduran Revolutionary Democratic Front) in Honduras, West 
Indian workers saw their racial identity central in forming a cohesive labor movement (Opie 
2009:7).  Although these organizations influenced Honduras’ labor movement, it was black 
people, Sara Iriona observes, who first initiated several movements in Honduras culminating 
with the 1954 general strike in Honduras (personal communication, March 29, 2012) when 
“40,000 workers . . . paralyzed not only the banana company operations, but also all other sectors 
associated with the export economy” (Euraque 1996:71).  The 1954 strike was successful, 
anthropologist Adrianne Pine claims, because it “changed the face of labor relations there 
[Honduras] for many years afterward” (2008:16).  Iriona claims that despite black people 
initiating the labor movement, the Garinagu and other black people in general, did not articulate 
a separate political and economic agenda (personal communication, March 29, 2012), although 
an estimated “90% [of black people] were found in the banana-producing coastal departments of 
Cortés, Atlántida, Colón, and Islas de la Bahía, [Bay Islands]” (Stokes 1950:16).  Instead, the 
Garinagu organized as a “political movement at that time” (S. Iriona, personal communication, 
March 29, 2012).  A host of factors contribute to workers’ struggle.  
First, “the central point of tension between capital and labor lies in the workplace and is 
expressed in struggles over the work process and the wage rate” (Harvey 1985:84).  Class 
struggle therefore is an outcome of capitalism because it commands among many things “land,” 
“money power,” and labor force to make capitalism “place dependent” (Merrifield 1993b:521-
522).  Because it is place dependent, capitalism is “vulnerable to political contestation,” imputed 
or “inscribed in place” (Merrifield 1993b:521-22; see also Massey 2004:11).  Local “resistance 
and fightback (i.e. fending off in some way the ‘global’ forces) or in terms of building 
alternatives” characterize these social forces (Massey 2004:11).  Local resistance of the 
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Garinagu, West Indians, and mulatos informs us that capitalists generally forget about human 
agency because their relationship with the state shields them by averting any conflict that 
interferes with the flow of capital.   
Second, it is true what Merrifield argues that place forms through social struggle which 
becomes a barrier for capitalism (1993b:103).  Thus, the “dominant form of [place], that of the 
centres of wealth and power, endeavors to mound the [places] it dominates . . . and it seeks, often 
by violent means, to reduce the obstacles and resistance it encounters there” (Lefebvre 1991:49).  
It is within these processes that racism in Honduras exacerbated the situation between workers 
and domestic and foreign capitalists.  From racist practices stemming from the domestic and 
global economic forces, one finds that racial identity also shaped black workers’ collective 
efforts challenging the orthodox “Marxist binary model of a class struggle between capitalist and 
proletariat” (Wilson 2000:68).  Wilson is on point in his assessment that class is not the only 
factor that we should consider in our analysis of class struggle, identities must be also included.  
As political geographer Kevin Cox also asserts, “identities are multiple” (2002:147).  Class is 
not, therefore, the only unifying force among workers; race must be filtered into discussions 
because as Laura Pulido argues our experiences are racialized.  Based on this understanding, 
differences in time and space generate geographical variations in terms of the construction of 
race (Pulido 2002:763).  Race is indeed a social construct that has defined human interaction and 
shaped our frame of reference of who we are as a society.  
The Anti-Black Sentiment and a New Cultural Identity 
Citing Francisco Scarano, Chambers states that “‘the historical experiences of people of 
African descent have often been buried beneath a homogenizing discourse of national unity in a 
popular undercurrent of anti-black intellectual thought’” (2010:9).  Chambers further indicates 
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that the West Indians experience has been “submerged beneath an ‘all-inclusive’ nationalizing 
agenda, but also through the homogenization of blackness in the literature that emphasizes the 
Garifuna experience above all others” (2010:9).  Consequently, because the Garinagu have been 
present in Honduras before their West Indian counterparts, the Garinagu “bore the brunt of anti-
black sentiment and continue to experience racism and prejudice that marginalizes them within 
Honduran society politically, socially, and economically” (Chambers 2010:9).  Euraque’s 
analysis of Honduran politicians’ economic policy in the 1920s and 1930s agrees with 
Chambers’ assessment.   
Honduran politicians shifted their attention to passing rigorous “immigration laws” in 1929 
and 1934 requiring immigrants “to deposit $2,500 when entering the country” (Euraque 1998: 
152).  President Miguel Paz Barahona (1925-1929) fueled existing racist discourse by 
proclaiming in the 1920s that Honduras “needed ‘serene races’” (Euraque 1998:158; 2003:244).  
For Barahona, blackness represented social and cultural disorder.  Correcting this social ill 
required not only reinvigorating the state’s racist practices, but also echoing racist beliefs in 
borrowing from Blaut’s analysis, Europeans’ “biological” superiority (1992:299).  Denigrating 
black people justified many “anti-labor” laws passed and introduced to the Honduran congress in 
the 1920s (Euraque 1998:152).  The intent of such laws was to characterize Honduras’ society as 
strictly mestizo and thus advance a “fictitious national image of racial and ethnic homogeneity” 
(Mollett 2006:79).  This social construct came to represent a new identity befitting to the elites’ 
social and political agenda.  Barahona’s successor, President Vicente Mejía Colindres (1929-
1933), “institutionalized” various racist policies linked to the Agrarian Reform Law of 1924 
(Euraque 1998:158).  Under this law, the exporting of Europeans to Honduras would whiten 
what Honduran politicians perceived to be a dark population.   Members of the Liberal Party, 
141 
 
which many Garinagu blindly support, complemented their Agrarian Reform Law by 
“contracting J.H. Komor, a British subject, to promote ‘white immigration’” (Euraque 
1998:158).  Instead of Europeans migrating to Honduras, Lebanese, Palestinians, and Syrians 
became the new migrants and the “dominant commercial elite” to this day (Euraque 1998:161).  
Jews too migrated and are today part of the dominant elite as well.  Although Honduran 
oligarchs’ plans to whiten the country did not materialize, they still equate “the nation with one 
particular identity” while excluding others, namely black people, who they viewed as a 
hindrance to the nation-building project (Medina Kroshus 1997:760).  The Honduran oligarchs 
had to perceive blacks as subhumans to exclude them from the nation-building project.  Their 
perception derived from their ideology which in turned shaped their practices.   
The Honduran politicians’ racist practices were their way of purging blackness from what 
they construed to be an ideal mestizo nation.  Socially, the mestizo construct came to represent 
Latin America society and the national identity by eliminating black people and erasing their 
“historical and cultural contributions” (Rosa 1996:276).  Academically, mestizo like mestizaje 
came to represent a theoretical framework for white scholars, in particular, studying Latin 
America society (Rosa 1996:276).  Similar to white scholars, for the Honduran oligarchs, their 
mestizo framework excluded black people “by notions of mestizaje, the idea” of conjuring up “a 
unique people through particular forms of racial and cultural mixture” and imagining a culture 
comprised only of European ancestry (Gordon 1998:121 emphasis added).  The brown-skinned 
person was thus deemed aesthetically pleasing to the nation’s architects.  Under this rationale, 
the Honduran politicians and intellectuals “rendered” black people “invisible” (Hooker 
2005:301).  This invisibility prevails today.  
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Anti-immigration laws together with racist language and Honduran politicians’ racist 
policies found support among the country’s elites.  For example, López Pineda, owner of El Sol 
newspaper, called on the Ku Klux Kan (KKK), a white terrorist group from the United States, for 
assistance in a national whitening project of the 1930s (Euraque 1998:159).  Evidently, Pineda 
was ignorant of the fact that the KKK did not consider people like him to be of European 
ancestry either.  However, because he perceived himself to be “white,” he thought the KKK 
would aide him in his cause since both groups could establish a mutual agreement based on their 
common vision: to eradicate black people and reinforce white supremacy.  Among some of the 
intellectuals who agreed with Honduran politicians’ racist discourse included Froilán Turcios, 
Ramón Rosa, and Alfonso Guillén Zelaya.  Turcios (1875-1943) supported the state’s racist 
policies and spoke of the “‘danger of racial mixture” whereas Rosa supported the migration of 
Europeans to Honduras (Euraque 1998:159; 1998:160; 2003:243).  For Zelaya (1887-1947), the 
presence of people of African descent in Honduras not only “displaced Hondurans,” but worse 
still increased the risk of Honduras becoming “a nation of mulattos for years to come” (Mollett 
2006:90 emphasis added).  Although Honduran elites developed a penchant for a phenotype 
closely resembling “whiteness,” it seems that this approximation did not satisfy Zelaya’s 
representation of the white society he envisioned (Jackson 1976:4).  Instead, he decried it 
because it did not represent the white society that the Honduran elites sought to create.  
Besides mestizaje, Honduran elites conjured up indigenismo and incorporated it into the 
racial discourse.  Although  the Honduran state did not afford the indigenous population equal 
rights, much less view them as humans, Indians and the narrative of indigenismo nevertheless 
came to represent “paradigmatic symbols of national identity” (Hooker 2005:301) and “the 
ancestral spirit of the nation” (Gordon 1998:121).  Indians then became aesthetically pleasing.  
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Having satisfied the prescribed physical criteria, the dominant culture in Honduras deemed the 
Indians’ humanity comparable to that of Europeans, although this was not always the case.  
According to Isidro Chávez,  
during the period of independence, the Honduran legislation differentiated 
between two indigenous groups, the Indians of the south, center and west 
comprised by Lencas and Mayans, and Mayans Chorti and the Indians from the 
forest [selvatico] area located on the north coast and currently in the 
Departamentos of Yoro, Olancho, Colón, and Gracias a Dios.  The first ones 
appeared sparsely in 19th century legislation to totally disappear in the present 
century due to progressive loss of their indigenous languages and to the 
accelerated process of ladinization.  It has not yet ended.  This absorption into 
the mestizo culture provoked the absence of protective laws of their land, 
languages, and cultures without the treatment and the exploitation to which 
they were subjected stop.  The so-called forest tribes [tribus selvaticas] in the 
Honduran legislation are comprised of the indigenous groups who were not 
ruled by the Spaniards or were not reduced by short or interrupted periods  
These tribes are the Xicaques or the Tolupanes, the Payas or Pech, the Sumus, 
Tawakas, the Miskitos, the Sambos, and the black Garifunas. (personal 
communication, April 24, 2010)   
 
Indeed, the so-called forest tribes or “indios selváticos” (forest Indians) was a late 
nineteenth century label referred largely to the Miskito inhabitants of the Honduran Mosquitia” 
(Mollett 2006:89).  Through a “religious missions led by the Moravians [missionary] and the 
government-sponsored Spanish education, the state sought to ‘elevate [civilize]’” the savage 
Indians (Mollett 2006:89; see also Césarie 1972:18).  The mestizaje and indigenismo construct 
then came to represent the national racial discourse in constructing what Honduran politicians 
perceived to be a new cultural reality.  Within these racial parameters and a sea of hypocrisy, the 
architects of the new cultural identity safely purged blackness from their conceived nation, at 
least in the politicians and elites’ mind.  Hence, in 1926, the Honduran elites solidified their 
nation-building project when they made the Lempira the country’s national currency (Euraque 
2003:229).  Considered by the elites to be “an indigenous chieftain who died fighting the 
Spaniards in the 1520s,” although there is no adequate “evidence for Lempira’s historic 
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existence,” he came to symbolize the new valiant society (Euraque 2003:229).  Bureaucrats 
commissioned a portrait of Lempira and distributed copies of leaflets with his image to mulato 
laborers on the banana plantations who, surely, were more concerned with surviving inside the 
Green Prison than with the elites’ racist practices (Euraque 2003:229-230).  
Nonetheless, the passage of legislation naming Lempira as the nation’s hero in 1926 
framed a new cultural identity.  For example, the state named “avenues, schools, stadiums” 
Lempira as a way to shape place identity (Euraque 2003:231).  Lempira’s passage also 
transformed consumption patterns with the naming of “coffee and cigarette brand names” 
(Euraque 2003:231).  To produce the ideal image of this fictitious indigenous hero, Lempira’s 
image has been continuously altered.  During the early twentieth century, the elites constructed 
his image as 
homely, short, and naked except for a loincloth, wearing a headdress with three 
upright feathers in front over short hair.  On later coins his head is in profile, 
his expression is more dignified, and his shoulders are covered.  In recent 
decades, on paper currency the feathers have disappeared from his headband, 
his hair has become longer, and he has had a look of innocent idealism of him. 
(Pine 2008:11)  
 
Today, the dominant culture plasters, figuratively speaking, this fictitious indigenous 
chieftain on most Honduran souvenirs and July 20
th
 is a national holiday.  During this holiday, 
mestizos organize competitions about who would earn the coveted title of “la india bonita (the 
prettiest Indian girl) and el indio guapo (the handsomest Indian boy)” (Pine 2008:10 emphasis in 
original).  Drawing from Andy Merrifield analysis of space, the Honduran elites’ post-colonial 
practices suggest that “imagery, too, may centre around symbolic representations of landscape 
(monuments, landmarks) which, while put in place through dominant spatial practices, become 
imbued with meaning in daily life” (1993b:525).  Through these practices, the elites imposed 
their norms and values on the masses in post-colonialism and forced them to see blackness “as a 
145 
 
threat to the ‘mestizo’ nation,” reinforcing extant terms such as negro and moreno not only on 
the Garinagu but black people as a whole (Euraque 2003:231 emphasis added).  In this manner, 
the nation-building project was a means to disempower blacks and reinforcing socio-spatial 
boundaries.  What the Honduran state and elites’ practices signify is that ideologies feed 
practices and practices maintain ideologies.   
The creation of the Lempira served various purposes.  Honduran elites created a new socio-
spatial hierarchy by manufacturing a mythical political discourse of a strong nation amid 
economic and political paralysis.  Their actions shifted attention from the poverty affecting the 
country and workers’ exploitation in the banana plantations.  Drawing from Wilson’s analysis of 
Black experience in the United States, the Honduran elites racialized the working class’s identity 
preventing blacks including the Garinagu and mulatos “from seeing their socio-conditions 
differently” (2002:36).  This social segmentation allowed Honduran politicians to frame a 
national identity.  In borrowing from Cox’s analysis of the construction of nation, I define the 
construction of race in Honduras as a “labor process,” which makes racial categories an integral 
component for its survival (2002:203).  Given these conditions, capitalism “installs a regime of 
extreme material insecurity, a struggle for material advantage, and an enmeshing of people in 
geographically extended webs of market exchange: a world of labor migrations, imports, exports, 
financial flows, geographically expanding markets everywhere and for everything” (Cox 
2002:190).  Echoing Lefebvre’s theory on the social production of space, geographer James 
Tyner maintains that space “is produced through the interactions of ideas (or discourses) and 
practices” reflecting power and ideology as well as values (2006:64).  In Honduras, capitalism 
has been a key factor in shaping national identity in relation to land and several aspects of the 
society.  The Honduran oligarchs’ practices framed a mestizo national identity which prevails to 
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this day, and they based their project in material insecurity compounded by their forbears’ racist 
practices during the colonial era.   
Perceptions of Race 
Despite overwhelming evidence about race stemming from capitalism, it is not generally 
understood to be a social construct.  It is instead “conceptualized as transhistorical, essentially 
corporeal, or allegorical or symbolic” (McKittrick and Woods 2007:7; Wilson 2002:34).  It is 
because of this conceptualization that “black geographies disappear – to the margins or to the 
realm of the unknowable” (McKittrick and Woods 2007:7).  Most people in Honduras see race as 
an offshoot of natural forces and racism as a normal social practice.  Mario Moran states, 
I know that when I was growing up [in Honduras], there were three races: 
yellow, white, and black – that’s what I was taught as a child . . . until I came 
to the United States December ’69, and until I started going to school here in 
America, whites called me black and blacks –there was no such thing as 
African- Americans.  We were blacks.  But, blacks who were born here used to 
call me foreigner because . . . I didn’t speak English at that time and I have a 
name like Mario Moran.  As Richard Pryor would say “what kind of name is 
that for a nigger?” Anyway, now, when you have been exposed to that – I 
knew that I was black, but I have never been discriminated and I’ve heard the 
term discrimination until I got to America.  It wasn’t until I got here that I got 
to understand that we were discriminated in Honduras. (personal 
communication, June 6, 2009)   
 
Moran, an inner-circle member of New York City’s Garifuna middle class, is not alone in 
believing that he was not discriminated against in Honduras.  While researching in the Bronx in 
2010, an acquaintance invited me to eat traditional Garifuna food at her in-laws’ apartment in the 
public housing projects in the South Bronx.  Sitting quietly in the living room consuming my 
meal, stories about living and growing up in the city of La Ceiba dominated the conversation.  At 
some point, the conversation turned to partying.  A Garifuna woman in her early to mid-sixties 
seized the moment.  She stood up and proudly declared “I went to dance with my white 
[mulatos] friends in a dancehall in La Ceiba in the ‘60s where morenos were not welcomed, yes, 
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me, yes, me,” pounding her chest (field note, May 30, 2010 emphasis added).  Her declaration 
did not represent an indictment of racist practices in Honduras or their connection to the 
Garinagu’s dispossession from their land.  Instead, she described it as if dancing at a segregated 
dancehall with her “white” friends was a privilege that only she had the honor to experience.  
Neither Moran’s nor the elderly lady’s narratives imply that they never experienced racism 
in Honduras.  What their narratives reveal is that dominant socio-spatial practices shaped their 
frame of reference in a way that prevented them from adequately contextualizing racist practices.  
As such, in borrowing Wilson’s words, they do not link “race-connected practices” associated 
with social-spatial boundaries (2002:54).  Not understanding race-connected practices makes it 
difficult but not impossible to develop “critical consciousness” (Freire 2000:35).  This is due in 
part to the fact that Garinagu writers, in drawing from hooks’ analysis, have not produced a body 
of “critical cultural analysis” that interrogates the representation of blackness (1990:4).  If the 
Garinagu would have produced critical work, the Garinagu may have developed a different 
discourse about the politics of race, and might have been more vigilant and critical, although 
some are.  Engaging in critical consciousness means challenging the status quo and “search[ing] 
for self-affirmation” (Freire 2000:36).  Lacking critical consciousness construes race-centered 
practices and discourses to be an inescapable reality and accepting myth to be a reality.  In so 
doing, “We make false starts because we have been programmed to depend on white models or 
white interpretations of non-white models, so we don’t even ask the correct questions, much less 
begin to move in a correct direction” (Bambara 1970:133).  Because we have come to depend on 
these models as scholar and activist Toni Cade Bambara argues, the Garifuna elderly woman, 
Moran, and many others see racism as something primordial.  Race and racism are seen as 
normal.  It is, therefore, the normalization of racism and its maintenance through ideology and a 
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host of social practices that prevent most Garinagu from being able to see and understand it as a 
social construct impacting their humanity and shaping their discourses.  In their view, racism 
becomes an unquestionable development which is best left unchallenged.  Consequently, being a 
patriotic Honduran is more important for Garinagu than critically addressing hegemonic spatial 
practices.  
In keeping racial discourse unchallenged, race in contemporary Honduran society has come 
to rule every-day interactions.  For instance, mulatos, indios, and ladinos, as they are referred to 
in Honduras more so than mestizo and blanco, generally address the Garinagu and black people 
in general derogatively as negra, negrita, or morena (black, little black, or black-skinned) 
denoting feminine and negro, negrito, “negron,” or moreno (black, little black man, big black, or 
black-skinned) denoting masculine.  As a colonial term, moreno originates from “moro, the word 
for Moor, and it was ‘originally used, as it is still, to describe a black horse’” (O’Farrill 2012:29 
emphasis in original).  By the sixteenth century “‘moreno became the general term used to refer 
to blacks and mulattoes alike’ – and thus a category for identities threatening to colonial and 
Christian power in the Spanish-controlled Americas” (O’Farrill 2012:29 emphasis in original).  
As for the diminutive suffix “-ito, added to negro, renders negrito . . . ’ a common racialized 
epithet’ suggestive of an ‘endearment between white and [blacks],’ one that is ‘never free of the 
infantilizing, patronizing connotation that ‘little’ carries when applied to an adult black male’” 
but also black woman (O’Farrill 2012:24 emphasis in original).  Mulatos addressing black people 
with words ending in ito or ita characterize these pejoratives to be endearing despite the fact that 
mulatos themselves are blacks.  In the United States, many Garinagu including some holding 
socially progressive views occasionally refer to other Garinagu as morenos or morenas.  Some 
claim using these terms out of anger whereas others employ it in everyday language in a way that 
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resembles African Americans use of nigga or nigger.  Most Garinagu and African Americans are 
unaware of the terms’ colonial roots and racist implications because of the normalization of 
language; hence, many Garinagu do not see the social harm and perpetuation of oppression these 
terms cause. 
At the heart of the Garinagu’s use of moreno or morena or any other disparaging terms is 
that they are uninformed that the “representations of the African Diaspora history and culture 
have assumed a binary formation – us and the Others – a residual construction surviving from the 
master/slave heritage” (Clark 1991:42).  Consequently, most Garinagu have not even begun 
deconstructing representations designed to promote and reinforce domination which in 
Kobayashi and Peake’s analysis of race would help the Garinagu contextualize racism.  For these 
scholars, racism represents space of white supremacy and the “location of social privilege” 
(2000:383) and blacks as the Other (hooks 1990:3).  Lacking this understanding only reinforces 
the master/slave heritage that African diaspora scholar Vévé A. Clark articulates and, of course, 
the domination that bell hooks addresses.  
Some Garinagu challenge racial discursive productions.  For instance, Miguel Santos who 
is looking into building luxury hotels in La Ceiba once his legal struggle over his family land is 
over challenges mulatos addressing black people as a whole as negron instead of engineer or 
licensiado.  In Honduras, a college or university graduate with a Bachelor of Arts degree is 
addressed as licensiado (a), although the word also means lawyer.  Honduran fascination with 
higher education titles has become a cultural trait expressing a high value for social status.  
However, even if a black person has the same educational credentials as a mulato, generally a 
black person is greeted as negron or negra rather than licensiada (o).  These social markers 
disempowered Garinagu and black people in general because they signify exclusion including 
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from their land and the maintenance of the socio-spatial hierarchy.  As Santos’s actions show, 
exclusionary practices become “terrains of resistances” in borrowing Routledge’s words (1993: 
xvii) suggesting that place is the embodiment of “real human activities” (Merrifield 1993a:530).  
The construction of racial discourse concomitant with other conditions reinforced colonial 
discourse associated with the banana plantation economy. 
Other examples illustrating how racial discourse prevails in contemporary Honduran 
society are manifested in the sphere of mass consumption and the Garinagu representation by 
Honduran politicians.  Honduras businessman, landowner, and biofuels leader Miguel Facussé 
Bargum named one of his snack lines, Zambos, a word used during the colonial-era to racially 
categorize people of mixed African and Indian parentage.  The snack packaging shows a monkey 
preparing to eat a sweet plantain whereas another of Bargum’s snacks features the slogan 
“Salvajes del Trópico” or Savages of the Tropic (figure 5.1).  Ironically, the latter snack is  
 
      Figure 5.1 Dinant Corporation’s Zambos Snack Division 
      Source: Dinant Corporation, 2014 
151 
 
made from cassava, a crop the Garinagu have always used for making ereba, a staple food in 
their diet.  Yet, for many years, mulatos denigrated the Garinagu for consuming ereba.  Today, 
Facussé Bargum has appropriated much of the Garinagu’s land and cassava and peppered his 
products with racist narratives.  Facussé Bargum’s action implies two things.  First, racism not 
“only operates through culture, it is also the expression of structural conflict.  Individuals are 
actions in a power structure.  Power can be used to reproduce racism . . .” (Essed 1991:viii).  
Second, the Zambo image in Facussé Bargum’s product speaks of the reproduction of racism 
because it reinforces extant depictions of black people in the so-called mestizo society’s 
imagination and reinscribes the image of the savage, wild, and barbarian.  In this manner, the 
depiction of the Other through the imagery of product advertising represents how mestizos 
employ racist practices to keep alive the self-presumed whiteness of Honduran elites.  
The second example represents the deployment of racism in Honduran politicians’ 
discourse.  In the aftermath of the 2009 coup d’état, President Lobo Sosa told the Garinagu while 
attending their April 12 ancestral celebration in the Garifuna community of Sambo Creek “Sigan 
Bailando y Bebiendo Guifiti que esa es Su Cultura no la Dejen” (continue dancing and drinking 
your guifiti because that is your culture and do not let it go) (I. Centeno, personal 
communication, April 17, 2010 emphasis added).  E. Roy Cayetano, editor of The People’s 
Garifuna Dictionary Dimureiágei Garifuna and Ruben Reyes author of Garüdia: Garifuna 
Trilingual Dictionary, spell guifiti as gífiti (2005:45; 2014).  Gífiti meaning bitters is a Garifuna 
drink traditionally prepared by community elders for medicinal purposes and personal 
consumption.  Using any type of liquor, Garifuna elders infused the drink with two types of 
anise, cloves, chamomile, nutmeg, and pieces of the contrigo tree, which gives the drink its bitter 
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flavor.  Yet, in the last thirty years, commodification has stripped gífiti of its original cultural 
meaning in a similar way to hip hop in the United States and Rastafari in Jamaica. 
The Garifuna middle class did not interrogate Sosa’s patronizing and paternalistic 
discourse.  Instead, they seem to see it as a recognition and affirmation of Garifuna culture, an 
uncritical vantage point which seems to be an accepted trend among most Garinagu.  Activist 
Trujillo sees Sosa’s statement as a matter of individual interpretation and the fact that Honduran 
presidents “lack eloquence” (personal communication, May 24, 2010).  For Moran, Sosa’s 
statement signaled incorporating the Garifuna’s culture into capitalism or as he maintains “taking 
the culture to tourism, which is how I have envisioned it because that was the other things that I 
have envisioned was the fact with us to participate, it would have to be power – once again, was 
the culture” (personal communication, May 25, 2010).  Moran seems unconcerned about the 
white gaze and the objectification of the Garifuna people as illustrated in figure 5.2.  This figure 
shows two Québécois tourists in the city of La Ceiba one hugging a Garifuna young boy while 
the other gazes.  Sharing Moran’s perspective, Benitez indicates, “personally, for me what he 
[Lobo Sosa] said is not a lie.  We all know that for Garinagu gífiti is consumed in every 
celebration.  So, why do we have to get offended by the truth?” (personal communication, May 
25, 2010).  For Moran and other Garinagu, Lobo Sosa’s words are devoid of racism and not 
connected to the Garinagu’s dispossession from their land.  They treat his racist discourse as 
presenting a window of economic opportunity for commodifying the Garifuna cultural traditions 
into a profitable spectacle of consumption, which is already the case.  Israel Centeno states, 
“pobre aquelos Garifunas que asistieron al Circo donde los payasos fueron ellos y los duenos 
del Circo fueron los Blancos Explotadores” (poor Garinagu who attended the circus where the 
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clowns were them and the circus owners the white exploiters) (personal communication, April 
17, 2010 emphasis added).  
Evidently, Moran, Benitez and many Garinagu believe that the “mantle of invisibility,” in 
borrowing hooks’ assessment does not exist (1995:35).  And, if it does not exist, it means that the 
“mark of oppression” has been eliminated by sheer magic (hooks 1995:35).  Their compliance 
and complacency show that the Garifuna middle class, and most Garinagu in general, resist 
critical imagination in addressing racism, whether institutionalized or not, because they fear 
upsetting the status quo.  As a result, most Garinagu with the exception of organizations such as 
OFRANEH have failed to equate their displacement from their land with racism.  Figure 5.3 
shows a banner that reads, “The dispossession of the Garifuna people from the land and the 
territory is racism.”  The Garifuna protesters carried this banner during their march in  
          
 Figure 5.2 Québécois Tourists in the City of La Ceiba 
        Source: Courtesy of Dawn Paley, 2010 
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Tegucigalpa in 2011.  Organized by OFRANEH, the Garifuna people protest was in response to 
the dispossession of a Garifuna community from Punta Gorda, Roatán located in the Bay Islands 
(Organización Fraternal Negra Hondureña, 2011).  The Garifuna middle class complacency is 
compounded by “inarticulateness” in confronting painful and complicated issues (hooks 1992:2). 
 
Figure 5.3 Garinagu Protesting Dispossession from their 
  Land in 2011, Tegucigalpa 
    Source: Honduras Resists, 2011 
 
Bell hooks advises that a “fundamental task of black critical thinkers has been the struggle to 
break with the hegemonic modes of seeing, thinking, and being that block our capacity to see 
ourselves appositionally, to imagine, describe, and invent ourselves in ways that are liberatory” 
(1992:2).  The Garifuna intellectuals and the Garinagu in general must break away from their 
inarticulateness to truly challenge not only racist images of black people in the dominant group’s 
mind but racist practices as a whole. 
The Garinagu in the United States 
Contrary to how racist practices are expressed in Honduras, the United States developed a 
two-tiered system comprised of black and white and various “mixed” groups (Wade 1986:1).  In 
the United States race has been vigorously enforced throughout the country’s history.  In Latin 
America, mulato “forms a buffer zone between whites and blacks” (Jackson 1976:6).  The 
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Honduran dominant culture equates mulato with white.  In the United States the category mulatto 
appeared as a racial category in the U.S. Census from 1850 to 1890 and from 1910 to 1920.  The 
U.S. Census Bureau defined a mulatto as a person of “mixed ‘Black’ and ‘White’ ancestry” 
(Mukhopadhyay & Henze 2014:166).  The Census Bureau expanded its definition and used 
“quadroons” to classify “those persons who have one-fourth black; ‘octoroon,’ those persons 
who have one-eighth or any trace of black blood” (Mukhopadhyay & Henze 2014:166).  The 
Census Bureau used other definitions, including negroe and colored.  These racial categories 
coincided with the colonial concept of nigger to define race relations in the United States.  We 
cannot then understand the Garifuna experience in the United States without fully understanding 
that “the sociospatial patterning” of the United States because as geographers George A. Davis 
and O. Fred Donaldson contend its construction is based on order and meaning (1975:1).  This 
process is situated in racial spatial terms such as “integration, segregation, colony, community 
control, separation, ghetto, inner-city, apartheid, busing, ‘keeping their distance,’ ‘knowing their 
place’” and spaces of consumption (Davis & Donaldson 1975:1).  
Bobby Wilson’s far-reaching work examines the interplay between political economy, race, 
place, and the consumption sphere, mainly as it pertains to African Americans social mobility in 
the postbellum southern United States.  Whites sought to maintain white supremacy by excluding 
African Americans from spaces of consumption because they were no longer able to exert the 
same control that they had during the years of slavery (2005:588).  To reaffirm their power, 
Wilson concludes that whites enforced spatial segregation (Wilson 2005:588).  This was one way 
of maintaining the racialized pattern of the socio-spatial organization of the United States.  
Racist socio-spatial patterns are also reflected in toponyms and other geographic terms such as 
“the Black Belt, Coontown, Buttermilk Bottom, Black Bottom, Harlem, walls, Cotton Curtain, 
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ghetto, and inner city” (Davis and Donaldson 1975:1).  These socio-spatial problems must then 
be understood within the historical framework of slavery and perpetual African American 
struggle to overthrow white supremacy, from slavery’s racial coding (nigger, negroe, coon, 
sambo, mammy etc.) to the KKK’s murderous practices and state-sponsored violence.  The 
purpose for creating socio-spatial problems was an “attempt to fix the meaning of [place] 
reflecting a hegemonic cultural norm . . .” (Tyner 2006:64).  This hegemonic cultural norm, 
albeit somewhat different from Honduras, is what Honduran elites sought to accomplish in the 
1920s with the passage of the Lempira as the national currency, the creation and 
institutionalization of mestizo as an identity and ideology, and the denigration of the Garinagu 
and black people as a whole.   
The black liberation struggle in the United States that began during slavery and grew to a 
larger scale with events such as the Civil Rights Movement was a way of annihilating white 
supremacy and cultural hegemony.  Because of the black liberation struggle, the U.S. Congress 
ratified the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 granting people of African descent citizenship, but 
also opened the doors to millions of immigrants entering the United States.  The Fifteenth 
Amendment granted African American men the right to vote in 1870.  Continuing to challenge 
the socio-spatial order, the Civil Rights Movement destroyed de jure segregation, and secured 
laws such as the Voting Rights Act of 1965.  These and many other accomplishments are what 
Cornel West calls African Americans’ “gifts” to the world (2010).  Although their gifts are 
enormous, de facto racial segregation still exists and white supremacy still dominates cultural 
production and black representation.  The dominant culture keeps these concepts alive by a host 
of practices fueled by racist ideologies.  To demonstrate, bell hooks argues that there is a 
misconception in the contemporary United States between blacks and whites, and I would also 
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add other ethnic groups, that racism is obsolete.  Growing up in the Marble Hill Housing Project 
in the Bronx, New York, I heard Garinagu, Dominicans, European Americans, and a host of 
other groups quip, “African Americans demand too much.”  
Another equally significant contemporary example is the election of President Barack 
Obama in 2009.  The so-called experts (blacks, whites, and other groups) hopping from one 
mainstream television network to another define President Obama’s election as a representation 
of “post” racial United States.  This “post” racial narrative signals to African Americans that the 
struggle for justice and equality is over.  They have made it.  The explanation hooks’ gives 
elucidates such a misguided notion,   
This erasure, however mythic, diffuses the representation of whiteness as terror 
in the black imagination.  It allows for assimilation and forgetfulness.  The 
eagerness with which contemporary society does away with racism, replacing 
this recognition with evocations of pluralism and diversity that further mask 
reality, is a response to the terror . . . Black people still feel the terror, still 
associate it with whiteness, but are rarely able to articulate the varied ways we 
are terrorized because it is easy to silence by accusations of reverse racism or 
by suggesting that black people who talk about the ways we are terrorized by 
whites are merely evoking victimization to demand special treatment. (1995: 
47)  
 
Because of the various masks white supremacists use, many Garinagu, similar to other people 
including the experts, see black people’s efforts countering “hegemonic spatial practices” as 
unnecessary (McKittrick and Woods 2007:7).  The reason for this is because the white dominant 
culture has built an image of the United States that denies its true historical and contemporary 
reality, and presents it as a just society.  Phrases such as “the land of the free,” “the melting pot,” 
“the American Dream,” “the land of opportunity” or the “bastion of democracy” support their 
practices.   Most Garinagu routinely evoke some of these phrases because they have come to 
associate myth with reality.  Another equally effective tool whites use is the media.  Negative 
stereotype images portraying African American men as thieves, rapists, buffoons, and lazy and 
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women as welfare recipients are a staple in mainstream media discourse (see Alexander 2010).  
The Garinagu and millions of people domestically and globally continue to consume these 
images.  Audiences around the world, including many African Americans themselves, accept 
these images passively and uncritically as accurate representations of African Americans in the 
United States.  Although these images lack accuracy, they nevertheless gain currency.  Why this 
is the case is explained by bell hooks,    
Like fictions, they are created to serve as substitutions, standing in for what is 
real.  They are there not to tell it like it is but to invite and encourage pretense.  
They are a fantasy, a projection onto the Other that makes them less 
threatening.  Stereotypes abound when there is distance.  They are an 
invention, a pretense that one knows when the steps that would make real 
knowing possible cannot be taken or are not allowed. (1995:38)  
 
From the public housing project where I grew up, the only view I could appreciate from my 
family’s twelfth floor apartment was the tall buildings imposed on the landscape and bodies on 
the street going about their daily lives.  On various occasions from among these many bodies, my 
mother handpicked two and declared, “whenever you see a black and a Puerto Rican guy 
together, they are up no good.” Unhappy with her comments, one day I asked her “how do you 
know that?”  She did not reply.  My mother like other Garinagu came to believe in a fantasy 
created by racists without realizing that the Garinagu’s bodies also form part of the exploited 
group and they are, in borrowing Clyde Wood’s words, at the “front lines of globalization and a 
global racialization” as evident with their mostly low paying jobs in the United States and 
dispossession from their land on Honduras’ north coast (2002:63).  An overwhelming number of 
Garinagu live in the so-called ghettos and most hold low paying jobs as porters, home attendants, 
domestic workers, and janitors.  My mother worked as a domestic worker and home attendant for 
many years.  In fact, occasionally, she would assign one of her older children, including myself, 
to cover for her on Saturdays.  Yet, despite the Garinagu’s economic and social alienation and 
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fragmentation, distrust among the Garinagu and African Americans abounds just like it 
abounded between West Indians and African Americans because each group is forced by racial 
and class oppression to compete for the same meager resources.  
The African American liberation struggle influenced the Garinagu cultural practices and 
identity.  Cultural nationalist Sara Iriona reflected on how this influence shaped her 1973 
marriage in New York City.  For her wedding, she had her hair braided in African style and the 
bride and groom wore African attire prepared by the bride’s sister.  Iriona also states “we had 
music and everything but it was drums and there was singing in Garifuna . . . Our wedding cake 
was made out of the darkest chocolate we could find; [the cake colors were] black, green, and 
red and so when we cut it one can see the colors of the black revolution,” which were adopted 
from the colors of the black liberation flag introduced by Garvey in the 1920s (personal 
communication, March 29, 2012).  One can connect Iriona’s cultural nationalism to Harlem as an 
“incubator for the rebirth of West African Culture” in the 1960s and 1970s when Miss Natural 
Standard of Beauty Contest was held in 1963 and many more cultural and political activists took 
place in the neighborhood (Olugebefola 1995:2).  Yet, many Garinagu has misunderstood these 
developments because like many people in the United States, they have been miseducated about 
the African American liberation struggle.    
Speaking of Martin Luther King, Jr. and Malcolm X, Tomas Cevello, a member of the New 
York City’s middle class group, states “one was for peace [Dr. King] and one was a little more 
violent [Malcolm X]” (personal communication, May 24, 2010).  As Cornel West states during 
an interview with former co-host of Al Jazeera’s Fault Lines investigative series, Avi Lewis, 
King’s image have been “deodorized, sanitized, and sterilized” to fit conservative and liberal 
politics whereas Malcolm X’s militancy has been added to the terrorist list (2010).  Erroneous 
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distinctions made about these men represent how each group or individual “sees a thing or 
event” in a way to reconcile them with their “interests and ideological stance” (Baraka 1992:19).  
Against this background, scholar and human rights activist Grace Lee Boggs summarizes 
distinctions between King and Malcolm X.  For Boggs, “[King’s] goal was integration but his 
strategy was confrontation, and in the actual struggle the first was turned into its opposite by the 
second,” although the Civil Rights Movement was about confrontation (2005:271 emphasis in 
original).  Part of this confrontation became more evident in the last years of King’s life before 
his April 4, 1968 assassination in Memphis, Tennessee.  Before his assassination, King’s April 4, 
1967 speech’s “Beyond Vietnam,” written by historian and theologian Vincent Harding, linked 
the plight of African Americans to Southeast Asians and to other members of the so-called Third 
World impacted by capitalism and imperialism (Goodman, 2014).  King’s speech signaled a shift 
in his politics.   
While King’s declared “aim was civil rights legislation and integration, the means of 
confrontation taught Black people that all the civil rights legislation in the world could not solve 
their real grievances and led them to question whether, after all, whites were good enough to 
integrate with” (Boggs 2005:271 emphasis in original).  So, “as the saying goes, Why fight to get 
into a burning house’ or ‘Why integrate with cancer’” (Boggs 2005:271; see also Belafonte, 
n.d.).  Malcolm X, on the other hand, used the concept of the “struggle for Black Power” and 
black revolutionary nationalism, a tradition that developed from African American’s socio-
spatial conditions (Boggs 2005:272 emphasis in original).  He believed that “Black Power could 
be achieved only by a struggle for power, or what he called the Black Revolution.  Hence his 
famous phrases, ‘by all means necessary’ and ‘by ballots or bullets’” (Boggs 2005:272).  
Although Malcolm X did not leave a blueprint to follow, he did “leave us a site for Black [or any 
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oppressed group] political discourse,” (Wood 1992:15) and “political development” (hooks 
1994:192).  Hence, “for many of us, his unequivocal critique of internalized racism coupled with 
his unapologetic stance on the need for militant resistance was the kind of political intervention 
that transformed our consciousness and our habits of beings” (hooks 1994:192).  Erroneous 
distinctions made by interpretations of King and Malcolm X distort their politics and goals, 
again, to fit a group’s or individual’s values, politics, and frames of reference.  Most Garifuna 
people have concocted their own narrative, better yet, they have repeated what they have heard 
and learned from the dominant culture about King and Malcolm X as some of the interlocutors’ 
narratives show at the beginning of this discussion.  
In East New Orleans, most Garinagu were adamant to connect with African Americans.  
Language barrier can serve as a barrier too.  Most Garinagu interviewed in East New Orleans did 
not or barely spoke English.  Those who did speak fluent English are not part of the land struggle 
in Honduras and several members of this same group are married or dating African Americans.  
In New York City, some see a linkage with other blacks, but most seem to gravitate toward 
establishing social alliances with whites and Latinos, even though they have been influenced by 
African American’s struggle.  For instance, Moran states that when he became involved in 
Garinagu activism for the first time,  
the first thing that I did was I started writing . . . newsletter and actually what I 
did was translate a lot of the articles from Ebony, Jet, which is why I read 
Black Enterprise. So, my whole idea of getting involved in the movement was 
actually based on the African American movement.  And, again I used a lot of 
material of Jessie Jackson and Martin and all of them. (personal 
communication, May 25, 2010)  
 
Moran is one of the leading figures in New York City striving for the Garifuna middle class 
social mobility.  Iriona believes that there is a “natural connection” between Garinagu and 
African Americans, though she claims that African Americans’ leadership rightly focused on 
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issues in the United States during the Civil Rights Movements (personal communication, March 
29, 2012).  However, this is not entirely accurate because African American activists’ discourse 
and efforts upheld an international outlook. 
Impact on Contemporary Discourse 
Using Kobayashi and Peake’s analysis of the geography of race, I state that scholars cannot 
pursue a social analysis in the United States without tackling the “geographies of whiteness,” 
while in Honduras there is this mestizaje framework the dominant post-colonial culture 
constructed and western scholars adopted in studying Honduran society (2008:157).  Within 
these racialized places, some groups are racially labeled, excluded, and spatially segregated.  As 
I have shown thus far, the Garinagu straddled these geographies.  In the United States, Garinagu’ 
bodies are racially recoded because other than their mother tongue, Garifuna, most Garinagu also 
speak Spanish and have Spanish names.  I say most because the Garinagu from Belize generally 
speak Garifuna and English whereas those from Honduras and Guatemala speak Garifuna and 
Spanish, and those from Nicaragua also generally speak Spanish.  Consequently, most people in 
the United States refer to Garinagu as Latino(a), Afro-Latino(a), and Hispanic.  Some Garinagu 
decry these categories while others, particularly the younger generation and some members of 
the middle class, embrace them, namely the categories of Latino(a) or Hispanic.  
Most Garifuna middle class embrace these ethnic categories and also Garifuna American to 
assert a new identity that supports their politics.  Increasingly, manifesting among the Garinagu 
in New York City, Houston, Los Angeles, and I suspect in several other urban areas having large 
Garifuna communities is the Garifuna American descriptor.  GCU’s José Francisco Ávila 
circulated various e-mails on the Garifunalink listserv urging Garinagu to write Garifuna as their 
ethnicity on the 2010 U.S. Census form.  Paradoxically, Ávila also calls on Garinagu to define 
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themselves as Garifuna Americans.  Identifying as Garifuna on the census form is only a 
symbolic gesture, since the Census forms contain no official state-recognized category for the 
Garinagu.  The Garifuna middle class explore their ethnic and racial identity options because 
these descriptors inform their politics.  What the Garifuna middle class’s activities suggest is that 
identities form through social relations embedded in place.  Those Garinagu who reject the 
Latino(a) category and identify as black, speak of how geography generates multi-dimensional 
racial discourse for many Garinagu.  Iriona declares, 
We consider ourselves of African roots and when we are here in the United States 
and walk in the streets anyone can say that we are blacks . . . African Americans.  
We are not seen as Latinos because we do not appear to them as Latinos and 
usually . . . we mix a lot with Afro Americans.  We do not lean that much towards 
the so-called Latin American community.  In fact, the Latin American programs 
on television, such as Univision do not represent us that much even here.  In other 
words, we would prefer that we are counted among African Americans.  In other 
words, the African American community is larger than it is counted because we 
are counted as Latinos and so that was part of the message . . . and we like people 
of African descent.  We solidarize and we understand the problems that impact 
the Afro American people because if our children grow up here, they are seen the 
same way. (personal communication, March 29, 2012) 
 
Adding to the Latino(a) or Hispanic discourse is that while there is nothing wrong with the 
Garinagu forming alliances with Latinos, as many do, very often these alliances may pose a 
problem.  Like the mestizos in Honduras, Latino (especially those with “brown” skin) politics 
conform to whiteness and negate blackness.  One reason for this is that many Latinos, like 
millions of people in the United States, are miseducated about African Americans’ experiences, 
struggles, contributions, and about their own blackness.  Moreover, “imperialism [and] 
colonialism” inform the Latinos’ identity politics for they have been coerced “to internalize 
negative perceptions of blackness, to be self-hating” (hook 1992:167).  One finds these 
internalized perceptions of blackness across Central and South America and Spanish-speaking 
Caribbean islands such as Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic.  Most Dominicans articulate 
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a pernicious discourse about their blackness.  Professor of English Silvio Torres-Saillant 
observes that Dominicans decry “their blackness” because they retained the former colonial 
master’s (Spanish) ideas about blackness and emulated the new master, the United States 
(1998:126).  This social interaction attests to Iriona’s statement about the Garinagu’s troubling 
racial discourse. 
Contrary to the United States, in Honduras the Garinagu are challenging the derogatory 
terms of negro or moreno more openly in a variety of ways.  Some prefer to be referred to as 
Garifuna because it makes them “feel happier, because it is pride” (J. Cespedes, personal 
communication, June 4, 2010).  There is also a new generation of Honduran activists reclaiming 
their African roots and blackness, which seems to be central in their discourse.  This is evident 
with the First Garifuna Hospital’s logo which depicts not only cultural and political symbols 
associated with their identity but also a map of Africa (figure 5.4) which suggests a spatial nexus 
(“Primer Hospital Garifuna,” n.d.).  
 Among contemporary Garifuna artists, the renowned artist and songwriter, Aurelio 
Martinez, authored and recorded the song Africa in 2000 signaling some important cultural and 
historical changes.  Here is a sample of the song lyrics I translated from Garifuna to English: 
            English (short version) 
     I will travel to Africa  
    To see the traces our ancestors left 
     I will never forget Africa 
     I will never forget Africa  
    Oh, Africa, eh, Africa 
    The blacks’ ancestors  
    There are Garinagu who have forgotten their roots 
    There are blacks who have forgotten their ancestors 
    But I will never forget Africa . . .  
                        (Martinez, 2000)                 
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           Figure 5.4 First Garifuna Hospital Logo 
         Source: Primer Hospital Garifuna, 2014 
    
Martinez’s musical contribution adds to a host of Caribbean musicians who write songs and sing 
about Africa as being part of their collective memory and to reclaim their identity and history.  
Among these musicians are Rastafarians Peter Tosh, Winston Rodney known by his artistic 
name as Burning Spear, and Bonny Wailer from Jamaica, and Midnite, a root reggae band from 
St. Croix.  The Garinagu’s ethno-musical practices as evident with Martinez’s song articulate 
black geography, a geography that imagines a new place.  However, most Garinagu prefer the 
song Yurumein, which refers to St. Vincent as their ancestral homeland rather than Africa.  In her 
analysis of the Garifuna leaders’ politics of identity, England states that the Garifuna organizers 
of the 1997 Garifuna Bicentennial celebration referred to St. Vincent as the “homeland from 
which the Garinagu have been exiled and as the territorial base of their culture, race, and 
identity” (1999:8).  This is a common theme among many Garinagu.   
 The usage of Afrodescendant or Afrohondureño(ña) also illustrates a preference for 
challenging racialized geographies on one hand and it signifies embracing one’s blackness and 
African roots on the other by some Garinagu.  However, this development has unleashed a 
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political war between OFRANEH and ODECO and most Garifuna middle class in Honduras and 
in the United States.  Before addressing this war of political identity, I first discuss the origin of 
the Afro prefix concept.  Juan Pablo Sojo’s Afro-Venezuelan Notes and Themes essay published 
in 1943 applied the prefix Afro as a way for black people to rid themselves of colonial racial 
identities such as negro and moreno (García, 2013; see also Ihrie & Oropesa 2011:9; see also 
Jackson 1979:112).   
In the aftermath of Casildo’s trip to the 2001 United Nations World Conference Against 
Racism in Durban, South Africa, he began using the Afro prefix.  Tensions emerged over its 
usage, particularly in recent years.  Many Garifuna middle class from Honduras and the United 
States circulated e-mails on Garifunalink listserv denouncing the Afro concept (R. Armenia, 
personal communication, September 20, 2013).  During interviews some of these people asserted 
that the general consensus is that most Garinagu reject it.  However, those contacted offered little 
information to support their claim.   In Honduras, Miranda decries Afro, Afrodescendants, and 
Afrohonduran because the Garinagu are not the only groups that fall under the term Afro; 
humanity as a whole does because all people “definitely come from Africa” (personal 
communication, September 19, 2013).  Although she acknowledges this historical origin, it 
seems that using Afro conflicts with OFRANEH’s land struggle (M. Miranda, personal 
communication, September 19, 2013).  Miranda’s statement suggests that she does not accept the 
Garinagu’s blackness because it does not fit her politics.  Throughout Latin America in the 
1990s, states introduced legislative reforms “establishing collective rights for ethnic groups” 
(Anderson 2009:106).  Honduras was one of these countries.  Drawing from Wilson’s assessment 
of “localizing black identity,” the Honduran government’s move suggests that the state 
constructed Honduras as a place of “shared meanings” for all its inhabitants, although this does 
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not reflect the reality of the Garifuna people (2000:181).  As a result of the ethnic groups’ 
presumed recognition, organizations such as OFRANEH define themselves as citizens of the 
Honduran nation and legitimatize their land struggles.  Speaking of black Colombians, 
anthropologist Bettina Ng’weno states, “‘Afro-Colombian’ was not the self-description of choice 
of most people with whom she worked (2003:10).  Ng’weno’s usage of Afro-Colombian in her 
dissertation is motivated by the desire to form a “connection to Africa” (2003:10).  Because the 
Garinagu generally identify themselves using their ethnic descriptor, Garifuna, this is the reason 
why I use Garifuna or Garinagu.  However, I also use people of African descent or black people.   
Casildo seems to disagree with Miranda’s politics.  Casildo sustains that at the Americas 
International Conference organized by the Organization of American States in 2000 and WCAR 
in South Africa affirmed “that Afrodescendants are descendants of Africans within which 
Garinagu are found.  So, it is not a bad word [Afrodescendant] as some may see it.  
Afrodescendants are those descendants of Africa, where humanity comes from” 
(“Afrodescendiente no es una mala palabra,” 2014).  Other Garifuna middle class in Honduras 
find the Afrodescendants/Afrohonduran terms meaningless because racism in Honduras is “part 
of the ‘60s and ‘70s,” basing this assertion on myriad unions between the Garinagu and mulatos 
(R. Contreras, personal communication, February 20, 2011).  Racism, however, is not part of the 
past as Contreras asserts; it is entwined into the fabric of the Honduran society developed during 
slavery, reconstructed during the banana industry, and safeguarded through a host of practices.  
To counter Contreras’ assertion that racism in Honduras is part of the past, I cite one 
sample, though by no means the only one.  In post-Hurricane Mitch, the Cuban government 
offered the Honduran government 600 scholarships for Hondurans to study medicine in ELAM 
(J. Espinosa, personal communication, September 23, 2011).  The Honduran government “sent 
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out only 269 students out of which only eight were Garifunas” (J. Espinosa, personal 
communication, September 23, 2011).  In 2000, the Cuban government “sent out 250 
scholarships, and they [Honduran government] did not send one single Garifuna” (J. Espinosa, 
personal communication, September 23, 2011).  Because of their exclusion, the Garifuna 
students mobilized and the Cuban government awarded them twenty scholarships (J. Espinosa, 
personal communication, September 23, 2011).  What the exclusion of the Garinagu from 
receiving scholarship signifies is that racism prevails in contemporary Honduran society.  The 
maintenance of racism is linked to the prevailing idea about the mestizo society and the state and 
elite-led socio-economic reproduction of Honduras’ north coast.  The Honduran government and 
local oligarchs do not want educated the Garinagu.  They want the so-called exotic Garifuna to 
be the spectacle of consumption as they built a new place.  
Similar to Miranda’s rejection of Afrodescendant, the Garifuna leader Ruben Reyes also 
decries such as a category.  Speaking about the Garinagu’s ethnohistory during a question and 
answer session following a public showing of his film Garifuna in Peril, he stated, “Africa is our 
father and the Arawak our mother.  I am not Afro descendant.  I am Garifuna.  There are only a 
few African words in our language” (field note, April 19, 2013).  First, colonialists not only 
created new cultures but also transformed the identities of the people they colonized.  Of course, 
this transformation includes language.  Literary theorist and cultural critic Edward W. Said 
argues, “neither imperialism nor colonialism is a simple act of accumulation and acquisition.  
Both are supported and perhaps even impelled by impressive ideological formations that include 
notions that certain territories and people require and beseech domination, as well as forms of 
knowledge affiliated with domination . . .” (1994:9).  This domination is manifested in the 
transformation of language.  The Garifuna language transformation went from African and 
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Arawak words to include English and Spanish words as well.  Second, referring to the African 
father assertion, Dosanto states, “there is no accurate scientific basis for such asseveration” 
(personal communication, February 25, 2014).  The “gender dominated Garifuna society is the 
only answer” (personal communication, February 25, 2014).  Reyes’ genderization of place – 
Africa the father and Arawak the mother – and rejection of his ancestral African heritage attests 
to the conflicting views many Garinagu endorse.  
Stuart Hall’s analysis that identity is constantly in flux is right on target.  Echoing similar 
sentiment, Paul Gilroy states that identity provides a way of understanding “the interplay 
between our subjective experience of the world and the cultural and historical settings in which 
that fragile subjectivity is formed” (1997:301).  Based on Hall’s and Gilroy’s analysis, this is the 
reason why the Garinagu are constantly redefining their image to fit the prescribed ethnic 
category of Latino(a), Hispanic, and Garifuna American, not only because of their interaction 
with Spanish speaking people but because of geography.  Bodies are racially coded, displaced, 
replaced, and molded under capitalism.  The Garifuna middle class strives to mold itself to fit the 
host culture norms.  Place is no doubt a complex concept built out of complicated social 
processes stemming from geographies of difference and power-geometries found within 
capitalist societies.  Place is also where “everyday life is situated” and where all sorts of social 
practices developed (Merrifield 1993b:522).  This includes the formation of identity 
Conclusion 
The geography of race in the Garinagu experience has generated a complex racial 
discourse, self-perception, and relationship with place.  In Honduras, their experience has been 
shaped principally by the development of the banana industry beginning in the late nineteenth 
century.  During this period, the Garinagu entered the global market as wage earners and petite 
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bourgeois capitalists.  Their entrance into this global economy situated the Garinagu in a tenuous 
place where the Honduran government was developing a new economy in the midst of their 
established communities.  Although it is unclear if the Garinagu engaged in any land struggles 
during this period as they began doing in the early 1990s, the point is that the global economic 
forces, as evident with the banana industry, fragmented their culture along class lines.  The 
working conditions and racist practices in the banana plantation industry, compounded by the 
Honduran politicians’ and elites’ construction of a new national identity deriving from their 
racist practices, shaped social integration and relations in Honduras and the Garinagu’s racial 
discourse.  Geographical variations further reshaped the Garinagu’s experience.  In the United 
States, the Garinagu redefined their identities to fit their politics.  Thus, in most major urban 
areas in the United States where the Garinagu live, they generally identify as Garifuna American 
and decry the prefix Afro.  Their new self-ascribed identity, Garifuna American, suggests that 
the Garinagu, namely the middle class, are reconciling themselves to the cultural politics of a 
different place that offers them distinct resources.  However, by and large their racial discourse 
and frame of reference inform their social, political, and economic experiences in Honduras. 
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CHAPTER 6 
SOCIAL PRACTICES AND MOBILITY IN THE BRONX 
 
A Brief History of the Bronx 
In this chapter, I discuss the Garifuna middle class’s economic and political integration in 
the United States as well as in Honduras.  Included in this discussion is the myth of belonging 
and cultural practices surrounding their social mobility.  Because there is a disconnection the 
Garifuna middle class and race, I will also factor in this concept into the discussion.  Before I 
examine their practices, I provide a brief history of the Bronx and how the Garifuna community 
settled in this borough.  Geographically separated from Manhattan by the Harlem River (Great 
Kill) and divided by the Bronx River (Aquahung), the Bronx, New York bears the name of the 
colonial landowner Jonas Bronck, who was either a “Swedish developer” or a Dutch born in 
Hoorn, Holland (Cook 1913:9; Rooney 1995:22).  Bronck was a former East India Company 
commander who settled in Old Morrisania, the area of present-day South Bronx, in 1639 on “a 
five-hundred acre tract” he bought from the Mohegan Indians, namely from the sachems 
Ranachqua and Tackamuck (1913:9; Rooney 1995:22).  Bronck built a “stone dwelling, a bar, 
several tobacco houses and two barracks” for his labor force comprised of Swedes, Germans, 
Danes, and Dutch between Harlem River and the Bronx River, in Old Morrisania (Cook 1913:9; 
Rooney 1995:22).  Upon his death in 1643, his widow Antonia Stagboom remarried and “sold 
the estate to Jacob Jans Stoll” (Cook 1913:11).  After passing through various proprietors, British 
Colonel Lewis Morris and Captain Richard Morris purchased the estate on August 10, 1670 
(Cook 1913:12).  However, the Landmarks Preservation Commission’s 2010 report states that 
the “English crown granted Lewis Morris the entire south Bronx in 1697” which remained the 
Morris’s property until the 1840s. 
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The Morrises previously resided in Barbados where Richard Morris’s wife, Sarah Pole, 
owned a sugar plantation (Cook 1913:12).  They later imported African captives from the 
Caribbean to toil on their plantation in the Bronx and in New Jersey (“Plants and People, 
remembering the Bronx River’s African-American Heritage,” 2014; see also Adams 2003:9).  In 
fact, Lewis Morris’s family “owned one of the largest slave holding estates in the north 
Morrisania, in what was then Westchester county but is today the Bronx” (Singer 2008:69).  
Besides the Morrises, all wealthy landowner families in the Bronx owned slaves.  Indeed, the last 
“held slave in the state of New York belonged to the Morris family” in 1827 (Landmarks 
Preservation Commission, 2010:3).  Occupying 1,920 acres of land at the southernmost part of 
the Bronx, Morrisania remained “the agricultural hinterland for the still small city of New York” 
by 1791 (González 2004:5; see also Kirschke 2005:1).  To facilitate Lewis G. Morris’s 
(Morrisania’ last lord) business activities between his estate and Manhattan Island, he built the 
High Bridge crossing the Harlem River in the mid-nineteenth century and the New York and 
Harlem Railroad (González 2004:11; Rooney 1995:24).  From this period, the Bronx witnessed a 
surge of subway, bridge, tunnel, and road construction and became “the third greatest building 
community in the United States, Manhattan ranking first and Chicago second” (Cook 1913:29).  
The Bronx came to be characterized by manors or “huge land grants owned by wealthy families, 
worked either by slave labor or by tenants as family farms” (Ultan & Unger 2001:8).    
Added to the British landholdings were West Farm and Hunt Point that was named after 
slave plantation owner Thomas Hunt.  Historical records list Hunt as owning ten African 
captives in the 1790 census and 136 by the end of the same year (González, 2013).  African 
captives toiled in the Hunt family’s business producing flax and honey to export to Ireland 
(Rooney 1995:22).  Writer Harry T. Cook states, “directly opposite the Hunt burying ground is a 
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small enclosure in which the slaves of early residents are interred” (1913:101).  To the north of 
Fordham was the manor of “Philipsburg, owned by the Philipse family,” an area extended along 
the “Hudson River shoreline well into modern Westchester County” (Ultan & Unger 2001:8).  
Through marriage, Jacobus Van Cortlandt, after who Van Courtlandt Park in the Bronx is named 
after, joined the Philipse family.  Van Cortlandt became the owner of much of the northwestern 
part of the Bronx.  The Pell family owned the manor of Pelham, which constituted the northeast 
of the Bronx.  These were the Bronx’s eighteenth century elites whose vision was to create an 
“English society” (Ultan & Unger 2001:8).  American capitalist Jordan L. Mott arrived in the 
Bronx in 1828 where, with land bought from Governor Morris II, he started manufacturing coal-
burning stoves (Rooney 1995:24).  Mott went on to found Mott Haven Village in 1849 
(González 2004:20).  It is Mott Haven, Morrisania, Hunt Point, and other places such as Crotona 
Park East, Claremont, and Melrose that were first to converge in forming the Bronx and to 
benefit economically from receiving “rapid transit connections” with neighboring Manhattan 
(González 2004:7).  
By the mid nineteenth century, in addition to West Farm’s mills, the Bronx had “extensive 
foundries, gas works, breweries, piano factories, and numerous smaller establishments, 
supplemented by railroads, ferries, and a horsecar line” (González 2004:16).  During the late 
nineteenth century, the politicians reorganized the Bronx’s built environment.  Formerly part of 
Westchester County, in 1874 New York City annexed Melrose, Morrisania, West Farms, and 
Kingsbridge towns located west of the Bronx River.  By 1895, New York City annexed Pelham 
and Eastchester, Wakefield, and Westchester from east of the Bronx River.  All annexed territory 
formed the Borough of the Bronx in 1898 (Landmarks Preservation Commission, 2010:2; also 
see Cook 1913:23).  The Bronx’s population swelled after annexation from 33,000 in 1895 to 
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430,980 in 1910 and 950,000 by 1920 (Cook 1913:23).  From the late nineteenth century to the 
1960s, descendants of early settlers, and eastern and northern European immigrant newcomers 
dominated the Bronx’s cultural landscape, particularly the South Bronx (González 2004:38). 
Politically, the Morrises dominated the political scene in the eighteenth century in the 
Bronx, then German-American Louis F. Haffen became the Bronx’s “first Borough President” 
serving two terms 1897 to 1909 (Landmarks Preservation Commission 2010:10).  Demographic 
and ethnic changes after World War II transformed the borough’s political landscape.  Born in 
Caguas, Puerto Rico, Herman Badillo was the first Puerto Rican to be elected Bronx Borough 
president (1966-1970) and in 1970 became the U.S. Congressperson from New York’s 21st 
District in the South Bronx (Enciso & North 1995:1).  Other Puerto Ricans followed.  Fernando 
Ferrer’s 1987 election as the Bronx Borough president (1987-2001) signaled another milestone 
for Puerto Ricans.  Ferrer replaced Simon Stanley (1979 to 1987), a Jew, who was incarcerated 
for two years on charges of “racketeering in the Wedtech scandal” (Lynn, 1991).  It is New York 
City’s political landscape that the Garifuna middle class strives to form part of as I would show 
in this chapter. 
The Garinagu in the Bronx 
The Garinagu began arriving to the United States during the years following World War II.  
Some scholars consider two factors to be responsible for their migration: the decline of the 
banana production in parts of Honduras and the global economic restructuring of the 1940s 
(England 2006; 1999:11; see also González 1988).  Garifuna men found employment in New 
York City’s manufacturing industry but, more significantly, many became merchant marines.  As 
some became members of the New York City-based National Maritime Union, they received 
better wages and benefits (England 2006:44).  This group settled in New York City 
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neighborhoods such as Harlem.  Besides manufacturing and seafaring jobs, the Garifuna men 
also worked in building maintenance jobs.  Garifuna women began migrating to New York City 
in the 1960s.  Employed in traditionally black-dominated domestic service jobs such as nannies 
and home attendants, they too settled in Harlem (England 2006:2).  By the 1970s, many 
Garinagu moved from Harlem to the Bronx, concentrating in the neighborhoods of Mott Haven, 
Longwood, Hunt Point, Crotona Park East, Melrose, and Morrisania.  A report by the Garifuna 
Coalition, USA, Inc., estimates that “200,000 [Garinagu] live in the South Bronx, Brownsville 
and [East New York in Brooklyn], and on Manhattan’s Upper West Side [Harlem]” (2007:6).  
Other places with Garifuna communities include West Farms, East Tremont, Mount Eden, 
Marble Hill, and Soundview.  
At the time of the Garinagu’s arrival to the Bronx, chiefly the South Bronx, urban decay 
was this area’s emblem, and white socio-spatial separation, dubbed white flight, was at its zenith. 
Figure 6.1 illustrates the demographic changes experienced in the Bronx before and after the 
Garinagu’s arrival.  Sarah England states that many Garinagu found the “Hispanic flavor” in the 
South Bronx a pull factor attracting them there (2006:51).  However, at the heart of this 
demographic shift was not the Bronx’s Hispanic flavor, but its deindustrialization (“The Bronx: 
An Economic Decline,” 2003:3).  Deindustrialization resulted from the relocation of capital 
outside of the United States in the 1950s and 1960s when capitalists emphasized “acquisitions 
and new ventures” and “maximizing corporate profits” without regard for the local labor force 
(Wilson & Green 1989:33).  These economic conditions “put incredible pressure on the 
employment base of many urban regions.  A combination of shrinking markets, unemployment, 
rapid shifts in spatial constraints and the global division of labour, capital flight, plant closings, 
technological and financial reorganization, lay at the root of that pressure” (Harvey 1987:263;  
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Figure 6.1 Change in Racial Composition of Population in the Bronx, New  
         York City 1940 to 1990 
               Prepared by: Doris Garcia 
   Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, United States  
                Census of Population, General Population Characteristic, New York       
                (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, various years). 
 
see also Cox & Mair 1988:307).  Disregard for local economy exacerbated urban decay and 
expanded already existing “receptacles for next arriving groups” (Blaut 1983:35).  Ghettoization, 
Blaut concludes, is a “necessary component” of capitalism because it is a way of “maintaining a 
super-exploited sector of the labor force within the advance capitalists’ countries” (1983:40).  
The Garifuna communities form part of this super-exploited sector in the Bronx and other urban 
areas in the United States.  Compounding this super-exploitation in New York City is the 
inaccessibility to affordable housing, low wages, and racism (see Green & Wilson 1989:45).  
One can trace the absence of affordable housing in New York City to the zoning initiated in this 
city in 1916.  By 1926, the United States Supreme court ruled for the “right of cities to subsume 
the unfettered individual’s ability to determine use of land in favor of constricting this to plan for 
the general public interest” (Wilson 2007:21).  The intent of zoning in places such as New York 
City and elsewhere in major cities paved the way for “the making of privileged  city sections (the 
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downtown, massive industrial districts)” (Wilson 2007:21).   These city sections feed the 
“industrial giant” that New York City is today and “protect real-estate values” (Wilson 2007:21). 
The rebuilding of blighted buildings in the South Bronx began by the early 1990s.  Despite 
these changes, most areas today remain impoverished.  It is in this social apartheid that most 
Garinagu live, and from where the Garifuna middle class is attempting to build an economic base 
by forming a group of Garifuna entrepreneurs in New York City.  The socio-economic 
conditions of neighborhoods with large Garifuna populations in the Bronx, Brooklyn, and 
Manhattan are demonstrated in figures 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4 that show the spatial distributions of 
median household income ranges.  Please note that the highlighted green area at the northern tip 
of figure 6.4 is the Marble Hill neighborhood.  Originally, Marble Hill was part of   
Manhattan Island until the builders of the new landscape separated it by construction of the 
Harlem River Ship Canal in 1895 (Smith, 2012).  Marble Hill is thus “hooked on the Bronx [but] 
legally Manhattan’s” (Smith, 2012). 
Economic Integration 
 
On May 21, 2000 José Francisco Ávila and ten Garinagu formed New Horizon Investment 
Club.  This group gathered their financial resources “to learn how to invest in the stock market 
and subsequently become active participants in the economic development of the Garifuna 
Community Residing in New York City, teaching members how to become successful strategic 
long-term investors” (New Horizon Investment Club, 2010).  To join New Horizon, a person 
pays $300 and then $25.00 each month as a New Horizon’s associate (T. Ávila, 2012).  The 
associates’ commitment to amassing wealth and their visions of economic integration allowed 
New Horizon to invest “$250,000 in the stock market” (T. Ávila, 2012).  Ninety-nine percent of 
New Horizon Investment Club’s associates are Garinagu (Colón, 2010). 
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To promote and expand New Horizon Investment Club’s economic services, in 2012, GCU 
and Garifuna Advocacy Organization launched the Bronx Immigrant Entrepreneurship Initiative 
Program (Colón, 2010).  These organizations designed the program “to not only help immigrant 
entrepreneurs scale the many unique obstacles they face in their efforts to start and grow 
businesses in the Bronx, but overall to also support Bronx immigrant communities and empower 
them to grow and create jobs” (Colón, 2010).  On February 21, 2010, New Horizon’s associates 
celebrated their Third Garifuna Food Expo at St. Martin of Tours Church in the South Bronx 
(New Horizon Investment Club, 2010).  A host of club events that include organizing celebratory 
galas and fundraisers accompanied the investment strategies of the New Horizon’s members in 
their pursuit for wealth.  
 On May 22, 2010, I attended New Horizon’s Blue and Silver First Decade Gala at The 
Eastwood Manor Caterers on the northeast of the Bronx.  The Eastwood Manor is where GCU 
regularly holds its galas.  After paying a $75 admission fee, I walked into a dancehall decorated 
with mirrored walls and sparkling crystal chandeliers.  Inside the dancehall, bourgeois-oriented 
working class Garifuna men and women impeccably dressed in blue or silver-colored fashions, 
with some women in light brown curly wigs, socialized.  Seated among a group of Garinagu, I 
canvassed the ballroom.  Decorating the round tables were silver linen, white and blue balloons, 
blue napkins, and chairs wrapped with silver cloth and blue ribbons.  A large digital projection 
screen and microphone awaited New Horizon’s president, José Francisco Ávila, and a host of 
other Garinagu eager to be heard.  Entertainment before and after the echoing cacophony of 
speeches included, reggae, calypso, salsa, rhythm and blues, and Garifuna music.  A smiling 
bartender tended to the guests’ drinking needs.  Platters of chicken cutlets, lasagna, baked 
salmon, fried plantains, Italian bread, and fruit salad decorated one corner of the ballroom.  
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Absent from this menu was anything reflecting the Garinagu dishes such as ereba (grilled 
cassava) and coconut bread (field note, May 22, 2010).  
 As the guests enjoyed their meals, some Garinagu passed the microphone from one speaker 
to another.  Some Garinagu spoke about the Garifuna race or “la raza Garifuna” and others 
indicated that they were happy that Garinagu had reached “Wall Street” (field note, May 22, 
2010).  Others urged Garinagu “to consume what your people produce,” referring to the 
importation of ereba, produced by Garifuna women in Honduras and packaged and sold by 
Wabagari (Our Life) Distribution under the brand name of Casabe O’Big Mama (field note, May 
22, 2010).  Headquartered in La Ceiba, Garifuna Lina Hortensia Martínez Laredo owned 
Wabagari.  New Horizon “established a commercial partnership with Wabagari” to distribute its 
product in New York City in 2008 (New Horizon Investment Club, 2010; Press Release, 2008).  
New Horizon’s website states that ereba is sold at three neighborhood stores in the South Bronx.  
The Garinagu vendors sold the product at Casa Yurumein’s second anniversary celebration on 
June 5, 2010.  The U.S. State Department named Martínez in October 2010 “an alumna of the 
International Visitor Leadership Program (IVLP) and the Central American Peace Scholarship 
(CAPS), as State Alumni Member of the Month” (“U.S. Department of State Honors Lina 
Hortensia Martinez Loredo of Honduras as State Alumni Member of the Month,” 2010).     
 Following the parade of speeches and the alacrity demonstrated by Garinagu attending the 
Silver and Blue First Decade Gala, José Francisco Ávila played Matt Markowich’s brief report 
prepared for Money Track in 2009.  In this report, Ávila and his twin sibling appear standing 
next to Wall Street’s iconic Charging Bull sculpture.  In the same report, Ávila indicates that  
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              Figure 6.2 Median Family Income in Garinagu Concentrated Neighborhoods in   
                                the Bronx, New York, 2011 
         Prepared by:  Paul Karolczyk and Doris Garcia   
               Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 2007-2011  
       American Community Survey, Table S1903 
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              Figure 6.3 Median Family Income in Garinagu Concentrated Neighborhoods in   
                               Brooklyn, New York, 2011 
              Prepared by: Paul Karolczyk and Doris Garcia   
              Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 2007-2011  
American Community Survey, Table S1903 
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                 Figure 6.4 Median Family Income in Garinagu Concentrated Neighborhoods in  
                                Manhattan, New York, 2011 
              Prepared by: Paul Karolczyk and Doris Garcia   
              Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 2007-2011  
     American Community Survey, Table S1903 
 
 
183 
 
New Horizon is all about “how to create capital” (field note, May 22, 2010).  Ávila concluded, “I 
have confidence in the market” (field note, May 22, 2010).  After awarding Ávila with a silver 
bull engraved on a wooden stand, he stated “what I do is for the benefit of our people” 
(field note, May 22, 2010).  Ávila’s statements deserve some analysis.  
Overseen by the Bowling Green Association, the charging bull sculpture statute became the 
focus of a space of consumption, attracting millions of visitors both nationally and globally soon 
after its installation.  In borrowing Harvey’s words, it is precisely this “‘pseudo-place’ or ‘non-
place’” that the Garifuna middle class associates with social mobility and belonging (Harvey 
1996:317).  This bull sculpture has become a symbol capturing the imagination of the Garifuna 
middle class.  Although this group is at the margins of power in the social structure, their 
activities and discourse suggest that they perceive the urban sphere through the lenses of 
bureaucrats, developers, and speculators.  And like for millions of people in the United States, 
the bull has come to symbolize the American Dream.  The American Dream narrative, however, 
represents how ideologies shape practices and practices maintain ideologies.   
 Also, evident in the Garifuna middle class’s discourse is a constant reframing of their 
identity and racial discourse which confirms Hall’s assessment that identity is a social production 
(1990:222).  Their usage of the Garifuna race rather than ethnicity reveals this change.  Such 
usage suggests that the Garifuna middle class is asserting an identity, which in its view 
commands inclusion and respect.  Professor of comparative literature David Theo Goldberg 
argues that ethnicity now tends “to facilitate naturalization of the group formation and 
internalization by ethnic members of their group identity” (1993:76).  The interplay of 
naturalization and internalization is “enabled primarily by rhetoric of origin, ascribed or self-
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ascribed, that is reflected through the ethnic content” (Goldberg 1993:76).  Goldberg’s argument 
parallels Stuart Hall’s argument that identity is constantly in flux.  
Another significant aspect of the Garifuna middle class’s discourse apparent during its gala 
event is that, undoubtedly, there is a certain economic ideology of what it means to be Garifuna 
in the United States, but most importantly in capitalist United States.  This ideology is predicated 
on the idea of entrepreneurship in which development is guided by certain practices, images, and 
discourses.  Hence, ideologically the Garifuna middle class is experiencing what sociologist, 
theorist, and political activists W.E.B Du Bois calls a “double-consciousness,” meaning “this 
sense of always looking at one’s self through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul by the 
tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity” (2003:9).  Seeing themselves through 
this lens implies a negation of their culture and history.  To explore the why and how of 
entrepreneurship, I consult historian Manning Marable’s examination of African American 
elites’ economic status and outlooks in capitalist United States since they are closely reflected in 
the Garinagu elites’ ideology and practices.  Marable states, 
Easily the most decisive element of the Black elite, both in the United States 
and in the Third World periphery, is the entrepreneur. The black 
businessperson is the linchpin of underdevelopment and capital accumulation 
within the Black community.  The goal of the Black entrepreneur is to make 
profits, period.  How he/she accomplishes this task is secondary to the goal. 
The nonwhite businessperson is the personification of the legitimizing and 
rational character of capitalism.  For white corporations, he/she serves to 
perpetuate the illusion that anyone can ‘make it’ within the existing 
socioeconomic order, if only he/she works sufficiently at it.  For the state, the 
Black entrepreneur represents the role model of proper civic behavior that the 
unruly and ‘nonproductive’ Black masses should follow. (2000:138)  
 
In Marable’s judgment, black elite entrepreneurs are essentially ideological bait in a capitalist 
society, meaning that this economic system provides the opportunity for individual upliftment. 
Non-whites just need to try a little harder and engage in certain practices.  Their persistence will 
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be rewarded by becoming role models to their people.  These black elites thus become caretakers 
of the wealthy whites’ assets by following the capitalist prescribed recipe of success, building an 
image, and engaging in certain practices.  For example, the Garinagu perceived such images and 
events as the Ávilas standing next to the bull sculpture, holding their galas at Eastwood Manor 
Caterers, and consuming certain foods to indicate their ascendance within the socio-economic 
class hierarchy.  
In the same vein that the Garifuna middle class build on the “social myth” (Frazier 
1957:161) Marable calls “Black capitalism,” this group also serves as a liaison between 
capitalism and the rest of the Garifuna population just like the African American clergy did 
while becoming “the bedrock of Black petty bourgeois” (2000:137).  The white establishment 
viewed African American pastors “as an ideological buffer between themselves and the often-
dangerous Black masses.  The Black messengers taught the Gospel of Christ to the weary, 
promising sweet visions of freedom in the afterlife” (Marable 2000:137).  In a similar way, when 
José Francisco Ávila tells fellow Garinagu that what he is doing is on their behalf suggests 
collective benefit and implies a sense of communalism that invites trust and confidence.  In other 
words, it was his way, in borrowing Wilson’s words, of “connecting identity,” specifically 
Garifuna identity, to social mobility and assuring the Garinagu that they are the beneficiaries of 
this endeavor (2000:72).  What Ávila seems to understand is that images of prestige, social 
status, and departure from Honduras’ north coast resonate with the New Horizon Club members 
and its gala’s attendees.  Drawing from Wilson’s analysis of African Americans in the United 
States, Ávila seems to create these images simply by “stirring the souls” of the Garinagu using 
identity politics (2000:73).  In this case, Ávila’s message parallels the role of the clergy as a 
conduit to proselytizing on behalf of the white establishment as demonstrated by Marable’s 
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argument.  Without engaging in such practices, members of the Garifuna middle class believe 
that their social mobility cannot come to fruition.  As such, they must adhere to the racist 
stereotype of the “‘good’” domestic worker who serves their white boss by being “faithful, 
trustworthy and grateful” to them (Davis 1983:94).  These racist notions do not seem to permeate 
the Garifuna middle class’s consciousness because they, in echoing hooks’ assessment of 
African Americans, have difficulties pursuing “liberatory paradigms of black subjectivity” which 
is in “part a failure of critical imagination” (1990:18-19).  What seems to be of central 
importance to this group is the myth associated with their social mobility. 
The Garinagu in New Orleans 
Contrary to the Garifuna middle class in the Bronx, in East New Orleans, members of the 
organization Vallecito Faya slightly differ in ideological orientation from the Garinagu in New 
York City.  Their organization’s attention is directed to cultivating plantains and other crops in 
Vallecito to sell in the municipality of Limón and throughout Honduras.  Vallecito, a hamlet of 
the municipality of Limón in Colón, remains a place of struggle today between the Garinagu and 
Miguel Facussé Bargum and ladino land invaders.  Compounding the Garinagu’s land struggle in 
Limón is drug trafficking, a problem existing in Honduras for many years, but which began 
affecting the Garifuna communities only in recent years.  Despite difficulties in Limón and in 
organizing meetings in East New Orleans, Vallecito Faya’s members held a few monthly 
meetings.  From March 4 to August 1, 2010, only three meetings were well-attended.  The 
Garinagu from Houston and Mississippi attended August’s meeting.  Because of the strong 
presence of Limoñenos in Louisiana and in other southern states, all the attendees were from 
Limón in comparison to the Garinagu in New York City who come from diverse Garifuna 
communities in Honduras and other nations (Belize, Guatemala, and Nicaragua).  Vallecito 
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Faya’s members held their monthly meetings at a privately owned Garifuna woman’s house in 
East New Orleans, which required private transportation to reach.  They decorated the coffee 
table in the living room where they held their meeting with a hand-made crotchet cover having 
the black, yellow, and white colors of the Garifuna flag.  Garifuna food and beverages were 
served at the meeting.  Each meeting referred to Miguel Facussé Bargum, one of Honduras’ 
ruthless large landowners, but attendees also discussed fundraising activities to protect Iseri 
Lidawamari, a cooperative farm in Vallecito, Limón.  Funds raised were generally around 
$1,000 which Vallecito Faya members used to purchase flashlights in the United States to send 
to security guards protecting the Garifuna farms in Vallecito from ladino land invaders.  
On June 8, 2010, I attended one of Vallecito Faya’s fundraising events held at Gari Mix 
Restaurant and Club in the East New Orleans business district.  A Garifuna woman from Limón 
owned the club until it closed in 2012.  Club owners painted the interior walls with the black and 
yellow colors of the Garifuna flag.  To enter the club, patrons paid an admission fee of $15. The 
club was equipped with a bar, disc jockey, dance floor, Garifuna drummers and dancers, and a 
stage for live performances.  Inside, Vallecito Faya’s president, Brigido Cayetano, served guests 
cups of “Hi Hi,” a sweet Garifuna drink he is attempting to commodify.  Entertainment featured 
a live performance by Limoñena Ruby Aruba, who is shunned by the Garifuna middle class in 
New York City.  Wearing a sexy dress having the Garifuna colors, a pair of black lace gloves, 
fishnet stockings, and a blond wig, Aruba sang in Garifuna and danced to pre-recorded music.  
Most members of the audience ignored her performance.  This was the only fundraising event the 
Garinagu in East New Orleans organized during my fieldwork.  Meeting cancellations were 
common due to poor attendance.  Cayetano associates poor fundraising attendance to the lack of 
transportation and interest but also to people’s work schedules.  Most Garinagu in East New 
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Orleans are employed in the service industries, which commonly requires them to work during 
the weekends.  In addition, their immigration status makes it difficult for many of them to 
negotiate time off.  By mid-2011, Cayetano relocated to Limón and ceased all activities in East 
New Orleans.   
While differing in many respects, the Garinagu in East New Orleans emulate the Garifuna 
middle class in New York City.  Speaking of the partnership between Lina Martinez and New 
Horizon Investment Club to import ereba to the Bronx, Brigido Cayetano states, “it is my 
understanding that she has cassava in New York, in the supermarkets, and other places.  So, that 
is the vision that I have in regards to Faya.  This is why I tell you – that is why I aspire to the 
presidency [of Iseri Lidawamari]” (personal communication, October 10, 2010).  Both the 
Garifuna middle class in East New Orleans and New York City aspire to form part of the global 
economy.  Their economic practices therefore suggest their conflicting views of place regarding 
Honduras’ north coast.  Malcolm X’s assertions are useful in understanding the Garifuna middle 
class’s economic practices.  In his 1960 speech at the Harvard Law School Forum, Malcolm X 
declared “once the slave has his master’s education, the slave wants to be like his master, wants 
to share his master’s property, and even wants to exercise the same privileges as his master even 
while he is yet in his master’s house” (Kelley 1998:426).  Malcolm X’s criticism of educated 
African Americans was an indictment of their assimilation of a white-oriented middle class 
mentality.  In assessing Malcolm X’s criticism of African American middle class education,  
historian Robin D. Kelley observes that it “implied that the black bourgeoisie was incapable of 
siding with the masses and giving up their class interests – what African revolutionary Amilcar 
Cabral described as committing class suicide” (1998:426).  Malcolm X, therefore, saw black 
middle class’s practices as a submission to white supremacy.   
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Cornel West argues that Malcolm X’s political discourse called for black bourgeoisie 
“psychic conversion” (1994:136).  This was Malcolm X’s “black rage,” a rage deeply grounded 
in the struggle for self-determination and liberty (West 1994:137).  West also links Malcolm X’s 
black rage with his “great love for black people.”  Hooks modifies West’s assessment saying that 
Malcolm X possessed a perpetual thirst for “justice,” which served as the “catalyst for his rage” 
(1995:13).  This was a rage by which blacks in the United States could gain freedom.  Malcolm 
X’s rage is absent from the Garifuna middle class’s discourse.  In integrating into capitalist 
United States and distancing themselves from the land struggle in Honduras, most of them do not 
link the ramifications of their political and economic practices to the removal of the Garinagu 
from their land.  Benitez, a member of the Garifuna middle class inner circle in the Bronx, 
concludes “I believe that sadly we will be displaced [from the land] but our culture will be kept 
as it has been kept to this day” (personal communication, May 25, 2010).  Because the ideas 
diffusing from New Horizon’s leaders center on social assimilation and economic integration, 
Benitez does not link the Garinagu’s displacement from their territory to the forces of capitalism.  
Instead, she follows the prescription of New Horizon’s leaders, “if you can’t beat them 
[capitalists] join them by competing against them, which is the whole idea of raising capital in 
New Horizon . . . talking about economic development from the Garifuna community ‘cause 
unless we become entrepreneurs, unless we mechanize and produce – mass produce – again . . . 
that’s what colonialism was all about; that’s what imperialism was all about” (M. Moran, 
personal communication, May 25, 2010).  Moran, however, has not only resisted capitalism, he 
has adopted billionaire Texas real estate mogul Trammell Crow’s model of profiting from land 
development (M. Moran, personal communication, May 25, 2010).  
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  Moran decided upon adopting Crow’s land development approach to apply it to the 
Garinagu’s plight in Honduras as the Honduran government rigorously pursued tourism in 1992 
(M. Moran, personal communication, May 25, 2010).  Moran believes that it was his duty to 
educate the Garinagu about tourism because it was an unavoidable economic change.  Given his 
“interest in real estate and . . . interest in the culture,” he believed that the “Garifuna culture was 
gonna play a major role in tourism” (M. Moran, personal communication, June 8, 2009). 
Therefore, “understanding how tourism develops and understanding culture [was important]” 
(M. Moran, personal communication, June 8, 2009).  This help explains why Moran sold the 
Garifuna’s land via the internet in the early 1990s (R. Armenia, personal communication, 
September 14, 2013).  The Garifuna middle class’s politics of identity has shaped their views of 
place.  Consequently, they are not developing a progressive agenda that can help safeguard the 
Garinagu’s land on Honduras’ north coast.  Instead, guiding the ideas diffusing from the visible 
Garifuna leaders in New York City are capitalist-oriented.  They are more concerned with 
preaching individual ownership and competition rather than addressing oppression and 
domination.  Hence, in evoking David Harvey’s thoughts, they have accepted “exclusionary . . . 
doctrines (the promise of eternity in a world of rapid change)” (2001:12).  They thus see place 
dazzled with glitter.  It is, therefore, this form of “reasoning framework” that isolates spaces for 
the development of critical consciousness (West 1994:36).  
The Myth of Belonging 
Many members of the Garifuna middle class in the United States see themselves as makers 
of the Garifuna social mobility by equating social mobility with assimilating western values.  In 
2007, GCU’s administrators organized their first gala and on November 20, 2010 held their third 
one at the Eastwood Manor Caterers.  Attended by over three hundred Garinagu and non-
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Garinagu guests from the New York City metropolitan and tri-state areas (e.g. New Jersey, 
Connecticut) and California, Gunchei dance (Quadrille Dance) show entertained attendees 
(Colón, 2010).  As Garifuna blogger Teofilo Colón states, Gunchei is “according to Garifuna 
American Choreographer MARIANO MARTINEZ, ‘the most formal, social dance of The 
Garifuna culture.  Known to many as the Quadrille Dance.  A waltz if you will’” (2010 emphasis 
in original).  Colón concludes, “Most people associate The Punta Dance with Garifuna People so 
it was refreshing to see another Garifuna cultural dance performed with style, elegance and 
grace.  Kudos to the Garifuna Americans of The J Dove Productions Dance Company” (2010).  
Colón stated in his speech after receiving an award from the gala organizers, that it was special 
receiving the award in front of people he “consider[s] the ROYALTY of The Garifuna 
Community in New York City” (Colón, 2010).  If the Gunchei dance is part of the Garifuna’s 
culture as Colón contends, the question arises how did the Garinagu adopt it?  Did they adopt it 
from European colonizers or more recently introduced it as a fictitious but socially respectable 
cultural invention of the Garifuna middle class in the United States to help them overcome socio-
spatial barriers as they integrate into capitalist United States?  Who are the people who associate 
Punta Dance with Garifuna?  
To answer the questions posed above requires some background into the origin of Gunchei.  
From the Latin word quadratus, meaning square, Parisian aristocracy embraced quadrille dance 
in the aftermath of the French Revolution (1789-99).  Embracing the quadrille dance meant an 
attempt to foment a national identity.  As a cultural practice associated with the upper social 
class, quadrille dances “became very elaborate and a mark of prestige” (Guilbault 1985:32; see 
also Miller 2007:79).  By the mid-nineteenth century, quadrille diffused mostly to Western 
Europe, but also to the French and British colonies in the Caribbean where it is still practiced in 
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St. Lucia, Jamaica, and Carriacou as the Kwadril.  In the Caribbean, the French plantocracy was 
known for enjoying quadrille dances.  Anthropologist Rebecca S. Miller states that African 
captives “learned the dance . . . from watching and imitating” the master or whenever the master 
“asked the slaves to play music” (2007:81-82).  In a society where African captives faced 
extensive constraints upon their spatial mobility, it is incomprehensible how the masters allowed 
the slaves to become an audience at their gatherings when the extent of their interaction was 
about “the honoring of the master [and the mistresses] and the dishonoring of the slave” 
(Patterson 1982: 11).  Another important point to make is that I doubt that the master asked 
African captives to play music as Miller suggests; the masters ordered them to carry out their 
wishes.  Once the Europeans abandoned quadrille dance, the masses retained it. 
 Given quadrille’s historical trajectory and the fact that the French and British colonists were 
present in St. Vincent, the Garinagu may have adopted it from either group.  Anastasia Pascual 
remembers dancing quadrille during the late 1950s up to the mid-1970s in Honduras (personal 
communication, February 11, 2013).  However, she resents the fact that the Garinagu have 
“abandoned this Garifuna’s tradition” (personal communication, February 11, 2013).  Judging 
from the Garifuna middle class’s practices, it seems that the Garinagu never completely 
abandoned it.  Instead, as evident with members of the Garifuna middle class, it seems that they 
see quadrille as an elevation of their values and as a cultural trait.  For members of the Garifuna 
middle class, quadrille is refined while the traditional Punta is not.  Decrying Punta and replacing 
it with quadrille is a form of cultural rejection.  Cultural rejection by members of the Garifuna 
middle class can be also associated with their outlook on slavery.  Most Garinagu are fond of 
saying that they were never enslaved, though as a culture, they emerged from slavery.   
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 According to the unchallenged colonial master narrative of the Garinagu’s ethnogenesis, a 
slave ship possibly owned by the Spanish or the Dutch, traveling from West Africa to the 
Caribbean with a cargo of African captives wrecked as a result of a hurricane near Bequia Island 
in the Lesser Antilles.  The shipwreck’s survivors and maroons (a colonial appellation for 
runaway African captives) from nearby islands took residence on St. Vincent where they adapted 
to the customs of the island’s inhabitants who were variously referred to by the European 
colonizers as Arawaks, Arawak-Indians, Carib Indians, Charibs, Charaibs, Carib, Caribe, and 
Yellow or Red Caribs (Anderson 2009:3; Honychurch 1997:291; González 1988:xi; Young 
1971:1).  Twentieth century anthropologists referred to these inhabitants as “Island Caribs,” 
although “they called themselves” Kalinago (Honychurch 1995:21).  It is fair to say that 
segments of the master narrative are well-supported.  Abundant data exists of the pre-colonial 
presence of Kalinago on St. Vincent, and of intermarriage between newly arrived Africans and 
maroons and the Arawaks (Anderson 2009:3; González 1988:21).  It is also fair to say that 
indeed many slave ships wrecked in the Caribbean Sea.  While such components of the master 
narrative yield a degree of sound information, we must reappraise other parts to create a new 
historical framework that speaks of the agency of Africans and their descendants in the African 
Diaspora.  Did a shipwreck, in fact, occur?  If so, was it caused by a hurricane or the Garinagu’s 
African ancestors?  These are key questions to ask since the shipwreck narrative has become an 
accepted belief.   Blaut argues, “Beliefs tend to gain acceptance if they support the myth, and are 
either rejected or denied attention if they do not do so” (1993:59).  The intent in briefly probing 
into the Garinagu’s ethnogenesis is not to answer whether the shipwreck did or did not occur.  
The plan is to critique the reality of the Garinagu’s ethnogenesis by taking an approach which 
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involves, in borrowing from bell hooks’ words, “decolonizing our minds and imaginations, 
[learning] to think differently” and “to see everything with ‘the new eyes’” (1994:7).   
 The first step in questioning the shipwreck myth considers whether the supposed shipwreck 
was actually caused by a hurricane.  By claiming that a hurricane caused the wreck, the story 
takes away from the Garinagu’s African ancestors’ agency in being able to liberate themselves 
aboard the slave ship, a “location through which . . . hardship and human cruelty” gave a “new 
meaning to the vessel itself” – that is, as from being a space of captivity and domination to a 
space of struggle for freedom (McKittrick 2006:xii).  Adequate evidence exists which supports 
the possibility that a slave rebellion could have resulted in African captives taking possession of 
the slave ship, for it was a common occurrence throughout the trans-Atlantic slave trade (see 
Greene 1944:348; Postmas 1990:165; Holloway, 2010; Beckles and Shepherd 2007: 12; James 
1989:9; Robertson 2001:72).  This could help us understand if African captives’ struggle for 
freedom may have caused the vessel carrying the Garinagu’s African ancestors that presumably 
wrecked.  
Second, in questioning the shipwreck myth, one must also consider that the durations of 
the trans-Atlantic slave trade varied with an average voyage from West Africa coast lasting over 
two months (Eltis, 2007; also see Uya 1976:67).  These voyages tended to have “higher rates of 
mortality, per voyage and per day at sea, than did other ships” (Klein et al. 2001:107).  Historian 
Johannes Postmas’ examination of the records of the Dutch slave trading company, 
Middelburgsche Commercie Compagnie, reveals that the mortality rate among captives was 12.3 
percent (1990:156).  The high mortality rate was certainly expected.  African captives “were 
packed in the hold on galleries one above the other.  Each was given only four or five feet in 
length and two or three feet in height, so that they could neither lie at full length nor sit upright” 
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(James 1989:8) and men and women “were separated, kept naked, packed close together, and the 
men were chained for long periods (Eltis, 2007).  Given such conditions, smallpox, syphilis, 
fevers, opthalmia, dropsy, seasickness, gastro-intestinal, and food and water shortage made 
conditions aboard the slave ship torturous (Greene 1944:348; West 1997:8).  So, if a hurricane 
caused the shipwreck which led to the Garinagu’s African ancestors as European colonizers state 
and scholars maintain, how could ailing and injured African captives have escaped their bonds 
and managed to survive a hurricane’s violent waves, currents, rain, and winds? 
  Yet, the shipwreck narrative remains strong much like other myths such as cannibalism. 
The Garinagu have come to believe this myth first because, in borrowing hooks’ words, “they do 
not want to see images that might compel them to militance” (1992:6).  Second, as historian 
Larry Levine states in the documentary Ethnic Notions, when people see an image so many 
times, the image begins to gain “meaning” and they begin to believe that, in fact, the image is an 
accurate depiction of who they are (Riggs, 1987).  I apply hooks’ and Levine’s argument to the 
Garifuna people’s understanding of their ethnogenesis and of their self-perception.  If certain 
false accounts of historical events are repeated, then a distortion of the people and places making 
that history results.  In this way, the acceptance of the shipwreck narrative makes it difficult to 
know the true of the Garinagu’s ethnogenesis and how their culture and relationships with their 
lands actually started and developed.  We know that it began in Africa.  However, having 
become a popular belief within contemporary Garifuna culture, the shipwreck narrative becomes 
an obstacle to uncovering the historical facts of the Garinagu’s ethnogenesis and cultural 
evolution.  In deconstructing the shipwreck’s myth, it would shed light on the cultural 
relationship between the Garinagu and their African ancestors, a relationship that many feel is 
best to forget or ignore.  Former Haitian professor of anthropology and social sciences Michel-
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Rolph Trouillot states, “silences are inherent in history because any single event enters history 
with some of its constituting parts missing.  Something is always left out while something else is 
recorded” (1995:49).  Deconstructing the Garinagu’s ethnogenesis remains unfinished.  Yet, the 
Garifuna middle class, and most Garinagu in general, do not address what is missing because it 
does not fit their politics and practices today as evident with their narrative of quadrille. 
As a Garifuna middle class’s practice in a capitalist society, elevating quadrille therefore 
suggests that “it is better not to be black in a country where being black is a liability” (Jones 
1963:123-24).  Tracing African American middle class cultural development in the United 
States, chiefly in the post-Reconstruction period, cultural critic, writer, and political activists 
Everett LeRoi Jones’s (Amiri Baraka) analysis helps us understand how this group’s assimilative 
practices aided them in shedding their blackness.  Many African American middle class 
perceived jazz to be a “hindrance to racial progress, since jazz often presented it as a referent for 
sexuality, primal passions, and exotic ‘primitivism’” (Franklin and Higginbotham Brooks 
2011:387).  For African American artists, however, artistic experience represented a way of 
reshaping “the black image in the larger public mind” (Franklin and Higginbotham Brooks 
2011:381).  Undoubtedly, each component of African American society shaped by social 
mobility in the United States informed their cultural values.  Jones’ analysis again succinctly 
captures African American cultural contestations.  He states, 
It was the growing black middle class who believed that the best way to 
survive in America would be to disappear completely, leaving no trace at all 
that there had ever been an Africa, or a slavery, or even, finally, a black 
[person].  This was the only way, they thought to be citizens.  For the Creoles 
and mulattoes of the South, this was easier – there was a quickly discernible 
difference between themselves and their darker brother since it was the 
closeness of the father (and mothers) to the masters that had produced them in 
the first place. (1963:124) 
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These are precisely the same practices that members of the Garifuna middle class are engaged in 
because they believe that their very survival in the United States, as a specific group striving for 
economic and political integration, rests on shunning anything that remotely resembles their 
African heritage and who they are as black people.  In assimilating these practices, the Garifuna 
middle class are unconcerned about losing their communities on Honduras’ north coast.  Instead, 
they create a new social identity associated with middle class status or “’acting white’” in 
borrowing Goldberg’s words (1993:69).  The Garifuna middle class perceives their newly 
reconstructed social identity as offering a way to attain upward social mobility in the United 
States.  
Speaking of African Americans’ “exile” to Europe, Jones states that their adoption of a new 
cultural identity in the 1940s as reflected with the “goatee, beret, and window-pane glasses were 
no accidents” (Jones 1963:201).  They were bee bop “symbols” (Jones 1963:201).  Jones 
contends that adopting these “socio-cultural symbols” was a way to formally conform to western 
values (1963:201).  Members of the Garifuna middle class are undergoing a similar cultural 
transformation to blacks in the United States.  Their silver and blue gowns, and wigs, whether 
brown or blond, reflect this change.  This change results from a form of cultural politics that 
prevents them from calling for a progressive agenda and values antithetical to western values.  
Instead, they are pushing other Garinagu to embrace these values while negating their own 
traditional values.  Only when they find it to be opportune in advancing their own immediate 
aspirations do they articulate “race matters” in borrowing Cornel West’s words, politics of 
identity, and the land struggle in Honduras (2001).  Invoking the concept of race in accentuating 
the Garifuna’s social mobility suggests that in the same way the Garifuna middle class adopt 
western values, they undermined their culture and their homeland on Honduras’ north coast.  
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Again, I will draw a parallel between African Americans in assessing the Garifuna middle class’s 
cultural practices.  Drawing from bell hooks’ comparative analysis of African Americans racial 
discourse, there is no doubt that the Garifuna middle class’s identity politics relate to their 
economic and political integration agenda.  Hooks argues that “assimilated black people evoked 
an identity politics rooted in the privileging of a model of integration, wherein allegiance to 
blackness was abdicated in the interest of erasing race and promoting an ethos of humanism that 
would emphasize commonalities between white and blacks” (1995:241).   The Garifuna middle 
class follows similar path.  They encourage the Garinagu in Honduras, as I discuss in chapter 
seven, to become shareholders in the Honduran government tourism project.  Of course, not all 
Garinagu subscribe to the social mobility doctrine articulated by the Garifuna middle class.    
Most Garinagu that I interviewed believe in their economic, political, and social upliftment 
in the United States and in Honduras, but they must not pursue them by decrying and 
commodifying their culture.  For instance, Armenia defines the Garifuna middle class in the 
United States as “Oreo cookies,” meaning black on the outside but white on the inside (personal 
communication, January 23, 2011).  Armenia explains her definition as follows: “So, we have 
whitened, we have elevated, we are rubbing elbows with people from different levels; so, we 
don’t have to be so Garifuna unless the only difference that makes us so Garifuna is that here it is 
a fashion to dance with the ethnic characteristics” (personal communication, January 23, 2011).  
Here Armenia is explaining the geography of the new social identity bolstering the Garifuna 
middle class’s social mobility and the geography of race shaping the Garifuna middle class’s 
practices.   
Armenia also points out other contradictions manifested today in the spatial ambiguity of 
the Garifuna positions and social mobility, which she calls “Garifunism,” or Garinagu’s 
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representation and integration methods in New York City and the tools used in pursuing that 
representation and integration in Honduras.  Armenia succinctly states,  
it is easier here to infer the issue of well the political and economic, but being 
in Honduras we are nobody because even from the land [Garinagu] are being 
removed. So, why the people who live [in the United States] have constructed 
beautiful houses but we are not affecting the economic development of 
Honduras . . . Because in the end, if they leave [the United States], they do not 
have the resources to support their economic activities and even the house they 
would lose. So, they would end up deteriorating because what [humans] make 
must be maintained. So, that is the difference, but generally speaking in having 
been capable of purchasing a house in the big neighborhoods in La Ceiba has 
made people think that that has connected them with the economic power 
because now they have a car, they have a beautiful house in one of the colonial 
[neighborhood] and they go back and forth so they can have a middle class 
lifestyle. But, that is not the reality in affecting the political and economic 
structure . . . all the preeminence in making decisions within the power. So, in 
the communities we have had our own mayors and that same conduct with the 
exception of Lombardo and he was worried about the land. (personal 
communication, January 23, 2011) 
 
Armenia is not only questioning the socio-spatial conditions of the Garinagu but also the illusion 
of belonging.  Echoing Blaut’s assessment of faculty’s cultural practices in higher education, 
there is this presumption among the Garifuna middle class that they belong to an “ethno-class” 
(1979:158).  By ethno-class, Blaut means adhering to certain cultural practices.  This is what the 
new Garifuna leaders associate with class and prestige.  The new Garifuna leaders in New York 
City use class and ethnicity as measurements of asserting legitimacy.  Redefining their identity 
from Garifuna to Garifuna American and transforming their relationship with the land are some 
of the dominant culture’s ideologies and values that they have assimilated to inform their cross-
border activism.  
I attribute the weakening of the land struggle’s activism in New York City to practices 
assimilated by the Garifuna middle class in New York City.  Armenia summarizes changes in the 
Bronx by stating, “apparently they [the Garifuna leaders] have not understood the essence of the 
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land conflict, which [some] have been trying to work on by themselves and lose sight of the 
international help.  And others have sought international help in a different direction and that’s 
where it is now” (R. Armenia, personal communication, January 23, 2011).  The Garinagu have 
thus used international cultural politics while simultaneously neglecting ties to previously 
important international social issues such as the land struggle.  I must recalibrate one aspect of 
Armenia’s statement concerning the Garinagu’s impact on Honduras’ economy.  The Pew 
Hispanic Center’s report states “remittances to Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and 
Nicaragua – nations that receive almost all their money transfers from the United States – totaled 
some $10.2 billion” (2001:2).  Although it is hard to ascertain what percentage of this figure 
represents remittances sent to Honduras, it still represents a significant contribution to Honduras’ 
economy.  It must also be mentioned that the Garinagu use their remittances for building roads, 
clean water supply systems, sewage disposal systems, and medical facilities in their respective 
communities.  
Unlike Armenia, other Garinagu address race to a larger Garifuna audience.  The first 
Garifuna Cultural Heritage Awards celebration held on March 13, 2010 at Hosts Center for the 
Arts & Culture in the Bronx displayed various Garinagu performers.  Among these performers 
was the Garifuna Folkloric Ballet of Honduras headed by its longtime artistic director, Crisanto 
Armando Melendez.  One of the Folkloric Ballet’s performers recited “our ancestors came from 
Africa; Asante, Fun, Yoruba; this is our history; I absolutely refused to be part of the silenced 
ones, of those who cry or are afraid; I accept myself; I am certainly black” (Monaco, 2010).  
These words indicate that there are isolated voices resisting the hegemonic practices embraced 
by the Garifuna middle class.     
201 
 
Different perspectives existing among members of the Garifuna middle class raise the 
question: how does the Garifuna middle class see the urban space in relation to their cultural 
practices and Honduras’ north coast?  In an e-mail José Francisco Ávila circulated on 
Garifunalink listserv, he states,  
During a recent visit to Honduras, I attended the Afrodescendants Women 
Forum in Tegucigalpa, where I had a conversation with various Garinagu 
where someone commented ‘It would be nice if we could hold events like 
these, more often, instead of just in April. To which I answered, in New York 
City, you can attend a Garifuna event just about every week, which really 
surprised them.  I continued, as a matter of fact I will dare to say that New 
York has become the epicenter of the Garifuna Culture! That really blew their 
mind! I am certain that someone will disagree, therefore, let me share some 
factual evidence. According to Mayor Michael Bloomberg ‘Our city has 
always led the nation - not just in celebrating holidays, but in pioneering the 
most innovative and ambitious new ideas. In so many areas, whatever happens, 
happens here first. New York is, as Mayor Koch once famously said, “‘where 
the future comes to audition.’” (personal communication, May 31, 2013)  
 
First, Ávila’s declaration suggests that he embraces Bloomberg’s Eurocentric model.  Borrowing 
from Blaut’s analysis on Europeans presumed superiority, the Eurocentric model is predicated on 
the belief that Europeans “are seen as the ‘makers of history,’ advances, progresses,” and 
modernity while those so-called developing nations are devoid of imagination (1993:1; see also 
Said 1979:7).  Hence, their only recourse is to imitate Europeans.  I argue that Bloomberg is 
applying the same model.  Second, Mayor Ed Koch (1978-1989) perpetuated “the mythology” 
that New York City is a harmonious cultural mosaic because of its diverse ethnic population 
(Green and Wilson 1989:94).  While New York City does have a diverse ethnic population, it 
does not mean that all the city’s inhabitants enjoy equality as we shall see.  Koch’s reaction to 
New York City’s Mayor, John Lindsay’s (1966-1973) initiative in 1971 contradicts his 
mythology.  Lindsay announced in 1971 the construction of a low-income housing in Forest Hill, 
Queens, a neighborhood heavily populated by Jewish middle class.  Neighborhood residents 
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mounted a fight.  Consequently, city officials used the site proposed for low-income housing to 
build housing for the elderly.  Koch “shredded his liberal credentials and emerged as the leader 
of the white backlash movement frightened” by the city ethnic landscape (Green and Wilson 
1989:27).  Yet, it seems that members of the Garifuna middle class embrace Koch’s mythology 
because it fits their ideology of integrating into the city’s political landscape.  
Lastly, Ávila’s promotion of the Garifuna middle class’s practices in New York City 
suggests that for him the urban sphere is where culture flourishes and from where it diffuses to 
the rest of the world.  His statements speak of the colonized mindset that denies black agency, 
values, and Honduras’ north coast as the Garifuna cultural hearth; instead, he yields to the 
dominance of white supremacy.  His views also suggest that organizing scores of social events 
signal the Garifuna people’s progress and social recognition that can only be attained in the 
capitalist metropolis, New York City.  Changes in the Garifuna middle class’s perceptions push 
them further away from devising realistic political strategies that could enable them to foster a 
healthier dialogue among the larger Garifuna community to challenge hegemonic spatial 
practices.  Their understanding of place has been fragmented as evident with their cultural 
practices (e.g. galas).  It seems that the Garifuna middle class organizes galas and other events to 
safeguard a false sense of belonging projected through imagery.  This imagery is directly linked 
to spatial meaning found in the urban sphere.  After all, as theorist, philosopher, and sociologist 
Henry Lefebvre argues, spaces “conceal their contents by means of meanings, by means of an 
absence of meaning or by means of an overload of meaning” (1991:92).  By this Lefebvre means 
that spaces like places do not reveal a full understanding of a society’s reality.  It is the 
concealment of this reality or the overload of meanings and concealment of true meanings that 
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negate critical imagination among the Garifuna middle class and gratify the meaning they draw 
from the urban sphere.  
“Civic Participation” 
On July 4, 2010, Hondurans Against AIDS, Inc. and GCU’s leaders organized a “Garifuna 
community civic meeting with New York City Mayor [Michael] Bloomberg.”  I e-mailed Pabla 
Trujillo to inquire about the purpose of this meeting.  Trujillo replied, “the meeting with the New 
York City  Mayor was basically for visivilization [sic] of the community in New York and the 
United States, remember that most of the immigrants communities this is one of the first step [s] 
only” (personal communication, July 18, 2010).  For Trujillo, the Garifuna middle class in New 
York City must also engage in a host of political practices to gain the visibility that other ethnic 
groups have gained in this polyethnic city with more than nineteen million inhabitants.  Most of 
these groups have come to define the city’s political landscape.  In the Garinagu’s case, they 
have advocated the proclamation of Garifuna Heritage Month in the Bronx and organized voter 
registration drives, and held civic meetings with New York City’s mayor.    
To begin gaining the visibility which members of the Garifuna middle class believe they 
can attain in New York City, on December 1, 2010, José Francisco Ávila circulated an e-mail in 
Garifunalink listserv which reads, 
we successfully petitioned [current] Bronx Borough President Ruben Diaz, Jr., 
to once again proclaim Garifuna Heritage Month in the Bronx. Furthermore, 
we were successful in petitioning Mayor Michael Bloomberg, and 
Assemblyman Michael Benjamin to sponsor Legislative  Resolution K1120 
memorializing Governor David A. Paterson to declare March 11 - April 12, 
2010, as Garifuna American Heritage Month in the State of New York. We 
invite all Garinagu and friends to join us in celebrating Garifuna American 
Heritage Month 2011, in observance of the 214th anniversary of the exile of 
the Garifuna people from St Vincent and their settlement in Central America. 
(personal communication, December 1, 2010) 
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As a result of advocacy by the GCU and several other Garifuna organizations, the Bronx 
Borough President Ruben Diaz Jr. and GCU “celebrated the proclamation of March 11 to April 
12, 2011” as Garifuna Heritage Month (J. Ávila, personal communication, March 13, 2011).  
Held at the Bronx County Courthouse and attended by several Garifuna leaders including 
prominent Belizean Garifuna E. Roy Cayetano, the event, as Ávila’s e-mail concludes, 
“highlighted the great contributions of the Garifuna Americans to the fabric of New York and the 
Bronx, and to pay tribute to the common culture and bonds of friendship that unite the United 
States and the Garifuna countries of origin” (personal communication, March 13, 2011).   A 
banquet, “‘Abrazo Garifuna” (Garifuna Embrace), held on April 5, 2011 celebrated the common 
culture and bonds of friendship Ávila highlights in his e-mail.  Garifuna heritage month’s 
proclamation took place on the twenty-first anniversary of the Happy Land Social Club tragedy.  
New York State Democrat Assemblyman Eric Stevenson, who is African American and 
represented the 79
th
 Assembly District until early January 2014 when he was convicted “on 
bribery and extortion” worked with the Garinagu on their proclamation project (Weiser, 2014).  
Stevenson whose district includes Morrisania, “sponsored a Resolution in the New York State 
Assembly to declare March 11- April 12, 2011, as the Garifuna American Heritage Month in the 
State of New York” (J. Ávila, personal communication, March 13, 2011).  Stevenson presented 
the resolution to the Garinagu at the Second Annual Garifuna Heritage Awards and Cultural 
Night on March 26, 2011 at the Hostos Center for the Arts and Culture in the Bronx (J. Ávila, 
personal communication, March 13, 2011).  
Mobilizing around Garifuna Heritage Month has become a ritual for GCU and for many 
Garinagu.  Initiated either by “an individual,” “local group,” or legislative process, proclamations 
are largely symbolic and do not hold any political significance (“Proclamation Index Paterson,” 
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n.d.).  A proclamation’s petitioners, however, view it as having important meaning.  For GCU’s 
administrators, the proclamation gives them a chance to mingle with city and state politicians 
who they saw as a major milestone in recognizing the Garinagu’s presence in New York City.  
As Ávila declares, the recognition of Garifuna Heritage Month demonstrates that the Garinagu 
“have risen from obscurity to the pinnacle of Recognition and honored the legacy of Thomas 
Vincent Ramos” (Ávila, 2011).  Do all Garinagu know who Thomas Vincent Ramos was or what 
impact the Garifuna Heritage Month proclamation will have on changing the Garinagu’s socio-
spatial conditions and relationship with Honduras’ north coast?   
Born in Tulian, Puerto Cortés, Honduras, to Cecilio Ramos and Santolina Rhys (Welsh last 
name) in 1887, in 1923 Ramos settled in Dangriga, Belize.  He died on November 13, 1955, a 
year after he was “naturalized as a British subject” (Ramos 2000:5).  For many Garinagu, 
Ramos’ most important accomplishment is the Garifuna Settlement Day, “initially known as 
Carib Disembarkment Day” (Ramos 2000:5).  Observed on November 19 since 1943 in Stann 
Creek Town and 1977 nationwide in Belize, the day recognizes the Garinagu’s late nineteenth 
century arrival to Belize.  In celebration of Belize’s tenth independence anniversary in 1990, the 
government issued a twenty-five cent stamp featuring Ramos.  Ramos’ underlying belief was to 
integrate the Garinagu into Belizean society (Ramos 2000:8).  Ramos, a devoted Christian and 
loyalist to the British Empire, along with other Garinagu mobilized in 1941 for the Garinagu’s 
recognition.  In a letter Garifuna Profilio Marin sent from the District Commissioner’s Office to 
Ramos in 1941 commending him on the mobilization for recognition, Marin states, 
As a proud member of this much neglected and backward race (sorry to say) 
and as one who is honestly wishing to see it emerge into a respondent 
betterment in every respect, I would here suggest that you and the members of 
the suggested committee get together make some arrangement whereby the 
people, ESPECIALLY THE YOUTH, be properly informed and impressed 
about the history of our race which is another vitally important step on which 
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the coming generation need to build, as a foundation for their better 
preservation than had been in the past. For we all know from experience that 
race consciousness and racial love had not been sufficiently emphasized . . . 
instead, there has been and there still is among certain members of this race a 
decided tendency towards racial and self-determination. (Ramos 2000:10)  
 
Clearly, Marin not only articulates racial pride, but also upholds the colonial mindset.  Marin 
also seems to support British colonists’ racial discourse.  At the same time, Marin supports the 
Garinagu’s self-determination, but it is hard to ascertain if he is referring to political, economic, 
or cultural self-determination.  
Judging from Ramos’ writing, as we shall see, it appears that the Garinagu were seeking 
cultural integration.  In various articles presented in Ramos’ granddaughter, Adele Ramos-Daly’s 
book T.V. Ramos - The Man and His Writings (2002), Ramos calls for the Garifuna women to 
teach the Garifuna children and praises the first Garifuna teacher Santiago Beni for teaching 
Garifuna children at a Catholic school in Stann Creek.  Despite Ramos’ activism, he was also 
very loyal to the British occupation of Belize until its independence in 1981.  In his article 
Settlement Day Celebrations: Message of Loyalty to His Excellency published November 23, 
1943, Ramos states “Today we commemorate the 120th Anniversary since our ancestors landed 
on these shores under protection of the Great British Empire, the champion of weaker races” 
(Ramos 2000:32).  In the same article, Ramos states that despite the economic crisis affecting 
Belize, the British government has “not in the very least slackened in its watchfulness to protect 
us against invasion either by air, land or sea by ruthless enemy whose aim is to destroy the peace 
and happiness of free peoples of the world,” but with “God’s help” this crisis will be averted 
(Ramos 2000:32).  Despite Ramos’ loyalty to the British Empire, Adele Ramos-Daly maintains 
there was another side to him.  He chaired UNIA in Stann Creek (2005).  UNIA advocated for 
black racial pride, self-determination, and repatriation to Africa (Giffin 2005:210).  Garvey’s 
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pan-Africanist message resonated with people of African descent globally.  In fact, Belizean 
Samuel A. Haynes formed a branch of the UNIA in Belize in the early 1900s (Boyce Davies 
2008:154; also see Hill 2011:639). 
Given Ramos’ loyalty to the British Empire, at what point in his life did he become a 
Garveyite?  Judging from Ramos’ poems and articles, he does not seem to express UNIA’s 
principles.  Therefore, there is a paradox in Ramos’ viewpoints.  In historian Wilson Jeremiah 
Moses’s analysis of “classical black nationalism” which he defines as an “ideology whose goal 
was the creation of an autonomous black nation-state, with definite geographical boundaries – 
usually in Africa,” he argues that black nationalists’ perspectives in the nineteenth century may 
seem incomprehensible to many today because it was driven by religious ideologies (1996:3).  
However, for classical black nationalists of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, it 
provided “a means of preserving shreds of dignity and self-respect in the face of the almost 
universal military, technological and economic domination by whites over blacks” (Moses 
1996:3).  Ramos’ cultural ideals, similar to black classical nationalists, “resembled those of 
upper-class Europeans and whites Americans” rather than those of Africans or the black masses 
(Moses 1996:3).  Although Ramos’ views similar to the black classical nationalists’ were not 
driven by cultural relativism, there is a slight difference between them.  Black classical 
nationalists were following a mythical framework in the nineteenth century.  Ramos, on the other 
hand, was preaching a passive integrationist approach in the 1940s at a point when more 
progressive black ideas had developed.  Ramos’ integrationist approach is what the Garifuna 
middle class follows.  Using Ramos’ approach has not transformed the Garinagu’s social-spatial 
conditions.  On the contrary, this social recognition continues to keep them at the margins of the 
social hierarchy.  Geographer and regional urban planner Clyde Woods states that the “creation 
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of and reproduction of distinctive ethnicity, class, resources, sectoral, and constructional 
practices are the very definitions of identity in the social constructed region” (2002:64).  The 
Garifuna middle class aspires to form part of the identity region that Woods addresses and their 
political practices reflect this aspiration.   
Comprised of 12 community districts, Congressional District 16 but also District 7 and 17 
prior to the 2012 redistricting covered most of the Bronx (Paul, 2011).  The 16
th
 district covers 
the northern Bronx and half of southern Westchester County including the cities of Mount 
Vernon, Yonkers, and Rye.  From 2003 to 2013 the district included the neighborhoods of 
Bedford Park, East Tremont, Fordham, Hunt Point, Melrose, Highbridge, Morrisania, Mott 
Haven and University Heights (“New York’s 16th Congressional District”).  Politically, most of 
the South Bronx today is a Puerto Rican political stronghold due in part to what Sonia Song-Ha 
Lee defines as racial tension between Puerto Ricans and African Americans over “antipoverty 
funding” and its leader Ramón Velez’s “mass voter registration drives” in January 1968 in Hunt 
Point (Lee 2014:217).  Although Lee claims that tension over resources was the main cause of 
struggle between these two groups, African Americans nevertheless still have a strong political 
presence in the 16
th
 district as well.  The Concourse Village is one example.  It is populated by a 
working class population residing in a “housing development that is 81 percent black” 
(“Bronxites Speak Out Against Council Redistricting-Again,” n.d.).  Much of “northern 
Manhattan” is also another African American political stronghold (Taylor, 2014).  However, 
redistricting which takes place every ten years in the United States as a process is designed to 
redraw the boundaries of voting districts to reflect demographic changes and to offer equitable 
congressional representation.  How does this political and geographical reorganization impact the 
209 
 
Garinagu?  The Garifuna’s voter registration drives reflect their response to changes in the Bronx 
and their desires to also join the Bronx’s political landscape.   
Following President Barack Obama’s call for civic engagement, former Mayor Michael 
Bloomberg’s Immigrant Civic Engagement Zone of New York City invited GCU to participate 
in the voter registration drive campaign.  On July 29, 2010, GCU announced the Garifuna’s 
Voter Education and Registration Project for the November 2, 2010 New York State elections 
(Garifuna Coalition USA, Inc. 2014).  Hoping to register 5,000 Garifuna voters, GCU kicked off 
initiative at The Garifuna Advocacy Center, Casa Yurumein, and in Brooklyn at MUGAMA, 
Inc., Wabatou Cultural Center, and The Biko Transformation Center, a center named after South 
African anti-apartheid activist Stephen Bantu Biko (Colón, 2010).  In the Bronx, GCU set up 
information and registration tables with Garifuna representatives at Ferry Point, Bill Rainey, and 
Crotona Parks and at Linden Boulevard Park in Brooklyn, where Garinagu gather throughout the 
summer on Sundays to play soccer.  In addition to registering Garinagu for the New York State 
elections, the voter registration drive served other purposes: (1) “to educate Garinagu about the 
political process,” and (2) “to educate legal residents of their qualification for naturalization, and 
provide them with the information of places where they can complete this process” (Garifuna 
Coalition, USA, Inc., 2009; M. Moran, personal communication, November 3, 2010).  For 
members of the Garifuna middle class, the fundamental reason for registering Garinagu is 
because “civic participation and voter engagement are critical components toward reducing 
barriers for poor and disenfranchised communities” (Garifuna Coalition, USA, Inc. 2009; M. 
Moran, personal communication, July 29, 2010).  Albeit peripheral, it seems that for the 
Garifuna middle class, the voter registration represents political legitimacy.  
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Besides voter registration drives, members of the Garifuna middle class also organize civic 
meetings.  On July 14, 2010, José Francisco Ávila and Mirtha Colón organized the “Garifuna 
Community Civic Meeting with New York City Mayor [Michael] Bloomberg.”  Held at the 
Lincoln Hospital Auditorium in the South Bronx, this ninety-three minute event was well-
attended by the Garinagu.  A member of Bloomberg’s entourage was 71-year-old Police 
Commissioner Raymond W. Kelly.  Sitting alongside participating Garinagu in the audience’s 
front row was the Honduran Consulate in New York City, Francisco Quesada, whose presence 
Colón acknowledged while speaking at the podium (J. Ávila, 2010).  Yet, Quesada did not speak 
on behalf of the Garinagu residing in New York City; instead, they spoke on their own behalf, 
suggesting that they used different methods in challenging the Honduran government’s 
oppression outside of Honduras.   
Before José Francisco Ávila introduced Mayor Bloomberg to the cheering crowd, Colón 
and Ávila stated that the purpose of the civic meeting was “to discuss some of the problems that 
affect our community here in New York.  We would like the Mayor to help us strengthen our 
work in alleviating these problems” (Colón, 2010:n.p.).  Once Colón introduced Ávila as the 
moderator, he stated that this “is a civic meeting designed to discuss issues facing New York 
City, in search of steady and significant social, economic, civic, and cultural improvements of 
the Garifuna community in New York City because the Garifunas’ issues are every community 
in New York’s issues” (Ávila, 2010).  Ávila went on to state that the “ideas and 
recommendations discussed here tonight will serve as the basis for a local advocacy agenda.  If 
the issues identified here tonight are important to you, we strongly encourage you to become 
involved with a local advocacy group or organization such as the ones here and even the local 
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community boards” (Ávila, 2010).  Once Bloomberg took the podium, he thanked Ávila for “his 
census outreach work” (Ávila, 2010). 
To the Garinagu’s thunderous applause, Bloomberg said seremein (Garifuna word for 
thank you), which he translated as meaning “good night” (Ávila, 2010).  He also stated that if it 
“wasn’t too hot outside I would finish the night with hudutu,” a traditional Garifuna dish.  
Bloomberg thanked the New York Fire and Police Departments for keeping “us safe” (Ávila, 
2010).  Questions and answers session followed his speech.  Rather than questions, I would 
describe the audience member’s statements as being, more accurately, comments and praises for 
the mayor and government.  Edgar Cordova praised the Bloomberg administration for expanding 
charter schools which is the government’s way of scaling down public education by privatizing it 
(Colón, 2010:n.p.).   
Other Garinagu inquired about the availability of resources for Garinagu entrepreneurs. 
Garinagu attendees also asked questions about low-income housing and gentrification, which 
Bloomberg acknowledged to be a problem.  He added that “now we started a plan to rehab or 
build 165,000 units of affordable housing.  We are actually a little bit ahead of schedule, the guy 
that started that I did an event with today, Shaun Donovan” (Colón, 2010:n.p.).  According to the 
Coalition for the Homeless, there were 40,000 people living in city shelters in 2010 and 53,615 
as of January 2014 (Coalition for the Homeless, n.d.).  Next, Garinagu participants asked several 
questions about securing a community center.  Speaking in Garifuna, Milton Guity asked if the 
Bloomberg administration could help the Garifuna community build a place in memory of the 
Happy Land fire of 1990.  Mayor Dinkins had offered Garinagu the opportunity to build a center 
soon after the fire, but their bickering stalled the plan as some Garinagu who participated in the 
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process point out.  In any event, Ávila poorly translated Guity’s words to mean that the Garinagu 
were seeking closure from Bloomberg for the Happy Land tragedy.   
Another question came from the Garifuna Sara Logan, who commented about Manhattan’s 
safety being better than the Bronx’s.  Because the Garinagu asked noncritical questions, Mayor 
Bloomberg and Commissioner Kelly glowed when talking about the low crime level in the 
Bronx.  Complementing Bloomberg’s response about the low crime was mentioning Operation 
Impact as being a program implemented by Kelly to ward off crime in areas such as the Bronx.  
In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, billionaire Republican Michael Rubens Bloomberg was 
inaugurated on January 1, 2002 as New York City’s 108th Mayor, preceded by Republican 
Rudolph Guliani.  With post-9/11 nationalist sentiments still high today among many New 
Yorkers, fear among others, and critical analysis deriving from others, Bloomberg named then 
61-year-old Raymond Kelly as the city’s police commissioner, a post he first held under Mayor 
Dinkins in 1992.  In 2002, Commissioner Kelly established the first counterterrorism bureau and 
also conceived the stop-and-frisk campaign (“Raymond Kelly,” n.d.).  
The New York Civil Liberties Union’s (NYCLU) website states that since the stop-and-
frisk program’s initiation, the New York City Police Department (NYPD) stopped and 
questioned New Yorkers over 4 million times (New York Civil Liberties Union, n.d.).  Most of 
those stopped were black people and Latinos.  According to NYCLU “nine out of 10” of those 
stopped were innocent (New York Civil Liberties Union, n.d).  Stop-and-frisk numbers posted by 
NYCLU covering the period of October 1 to December 31, 2003 for all police precincts in New 
York City reveal that the 40
th
, 41
st
, and 42
nd
 precincts, all located in the South Bronx heavily 
populated by Garinagu, reported 424 and 274 stop-and-frisks respectively (New York Civil 
Liberties Union, n.d.).  In Brooklyn, the 73
rd
 precinct in Brownville also where Garinagu reside 
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reported 451 stop and frisk events whereas in Harlem, the 26
th
 precinct reported 212 (New York 
Civil Liberties Union, n.d.).  During Stop-and-Frisk’s first year, the NYPD stopped New Yorkers 
97,296 times, out of this number 80,176 people or 82 percent were totally innocent (“Stop-and-
Frisk”).  By 2010, NYPD made 601,285 stops out of which “518,849 (86 percent) were totally 
innocent, 315,083 (54 percent) were black, 189,326 (33 percent) were Latino, 54,810 (9 percent) 
were white” (New York Civil Liberties Union, n.d.).  
Following a class action lawsuit in August 2013, Judge Shira Scheindlin ruled that stop-
and-frisk was unconstitutional because it is a “policy of indirect racial profiling” which targeted 
non-whites (Goodman, 2013).  Mayor Bloomberg and Commissioner Kelly responded angrily to 
the ruling and ensured the removal of Scheindlin from the case (Goodman, 2013).  In a 
November 6, 2013 interview with Democracy Now! news hour producer and co-host Amy 
Goodman, New York City Police Officer Adhyl Polanco, who has opposed stop-and-frisk since 
2009, states that his superior ordered him to stop random teenagers just for walking home 
(Goodman, 2013).  Polanco further states that his superior also prevented him from reporting 
certain cases of violent crimes as a way to create the appearance that the city’s crime rate was 
low (Goodman, 2013).  Like Polanco, many New Yorkers and organizations such as the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) held marches in New York City 
protesting stop-and-frisk.  In an interview with Goodman from Democracy Now!, sociologist 
Natalie Byfield draws a parallel between the five innocent black and Latino teenagers who were 
found guilty in 1989 for raping a white female jogger in Central Park in New York City and 
stop-and-frisk.  Byfield connects the racialization of the case that subsequently led to the 
conviction of the teenagers to make it acceptable to “criminalize black youth – Latino youth – 
male youth” who are “equated with crime.  So, it made it easier for practices of stop-and-frisk to 
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happen” (2014).  Similar to the “War on Drugs,” stop-and-frisk became a new means of putting 
“blacks back in their place” (Alexander 2010:5).  
The Garinagu attending the civic meeting did not ask Bloomberg or Kelly how many of the 
innocent New Yorkers stopped-and-frisked were Garinagu.  The Garinagu did not ask why the 
NYPD targeted blacks and Latinos or how they see blackness.  They did not ask Kelly why he 
said that he “wanted to instill fear [in African Americans and Latinos]” (Goodman, 2013).  The 
Garinagu should have asked these questions and many more because they reside in 
neighborhoods heavily populated by non-whites and where more residents are stopped- and- 
frisked.  In addition, the law enforcement does respect Garinagu’s lives.  In 2007, off-duty 
NYPD Officer Raphael Lora shot five times and killed 41 year-old Garifuna and father of six, 
Fermin Arzu (Colón and Ávila, 2007).  The extrajudicial killing was in response to Arzu 
crashing his van in the “cop’s Bronx block” (Marzulli, 2013).  Claiming self-defense, Officer 
Lora “thought [Fermin] was going for a weapon in his glove compartment, but no gun was 
found” (Colón & Ávila, 2007).  Mirtha Colón and José Francisco Ávila issued a press release in 
2007.  In it, they state “‘we are not going to tolerate the abuse of our brother’s civil and human 
rights . . . ’” (Colón & Ávila, 2007).  They also state that Arzu’s murder reminded many New 
Yorkers of the murder of unarmed Guinean immigrant Amadou Diallo who the NYPD shot 
forty-one times in the vestibule of his Bronx apartment in 1999.  The judge repealed Officer 
Lora’s manslaughter conviction in 2011 allowing him to retire and “collect 75% of the pension” 
(Marzulli, 2013).  Arzu’s killing should have also reminded Colón and Ávila of the state-
sponsored violence against the Garifuna activists and those surviving on Honduras’ north coast.  
I draw a parallel to Arzu’s case from Kobayashi and Peake.  They state that “racism is a product 
of specific historical geographies, varying across place according to processes such as 
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colonialism, migration, labor markets, and built environments . . .” (Kobayashi & Peake 2008: 
156).  Yet, the Garinagu attending the civic meeting with Mayor Bloomberg did not raise 
questions about stop-and-frisk or Arzu because it seems they were easily pleased by the Mayor’s 
mispronounced recitation of a few Garifuna words. 
Conclusion 
What I have illustrated in this chapter is the Garifuna middle class’s economic, cultural, 
and political practices in New York City.  They organize galas, voter registration drives, and 
civic meetings in an attempt to gain visibility.  There is nothing wrong with their practices.  The 
problem is that when they engage in these practices they shun their own cultural traditions 
because they believe that assimilating the dominant culture’s practices signals inclusion.  In fact, 
it is simply an illusion of inclusion.  Their preoccupation with assimilation has distanced them 
from the land struggle in Honduras to the extent that they have defined New York City as the 
Garinagu’s culture hearth.  This perspective suggests that the Garinagu residing in the United 
States have disassociated themselves from their homeland and adapted to another one instead.     
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CHAPTER 7 
THE MAKING OF A LANDLESS SOCIETY 
Honduras: Geography and Land Tenancy 
The Garifuna activists have been organizing for over two decades to protect their 
communities and territories along Honduras’ 456-mile Caribbean north coast, and on the Bay 
Islands and Cayos Cochinos.  Their communities have been settled in this region since the early 
nineteenth century before the formation of the nation-state of Honduras.  The Garinagu’s 
interaction with the physical environment through cultural practices of subsistence agriculture 
and fishing, have shaped their belonging to the coastal region.  Yet, the Honduran government 
and oligarchs, multilateral international lending institutions such as the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, Central American Bank for 
Economic Integration (CABEI), and Inter-American Development Bank in cooperation with the 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and foreign individual investors 
remain resolved to remove Garinagu from the north coast to appropriate the region into the space 
of free market capitalism (Pine 2008:19).  In this chapter, I contend that the ideology of 
economic development executed by the Honduran government and elites in the 1970s and later, 
in tandem with a recent set of laws implemented since the early 1990s, and the policies of 
international lending institutions, transformed the Garifuna people into a landless society.  
Bordering Guatemala to the west, El Salvador to the south, Nicaragua to the east, and the 
Caribbean Sea to the north, Honduras is a rugged mountainous country of 8.4 million 
inhabitants.  Forty-six percent of its population or over 3 million people reside in the city 
whereas 54 percent or over 4.5 million reside in the rural areas (González 2006:9).  Although 
Honduras occupies 112,492 square kilometers of land surface “only between 24 and 38 percent 
[is] suitable for agriculture” (Nelson 2003:1).  The remaining 60.8 percent of Honduras’ surface 
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area features slopes with steep grades exceeding 40 percent and uncultivable soils (Brockett 
1987:83).  Approximately 66 percent of Honduras is covered by forest, which is rapidly 
disappearing due to deforestation, land degradation, and hurricane damage (Nelson 2003:1).  
Honduras’ coastline occupies 16.4 percent of the country’s land (Centeno García 2004:95).  It is 
in this fertile littoral region where the Garinagu formed forty-two communities spatially 
distributed from Masca in the Departamentos of Cortés and Atlántida to Plaplaya in Gracias a 
Dios, that is coveted by the Honduran government, local elites, and foreign investors (figure 7.1) 
(Centeno García 2004:96).  Included in this region are the Bay Islands and Cayos Cochinos in 
the Caribbean Sea located about 25 miles off the Honduran coast.   
Four important cities and ports are also located in these areas: Puerto Cortés in Cortés, La 
Ceiba and Tela in Atlántida, and Trujillo in Colón.  It is important to note before proceeding that 
although figure 7.1 shows the locations of the Garifuna communities, it does not reveal the 
everyday reality which the Garifuna inhabitants in these places experience.  It is this everyday 
reality that brings me to geographer Dennis Wood’s assessment of the production maps.  For 
Wood, guiding the map production is the narrative and the image the producers construct.  This 
is the reason why Woods states that “every map shows this . . . but not that” (1992:48).  I apply 
Wood’s rationale to the Garifuna’s communities highlighted on the Honduras’ map.  The map 
lists many Garifuna communities, but the Garinagu no longer populates some of these 
communities or are no longer the majority of the population.  The reason for this is because the 
Honduran local officials and elites continue to dispossess the Garinagu from their land as evident 
with the situation in the community of Cristales and Rio Negro and several other communities.   
Canadian Randy Jorgensen, who I discuss, at length later in this chapter secured considerable 
vast of territory belonging to Cristales and Rio Negro communities (Organización Fraternal  
218 
 
!(
!(!(!( !(
!(!(!(
!( !( !(!( !(
!(!( !( !(
!(
!(
!( !(!( !(!(!(
!(
!( !(!( !(!( !(!(!(!(
!(
!(
!(
!(!(
!(!(
Nicaragua
Belize
El Salvador
Guatemala
Olancho
Yoro
Colón
Gracias a Dios
El Paraíso
Cortés
Lempira
Atlántida
Copán
Francisco Morazán
Choluteca
Comayagua
Intibucá
Santa Bárbara
La Paz
Valle
Ocotepeque
Islas de la Bahía
C a r i b b e a n  S e a
6
16
17
20
18
19
21
22
23
42
24
25
26
27
28
29 30
31
32
33
40
41
34 35
36
37
38
39
10
9
8
7
5
4
3
2
1
15
14
11
12
13
0 10050
Miles
19  Chachahuate, East End, Bolonas Cays
20  Guadalupe
21  San Antonio
22  Santa Fe
23  Cristales y Rio Negro
24  Barranco Blanco
25  Santa Rosa de Aguan
26  Limon
27  Punta Piedra
28  Cusuna
29  Ciriboya
30  Iriona Viejo
31  San Jose de la Punta
32  Sangrelaya
33  Cocalito
34  Tocamacho
35  San Pedro de Tocamacho /
       Colonia de Alfonso Lacayo
36  Buena Vista
37  Bataya
38  Pueblo Nuevo
39  Plaplaya
40  La Fe
41  Coyoles
42  Punta Gorda
  1  Masca
  2  Travesia
  3  Bajamar
  4  Sarawaina
  5  Rio Tinto
  6  Miami
  7  Tornabe
  8  San Juan
  9  La Ensenada
10  Triunfo de la Cruz
11  Nueva Go
12  Cayo Venado
13  Sambuco
14  La Rosita
15  Corozal
16  Sambo Creek
17  Nueva Armenia
18  Rio Esteban
P a c i f i c
O c e a n
!( Garifuna Communities
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1  Locations of Garifuna Communities in Honduras 
Prepared by: Paul Karolczyk and Doris Garcia  
Source: Editorial Guaymuras in collaboration with Salvador Suazo, n.d. 
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Negra Hondureña, personal communication, December 15, 2011).  Also, at the behest of the 
Institute of Military Prevision (Instituto de Previsión Militar, IPM), on April 7, 2011 “around 
3:00am heavily armed preventive police arrived to the community of Punta Gorda in the Bay 
Islands to forcibly remove forty Garinagu families” (C. Álvarez, personal communication, 
November 21, 2013; Organización Fraternal Negra Hondureña, personal communication, April 
7, 2011). 
According to Casildo, communication with IPM, minister of defense, SEDINAFROH, and 
other government institutions prevented the removal of Garinagu (personal communication, 
November 21, 2013).  On November 21, 2013, former president Lobo Sosa issued Definitive 
Property Title of 154,601.091 square meters of land to the Garifuna community in Punta Gorda 
originally held by IPM (C. Álvarez, personal communication, November 21, 2013).  How long 
Honduran officials and oligarchs will honor this land title remains unclear.  Managed by Infantry 
Colonel Jorge Federico Centeno Sarmiento, IPM is a Social Security Special Regime, which 
includes the Honduran Armed Forces, national police, firefighters, and others and is “designed to 
guarantee all of its affiliates and beneficiaries prompt issue of loans and social services” 
established under IPM’s law (“IPM Visión y Misión,” n.d.).  Yet, IPM’s actions suggest that it is 
also in the business of land usurpation and it goes to great length to accomplish its mission.  On 
May 23, 2014, members of the Honduran National Police, Military Police together with the 
Operation Xatruch III military unit tried to force the Garinagu residents from Puerto Castilla 
using tear gas canisters to disperse “a peaceful protest” (McCain, 2014).  Once the tear gas 
overtook the protesters, an estimated “500 security force members entered the community, 
dousing anyone within reach with pepper spray” (McCain, 2014).  This flagrant violation of 
human rights impacted the community’s “Children’s Garden and terrorized the residents” (M. 
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Miranda, personal communication, May 27, 2014; also see McCain, 2014).  Because of the usage 
of tear gas, six young children “were hospitalized and many infants were evacuated and placed in 
a ship docked in the community’s shore to avoid intoxication caused by the bombs” (M. 
Miranda, personal communication, May 27, 2014).  These are only few of many examples of the 
Garinagu’s land dispossession.  This is the Garinagu’s reality in Honduras, a reality fomented by 
the environment of violence that defines Honduras society and that rules land ownership in the 
country. 
The Honduran government recognizes four different types of land tenancy: private, ejidal 
(state owned land), national, and communal,” but also dominio pleno, which is presumably the 
most secure form of legal land ownership (Centeno García 2004:106; see also Nelson 2003:2). 
According to Garifuna writer Santos Centeno García’s investigation which does not provide a 
year of his study, the Garifuna communities he visited, which he does not mention by name or 
location, “54% of them hold ejidales titles while the remaining 46% are communally owned land 
which are today being usurped” (2004:106).  Richard T. Nelson also lists four categorizes, 
state or baldío [empty], private, ejidal, and ‘reformed.’ Baldío lands are 
legally, according to the constitution, the property of the national government. 
However, over time, peasants, large landholders and even sizeable commercial 
operations have occupied large sections of these national holdings. Many 
consider these illegally occupied parcels to be their own and can show usufruct  
titles (dominio util) issued by local authorities. As late as 1952, fully 52% of 
the Honduran land area was owned by the state. (2003:2 emphasis added) 
 
Biological anthropologist William H. Durham declares that “little is known about the history of 
land tenure changes in Honduras” (1979:113).  However, by examining historian Hector Perez-
Brignoli’s 1973 table of land titles issued in Honduras from 1600 to 1949, Durham identifies two 
types of land titles, ejidales and private (1979:113).  Historian Thomas P. Anderson’s work, 
albeit Eurocentric, declares, “one of the most important historical groups in Central America 
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includes those who control the land” (1988:6).  This power of large landholders is rooted in 
colonialism.  As Anderson goes on to say, the Spanish monarchy and its “agents left the 
hacendados broad latitude to deal with the Indian laborers and to control the local administration 
of justice” (1988:6 emphasis added).  Because only the wealthy were landholders, land 
ownership was concentrated in the hands of a small group of hacendados or plantation owners.  
In the post-colonial period, the oligarchy broadened its power to the “national level of politics, 
making and unmaking presidents [and] arming its own followers.  In rural Honduras to this day, 
many great landholders bear the honorary title of colonel” (Anderson 1988:6).  The hacendados’ 
economic and political practices have led to the concentration of land in the hands of a few.  
Pérez- Brignoli refers to this system of land ownership as “centralism” (1989:59).  Honduras’ 
post-colonial political economy and land tenure laws remain within the centralist system. 
 In interviews with Garifuna elders about land ownership, 74-year-old Anastasia Pascual 
explains that the Garifuna landowners historically did not have titles, but passed their land from 
generation to generation (personal communication, February 11, 2013).  Although the historical 
period she refers to is unclear, she states that communities routinely loaned pieces of land to 
landless Garinagu for farming and building houses.  In fact, Pascual points out that when her 
family migrated from Limón to Rio Esteban in 1951, the community provided the family with 
land.  This system varied geographically.  For example, in 1886, the Garifuna communities of 
Cristales and Río Negro in the port of Trujillo, Colón “secured communal titles for 9,000 
hectares of land, which sadly today has been invaded by the state, individuals, and by 
unscrupulous local officials” (Centeno García 2004:105).  The Association of the Communities 
of Cristales and Rio Negro (La Associación de Comunidades Cristales (Kristalu) y Rio Negro 
(Blagríba) mentions that these communities have held “a private title legally registered for 
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13,000 hectares since 1886” (personal communication, October 23, 2012).  It seems that in these 
communities Garinagu’s first land-related activism began in the nineteenth century due to the 
presence of the banana plantation, which “under the state’s eyesight usurped Garinagu 
territories” (Centeno García 2004:109).  The banana plantation economy might had introduced 
Garinagu to unfamiliar forms of land ownership and forced them to secure land titles.  I tried to 
gather data to map how much land the Garifuna communities have lost since the early 1990s, but 
abandoned the attempt because INA, which is responsible for handling land tenancy, lacks 
reliable and adequate publicly available land data.  
The Early Formation of a New National Economy 
  In this segment, I begin to lay out the formation of a tourism-based economy.  As the state 
sought to expand tourism from the Mayan archeological site in Copán,
7
 in the early 1970s, 
military dictator López Arellano became interested on the north coast Garifuna communities 
such as Tornabé (Lagiriga-wewe), San Juan, and Río Tinto (López García 2006:44).  The state 
perceived the coastline as ideal for developing “a huge Tourism Project in Tela” near the Micos 
Beach and Golf Resort.  Located between Tornabé and Punta Sal Protected Park, promoters 
named it Torna-sal (López García 2006:31).  Victor Virgilio López García states that despite the 
state’s $20 million expenditures on preliminary studies for Torna-sal, it did not materialize 
(2006:45).  With economic activities brewing, the military regime reversed social programs 
instated under Villeda Morales’s administration by ending the agrarian reform and economic 
policies favorable to the working class and attracting foreign investors (Nieto 2003:113).  
However, the military regime kept INA in existence.  The Villeda Morales’s administration 
formed INA to oversee land titling, although from 1962 to 1966, INA “distributed land to a mere 
281 families” reflecting the absence of a genuine agrarian reform in Honduras (Bulmer-Thomas 
                                                          
7
 The Mayan archeological ruins are located in the western and fertile valley of the Departamento of Copán. 
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1990:304).  Next, López Arellano turned his attention to the Garifuna communities.  He tried to 
secure their land, although sources explaining López Arellano’s plan does not elaborate how 
exactly he was hoping to achieve that.  However, once the Garinagu learned of López Arellano’s 
tourism plan, the Garinagu in Tornabé, San Juan, and Río Tinto began to organize “to defend 
themselves against possible forced removal” (López García 2006:25).  Simulating goodwill, state 
officials visited the Garifuna community of Tornabé to notify inhabitants of Torna-sal’s 
impending arrival and development of the tourism project.  
In 1972, the same year the Torna-sal project was put into motion the López Arellano 
regime established the Honduran Institute of Tourism (Instituto Hondureño de Tourism, IHT) 
which has been “predictated in 1962 by the Law of Tourism Development” and named Jacobo 
Goldstein as its director (Euraque 2004:236; López García 2006:31).  Perhaps to quell organizing 
by the Garinagu resisting the tourism economic project, Goldstein “facilitated IHT’s resources 
for the Festival de Danzas Garifunas to participate in the 1972 San Isidro Carnival in La Ceiba” 
(López García 2006:45; Euraque 2004:169).  Garifuna Armando Crisanto Meléndez’s dancing 
group’s participation in the Carnaval of La Ceiba of 1972 “elevated” his group to the “National 
Garifuna Ballet” (López García 2006:33).  The inclusion of Meléndez’s group cemented his 
aspirations to integrate the Garinagu into the cultural economy and pushed Honduras from “a 
state of underdevelopment and dependence” on other countries (López García 2006:33).  Today, 
Meléndez remains the director of the Garifuna Folkloric National Ballet of Honduras.  López 
García argues that despite existing political oppression in the 1970s, “socio-cultural preferences 
began to open up for other races.  Thus, the Garifuna intellectuals took advantage of these 
changes to project a good image of Honduras both nationally and internationally” (2006:46).  
The socio-cultural preferences López García addresses served two purposes.  First, they 
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countered the Garinagu organizing and positioned them within a spectacle of consumption.  
Second, rather than resisting cultural destruction, the Garifuna intellectuals joined the economic 
development.  The Garinagu’s engagement in Honduras’ economic development was not about 
liberation but about the personal aspirations and patriotism of some Garifuna individuals. 
By July 29, 1974, Hurricane Fifi destroyed “60 percent of Honduras’ agricultural 
production, and the banana companies abandoned many more of their plantations. The north 
coast became a resettlement area for landless and jobless mestizo peasants . . .” (Brondo 2013:36 
emphasis added).  Under the modernization law, the state distributed unused national and private 
land to peasants to form cooperative enterprises, leaving large landowners untouched.  The state 
thus encouraged a resettlement pattern.  INA ridiculed the Garinagu and other indigenous 
subsistence practices as being primitive and encouraged peasants to appropriate the Garinagu’s 
land (England 2006:111-12).  In applying anthropologist, Anthony Oliver-Smith’s analysis, 
Hurricane Fifi, and as we shall see later in this chapter Hurricane Mitch in 1998, as a “natural 
force encountered a society whose environment, infrastructure, and population had been 
rendered severely vulnerable by social and economic processes deeply embedded in particular 
approaches to development” (2009:1).  Throughout the years, the Honduran government’s lack 
of concern for the Garinagu and the poor in Honduras has maintained the social and economic 
vulnerability that Oliver-Smith addresses.   
In 1974, General Gustavo Alvárez Martinez forced the Garinagu “at gunpoint”  from their 
communities of Cristales y Rio Negro in Puerto Castilla to surrender  their communally owned 
land to the National Port Authority (Empresa Nacional Portuaria, ENP) (M. Miranda, personal 
communication, May 27, 2014).  Their dispossession forced the residents “to relocate to a very 
constricted area,” an area overcrowded today due to the population growth (McCain, 2014).  
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This was not the first time the Honduran government forced the Garinagu to relocate.  In 1940, 
the government relocated them south of their original settlement area for the construction of the 
United States military base (M. Miranda, personal communication, May 27, 2014).  
OFRANEH’s Miriam Miranda states that the Garifuna community of Puerto Castilla  
received [land] title in 1889 under the name of ‘La Puntilla’ from the hands of 
President Luis Bogran which included 12 miles in length and width. 
[President] Manuel Bonilla reindorsed the title in 1904 when he issued a title to 
the community of Cristales y Río Negro. In 1921, part of the lands were 
conceded to Truxillo Railroad Company and transferred again to the 
community of Cristales y Rio Negro en 1942. (personal communication, May 
27, 2014) 
 
Today, the primary occupant of the Puerto Castilla port is Dole, a multinational corporation 
(McCain, 2014).  General Alvárez Martinez was one of many Honduran graduates from SOA 
and one of the CIA’s leading allies in Honduras (School of the Americas Watch, n.d.).  Historian 
William M. LeoGrande explains that Alvárez Martinez was “Washington’s man  - ‘a model 
professional,’ U.S. Ambassador John Negroponte once called him” (1998:393).  LeoGrande goes 
on to say that the CIA “helped [Alvárez Martinez] rise to the top of the Honduran military, and 
he had helped the CIA wage war against Nicaragua.  Alvarez was personally close to both 
Negroponte and CIA Station Chief Donald Winter, who asked Alvarez to be the godfather of his  
child” (1998:393-94).  It is Alvárez Martinez’s close relationship with the CIA that allowed him 
to act with impunity against the Garifuna communities.   
Accompanying the usurpation of the Garinagu’s land in 1974 was the passage of Decree 
Law No. 135 which formed the National Investment Corporation (Corporación Nacional de 
Inversiones, CONADI) (National Investment Corporation, 1974).  According to a document 
disclosed by Wikileaks, a global digital journalistic nonprofit organization dedicated to 
publishing news leaks and classified government information, CONADI was “designed to 
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promote new industry and support those operations and organize a national capital market” 
(National Investment Corporation, 1974).  CONADI became a node for the convergence of elites 
and military leaders.  One of its key figures is the military regime ally Facussé Bargum, who 
through CONADI, secured loans from Bank of America and Lloyds Bank International to 
expand his company Dinant Chemicals of Central America S.A (Quimicas Dinant de Centro 
America, S.A) (“Raíces históricas de la fortuna de Miguel Facussé Barjum,” 2011).  The 
National Congress issued Decree No. 106-90 emitted in 1990 which outlawed CONADI 
(“Honduraslegal,” n.d.).  Amid the economic policies the Honduran government developed in the 
1970s, we can observe the political chaos governing the country which persisted beyond this 
period.  The military dictator Juan Alberto Melgar (1975-1978) removed López Arellano from 
power in a 1975 coup d’état.  Marred by “corruption and drug-trafficking scandals,” Policarpo 
Juan Paz García (1978-1981) ousted Melgar Castro in a coup d’état in 1978 (Nieto 2003:114).  
Developments discussed thus far provided the foundation for the tourism expansion but also kept 
the doors open, as it has been a practice in Honduras, for foreign investors to partake in the 
process.  
Foreign investor Puerto Rican Temístocles Ramírez de Orellano illegally purchased “5,000 
hectares [12,355 acres]” of land for about “24 Lempiras per hectare (approximately $4.86 per 
acre)” in Puerto Castilla, Colón, home to many Garinagu (Kerssen 2013:93; Rosset, 2001).  By 
1983, either the Honduran or the United States government forced Ramírez de Orellano to forfeit 
the land to build the United States Regional Center for Military Training (Centro Regional de 
Entrenamiento Militar, CREM) where the United States trained Honduran, Salvadorans, and 
contra forces in “counterinsurgency and irregular warfare” (McSherry 2005:223; see also 
Moreno 1994:41).  Conceived during President Roberto Suazo Córdova’s (1982-1986) visit to 
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Washington, D.C in 1983, he “agreed to the U.S. construction of a $250,000” military training 
center.  In 1984, the United States military instructors trained “some 4,000 troops” (Leonard 
2011:158).  The training center was also “the site of a secret detention center that held 
disappeared prisoners from all the countries in the region” (2005:223).  Ramírez de Orellano 
took his grievance over the seizure of his land to the United States government and the Honduran 
government paid him “15,600,000 Lempiras a value of 2,275 Lempiras per hectare 
(approximately $460.50 per acre), nearly 100 times the 1975 purchase price” (Kerssen 2013:93).  
Today, the Garifuna communities in Puerto Castilla face displacement from their land.  With 
funds from the United States, “three heliports are being built” in the environs of the Naval Base 
of Puerto Castilla (Base Naval de Puerto Castilla) training establishment in Colón (“En los 
próximos días finalizará construcción de tres helipuertos en Colón,” 2014).  The naval base’s 
commander general, Mario Fortín, states that the building of the heliports “form part of the 
shield against narcotraffic” (“En los próximos días finalizará construcción de tres helipuertos en 
Colón,” 2014).  As I described in this chapter, the United States government in collaboration 
with the Honduran government have used Puerto Castilla as a military base before World War II.  
The same development took place in the early 1980s when in keeping with General Gorman’s 
military expansion plan, the United States government included “a $150 million air and naval 
base at Puerto Castilla” to expand “maneuvers and the construction of several new airfields, a 
new radar installation” (LeoGrande 1998:316).  The purpose of this plans were to set-up “a naval 
blockade of Nicaragua and for interdicting arms being smuggle into El Salvador” (1998:316).       
Political Reorganization 
  Following the 1978 coup, the Honduran right-wing business and military leaders regrouped.  
Callejas Romero, Osmond Maduro former Honduran president Ricardo Maduro Joest’s relative, 
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and colonel Gustavo Álvarez Martinez head of the Honduran Armed Forces (1982-1984) formed 
the Association for Honduras Progress (Asociación para el Progreso de Honduras, APROH) 
(“Raíces históricas de la fortuna de Miguel Facussé Barjum,” 2011; see also Bulmer-Thomas 
1990:311).  Described by professor of Latin American studies Victor Bulmer-Thomas as a 
“semi-fascist organization,” (1987:235; 1990:311), APROH members advocated for the United 
States “military intervention against the Nicaraguan Sandinistas a necessary precondition of 
regional economic development” (Lansford, Muller, & Isacoff 2012:605).  Supporting APROH’s 
endeavors was Korean Evangelist Reverend Sun Myung Moon who contributed $5 million in 
1983 for the purpose of “countering Honduran ‘subversives’” (Lansford, Muller, & Isacoff 2012: 
605).  By 1984, the Honduran governed exiled Álvarez Martinez first to Costa Rica and then to 
Miami, where he remained until his return to Honduras in 1988 as a religious person.  In January 
1989, the Chinchoneros’ Popular Liberation Movement (Movimiento Popular de Liberación 
Chinchonero) one of Honduras political groups formed in 1979 in response to the military 
regime oppression of political dissidents claimed responsibility for the killing of Álvarez 
Martinez and his chuffer in Tegucigalpa (“Asesinado el General Álvarez Martínez,” 1989; see 
also Nieto 2003:115). 
  In addition to the military’s alliance with the elites domestically and abroad, one of its main 
sustenance was the “greatest purveyor of violence in the world:” the United States government 
(King, 1967).  Militarily, SOA continues to train many Honduran military officials.  In fact, 
Melgar Castro and Paz García are also among its graduates (¡Presente! n.d).  To create the 
illusion of democracy, the United States President Jimmy Carter (1977-1981) called for 
“democratic reforms” in exchange for an “increase” in economic aid (Nieto 2003:115).  In 1980, 
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Honduran elected rancher Roberto Suazo Córdova from the Liberal Party therefore becoming the 
first democratically elected president.  Facussé Bargum served as Córdova’s economic advisor.   
  The 1980s democratic transition also orchestrated the election of businessman José Azcona 
del Hoyo (1986-1990) also from the Liberal Party and longtime military ally and businessman 
Callejas Romero from the National Party.  Although other political parties exist in Honduras, just 
like in the United States, two dominate the political landscape: the Liberal and the National 
Party.  The United States government substantially rewarded the architects of the presumed 
democratic transition.  From 1981 to 1985 during which time “old-fashioned imperialist” John 
Dimitris Negroponte served as the United States Ambassador to Honduras, the military regime’s 
coffer swelled from “$5 million to nearly $100 million, and more than $200 million in economic 
aid, making Honduras the largest aid recipient in the region” (Hassan, 2004).  As the military 
regime enriched itself, in Atlántida, it usurped the Garinagu’s land in Tela Bay (Bahia de Tela), 
Rio Miel, and Punta Piedras (M. Miranda, personal communication, April 11, 2014).  Amid the 
seemingly peaceful democratic transition, several developments were taking place in 1987. 
Although unsuccessful, leaders of the Garifuna, Miskito, Tolupan, Pech, Tahwaka, Lenca, 
Pech, and Criollos, proposed the “‘Law for the Protection of Autochthonous Ethnic Groups’” to 
the Honduran government.  The law demanded among other things land titling and control over 
their resources (Anderson 2009:121-22).  Also, in response to state oppression and economic 
policies, university students, which included Garinagu, formed the Revolutionary University 
Front in 1987.  For Roberto Contreras, 
being involved in that Front, we [students] initiated a struggle process in 
solidarity with the peasant movement in relation to the defense of the agrarian 
reform because as it got close to 1990 and Rafael Callejas’ government, it was 
all about reforms. He created a law called the Law of Agriculture 
Modernization and that law impacted the agrarian reform.  This process would 
facilitate the big landowners to acquire possession of the peasant land and 
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would directly impact the Garifuna community.  In that sense, we then got 
involved in a struggle of solidarity with the peasant movement.  And it was in 
1991, 1992 that I integrated into the struggle for the defense of the Garifuna 
community in Honduras. (personal communication, February 20, 2011)    
 
Members of the Revolutionary University Front held workshops to educate the peasants about 
the impending changes.  OFRANEH’s director, José Hipólito Centeno García’s leadership, 
supported the Front’s efforts and sympathized with the peasant movement because they believed 
that “if the agrarian reform is destroyed, the Garifuna community would follow because up to 
that moment the Garifuna communities were not touched” (R. Contreras, personal 
communication, February 20, 2011).  However, as I have shown, the Honduran government was 
already appropriating the Garinagu’s land for tourism before the 1990s.  Also, judging from 
Honduras’ historical economic policies, there has never been a consistent agrarian reform that 
fostered social equity and transformed the social hierarchy.  On the contrary, the lack of land 
reform in Honduras has exacerbated inequality throughout the years.  Scholars of Latin America 
Carmen Diana Deere and Magdalena León, however, state that the agrarian reform “efforts” in 
Honduras “wound down” in the 1980s, although they do not specify whether or not it was in the 
early, middle, or the end of this decade this development happened (2001:95).  Judging from 
developments in Honduras, it is difficult to agree with their findings.   
The Garinagu’s land-related activism in defense of place has been ongoing.  Territorial 
“pressure” upon the Garifuna communities intensified following the 2009 coup d’état.  The 
removal of the Garifuna landowners was part of the Sosa’s administration “‘Christian 
humanism’” (M. Miranda, personal communication, April 17, 2011).  The Honduran state’s 
treatment of the Garifuna people is similar to the treatment of Palestinians by the Israeli 
government in that both groups are dispossessed and displaced from their land.  Speaking of the 
Palestinians dispossession from their land, Ali Abunimah, co-founder of the Electronic Intifada 
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news service, refers to this process in the occupied Palestinian territories as “‘Judaizing’ what 
remains of Palestinian land” (2014:xi).  Using similar tactics, the Honduran state is determined to 
establish different socio-economic and social relations throughout Honduras’ north coast as 
demonstrated in some Garifuna communities which are being increasingly populated by 
Honduran elites, Canadians, and other foreigners. 
Article 107 Amendment and its Consequences  
  David Harvey notes that there is a “permanent tension between the free appropriation of 
[place] for individual and social purposes and the domination of [place] through private property, 
the state, and other forms of class and social power” (1990:254).  This permanent tension 
remains entrenched in Honduras’ political economy which Garifuna pressure groups challenge.  
In the 1980s, the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs), also known as the “Washington 
Consensus” swept Latin American countries (Williamson, 2004; see also North American 
Congress on Latin America 1999:12).  Troubled with debts, accumulated “not to ﬁnance 
productive investments, but to ﬁnance the government’s patronage employment and large 
military and police forces,” the government in Honduras followed the SAP’s architects’ (IMF, 
WBG, USAID, and CABEI) demands (Easterly 2002:1; see also Chase 2002:1).  With support 
from the Honduran elites, SAPs became the law of the land.  Because SAPs’ execution required 
certain conditions such as implementing new laws regulating municipalities, under the IMF’s 
watchful eyes, the Córdova’s administration modified the Constitution which called “for 
economic and social development in the municipalities to form part of the national development 
programs . . .” (Merrill, 1995).  New laws allowed “municipalities to sell ejidal lands, which 
were reaffirmed two years later in an ‘Agricultural Sector Modernization’ law.  These changes 
provided the legal pretext for the current intrusion into Lenca [and the Garinagu] territory, even 
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though the subsequent ‘encroachment into indigenous land’ and ‘land grabs’ violated 
Convention 169 of the International Labor Organization which enshrines people’s land rights” 
(Beeton, 2013).  Included in the SAPs package was the reactivation of tourism. 
During the early 1980s, the Honduran government “began promoting tourism as a national 
development strategy – emphasizing the important Mayan archeological site of Copán, the scenic 
beaches and colonial history of the North Coast, and the relatively pristine coral reefs of the Bay 
Islands” (Stonich 2000:10).  Part of the north coast landscape is illustrated in figure 7.2 which 
shows the Garifuna fishermen getting ready to go fishing whereas figure 7.3 displays more 
clearly the mountains and trees.  The Honduran government similar to other governments in 
Central America sought to attract foreign investors.  To do so, the government established 
“‘Tourism Zones’” and “provided generous tax and import incentives” (Stonich 2000:10; see 
also Kerssen 2013:76).  The main tourism zones are the north coast, the Bay Islands, and the 
Cayos Cochinos, regions where the Garifuna communities are located.  To advertise this region, 
the government organizes them as “(1) the nation’s ‘living cultures,’” which is comprised of the 
Maya ruins and Honduras’ “seven indigenous and ethnic groups, “(2) eco-adventure 
opportunities; and (3) beachfront ‘fun and sun’” (Brondo 2013:48).  The living culture is the 
description for the Garifuna communities.  With Callejas Romero’s election in1990, his 
administration aggressively expanded on Cordova’s policies.  
Article 107 listed under Chapter II of the Honduran Constitution that outlines Individual 
Rights, prohibits foreigners from purchasing or owning land within forty kilometers or 25 miles 
of the nation’s coast, islands, islets, and reefs of the coastline (Honduras Const, art. 107). 
Callejas Romero’s government began to promote tourism leading to the passage of Decree Law 
90-90 in August 27, 1990 by the National Congress.  This Decree “weakened” Article 107 of the 
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        Figure 7.2 Garifuna Fishermen in Tibiniriba (Rio Esteban), Departamento of Colón  
      Source: Doris Garcia, 2006 
 
 
 
Figure 7.3 Beach in Río Coco, Departamento of Colón  
       Source: Doris Garcia, 2006 
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country’s Constitution (Kerssen 2013:76).  The passage of this Decree allowed foreigners to own 
properties in areas “designed by the Ministry of Tourism to be tourism zones” (Brondo 2013:42).  
Decree 90-90 also allowed foreigners to purchase “up to 3,000 square meters for residential use 
in urban areas and unlimited amounts in urban or rural areas for tourism or other development 
projects” (Brondo 2013:42).  In addition, Brondo states that “people” who I guess are foreigners 
could circumvent the 3,000 square meters by “forming stock corporations in which they name 
Honduras the original shareowners” (2013:42).  Citing anthropologist Susan Stonich, Brondo 
asserts that because of Law 90-90, property ownership by foreigners in the Bay Islands 
bourgeoned (2013:42).  By 1992, the Marbella Tourist Corporation began “usurping property in 
the Garifuna community of Triunfo de la Cruz in Tela Bay, the largest Garifuna settlement in 
Honduras with 9,000” inhabitants (Kerssen 2013:76).  As a result of this development, the 
Garifuna leaders formed the Defense Committee for Triunfo Land (Comité de Defensa de 
Tierras de Triunfo, CODETT).  In the aftermath of CODETT’s formation, threats from 
“authorities” began to pour in and by 1997, “three community leaders were murdered and a 
prominent anti-Marbella activist, Alfredo López” was arrested on false “drug trafficking 
charges” (Kerssen 2013:76; see also Ryan, 2008).  Thus, Garifuna people live amidst “a sea of 
violence” (M. Miranda, personal communication, June 12, 2012).  This sea of violence persists. 
As indicated in chapter four, Hurricane Mitch devastated Honduras in late October 1998.  
Again, evoking Oliver-Smith’s words, Mitch was similar to most “natural disaster” in that it was 
“multidimensional because was both a physical and social ‘event/process’” (2009:8).  As 
Hondurans dealt with the devastation Mitch left behind, President Carlos Roberto Flores Facussé 
(1998-2002) owner of the “national brewery (Cervecería Hondureña), several maquiladoras 
[assembly plants], and the influential newspaper La Tribuna,” continued his predecessors’ 
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economic policies exacerbating conditions in already devastated Garifuna communities (Pine 
2008:4).  Flores Facussé is Facussé Bargum’s nephew.  According to anthropologist Mark 
Anderson, in 1998 the Honduran National Congress began to mobilize to reform Article 107 of 
the Constitution that would allow foreigners to own land within “forty kilometers from any 
ocean or national border” (2009:131).  Pressured by government officials, members of the 
National Congress met on the night of November 30, 1998 and voted to amend Article 107 
(Brondo 2013:49).  The Garifuna leaders and other indigenous groups protested changes made to 
the Constitution and their movement received international coverage.  The Garifuna 
organizations mobilized using the “media and letter writing campaigns” and electoral power to 
pressure political candidate to have the National Congress “un-reform the constitution” (Brondo 
2013:49).  From OFRANEH’s office, Luisa Aguilar began to fax information to various non-
governmental organizations in New York City about what was happening to the Garinagu’s land 
in Honduras in post-Hurricane Mitch.   
As a result of Aguilar’s activity, “an indio” architect named Antonio Rico threatened 
Aguilar (personal communication, February 24, 2011).  According to Aguilar, Rico asked her at 
a parking lot in La Ceiba “what is it that Garifunas want?” (L. Aguilar, personal communication, 
February 24, 2011).  She replied “Garifunas want development” but not the way “it is being 
promoted.  The Garifunas would be left out.”  Rico replied, “I am an advisor to a group in 
Congress and do you know how much it costs when people interfere . . . it only costs 15,000 
Honduran pesos . . . at that time it did not reach $500 or $600” (L. Aguilar, personal 
communication, March 24, 2012).  Rico’s statement implied that for less than $500 or $600, a 
politician and an oligarch could order her killing or anyone who interferes with their economic 
plans.   A few weeks after Rico and Aguilar’s conversation, she left the country (personal 
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communication, March 24, 2012).  Aguilar had every right to be concerned about her life and the 
Garifuna communities.  The Honduran government sought to relocate the Garinagu residents 
from their devastated community of Santa Rosa de Aguán in the Departamento of Trujillo (L. 
Aguilar, personal communication, March 24, 2012).  Yet, Honduran officials seemed unfaced by 
the Garifuna people and their leaders’ reaction.  According to Brondo, officials from the 
Honduran Institute of Tourism stated that the amendment of Article 107 was “just to make things 
easier, so that if you wanted to sell [land], you could sale immediately, with no approval process 
[from the Ministry of Tourism].  It [the reform] didn’t obligate the Garifuna to sell” (2013:48).  
Furthermore, the official indicated, “No one said they had to [meaning sell their land].  Because 
they already have their lands, and the lands are communal, not individual.  So if someone wanted 
their lands, they would need to get everyone to agree” (2013:48-49).  As we shall see, the 
Honduran government and oligarchs just continue to usurp the Garinagu’s land.  
In 1999 as the 2001 elections approached, “Garinagu organizations” used their electoral 
power to pressure presidential candidate Rafael Pineda Ponce of the Liberal Party and president 
of Congress to undo the amendment to Article 107(Brondo 2013:49).  Fearing a political 
backlash, on October 12, 1999, Ponce “authorized Rodrigo Castillo Aguilar of the National 
Congress to sign an Act of Compromise with the Garinagu” (Brondo 2013:49).  Brondo does not 
indicate who these Garinagu organizations were, since Casildo from ODECO initiated these 
political pledges in 2001 as I indicate in chapter four.  In any event, the political pledge stated 
that the “proposed reforms for Article 107 would not be incorporated into the Legislative 
Agenda, and thus Article 107 would be ratified” (Brondo 2013:49).  However, Brondo goes on to 
say that following the signing of the pledge, the Garifuna organizations reneged on their 
commitment on the grounds that Ponce would not keep his promise.     
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In the aftermath of the Article 107 amendment, “Canadian developers . . . fenced off land 
and begun construction of a tourism complex with 1,600 hotel rooms and a water park” in 
Tornabé and to the east in Triunfo de la Cruz (Dúfigati) and other land developers built vacation 
houses next to the Garifuna people’ traditional houses (Volgenau, 1998).  Canadian land 
ownership in Honduras has burgeoned since then.  Former muffler salesman from Saskatchewan, 
Canada and founder and owner of Adult Video Only, Randy Jorgensen, nicknamed the “‘porn 
king,’” (Paley, 2010) illegally appropriated the Garinagu’s land in the community of Rio Negro 
and demolished properties for the “construction of a cruise pier called Panamax,” but it is named 
Banana Coast (M. Miranda, personal communication, March 17, 2011).  Accompanied by 
OFRANEH, on December 13, 2011 leaders of the Cristales and Rio Negro communities 
“presented a demand against Jorgensen to annul several fraudulent contracts and sales of 
community owned land” (M. Miranda, personal communication, March 17, 2011).  According to 
journalist Dawn Paley, Jorgensen finds the Garifuna people’s land usurpation accusations 
amusing.  Instead, he refers to their charges of him acquiring land to build his luxury Campa 
Vista villas in Trujillo catering to Canadian retirees to be nothing more than “‘extortion’” (Paley, 
2010).  Listed as CEO of Life Vision Developments and owner of Life Vision Properties, 
Jorgensen has every reason to find the Garifuna people’s charges against him comical because 
his relationship with the local government and oligarchs shields him.  With funding from the 
“Canadian Shield Fund (including funds from the controversial mining company, Barrick Gold 
and the Canadian Oil and Gas Company),” Jorgensen is “converting a beautiful coastal area of 
Trujillo into a large scale tourism project that includes a series of vacation home developments 
and a cruise ship dock, displacing and destroying indigenous Garífuna communities” (Eidt, 
2013). 
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Through the support of Ramón Lobo Sosa, the former president Lobo Sosa’s brother, 
Jorgensen developed a cozy relationship with Porfirio Lobo Sosa himself.  At the invitation of 
the Lobo Sosa’s administration, on November 27, 2010, Jorgensen had a breakfast meeting with 
him at the Christopher Columbus Hotel in Trujillo attended also by Ramón Lobo Sosa (Life 
Vision Properties, 2010).  Lobo Sosa also presented Jorgensen in 2011 with a “CEO of Life 
Vision Developments, with a special award and recognition at the Annual Meeting of the 
Ministers held in Trujillo” (figure 7.4) (“Randy Jorgensen Meets with President Lobo,” n.d.).  As 
stated in Life Vision Properties’ website, this company is “the largest Developer of ocean front 
properties in Trujillo,” which currently “have over 1500 acres in development in residential and 
commercial real estate.  Life Vision Properties is very serious about the responsibility for the 
care of your property in Honduras” (2011).  Charactering its practices as caring and responsible 
certainly outrage the Garifuna people, who continue to be dispossessed from their land as Life 
Vision Properties expand its projects in Trujillo.  Kimberly Berge’s articles states, “Ultraluxury 
Silversea Cruises is the first cruise line to sign on to call at Banana Coast, the newest western 
Caribbean cruise destination at Trujillo, Honduras.  The 296-passenger Silver Cloud is scheduled 
to call Dec. 17, 2014” (2013).  Owned by Jorgensen, the Banana Coast Landing “is a themed 
retail destination with approximately 50,000 Square Feet of retail shopping, including jewelry 
stores, designer boutiques, and a themed restaurant and bar.  The site is home to an Excursion 
Marina and a large, sandy beach.  A finger pier will accommodate two post-Panamax cruise 
vessels by 2012” (Banana Coast Landing, n.d.).   
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The report goes on to say that the “facility’s design evokes the Banana Coast’s glory days 
of yesteryear, when the economy was fueled by the banana trade.  Big commerce, steam trains, 
foreign consulates, and American capitalists were mainstays in the colonial town, which 
boomed from the 1920s to 1940s” (Banana Coast Landing, n.d.).  In romanticizing the brutality 
associated with the banana plantations in Honduras and throughout Central America, Jorgensen 
is appealing to the taste and values of racist middle class whites and mestizos whose politics and 
racial discourse align with those of white Europeans and European Americans from the United 
States.  In the meantime, the Banana Coast Landing’s website depicts a young smiling black 
woman holding the Honduran flag.  We can explain the contemporary political economy of 
Honduras as follow.  First, the Honduran government and local oligarchs are rehashing the same 
economic model they used in the late nineteenth century when the banana plantation flourished 
in Honduras.  This economic model entailed modernizing certain areas of Honduras’ 
infrastructure as long as they get a piece of the action.  In the meantime, the Honduran peasants 
and blacks labored in the inhumane conditions developed by the banana plantation owners.  
 Figure 7.4 Randy Jorgensen (left) Shaking Hands with Porfirio Lobo Sosa 
 Source: Life Vision Properties, 2013 
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Today, while the Honduran government and elites exploit the Garinagu’s bodies and culture in 
reproducing Honduras’ north coast, the acquisition of their land remains a fundamental 
component of this process.  Second, complementing this process is advertising.  Advertising a 
place as a tourist destination involves creating a sublime place.  As geographer J. D. Goss states, 
destination marketing works by (re)presenting socially desirable consumer life-
styles with icons of a particular place, and suggesting, through various 
rhetorical devices, a substantive connection between them drawing upon and 
reproducing socializing and spatializing discourse.  Destination marketing is, 
therefore, simultaneously implicated in the construction of place imagery and 
the constitution of subjects who experience that image in specific ways. 
(1993:663) 
   
The place imagery Goss speaks of is the place of consumption and spectacle.   
While Canadian developers continue to take pleasure in Callejas Romero’s economic 
policies and his successor’s amendment of Article 107, the Honduran elites also take advantage 
of the spoils.  First, despite the Garifuna leaders’ on-going efforts, OFRANEH states that “up 
until 1993 there was a Garifuna’s territory beginning in Santa Rosa de Aguán to Plaplaya which 
included seventeen Garifunas communities” (personal communication, March 17, 2011).  In the 
aftermath of Facussé Bargum’s nephew, Carlos Roberto Flores Facussé, (at that time the 
Honduran president), amendment of Article 107 of the Honduran Constitution, Facussé Bargum 
appropriated 250 acres of land to plant oil palms.  The land he usurped begins in Punta 
Farallones, a Garifuna hamlet in Limón, and ends in Vallecito.  This hamlet is “located within 
the lands of the [Garifuna] cooperative Ruguma” (M. Miranda, personal communication, August 
27, 2012).  The Honduran Supreme Court declared Facussé Bargum usurpation of the Garinagu’s 
land illegal (M. Miranda, personal communication, August 27, 2012).  Yet, the Supreme Court’s 
declaration went unnoticed by Facussé Bargum because he, similar to other oligarchs in 
Honduras, is untouchable by the law of the land that also supposed to protect other citizens like 
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the Garinagu, as many Garinagu state.  Facussé Bargum resorted to other tactics to usurp the 
Garinagu’s land.  Isidro Chávez declares that Facussé Bargum agitated mostly poor mulatos from 
the nearby community of the Icoteas to occupy the Garinagu’s held land in Vallecito, Limón.  
Once they secured the land, they transferred it to Facussé Bargum (personal communication, 
April 24, 2010).  On other occasions, Facussé Bargum sent out his henchmen to intimidate or 
threaten the Garifuna leaders and landowners (B. Cayetano, personal communication, April 14, 
2010).  
Today, Honduras produces “more than 300 metric tons of African palm oil, almost 70% of 
which is exported.  This plant is now cultivated on 120 thousand hectares (compared to 40 
thousand during the 90s and 80 thousand in 2005), the majority of which is situated in the 
northern parts of Colón, Atlántida, and particularly in the Valley of Aguán” (International 
Federation for Human Rights, 2011:8).  Dinant Corporation “owns about one-fifth of all the 
agricultural land in Bajo Aguán, more than 22,000 acres of well-groomed plantations that supply 
oil for export and for its snack foods, margarine and cooking oil business” (Malkin, 2011).  As 
Roberto Contreras succinctly states, 
land is concentrated on the hand of a few people, it does not fulfill the social 
purpose; instead it is fulfilling a mercantile purpose but for the benefit of a 
corporation, like that of Miguel Facussé and precisely the law of agriculture 
modernization that came to strengthen a few people so that they can 
monopolize the land and destroyed the small and medium size peasants who 
owned the large tract of land because at that time by taking away all of the 
logistics, all of the financial and technical support from the peasantry, the 
peasantry was unable to produce the land. It could no longer produce it.  
Consequently, the law of agriculture modernization supposedly was to produce 
the land in a private manner but no longer to the public.  So, they began to give 
the largest extension of lands to certain corporations and it was like that that 
these corporations practically dedicated themselves to the African Palm. 
(personal communication, February 20, 2011) 
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Nature, Lefebvre argues, “creates and does not produce; it provides resources for a creative and 
productive activity on the part of social humanity; but it supplies only use value . . .” (1991:70; 
see also Smith 2008:6).  Yet, despite nature’s importance, it is “being murdered by ‘anti-nature’” 
(Lefebvre 1991:71) because “capital is continually invested in the built environment in order to 
produce surplus value and expand the basis of capital” (Smith 2008:6).  Thus, the social 
production of nature develops from the production of space.  In other words, nature is a social 
construct shaped by a particular place or space.  
While Canadians and local Honduran elites savored their accomplishments, amendment of 
Article 107 continued to devastate the Garifuna communities.  First, the Garifuna communities 
underwent a process of land titling which excluded functional habitat (Organización Fraternal 
Negra Hondureña, personal communication, October 3, 2012).  In its most limited definition, 
functional habitat refers “to community lands plus the surrounding lands, rivers, wilderness and 
marine areas upon which communities depend even though they may not have direct ownership 
of them” (Kerssen 2013: 80 emphasis in original).  In its broadest sense, the concept refers to a 
“territorial space that includes multiple communities, cultural interactions and relations of 
production and exchange” (Kerssen 2013:80).  Excluding the functional habitat from the land 
title created spatial barriers for the Garifuna communities because land and sea are integral 
components of the Garinagu’s cultural practices. 
Land invasions encouraged in the 1970s re-emerged.  In the summer of 1990, several 
armed Olanchanos (from the Departamento of Olancho) appeared in Vallecito for the first time 
looking for land (I. Chávez, personal communication, April 24, 2010).  Their presence alarmed 
the inhabitants for “it was only in Vallecito where the only parcel of land was communally 
owned for farming” (I. Chávez, personal communication, April 24, 2010).  The Garifuna people 
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organized with Lombardo Sambulá Lacayo (Dr. Alfonso Lacayo Sánchez’s son) as their leader.  
By 1993, they secured titles for 1,400 acres of land for the “six cooperatives [named Sinduru 
Free, Walumugu, Saway, Saway Sufritinu, Satuye, and Ruguma], which are located today in the 
Vallecito territory” (I. Chávez, personal communication, April 24, 2010).  According to Brigido 
Cayetano, in 1997 former President Idiáquez hand-delivered Vallecito’s land title to Sambulá.  
Complementing the Garinagu’s land struggle in Vallecito was the support they received from 
those Garinagu residing in New York City.  In New York City, the Garifuna activists formed a 
board of directors.  Its members organized dances to raise financial support for the Garinagu’s 
movement in Limón.  Dances are one of the common methods the Garinagu use to raise funds to 
support specific community projects in Honduras.  On May 1, 1991, the Garinagu in Limón 
formed Iseri Lidawamari (New Dawn Movement).  The Garinagu in New York City also 
organized and supported Lombardo’s appearance before the United Nations to denounce the 
violation of their human rights.  As Isidro Chávez observed: 
Lombardo travelled twice to the United Nations to present the problems that 
we were having with Facusse . . . the first problem we had there was with the 
military who had taken ownership over the land and they said they had set up 
an investment scheme; but, in fact, they put our land as a guarantee [for the 
loan they were securing from the World Bank]. And when they learned in the 
United Nations that the problem existed, they ordered that the bank . . . should 
not authorize loans to those people [some members of the military]. (personal 
communication, April 24, 2010) 
 
When the United Nations learned of developments in Vallecito, it “ordered the bank [World 
Bank Group] not to authorize loans to those people [military in Honduras]” (I. Chávez, personal 
communication, April 24, 2010).  Chávez asserts that the military officials involved in the land 
usurpation instead sold the land to Facussé Bargum.  In borrowing from Routledge’s analysis of 
social movement in Indian against development, the Garifuna organizers in the early 1990s 
jumped scale to challenge the “legitimacy of state hegemony through the withdrawal of consent 
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and the active articulation of resistance” (1993:37).  Through their years of baündada, the 
Garifuna people have learned that the Honduran government and the country’s legal system 
would not and does not provide its citizens such as the Garinagu with any form of protection.  
Procuring external assistance was thereby their only recourse in challenging land dispossession 
and oppression.      
In addition to securing land titles, under Sambulá’s tenure, Iseri Lidawamari received both 
local and global funding.  For instance, the United Nations created Rescate Cultural-Ecológico 
(rescue ecological culture) designed to support a host of indigenous-oriented community projects 
ranging from bilingual education programs, cooperative agriculture, and the building of a 
training center (England 2006:177).  Besides the land recovery, Iseri Lidawamari Movement 
also transformed the political landscape when Limoneños elected Sambulá as Limón’s mayor 
(1994-1998).  Cayetano explains that many Garinagu from nearby communities and cities in 
Honduras traveled to Limón to cast their vote.  Limoneños residing in New York City sent a 
representative to Limón and helped finance Sambulá’s campaign (B. Cayetano, personal 
communication, April 14, 2010).  Many Garinagu consider Lacayo Sambulá’s election to be the 
consolidation of the Garinagu’s political activism in Honduras.  Under Sambulá’s initiative and 
OFRANEH’s efforts, the Garinagu put the state on notice that they were not going to comply 
with it.  A new generation of Garifuna activities matches their efforts.  Juan Espinosa declares,  
he [Lombardo] was a visionary comrade and some comrades accompanied him 
on this endeavor, collaborated, and defended, and followed the process in 
finding logistics and mechanisms to be able to carry out this process so that we 
believe that there should be more involvement from brothers [and sisters] that 
reside here [United States]. We cannot be detached from the problems that our 
place of origin is faced with. This must be done based on information, by 
sending more information. Obtaining more information would generate a 
higher level of consciousness concerning the problem that is confronted today 
in terms of the removal [of Garinagu] from the land of our, of our 
communities, that is to say, we repeat – as a culture, but a culture must have a 
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territory, that is to say, there is no culture without territory, that is why we do 
not neglect the struggle.  In this content, we believe that the factor – that the 
role of the Garifuna people abroad that each day is a strong community and 
large one, it is in the economic aspect. (personal community, September 23, 
2011) 
 
Despite gains the Garifuna people made in the 1990s, Facussé Bargum had extended his palm oil 
landholdings from “Punta Sal in Tela, Atlantida to Sico Valley near the Rio Platano Biosphere in 
Colón” by 1996 (“Raíces históricas de la fortuna de Miguel Facussé Barjum,” 2011).  His 
holdings now cover a large part of the Honduras coastline land because he rejected the 
Garinagu’s 1997 land titles.  Instead, he resorted to stealing the Garinagu’s land by “planting 100 
hectares of palm oil.  Today, his territory surrounds Vallecito.  In total, 86% of Garifuna land has 
been seized by non-Garifunas over the last 18 years, despite a Supreme Court ruling upholding 
the Garifunas’ title to the land” (“Honduras: Stand with the Garifuna people as they Recover 
Ancestral Lands,” 2012).  It is through this lens that the Garinagu inhabitants relate with and 
connect to Honduras’ north coast and to Sambulá’s legacy.  Developments addressed in this 
chapter thus far support Doreen Massey’s analysis that place is enmeshed in a host of social 
relations, which generate “internal tensions and conflicts” (1994:137; 1991:323).  In articulating 
this relationship, Massey is addressing the contradictions found in place as we continue to see in 
this chapter. 
Modernization and the Agricultural Sector/Law of Municipalities 
In this section, I outline the continuation of the making of the Garinagu landlessness.   A 
pernicious legislative framework included in Callejas Romero’s economic policies in the 1990s 
was Decree 31-92 enacted in1992, which created the Law for the Modernization and the 
Agricultural Sector (LMA) (Callejas Romero, 1992).  The law focuses on food production and 
seems to be inclusive in its objective.  For instance, some of the objectives outlined in Chapter II, 
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Article 0004 states that LMA “establishes the adequate conditions for the producers whatever 
their form of organization or business may be, to develop efficient food production and other 
agriculture products while ensuring the conservation and protection of the soils, water, forest, 
flora and fauna” (Callejas Romero, 1992).  It also calls for the development of the rural region 
and the generation of jobs.  However, it does not specifically state how the state would protect 
indigenous territories and communities in the rural and the north coast regions.  According to 
Brondo, the USAID crafted the LMA for the Honduran government to execute.  The LMA’s 
objectives were: “(1) to eliminate state intervention in the agrarian sector, (2) to limit 
appropriations and promote private ownership and (3) to promote new foreign and domestic 
investment in agriculture (because the law as intended to increase the amount of [legally titled] 
land available on the market” (2013:43).  Hence, many smallholders, Brondo states are 
“suffering from economic hardship chose to sell their land to wealthier landowners and to the 
giant banana producers who desperately wanted to expand their landholdings” (2013:43). 
Although Brondo contends that the mestizo peasants chose to sell their land, professor of 
law Lauren Carasik states that the 1992 Law for the Modernization of Land “gutted many of the 
protections written into the original agrarian reform efforts, creating pressure on peasant land 
cooperatives to sell their land to large landowners” (2012).  Small farmers sold their land for “a 
mere 1,000 lempiras per manzana (about $52 US dollars for 1.7 acres)” (Shell, 2012; see also 
“Raíces históricas de la fortuna de Miguel Facussé Barjum,” 2011).  With funding from the 
World Bank, Facussé Bargum, the leader of snack and biofuel enterprises and alleged drug-
trafficker in Honduras was waiting to partake in this bonanza, particularly land located in the 
fertile land of Valle of Aguán (Aguán Valley) (“Drug Plane Burned on Prominent Honduran’s 
247 
 
Property,” 2004).  Traveling to Sangrelaya, Trujillo during my fieldwork research in 2006, I 
noticed large plantations of palm oil. 
Before the National Congress created LMA, it passed the Law of Municipalities (Ley de 
Municipalidades) in October 1990 through Decree 134-90.  This law was a combination of 
electoral reform and decentralization of the central government.  The government put into place 
a formidable political apparatus that I consider the culmination of the Garinagu landlessness.  
Decree Law 134-90 granted the country’s 298 municipalities autonomy over their budgets, tax 
collections, investment, natural resources, electoral process – meaning separate elections for 
mayors and presidential candidates, and development programs, among others (El Congreso 
Nacional, 1990).  The Law of Municipalities came out of the “National Program for 
Decentralization and Municipal Strengthening established as part of the Administration's policy 
of State Modernization” (“International City/County Management Association” 2004:4-2).  I 
suspect that due to its involvement in training that the USAID might have been behind the 
creation of the Law of Municipalities.  In 1989, USAID “increased its support of the municipal 
level by providing it with technical assistance and training in order to improve the administration 
of the local governments” (“International City/County Management Association,” 2004:4-2).  
USAID’s involvement seems to suggest that the Municipal Reform Law might have been 
modeled after the United States political system.  Because of this law, the government annexed 
various Garifuna communities and incorporated them into urban areas.  Since then foreigners 
have received titles to the Garifuna communities land (M. Miranda, personal communication, 
October 3, 2012).   
The incorporation of the Garifuna communities into urban areas was a departure from the 
policies of the 1950s, for at that time the Honduran government did not recognize the Garifuna 
248 
 
communities as urban areas.  Under Honduras’ previous laws, the Garifuna communities had to 
have a population of over 1,000 to be considered urban (López García 2006:32).  Among the 
communities classified as urban were Corozal with a population of 1,296, Triunfo de la Cruz 
1,082, Limón 1,447 and Santa Rosa de Aguán 1,284, San Juan and Tornabé (location of the 
Projecto Touristico Bahia de Tela and today Micos Beach and Resort) with a little over 1,000 
(Euraque 2004:178; López García 2006:32; M. Miranda, personal communication, October 3, 
2012).  Under the Law of Municipalities, the central government also produced a new form of 
political structure that empowered municipalities to convert the Garinagu’s land into a national 
park without “consulting” the inhabitants (Brondo 2013:51).  Brondo notes that this same 
process took place in Tela Bay.  Against the Garinagu’s opposition, the government carried out 
the Tela Bay project land acquisition by amending the Constitution allowing the local 
government “to annex community lands (as in the case of Tornabé, Triunfo de la Cruz, and San 
Juan)” (Brondo 2013:51).  Since this transaction, local officials in Tela have sold “200 hectares” 
of Garinagu’s land (Brondo 2013:51).  In other instances, the local government co-opted the 
Garifuna organizations such as the Patronatos.   
The same situation that took place in Tela and in many other Garifuna communities also 
took place in Walumugu.  According to Garifuna scholar, Salvador Suazo, “the area known as 
Walumugu District is a Garifuna corridor located in the municipality of Juan Francisco Bulnes” 
in Colón (personal communication, June 21, 2014).  Comprising Juan Francisco Bulnes are the 
Garifuna communities of “Plaplaya [Bülagüríba], Bataya [Badayaugati], Coyoles [Koyolesi], 
Pueblo Nuevo [Ñon Ton], Buena Vista [Buena Wista] and La Fe [Pârinchi], plus a distinguished 
family that lives in a coconut plantation named Thigh-bone [Taibónu]” (S. Suazo, personal 
communication, June 21, 2014).  In the aftermath of Francisco Bulnes’ assassination in the 
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1880s, his three children founded Ñon Ton or New Town which was hispanized as Pueblo 
Nuevo (S. Suazo, personal communication, June 21, 2014).  These communities, similar to many 
other Garifuna communities, are in peril.  Under Walumugu’s three-term mestizo Mayor, several 
illegal land sales to foreigners linked with criminal activities took place.  The Garinagu reported 
the case to the central authorities, but their concerns fell on deaf ears (M. Miranda, personal 
communication, March 17, 2011). 
In 2004, the Maduro’s government approved the Law of Property (La Ley de Propiedad) 
which gave birth to the Property Institute (Instituto de Propiedad, IP).  Consequently, the 
government merged the National Geographic Institute (Instituto Geográfico Nacional, IGN) and 
several other institutions with overlapping tasks to oversee and “guarantee the property legal 
security and to integrate different registries for the protection and regulation of the land and land 
registry” (“Reforma Institucional,” 2012).  The Honduran legislature passed the property law in 
2004 that merged several bureaucratic institutions and the formation of the Land Administration 
Project of Honduras (Projecto de Administración de Tierras de Honduras, PATH) with the intent 
“to regularize and modernize property ownership” (Anderson 2007:384).  Included in this project 
were black people OFRANEH represented and indigenous inhabitants.  Yet, these social actors 
were wary of the government’s plan (Anderson 2007:385).  According to Anderson, an 
OFRANEH “senior representative” stated, “‘when illegality is made legal, peoples still have the 
right to justice’” (2007:385).  On this sea of legitimate suspicion, in December 2008, the World 
Bank funded PATH’s phase two by approving a $3,000,000 loan (“Program de Administración 
de Tierras de Honduras II, PATH II,” n.d.).  Usurpation and dispossession of the Garifuna 
inhabitants from their land has only grown because there are no land protection guarantees in 
Honduras. 
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Besides economic gains made by the central government and elites, the Municipal Reform 
Law also strengthened the dominant political group.  Through the law’s execution, the Honduran 
central government created cadres or gatekeepers to safeguard and preserve the ruling class’ 
interests in this poor nation.  Mayoral posts in Honduras have been occupied primarily by 
mulatos, except in 1992 when Garifuna Sambulá won election in Limón.  Otherwise, mulatos 
hold municipal offices where the Garifuna communities are geographically concentrated 
(“Principales Corporaciones Municipals Elecciones Generales 2009”).  For example, Santa Fé, 
Colón is the only Garifuna community represented by a Garifuna from the right-wing National 
Party.  This was the case in 2006 while researching in Honduras.  The violence and corruption 
associated with the Honduran electoral system, particularly since the 2009 coup d’état, can help 
us to understand why 64 percent of the Mayors were from the National Party (“Principales 
corporaciones municipales Elecciones Generales 2009”).  In addition, Lobo Sosa “designated” 
Garifuna Venancio Sabio Quevedo as governor of Atlántida, a region which is one of the 
battlegrounds for land between the Garifuna residents and the government (“Gobernador Político 
de Atlántida es Afrohondureño,” 2010).  It is also startling to learn about the number of Garinagu 
joining the National Party when most are ardent supporters of the Liberal Party.  As my 
interlocutor Crecencio Valdez stated, “I have been a Liberal from the crib” (personal 
communication, May 31, 2010).  Although the Garifuna communities can form an alternative 
political coalition, they would not do so because they have become puppet regions of the 
dominant group; hence, they do not have community control over the established institutions that 
influence their lives.  Instead, they work within the existing legislative system created in the 
1990s and the political apparatus that have made them a landless and fragmented society. 
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In view of changes in Honduras’ political landscape since the 2009 coup d’état, I asked 
several members of the Garifuna middle class in the United States how Lobo Sosa’s government 
helps the Garinagu in Honduras.  In Honduras, Isidro Chávez gives Lobo Sosa the benefit of the 
doubt, but he does not “believe him” (personal communication, April 24, 2010).  Tomas Cevello 
in New York City declares that it “is too soon to say – too soon for judgment on “Pepe” Lobo.  
First of all, he [Lobo Sosa] took a country in turmoil.  He has to iron out a lot of things not only 
in Honduras but all over the world, the acceptance from the international community that needs 
to be the first thing to be ironed” (personal communication, May 24, 2010).  Felicita Benitez 
from the Bronx replies, “well, it is my understanding that he [Lobo Sosa] signed some decrees 
last year in favor of the indigenous and the Afro-descendants” (personal communication, May 
25, 2010).  Then, she asked me to share with her what he has done.  Echoing similar thoughts, 
activist Pabla Trujillo declares, 
I don’t know how he’s gonna help. However, I learned that he was president of 
the congress. What I have described about the [land] struggle during that time 
he was the president of the congress during that time.  So, he knew about the 
problem.  He knows about the problem.  I’m not sure what he did in terms of 
helping them [Garinagu] during the time . . . I see Honduran having a lot of 
problems in dealing with their own laws.  I feel that Honduras doesn’t have 
respect for law. (personal communication, May 24, 2010)  
 
A January 24, 2014 La Prensa article states that President Juan Orlando Hernández’s (2014-) 
administration planned to eliminate four organizations among them SEDINAFROH and the 
Secretariat of Justice and Human Rights.  Hernández who cheered the coup d'état and “led the 
illegal 2012 ejection of four members of the Supreme Court and the illegal naming of a new 
attorney general to a five-year term,” targeted organizations such as SEDINAFROH created 
under Lobo Sosa’s administration (Frank, 2014).   
252 
 
 OFRANEH referred to SEDINAFROH and the Secretariat of Justice and Human Rights 
organizations also formed during Lobo Sosa’s administration as “extinct” (personal 
communication, February 3, 2014).  Although Hernández’s administration has not eliminated 
SEDINAFROH, Lobo Sosa’s compliance with ODECO’s campaign pledge suggests that he only 
used it to secure the Garinagu’s votes and appease them amid the political crisis that the 
Honduran oligarchs manufactured and the United States government approved.  Yet, several 
Garinagu interviewed believe that because a Garifuna woman served as the Lobo Sosa family’s 
midwife and the fact that his government named several Garifuna leaders  to various nominal 
ministerial posts, they feel included in the broader social fabric of Honduras.  Members of the 
Garifuna middle class choose not to see the danger of their politics.  I define their politics to be 
dangerous because it encourages the use and abuse of the Garinagu culture and the snatching of 
their land.  This is illustrated in Mario Moran’s statement.  
because I’m an eternal optimist, I’m actually encouraged by the fact that he 
[Lobo Sosa] accepts that he’s from Trujillo; I’m encouraged as a matter of fact 
that every speech that I heard he say, he actually states the fact that his 
mother’s midwife was a Garifuna woman lady and the Garifuna lady brought 
him to this world, Doña Catalina.  I like the fact that Bernard Martinez 
[Garifuna] is the Minister of Culture, Sports and Arts.  I like the fact that Luis 
Green is the Minister of Ethnic Issues.  Now, why do I like that? Because in 
contrast with what happened with the previous government [Manuel Zelaya 
ousted in a coup d’état] – where for the first time we actually have four people 
– four Garinagu in the senate. What’s significant about “Pepe” Lobo is the fact 
that this is the conservative party.  This is the party that most Garinagu do not 
support and as a result they have never taken us into consideration and yet - 
again, now we have – and I’m happy for Bernard.  Yes, we have four senators 
in the previous government but they were not representing the Garinagu 
interest.  They were representing the interests of those who sponsored their 
campaigns. (personal communication, May 25, 2010)  
 
It does not matter to Moran why Lobo Sosa would speak about his place of birth and the 
Garifuna midwife.  What matters to Moran is that Lobo Sosa references place and the Garinagu’s 
domestic services.  As for Bernard Martínez Valerio, his position as Secretary of State for the 
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Departments of Culture, Arts and Sports was ephemeral.  As a “trade unionist and black activist” 
and “first black Presidential candidate,” mulato politicians chased him out of office (Martínez 
Valerio, n.d.).  In addition to Valerio’s ousting, land usurpation remained ongoing under Lobo 
Sosa’s administration.  Yet, despite these developments, the Garinagu in Honduras and in the 
United States see themselves to be culturally powerful, which is false liberation.  What is the 
purpose of being culturally powerful when a group is politically and economically powerless?  
Being politically and economically powerful means having land and having land can also mean 
enjoying some form of autonomy.  Having land is more effective than being culturally powerful 
because it balances power relations.  In saying this, I am not implying that the Garinagu should 
neglect their culture.  It is part of who they are.  Therefore, they must preserve it and protect it.  
However, they cannot remain exclusively focused on culture as their only survival strategy.  The 
Garifuna activists and the Garinagu in general must become politically conscious as the 
Garinagu did with Dr. Lacayo Sánchez in the 1960s and Sambula did in the early 1990s.  If they 
do not, it means that there is a sense of defeatism that dominates their psychic. 
Whenever the Garifuna leaders have the opportunity to address the Garinagu’s land 
struggle to a global audience, some do not seize the moment.  On April 19, 2013, I viewed 
Garifuna in Peril at the Langston Hughes African American Film Festival in Seattle, 
Washington.  Directed and produced by Garifuna Ruben Reyes and Ali Allie, the film exams the 
Garifuna’s culture (e.g. language), HIV, and land dispossession in Honduras.  Most of the movie, 
however, focuses on the first two issues.  When the movie addresses land dispossession, it 
sanitizes the violence.  It does not reveal the Honduran government and elites’ brutality.  Instead, 
it presents the Garifuna Patronato to be complicit in the selling of the Garifuna’s land to 
foreigners.  Indeed, some members of the Patronatos are complicit in this conflict.  Using Braulio 
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Martínez’s association with a Patronato in Triunfo de la Cruz, “the mayor of the municipality of 
Tela insisted in selling the Garinagu land illegally to foreigners and investors in tourism” (M. 
Miranda personal communication, January 5, 2011).  The municipality sold “twenty-two 
manzanas of Triunfo de la Cruz that the municipality of Tela used to pay a debt to its union” (M. 
Miranda, personal communication, January 5, 2011).  Although some members of the Patronatos 
are complicit, which shows the fragmentation of the Garifuna society, the Honduran government 
and oligarchs have continued to orchestrate and maintain the state of violence and intimidation 
against the Garifuna opposition leaders.  I asked Reyes and Allie during the question and answer 
session, why they do not address the Honduran government violence against the Garinagu.  Ali 
responded, “the Honduran government is pleased with the film” (field notes, April 19, 2013).  
The Honduran government has every right to be pleased, for the movie advertises Honduras as a 
place of laws and respect for human rights rather than a violent and racist society.   
What I have so far outlined is that “the conquest and control of [place] . . . first requires that 
it be conceived of as something usable, malleable, and therefore capable of domination through 
human action” demonstrating that “there can be no politics of [place] independent of social 
relations.  The latter [conquest and control of place] give the former [conceived place] their 
social content and meaning” (Harvey 1990:254; 1990: 257).  The politics of land in Honduras 
and spatial barriers constructed through a host of laws speak not only of the steps taken to 
homogenize place but also of the “difficulties” for those excluded by the dominant group to 
assert control over place (Harvey 1990:257).  What follows in the following segments in this 
chapter is how the Garifuna activists in Honduras and in the United States responded to the 
Honduran government’s economic policies and global economic forces in the making of a 
landless society.   
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Pressure Groups  
Over the years in Honduras, the Garifuna pressure groups have resorted to various tactics to 
counter a host of national economic schemes ranging from tourism to monoculture palm oil 
plantations.  On October 11, 1996, OFRANEH and ODECO organized La Marcha de los 
Tambores (The March of Drums).  ODECO’s Casildo unity with OFRANEH seemed to have 
taken place before power and class became central to Casildo’s existence as a Garifuna leader. 
The Garinagu from across Honduras convened in Honduras’ capital “to demand their rights to 
communal land.  They also demanded that the Honduran government adhere to the Covenant 
[sic] No. 169 of the ILO” (“The Inspection Panel,” 2007).  The outcome of this march Anderson 
declares was an “agreement on land titling” (2009:161).  
On April 1, 2011, an estimated 7,000 Garinagu descended on Tegucigalpa.  Organized by 
OFRANEH, The Foundation for the Health of Our People, formed by ELAM’s graduates, and 
their Garifuna grassroots organizations, these groups named their march Alliance 2-14 (J. 
Espinosa, personal communication, September 23, 2011).  For march organizers, the 2-14 drums 
beat “represented the dignity of our people, but also to send a clear message of Garifuna people’s 
struggle and to denounce the entire process of land usurpation, denouncing the entire process of 
the third exile, denouncing all of this project of selling the national sovereignty” (J. Espinosa, 
personal communication, September 23, 2011).  It is therefore the “magic” of the drums that the 
Garinagu sought to use as a representation of their struggle against oppression, domination, and 
racism (B. Cayetano, personal communication, April 13, 2010). 
March organizers thus declared that there was “nothing to celebrate in Honduras,” referring 
to the upcoming Garifuna’s remembrance of their ancestor’s removal from St. Vincent and 
arrival to Honduras (J. Espinosa, personal communication, September 23, 2011).  Fifty Garifuna 
256 
 
organizations representing their respective communities comprised Alliance 2-14.  Each 
organization functions autonomously at a local level but through OFRANEH at a national level.  
Every Alliance 2-14’s member organization “has its own Patronato that is a member of the 
alliance and is represented in Alliance 214” (J. Espinosa, personal communication, September 
23, 2011).  For the marchers, the unremitting dispossession of the Garinagu from their land 
signifies another form of “exile” (J. Espinosa, personal communication, September 23, 2011).  
While the Garifuna activists were marching, chanting, and performing, other Garifuna 
participants performed cleansing rituals designed to “dissipate the spirit of violence that 
characterizes the current regime of Porfirio Lobo” (J. Espinosa, personal communication, 
September 23, 2011; Anderson 2012:69).  As the Garifuna protesters voiced their land 
usurpation in the streets, Casildo was “having lunch in an air conditioned office” with Lobo Sosa 
(J. Espinosa, personal communication, September 23, 2011).  For Espinosa, Casildo engaged in 
“celebrating officialism” an approach, which his critics claim, defines Casildo’s stand and 
politics in Honduras (personal communication, September 23, 2011).  
Again, Routledge’s observation helps us to understand the Garinagu’s marches.  Speaking 
of social movements in India in relation to economic developments, he states that the social 
actors’ “goals, scale and success have frequently depended upon the particular economic, 
political and cultural conditions existing at the time of the movement’s mobilization” (1993:16).  
Seeing that these conditions threatened them, the Garifuna activists defended their place that 
supports Escobar’s argument about the defense of place.  It also supports geographer Ruth 
Gillmore’s argument that “a geographical imperative lies at the heart of every struggle for social 
justice” (2005:16).  To support their struggle, the Garifuna drums, which uphold a central aspect 
in their culture, became vital in their resistance.  The Garifuna protesters usage of drums 
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supports Routledge’s argument that “cultural codes” are “spatially specific” and “cultural 
expressions of resistance” (1993:37).  Drums represent a salient cultural artifact in the Garifuna 
culture.  As Brigido Cayetano states, “when the drum beats you do not need to make an 
invitation everybody comes” (personal communication, April 14, 2010).  This is part of the 
Garifuna African traditions.  Some Garifuna leaders view the drum as their only weapon against 
economic and political forces.  Quoted by the Cultural Survival Quarterly, Alfredo López, 
OFRANEH’s vice president and founder of the first Garifuna community radio station, Sweet 
Coconut (Faluma Bimetu) based in Triunfo de la Cruz, declares “’Against their weapons, our 
drums are all that we have’” (“Honduras: Stand with the Garifuna people as they Recover 
Ancestral Lands,” 2012).  Indeed, the Honduran government and local oligarchs have the 
national police, the military, and their henchmen.  Foreign investors have the Honduran 
government and local oligarchs’ protection.  The Garifuna citizens have much more than a drum 
to counter their oppression; they have economic pressure that they can use. 
The Garifuna leaders can do many others things in addition to protesting, connecting with a 
network of organizations abroad, and jumping scale.  Direct pressure in the sphere of political 
consumerism is certainly an important route the Garifuna leaders can pursue by borrowing from 
African Americans’ movement.  In 1955, the Montgomery Improvement Association “modeled 
its transportation system, mass meetings, and ability to organize community leaders directly on 
the Baton Rouge boycott” of 1953 which was “spearheaded” by Mt. Zion Baptist Church’s 
Reverend T. J. Jemison  (Frystak 2009:67; King 2010:158).  Initiated by several African 
American women such as Jo Ann Gibson Robinson in Montgomery, Alabama, the Montgomery 
bus boycott was a response to segregation in busses, where blacks had to seat in the back of the 
bus or relinquish their seats to white passengers despite the fact that “75 percent of the city’s 
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ridership was black” (Wilson 2000:84).  It is from the black experience that the Montgomery bus 
boycott began on December 5, 1955 when “fifty thousand people - walked off from public city 
buses in defiance of segregation” propelling Dr. King as a national figure in the Civil Rights 
Movement (Robinson 1987:8).  For thirteen months, black domestic workers relied on car pools 
organized by blacks or walked long distance to challenge racist practices in the United States.  
African Americans’ actions “caused consternation among local businesspeople” because they 
were hoping to attract new business to the city (Wilson 2000:108).  In December 1956, the 
federal courts ordered the buses to be integrated (Robinson 1987:8).  Although spatial variations 
exist in terms of experiences and black people’s demands and the fact that the Garifuna people 
are fighting for land, the point is that the Garifuna pressure groups can borrow from African 
American activism because the Garifuna consumers buy the very same products (e.g. snacks, 
margarine etc.) Facussé Bargum’s company produces.  
Economic pressure might not appeal to the Garifuna leaders and the Garinagu in general 
because they blindly believe that UNESCO’s May 18, 2001 proclamation of the Garifuna’s 
culture as a masterpiece of the oral and intangible heritage of humanity and their status as 
“indigenous” in Honduras shelter them.  However, the Garinagu’s situation is not a matter of 
indigenous status.  Their situation is about oppression and domination.  It is about pushing the 
Garinagu from their land to be consumed by tourism and tourists, which is already occurring.  In 
his 1964 speech, Message to the Grass-roots, Malcolm X states, “land is the basis of all 
independence.  Land is the basis of freedom, justice, and equality” (Breitman 1990:9).  The 
Garifuna pressure groups must not simply accumulate tactics.  They must explore other strategies 
if they want freedom, justice, and equality.  As addressed thus far, local and foreign capitalists 
are constructing a new place on Honduras’ coastline with specific social relations demonstrating 
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that places are continually “reproduced” (Massey 1991:323).  The reproduction of Honduras’ 
north coast represents different social relations and the fragmentation of the Garinagu as a 
society. 
The Garifuna Middle Class’s Position 
As the Garifuna pressure groups embarked on marches in 1996, the Honduran government 
seized the opportunity for co-option.  The Garifuna middle class living in the United States and 
some in Honduras focused on the Garinagu’s bicentennial event held in 1997.  It appears that the 
economic and political milieu directly affecting the Garinagu seemed inconsequential to the 
Garifuna middle class in 1996.  Nine days before La Marcha de los Tambores, President Reina 
Idiáquez issued Executive Decree No. 017-96 approving the formation of a “presidential 
commission to coordinate the commemoration of the 200
th
 anniversary of the arrival of the 
Garifunas to Honduras” (J. Ávila & T. Ávila 2008:43).  Historian Roberto Pastor Fasquelle, 
Minister of Culture of Honduras together with Casildo and several others comprised the 
commission (J. Ávila & T. Ávila 2008:43).  
The Honduran government’s congenial response to the Garifuna middle class and the 
elites’ cultural politics require some reflection.  Undoubtedly, the government understood that it 
was in its best interest to appease the Garifuna people and their leaders.  Thus, employing 
cultural nationalism was an effective route to go in distracting them.  The government’s strategy 
undermined the unity that the Garinagu in Honduras and from the United States could have 
forged in forcefully denouncing the Garinagu’s land usurpation.  I can only interpret the attention 
that the Garifuna middle class received from the government to be co-option, which they 
apparently perceive to be inclusion and recognition.  The government’s efforts set the stage for 
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the commodification and politicization of the Garifuna’s culture.  Roberto Contreras explains 
why.  
the government now has to see what resources are available so that these 
groups carry out that famous celebration of the anniversary of the Garifuna 
presence in Honduras.  So, the political parties become involve, above all that 
campaign commitment that they sign for ODECO and in that campaign 
commitment, a budget of a million  and a half of lempiras was secured, you 
see, precisely that million and a half was for ODECO so that they can carry out 
the celebration and the government imposes its rules. You will celebrate in this 
and this direction.  That is to say that the government of that party practically 
takes possession of blacks’ commemoration and imposes its own political 
idiosyncrasy that is why it has been politicized and that is why the Garifuna 
would begin to lose its own cultural identity.  Why? Because we move 
according to those that are sponsoring the event and not in accordance to the 
cultural and moral values that must government our people. (personal 
communication, February 20, 2011)  
 
However, the Garinagu remember the commemoration event OFRANEH organized in Trujillo in 
1986 and 1988 as a period of solidarity among the Garifuna people because the Garifuna leaders 
controlled the event (R. Contreras, personal communication, February 20, 2011). 
After the bicentennial event, members of the Garifuna middle class in New York City had 
an epiphany in 1998.  They realized that Honduras was and is still experiencing a “land rush” 
(Volgenau, 1998).  As stated by “Maxima Thomas, director of the Garifuna Museum in Tela . . . 
’Investors not only are buying beachfront but also farmland.  The Garifuna will have no place to 
grow crops’” (Volgenau, 1998).  The reason was because local and foreign investors (e.g. United 
States and Canada) were eager to invest in the Marbella tourism project to build hotels, 
apartments, a shopping mall, supermarket, swimming pools, a golf course, tennis courts and even 
an airport (Volgenau, 1998).  Although most Garinagu in Honduras could not contextualize the 
legal mechanisms that facilitated the project to move forward, they began to denounce Article 
107 amendment.  In listening to the difficulties longtime activist Pabla Trujillo had articulating 
the meaning of Article 107 in relation to the Garinagu’s landlessness, it was clear the challenges 
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the Garifuna leaders face in framing a sound strategy.  Yet, they understood that land 
dispossession would generate a host of problems for the Garifuna residents on Honduras’ north 
coast.  Trujillo states:  
we were afraid because of poverty in our community. And, we know that the 
best land in Honduras happens to be our land, where we settled.  And the other 
thing is that if someone comes to you, you don’t have no money and I’m 
offering you a lot of money, being that you’re poor, what is it that you’re 
gonna do, you’re gonna sell. (personal communication, May 24, 2010)  
 
Generally, the Garinagu in Honduras do not sell their land because they are “poor.”  They sell 
their land because they are forced to do so or risk being murdered.  Reporter Gerry Volgenau 
lists a couple of cases.  A Garifuna man in Tela who was urging the Garinagu in the community 
not to sell their land was shot in October of 1996 and someone murdered a Garifuna leader from 
San Juan in Honduras’ capital, Tegucigalpa (Volgenau, 1998).  Today, Honduras ranks second 
after Brazil as having the highest number of “deaths of land and environmental defenders” 
(Global Witness 2013:11).  From 2003 to 2013, Honduras had 109 deaths and Brazil 448 (Global 
Witness 2013:11; see also “Honduras: UN official urges action to tackle chronic insecurity for 
lawyers, journalists,” 2012).  According to a table Global Witness prepared, there is an increase 
of deaths of land and environmental defenders in Honduras since the 2009 coup d'état.  
Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Guatemala have high death rates as well (Global Witness 
2013:10).  
The Garifuna middle class’ economic ambitions complicated OFRANEH and other 
Garinagu mobilization.  Several Garinagu interlocutors asserted that although ODECO is a black 
organization, its administrators “are blacks whose ideas are that of a privileged class within the 
Garifuna communities” (R. Contreras, personal communication, February 20, 2011).  Contreras 
refers to ODECO’s administrators’ complicity in the loss of the Garinagu’s land beginning in the 
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late 1990s and beyond.  From 1998 to 2000, Contreras served as INA’s regional director for the 
Atlantic coast area.  Tasked with granting communal titles to the Garifuna communities in 
volatile areas such as Tornabé, San Juan, and Triunfo de la Cruz, Contreras claims that he faced 
significant opposition from Casildo, who argued that the Garifuna people obtain individual land 
titles (personal communication, February 20, 2011).  
By awarding the Garifuna people individual land titles, the owners can sell their land or use 
it as collateral in a business transaction in the event that they need money “to travel to the United 
States” (R. Contreras, personal communication, February 20, 2011).  The Garinagu can only sell 
their communally owned land to another Garifuna member of the community.  Many Garifuna 
residents collected signatures in different communities to show that members of a particular 
community support individual landownership rather than communal.  Those who signed the 
petition meant they supported individual titles perhaps without understanding the implications of 
their actions.  Casildo and several Garifuna leaders mounted a struggle eventually leading to 
Contreras’s dismissal (R. Contreras, personal communication, February 20, 2011).  Contreras 
considers Casildo’s actions to be “the worse crime that ODECO could have committed against 
the Garifunas” (personal communication, February 20, 2011).  Yet, under Contreras’s leadership, 
Garifuna communities in Rio Esteban (Tibiniriba), Santa Fe (Giriga), Guadalupe, San Antonio 
(Márugurugu), Cusuna, Iriona, Rio Miel, Callos Venados, the Rosita, and Nueva Go, and 
Tornabé received communal titles, which the municipal government disregarded (R. Contreras, 
personal communication, February 20, 2011).  Casildo’s actions and of those of other Garinagu 
in Honduras speaks of their fragmentation under neoliberalism as their relationship with place is 
altered.  Under this economic system private property rights have “replaced communal 
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landholding in peasant and indigenous communities” (Chase 2002:2).  This is true in Honduras 
as it is the case throughout most Latin American countries.  
Casildo’s other activities have involved accompanying Honduran presidents to the 
Garifuna communities.  Dressed in a dashiki generally worn by the Garifuna drummers and 
black cultural nationalists globally, Casildo, former President Lobo Sosa, and his entourage 
attended the Garinagu’s commemoration of their 214 years’ presence in Honduras on April 12, 
2011.  Held in Bajamar, Puerto Cortés, one of the battlegrounds over land between the Garifuna 
people and the government, the Garifuna leaders from Travesia, Plaplaya, and several other 
communities attended the event. These leaders asked Lobo Sosa to have the roads repaired and to 
build a clinic for their communities (“Lobo emite decreto para mejorar calidad de vida de etnia 
garífuna,” 2011).  In response, he approved a Decree supporting “this ethnic group land tenure, 
development and cultural and education development” (“Lobo emite decreto para mejorar 
calidad de vida de etnia garífuna,” 2011).  Research did not reveal if the government carried out 
any projects in these Garifuna communities following the Decree.  What is evident is that Lobo 
Sosa’s promise in the presence of a “respected Garifuna” such as Casildo and his attendance to a 
Garifuna event neutralized the Garinagu.  Drawing from theorist, scholar, and co-founder of the 
Republic of New Afrika, Imari Abubakari Obadele’s analysis of black leadership in the United 
States, it was clear that some Garifuna leaders “almost always profit from [their] subservience” 
and they are “motivated by a conviction that there is no other course” (1968:37).  Casildo 
continues to play the role of subservience.   
The subservience of some Garifuna leaders has posed a problem because it has transformed 
how they view place.  The Garinagu’s practices and relationship with the land are therefore 
riddled with contradictions.  Some inhabitants view their relationship with the land as a cultural 
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identity but concurrently many view it as a commodity rather than a means to empowering the 
Garifuna people.  For example, some Garinagu believe that establishing assembly plants in 
Garifuna communities is the correct path to follow.  Assembly plants entered the Honduran 
economy as part of the package put together by neoliberalists in the 1980s connected to the 
Export Processing Zones (EPZs).  It is in these zones where “manufacturing firms operate tax-
free” (Kerssen 201Pal3:24).  Tanya M. Kerssen states that in 2003 “only 17 percent of garment 
workers were employed by Honduran firms; the largest employers were US companies (53 
percent) followed by South Korean companies (15 percent)” (2013:24).  Honduran elites such as 
Mario Canahuati partook in the spoils.  He is Lovable Group’s director that “owns four EPZs 
that manufacture products for Costco, Hanes, Russell Athletic, Footlocker, JC Penny and Sara 
Lee” (Kerssen 2013:24).  I learned in 2006 that many Garinagu work in these assembly plant 
industries.  Yet, many Garifuna middle class in Honduras and in the United States welcome 
assembly plants. 
The reason for welcoming assembly plant industries is that members of the Garifuna 
middle class sees these “floating prisons” as empowering the Garifuna people educationally and 
economically (Adams cited by Richardson 2001:73).  In the United States, longtime land activist 
Efrain Escobar states, “if a maquiladora comes to our community, what I say is welcome.  What 
we see is that our children educate themselves to come to work in the maquiladora.  I think it is 
an advancement and development for our community.  I see it in a positive way” (personal 
communication, June 7, 2010).  Roberto Contreras, another longtime land activist, also shares 
Escobar’s perspective.  What is more disturbing about Escobar’s statement as I also found 
among several Garinagu interviewed residing in Honduras and in the United States is that most 
of them or a family member own a piece of land in Honduras, have been or are actively involved 
265 
 
in the defense of the land, and speak of land as being Garifuna identity.  Yet, their capitalist 
outlook raises questions about how much they value the land when the survival of what they 
generally refer to as “Garifuna identity” is contingent upon having land.  Under capitalism, the 
Garinagu’s interaction with the physical environment has been transformed because the Garifuna 
middle class have adopted the very same perspective capitalists use. 
Contrary to Contreras and Escobar, ODECO’s Casildo has been consistent with his 
practices since he became a professional career activist through the formation of ODECO.  
ODECO’s flyer advertising the Garifuna and Afrocaribbean Culture Great Carnival certainly 
resonates with Ávila’s New Horizon Investment Club approach in the United States.  An e-mail 
Casildo circulated in Garifunalink listserv together with an attached flyer reads “Garifuna and 
Afrocaribbean Culture Great Carnival, guifity, flavor, love, candidness, and sweat” (personal 
communication, April 21, 2010).  In La Ceiba, Casildo seems to be one of the main overseers of 
the Honduran state and elites’ interests.  He facilitates these groups’ national economic policies.  
In so doing, Casildo supports the very same government that assaults the Garifuna people 
whenever they appropriate the public sphere to protest oppression and domination.  However, 
this same government allows the Garifuna people to appropriate the public sphere once a year 
during the Garifuna’s ancestral celebration in April 12 only to form part of the spectacle of 
consumption.  The reason why the Honduran government pushes them from their land is so that 
the Garifuna people can become the objects of attraction and entertainment as the brochure 
indicates, “Honduras . . . es Caribe!” or Honduras is the Caribbean (figure 7.5).  
Casildo thus assists in facilitating the building of “‘consumption of space’” as evident with 
the expansion of tourism (Gottdiener 1993:133).  As sociologist Mark Gottdiener explains, 
tourism is “‘when people seek a qualitative space – sun, snow, the sea; when capitalism  
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                                                Figure 7.5 Travel Brochure  
                                                         Source: Honduras, 2006 
transforms the  circulation of commodities for people into the circulation of people through 
commodified places’” (1993:133).  Besides the commodification of nature, we must also 
incorporate the commodification of the body and culture.  In this case, I am referring to the 
Garifuna’s body as an “‘absent presence’” (Longhurst 2009:430).  It is absent as a human being  
but present as an object of tourists’ gaze.  In this manner, the absent and present “reveals that 
although the body seems present, in fact, it functions . . . as Other to the mind . . .” and sight 
(Longhurst 2009:430).  It is this otherness that disembodied the Garifuna people as human 
beings, but re-positions them and their culture as objects.  In essence, the commodification of 
place, nature, people, and culture is “the commodification of everything” (Harvey 2005:165). 
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The Garinagu’s history under colonialism has been valued thereby generating a thorny nexus 
between culture, economy, and politics. 
  Contrary to the perspectives and positions of the Garifuna middle class in Honduras, the 
Garifuna middle class in the United States economic practices also include the Honduras’ north 
coast.   In a Garifuna documentary, Historia de Sambo Creek, Augusto Suazo, a resident of 
Sambo Creek states that as part of Ávila’s economic plan, “in 1990 Francisco Ávila founded a 
hotel” in Sambo Creek (“Historia de Sambo Creek,” n.d.).  Building hotels seemingly left the 
community wanting more.  Suazo proclaims that Sambo Creek needs more hotels to 
accommodate the growing number of tourists visiting this community (“Historia de Sambo 
Creek,” n.d.).  Besides building hotels, members of the Garifuna middle class also became 
involved in The Micos Beach Project “negotiations.”  Their involvement in the “negotiations” 
was for the Garifuna investors to become shareholders in the project, but also served as a bridge 
between the Garifuna residents in Honduras and those in the United States.   
 In October 2004, New Horizon Investment Club’s president, José Francisco Ávila, sent a 
letter to Thierry de Pierrefeu then Secretary of Tourism for Honduras under President Maduro 
Joest.  In the letter, Ávila congratulates President Maduro Joest for his trip to the Dominican 
Republic where he sought to finalize investment for the Tela Bay project (J. Ávila, 2004).                                                                                            
 Ávila also informs Pierrefeu of New Horizon’s shareholders interest in forming a partnership in 
the Projecto de Turismo Costero Sostenible, Sustainable Coastal Tourism Project (PTCS) 
“contracted through credit agreement number 3558-HO on 22 November 2001 with the World 
Bank and the Programa Nacional de Turismo Sostenible [National Program for Sustainable 
Tourism]” (J. Ávila, 2004).  PTCS is a master plan for multiple tourism projects along the north 
coast of Honduras that includes Los Micos Beach and Golf Resort.  Named after the Micos 
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Lagoon, this is an area belonging to the Garifuna communities of Tornabé, Miami, and San Juan 
in the municipality of Tela, Departamento of Atlántida.  
On August 22, 2005, the Patronatos from the communities of Tornabé and Miami met at 
the Honduran Institute of Tourism office.  Ávila was present at this meeting not as “an investor 
rather as a [pro bono] financial advisor” (J. Ávila, personal communication, July 6, 2012).  A 
letter of intent “confirms the intention of the Honduran Institute of selling 190.00 shares of stock 
in DTBT [Tela Bay Tourism Development, Inc.] for $1,000,000” (J. Ávila & T. Ávila 2008: 
121).  Quoting himself, Ávila states, “the signing of this agreement is a historical milestone 
which marks the first day of a shinning future for the Honduran Garifuna community . . .” (2008: 
121 emphasis in original).  On November 25, 2005, the Garifuna investors became shareholders 
of 7 percent of Tela Bay Tourism Development.  The stock Option Contract would provide 
Garinagu investors with a “five year period (2006-2010) to exercise the purchase of the stock” (J. 
Ávila & T. Ávila 2008: 123).   
For the Ávilas, “the economic social formation of the Garifuna communities can be 
classified as a capitalist subworld due to the low development of its productive forces which 
results in the presence of non-capitalist production forms and circulation” (2008:123).  The term 
subworld signifies not only the Ávilas’ lack of knowledge about the impact of capitalism on 
society but also the denigration of the Garifuna people.  As cited by the Ávila brothers, less than 
a month after the tourism negotiations began, Casildo issued a press release dated September 7, 
2004 which states that the “government of Honduras granted Definitive Property Title to the 
Garifuna community of Miami in the municipality of Tela, Departamento of Atlántida in the 
amount of 24 hectares, 98 areas, 80.01 square meters” (2008:124).  José Francisco Ávila formed 
a strategic partnership with the National Garifuna Tourism Chamber (Cámara Nacional de 
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Tourismo Garifuna, CAMANTUG).  Again, as cited by the Ávilas OFRANEH’s Gregoria Flores 
and Amilcar Colón denounced Thierry Pierrifeu’s tourism plan and the Garifuna activists as a 
whole involved in the negotiations stating that they believed that the project would only benefit 
foreign investors not the Garifuna people and labeled the participation of the Garifuna people as 
a “betrayal” (2008:123).  As stated by the Ávilas, Casildo supported the economic endeavor as 
long as “it includes the Garifuna communities as an integral part of the development process” 
(2008:125).  Apparently, after some skirmish between José Francisco Ávila and Casildo in 
Honduras for control over the tourism partnership, Ávila left the 7 percent agreement in 
Casildo’s hands to this day with the understanding that the funds would be allocated to a trust 
fund and used for the education of the Garifuna youths (J. Ávila, personal communication, June 
8, 2009).  
Other Garinagu observers differ with Ávila’s narrative.  Roberto Contreras contends that 
Ávila only negotiated 5 percent with the government (personal communication, February 20, 
2011).  He also claims that Ávila never delineated the fine details with regard to the Garifuna’s 
shareholding benefits that the Garifuna investors would receive, but the Honduran government 
suggested hiring locals, although that, too, never materialized (R. Contreras, personal 
communication, February 20, 2011).  Benitez, a member of New Horizon Investment Club, 
however, decries such statement.  She states that New Horizon’s aim was to organize 
“workshops [for the Garifuna people] so that they can organize as micro-enterprises so that they 
are prepared when [the tourism project] takes place” (F. Benitez, personal communication, May 
25, 2010).  Instead of going along with New Horizon’s plans, Benitez states, the Garifuna people 
in their respective communities in Honduras and their relatives in the United States decried New 
Horizon’s proposal. 
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For Benitez, the rejection of the plan by the Garifuna people was simply disastrous.  
Therefore, she nonchalantly forecasts that the Garifuna people will be displaced from their 
communities because “we Garifuna do not have sufficient capital to compete with these big 
companies and we want and need investment in Honduras, but the government will do that” 
(personal communication, May 25, 2010).  In Benitez’s view, because the Garifuna people lack 
capital, they also lack power.  The Garifuna people can only find power in money not in a social 
movement fostered by their collective consciousness.  Her vantage point suggests a very elitist’s 
perspective.  Benitez’s discourse is suggestive of ideas that seem to be hierarchally diffusing 
from the Garifuna middle class in the United States as evident with their shareholding meeting 
with Pierrifeu.  
Among the Garifuna middle class living in the United States, Mario Moran believes that  
“unless we [Garinagu] got involve in educating our people about land and tourism and so forth, 
what I foresaw was that we were going to basically be eventually relocated from the places of 
residence which were the Garifuna communities” (personal communication, June 8, 2009).  He 
also endorses the idea that “the value of the land is actually based on its use” (personal 
communication, May 25, 2010).  In other words, it is only when land yields capital that the 
Garifuna middle class must appreciate its importance.  Endorsement of the Honduran 
government’s schemes by members of the Garifuna middle class shows complete disregard for 
their impacts: environmental degradation, commodification of nature, land usurpation, and 
violence.  Their actions also contradict the Garifuna people’s motto that the Honduras’ north 
coast defines their cultural identity.  As Roberto Contreras states about the identity of the 
Garinagu settled on the Caribbean coast during the colonial era, there is that “linkage of the 
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human being to the land, sea, river, and lagoon.  This is where the spirit is, that ancestral 
identity” (personal communication, February 20, 2011). 
Today, some Garifuna middle class speaks of the Garifuna people’s “rich history and deep 
culture” (field note, May 29, 2010).  The Garifuna people “are strong” because “we walked from 
Trujillo to Tegucigalpa to secure documents for our land” (field note, May 29, 2010).  Hostess 
Luz Solis articulated these words during a tribute to legendary Garifuna songwriter and singer, 
Marcelino Fernandez, who is also known as “Don Marasa.”  What Solis’ words represent is that 
the Garinagu must remember their land struggle in Honduras as a symbolic effort and part of 
their collective identity and memory signifying historical strength.  What is central in their 
discourse is culture; a landless culture.  In the meantime, the Garifuna children on the north coast 
beaches of Honduras have learned to say “‘give me money’ in English” something they never 
did before (Volgenau, 1998). 
The Garifuna middle class aligns its political and economic discourse with its 
preoccupation with social mobility preventing it from seeing the political economy of place and 
oppression.  Its blindness plays a role in the devastation of the vast majority of the Garifuna 
communities along the north coast as Garifuna men and women and young and old rely more and 
more on tourism for their survival.  Thus, the reproduction of place that Massey speaks about has 
changed the relationships of the Garifuna people with the land in Honduras and in the United 
States.  How they see the land complicates the efforts of pressure groups such as OFRANEH. 
Cultural Commodification, Gender, and Migration 
In the end, the Garifuna people in Honduras did not emerge victorious from Ávila’s 
tourism negotiations some Garinagu claim.  There were only two winners according to 
Contreras.  The corporations secured the Garinagu’s land on Honduras’ north coast to build 
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hotels.  The other winner was Casildo.   The Honduran government “partially” financed the 
construction of Casildo’s Satuye Cultural Center in La Ceiba (R. Contreras, personal 
communication, February 20, 2011).  In the meantime, capitalists exploit the Garifuna’s culture, 
women, and force other Garinagu to migrate to the United States.  Many Garifuna men, 
Contreras states are “only used to grab the drum and beat those drums and dance” (personal 
communication, February 20, 2011).  In the Bay Islands, white middle class tourists exiting and 
boarding their cruise ship fix their gaze on these so-called exotic tribes, beating their drums.  A 
tourist Yolanda Lippens’ video shows Garifuna men and women dancing at the Roatán Bay pier 
on May 14, 2008 while the cruise ship docks.  Once docked a white couple takes picture with the 
Garifuna dancers who “welcomed” them (Lippens, 2011).  The rest of the video shows the 
tourists visiting Garifuna communities.  The Garifuna dancers perform the wanaragua (a 
traditional Garifuna dance) inside of a thatch house with cement floors and no windows.  In 
reviewing several tourism brochures and vacation guides I collected throughout the course of my 
research fieldwork in Honduras in 2006, I found the Garifuna’s culture present in most pages.  
One source advertises wanaragua as “The Garifuna Experience” (Honduras 2006:30).  The 
commodification of the Garifuna’s culture is one of the main reasons why the Honduran 
government and local oligarchs dispossess the Garifuna people from their land.                                                                                                                                                           
In other instances, as I learned in conversation with other Garinagu in 2006, some Garinagu 
performed at mulatos’ owned establishments in exchange for tips not for a fee.  The Garifuna 
women braid tourists’ hair.  Foreign-owned hotels want Garifuna women to sell them their 
coconut bread.  Some Garinagu women have refused to do so.  In other cases, some Garifuna 
families invite tourists to reside with them for a fee.  This is happening in the Garifuna 
community of Rio Esteban.  Judging from how tourism impacts the Garifuna communities, it is 
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important to ask: is this what Moran means using the Garifuna’s culture for tourism?  If so, then 
tourism has been effective in bringing development, modernity, and much more to the 
communities, including prostitution, which I include in my discussion of women’s exploitation 
and oppression.   
Contreras states that “our girls, well, those . . . that life gave them beauty, well, they are 
only good to be female companions when the big tourists come around with their money” 
(personal communication, February 20, 2011).  The Garifuna women serve as companions 
mostly, but not exclusively, to European males and their descendants looking for a so-called 
exotic tribe to make their dreams in the vernacular region they call the Caribbean paradise 
becomes a reality.  These women’s so-called exoticism and tropical accent dazzled the senses of 
these noble men of means.  The Garifuna and mulato men of “means” in Honduras and those 
visiting from the United States also take pleasure in these women’s bodies.  
Women’s bodies are given a value, particularly when their bodies are seen “by the eye and 
by the phallus” (Lefebvre 1991:302).  The commodification of their bodies signals the 
continuous project of the “capitalist patriarchal” system (hooks 2000:104; 1984:38).  Under this 
system, women are simply seen as the object of consumption and as consumers.   Drawing from 
hooks’ analysis of “gangsta culture” in addressing sexism and misogyny, she states that the 
“sexist, misogynist, patriarchal ways of thinking and behaving that are glorified in gangsta rap 
are a reflection of the prevailing values in our society, values created and sustained by white 
supremacist capitalist patriarchy” (1994:116).  Gangsta rap also “celebrates the world of the 
material, the dog-eat-dog world where you do what you gotta do to make it . . .” (hooks 
1994:117).  Hooks therefore advises that we must critique the “politics of hedonistic 
consumerism, the values of the men and women who produce gangsta rap” (1994:117).  In 
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Robyn Dowling’s case study of retail practices, she argues that “the role of consumers is 
constructed as a feminine one, images of feminity reconstituted by advertising are important in 
maintaining an objectified feminity, and commodities . . .” (1993:295).  Under capitalism, this 
construction indicates that women’s mobility is “troubling to the patriarchal gaze” (Massey 
2004:11).  As such, they must be subdued through rigorous commodification and consumption.  
So, the Garifuna women are doing what they gotta do to make it in the dog-eat-dog world 
because the capitalist patriarchy society tells them that their external beauty is the only thing that 
defines their humanity.     
 In applying hooks’, Massey’s, and Dowling’s analysis to the Garifuna women’s 
oppression and domination, we must not only defy the very system that created and safeguard 
this cultural practices, but also critique the Garifuna people’s silence on women’s oppression and 
domination.  This is evident in every aspect of the Garinagu’s life.  Speaking of the Garinagu’s 
early 1990s land struggle in Limón, veteran activist Isidro Chávez declared that although women 
were involved in the movement, they were there “only to make company” (personal 
communication, April 24, 2010).  His statement suggests that the struggle against oppression and 
domination is a male domain, although in drawing from hooks’ analysis of black males in the 
United States, black males in Honduras are “utterly disenfranchised in almost every area of life” 
(1994:110) .  Second, his perspective supports the notion that black people must only struggle 
against external forms of oppression and domination but it does not constitute undertaking these 
same forces existing within the Garifuna society connected to and in many ways produced and 
safeguarded by the very same racist patriarchal capitalist system they try to defy.    
Statements such as Chávez’s prevent the Garifuna people from even whispering women’s 
exploitation.  Instead, what dominates their discourse, as it is the case in Honduran society, is 
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that women must be virtuous whereas men are genetically predisposed to see women mostly as 
objects of their advances.  Or, as Anastasia Pascual declares “el hombre pertenece al mundo,” 
the man belongs to the world (personal communication, February 11, 2013).  In other words, 
men have free range to do what they want because it is in their nature or the world is theirs.  I 
draw from hooks’ analysis about how other groups view feminism to explore why Garifuna 
people do not speak out more forcefully about women’s oppression and domination.  She states 
that  
many women [and men] are reluctant to advocate feminism because they are 
uncertain about the meaning of the term.  Other women from exploited and 
oppressed ethnic groups dismiss the term because they do not wish to be 
perceived as supporting a racist movement; feminism is often equated with 
white women’s rights effort.  Large numbers of women see feminism as 
synonymous with lesbianism; their homophobia leads them to reject 
association with any group identified as pro-lesbian.  Some women [and men] 
fear the word ‘feminism’ because they shun identification with any political 
movement. (1984:23)  
 
Indeed, feminism is generally associated with whites.  Other cultures might perceive embracing 
the feminist movement to be a threat to the capitalist patriarchy system.  Among the Garifuna 
leaders  and the Honduran society in general questioning women’s oppression means challenging 
the very same system that some whites, blacks, indigenous, and other groups (men and women) 
in the United States and elsewhere in the world defy.  In addition, it would mean questioning 
their own positionality as men since the capitalist patriarchy system determines men’s 
positionality according to ethnicity and wealth.  Therefore, compromising their positionality is 
one path that most men in general are not willing to take, if they were to challenge women’s 
oppression and domination.  In saying this, I am not implying that dismantling the patriarchy 
system is not achievable.  It is attainable and some Garifuna women challenge black women’s 
oppression.   
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Founded by black women in 1994 and headquartered in Tegucigalpa, Link of Black Women 
of Honduras (Enlace de Mujeres Negras de Honduras, ENMUNEH), is concerned with black 
women’s well-being.  Among some of its objectives is to improve black women’s “social, 
economic, and cultural condition” and “revalorize black women’s image” (Enlace de Mujeres 
Negras de Honduras, n.d).  Although ENMUNEH does not spell out women’s oppression in its 
brochure, the organization addresses gender inequality.  However, it should also link this 
oppression to the patriarchal system.  To do so does not require transforming the “meaning” of 
power a reference hooks makes in her critique to radical feminists and bourgeois white women 
who sought to “obtain power in the terms set by the existing social structure as a necessary 
prerequisite for successful feminist struggle” (1984:83-85); it simply means women adopting a 
new value system that also integrate poor women.  The Garifuna organizations must integrate 
such approach in its agenda just like OFRANEH integrates racism into the Garifuna people’s 
land struggle.  Second, the Garifuna writers and leaders must address cultural judgment.  
Whenever the Garifuna women’s status is questioned outside of their communities, observations 
are riddled with cultural judgments.  Citing Nancie González, Euraque states that the Garifuna 
population increased in the 1920s because of “Garifuna fecundity” (Euraque 2003:241).  Such a 
cultural judgment suggests that the Garifuna female sexuality is a cultural trait that put her on 
position of power or advantage even to the point of rescuing the demise of her community.  
Lastly, I turn to the recent surge of the Garifuna migration to the United States in 
addressing their dispossession from their land on Honduras’ north coast.  Alongside thousands of 
immigrants from Central America, namely El Salvador and Guatemala, across different ethnic 
groups, the Garifuna adults have been crossing the Mexico-United States border.  The difference 
in their recent migration is that Garinagu adults are also traveling with their “toddlers” (Garsd, 
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2014).  The Garifuna children have joined the “47,000 unaccompanied” and accompanied minors 
from Central America crossing the border (Frank, 2014).  The Garifuna children and adults are 
also part of a larger migration of people from peripheral to core countries.  This movement 
includes people from the African continent crossing the Mediterranean Sea to reach Europe, 
Europeans, namely from Eastern Europe, migrating to Western Europe and to the United States, 
Asians, Arabs, and Haitians trying to reach the United States by undertaking dangerous journeys 
to escape poverty, violence including domestic violence, political instability and persecution 
which all results from geopolitics and national and global economic forces (Kassam 2014; 
“Haitian migrants killed as boat capsized,” 2013).  Citing human rights activist Ruben Figueroa 
from Shelter 72 (Albergue 72) which houses immigrants in Tenosique near the Guatemalan 
border, Jasmin Garsd writes that the shelter’s employees have seen “an increase of Garifuna 
women and children.  A year ago, we’d get maybe two Garifuna migrants in our shelter every 
day.  This year, we’re getting 10 or 15 Garifuna every day” (2014).  The number of Garinagu 
[migrants] riding the trains has also increased.  Figueroa states, “you used to see maybe 15 
Garifuna riding on top of the trains. Now you see 50 or 60 Garifuna, many families, young 
women with children on any given day” (Garsd, 2014).   
Nicknamed the Beast, the trains are a network of “freight trains that runs the length of 
Mexico, from its southernmost border with Guatemala north to the United States,” (Sayre, 2014).  
Operated by Ferrosur and Kansas City Southern de Mexico, the trains transport not only “grain, 
corn or scrap metal” but also hundreds of undocumented immigrants mostly riding on the roofs 
of its cars (Sayre, 2014; Villegas, 2014).  In response to the surge of Garifuna adults and children 
migrating to the United States, OFRANEH sent a letter to Democrat Senator Barbara Mikulski 
from Maryland addressing this crisis and linking the Garinagu’s exodus to their displacement 
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from their land (M. Miranda, personal communication, June 12, 2014).  ODECO’s coordinator, 
Edwin Alvárez, attributes the mass movement of Garinagu migrating to United States to the 
Garinagu communities becoming “key corridors for drug traffickers” (Garsd, 2014).  Indeed, as I 
learned during my 2006 research, in recent years drug traffickers began using many Garifuna 
communities to transport their cargo abroad.  Drug trafficking is not a recent development in 
Honduras.  It is an old practice among Honduran elites and politicians as I pointed out elsewhere 
in this dissertation.  Yet, during the Cold War, the United States government did not initially 
show interest in pursuing its so-called war on drugs policy.  Senior Associate at the Washington 
Office on Latin America, Coletta Youngers states that although the United States government 
was initially reluctant to embrace a war on drugs because it diverted resources from the military,  
once the USSR was no longer a competitor, the United States government needed to maintain 
hegemony in the region (2000:6).  Thus, the “U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) latched 
onto the drug war” (Youngers 2000:16).  However, much more developed out of the United 
States latching out to the drug war policy.   
A series of articles written by Gary Webb (1955-2004) in 1996, an investigative journalist 
and staff writer for the San Jose Mercury News, exposed the relationship between the CIA and 
its backed guerrilla army, the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (Fuerza Democratic Nicaraguense, 
FDN), the “largest” group comprising the group named the Contra (Against) (Webb, 1996; see 
also Kornbluh 2004:421).   According to Peter Kornbluh, author and director of the National 
Security Archive’s Chile Documentation Project, Pentagon documents show “a contra operation 
in Honduras called ‘Condor’ that was unrelated to Chile’s Operation Condor” (2004:478).  
Indeed, historian Thomas M. Leonard states that the “Contra troops and supporters” used 
Honduras’ southern Departamentos such as Olancho and El Paraíso as their base and 
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Tegucigalpa, the country’s capital, as their administrative office for hosting their “foreign 
visitors and as a propaganda distribution center” (2011:160).  With the United States government 
support, the Contras sought to overthrow The Sandinista National Liberation Front (Frente 
Sandinista de Liberación Nacional, FSLN) government in Nicaragua in the 1980s (Webb, 1996).  
As I stated in chapter four, the Sandinista ousted the United States-backed dictator Somoza 
Debayle in 1979.  Webb’s article also shows that to supply the Contras with arms, under the 
watchful eyes of the CIA, some FDN members introduced cocaine into African American 
communities in the San Francisco Bay area in the 1980s and used the proceeds to secure the 
weapons (Webb, 1996).  Although what I just discussed relates to Nicaragua, it is also directly 
tied to Honduras because the Contras in alliance with the United States government used some 
places in Honduras as their base.  I share this information to show that the source of Honduras’ 
contemporary drug crisis is, in part, a result of the U.S. government’s drug war policy in the 
region and a grip on its backyard. 
Historian Dana Frank gives two reasons for Honduran mass migration.  First, the rampant 
criminal practices of the post 2009 coup d’état government, and second the United States 
government’s support of the country’s politics (2014).  Frank also factors in privatization and 
globalization and the United States government’s historical control over its backyard.  While 
gangs in Honduras are responsible for their share of the violence in the country, Frank states that 
the real “dangerous gang is the Honduran government” and the United States funding (2014).  
The violence in the country is reflected in the number of homicides committed.  According to the 
United Nations Drug and Crime 2000-2012 report, Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala have 
high homicide rates, although Mexico has the highest with 10,737 per 100,000 in 2000 and 
26,037 per 100,000 in 2012 (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2012).  The number of 
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homicides highlighted in table 7.6 shows the insecurity from which thousands of Honduran, 
Salvadoran, and Guatemalan are trying to escape.  Other factors afflicting the Honduran masses 
are unemployment and poverty.  As of 2010, 67 percent of Hondurans lived in poverty.  Between 
2006 and 2009, poverty rate decreased by 7.7 percent.  However, between 2010 and 2012, the 
poverty rate increased by 13.2 percent (United Nations ECLAC 2012:14; Johnston and Lefebvre 
2013:1).  The wide spread corruption in Honduras continues to find fertile ground because the 
various government institutions, such as the police force works “closely with drug traffickers and 
organized crime” (Frank, 2014).   
        Table 7.6 Selected Countries in Central America with High  
                        Homicide Counts between 2000 and 2012 
         Prepared by: Doris Garcia 
         Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2012 
 
  Country 2000 2005 2009 2010 2012 
Honduras 3,176 3,212 5,280 6,236 7,172 
Guatemala 2,904 5,338 6,498 5,960 6,025 
El Salvador 2,341 3,778 4,382 3,987 2,594 
 
                         
A handful of Garifuna people became involved in drug trafficking fairly recently.  Thus, the 
Garifuna leaders  from OFRANEH, just like their Miskitos counterparts, are not only engaged in 
relentless land struggle, but also face the wrath of violence that accompanies the surge of drug 
trafficking.  In fact, several members of OFRANEH, including its coordinator Miriam Miranda, 
were briefly “attacked and kidnapped by heavily armed men” on July 17, 2014 in the Garifuna 
territory of Vallecito (Trucchi, 2014).  Yet, although drug trafficking is a major problem 
throughout much of Latin America and the Caribbean, in Honduras the Garifuna’s landlessness 
is at the heart of their fragmentation, and as Miranda points out in her letter to U.S. Senator 
Mikulski, is also a major contributor.  The Garifuna’s landlessness is, therefore, undoubtedly the 
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root cause of their migration, which results from the efforts of a violent government and local 
oligarchs, and global economic forces. 
Conclusion 
The Garinagu residing in the United States who are economically and politically 
marginalized, are more concerned with seeking economic and political integration in the U.S. 
and are disengaged from the land struggle in Honduras.  These Garifuna people believe that 
forming a partnership with the tourism projects in Honduras would change the Garifuna people’s 
situation from a landless society to integral members of the Honduran society.  The actions of 
those Garinagu who believe in forming a partnership with the tourism industry can only be 
described as opportunists masquerading as aligned with fellow Garifuna. 
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CHAPTER 8 
DISCUSSION 
  As I stated at the onset of this project, I have been preoccupied with the Garinagu’s social 
and structural fragmentation prior to pursuing my doctorate degree.  This has not been just 
another preoccupation.  This has been a preoccupation informed by my everyday experiences 
and of those around me.  Helping me to defy these experiences was my exposure to the works of 
critical thinkers across ethnic lines and gender.  However, the influence of black political 
activists’ ideas of justice and equality in the United States some of whom I feature in this 
dissertation also assisted me in defying my everyday experiences.  Malcolm X, for instance, did 
not sanitize the brutality of white supremacy in the United States; he spoke with bluntness about 
the lives of black people and other groups living under oppression and domination in the United 
States and internationally.  He also provided a platform for oppressed groups to use to overthrow 
oppression and domination.  For example, he spoke about the importance of land in empowering 
people and challenging spatial barriers imposed by the dominant culture.  Malcolm X’s 
ideologies, similar to many other men and women in the struggle, demonstrated the 
contradictions that define human relations.   
  Precisely the contradictions articulated by Malcolm X and by many other critical thinkers 
that inspired me to ask in this project: how has the Honduran government’s ideology of 
economic development and the global economic forces fragmented the Garifuna people?  The 
term fragmentation appealed to me because the Garifuna people, similar to other societies, 
emerged from the process of colonialism and capitalism in the Lesser Antilles in the Caribbean 
and then exiled to Honduras.  They also face similar challenges as other groups such as land 
dispossession and cultural commodification.  I situate these challenges within the global 
economic forces.  To chart the contradictions created by the Honduran government and the elite-
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led socio-economic reproduction of Honduras’ north coast together with the global economic 
forces, I employed a critical approach using three geographical concepts: place, race, and the 
politics of identity.   
  Using the concept of place, I learned about the complexity of place in determining and in 
shaping human relations and activities and human-environmental interaction.  In the case of the 
Garinagu, place has shaped their identity and cultural practices.  However, the global economic 
forces, such as the banana industry, capitalists from the United States developed in the late 
nineteenth century in many parts of Central America in alliance with each respective government 
in the region, led to the formation of different social relations among Garinagu.  In response, the 
Garifuna leaders began to mobilize and form organizations, which they continue to do today.  In 
addition, the Garifuna people’s migration to the United States after World War II changed their 
society from a group bonded to the land to a fragmented culture along class line.  The Garifuna 
people’s recent mass migration from Honduras to the United States required additional research 
for one reason.  The Garifuna people are not just escaping violence; they are more importantly 
escaping land dispossession.  Their land dispossession sets them apart from their mestizo or 
English speaking counterparts because their activities (e.g. cultural, social, political, and 
economic) derive from their human-environmental interaction.  As capitalists altered the 
demands of the global economy, the Garifuna people face eminent threats in safeguarding their 
territory and protecting their ways of lives on Honduras’ north coast.  Threats to their territory 
and communities began to take shape in the 1970s as the Honduran government conceived an 
economic scheme to expand tourism to the north coast.  The government tourism plans began to 
materialize in the 1980s and expanded in the late 1990s with the gutting of Article 107 of the 
Honduran Constitution and the implementation of a host of other laws the nation’s presidents and 
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the National Congress approved.  Since then, the Garifuna activists have been battling the local 
government using different resources in defense of their place.  
  The fragmentation of the Garifuna people has been most visible in each group’s political 
perspectives about place.  The Garifuna middle class and career activists in the United States and 
those closely affiliated with the Honduran government in Honduras, for instance, are not bonded 
to the land or struggle for the defense of place.  They have come to see the north coast and the 
Garifuna’s culture namely through the lens of domestic and foreign developers – simply as a 
commodity.  Adherences to the commodification of the Garifuna’s culture and place have 
generated conflict among the Garifuna leaders – between those who struggle to preserve the 
Garifuna’s territory and communities on Honduras’ north coast and those who favor the local 
governments and oligarchs’ economic schemes.  The conflicts that the production of the north 
coast has produced among the Garifuna leaders and the Garinagu in general have undoubtedly 
widened the door for the Honduran government, local elites, and foreign capitalists to 
appropriate the Garifuna people’s territory and culture.  Having said that does not mean that even 
if unity existed among the Garifuna leaders, the local government and elites and global economic 
forces would not have been equally brutal in their pursuit of the Garifuna people’s land and the 
commodification of their culture on Honduras’ north coast and area islands.  What I am saying is 
that the Garifuna leaders’ disunity and their response to the local and global economic forces was 
a contributing factor to the Garifuna’s land dispossession.  These are the economic and social 
processes that my work sought to deconstruct in this dissertation.  Deconstructing these 
processes, allows me to understand the fragmentation of the Garinagu’s culture and their 
communities on the Honduras’ north coast, their political, economy, and cultural practices in the 
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United States, and the global economic forces that have produced a new place and different 
social relation.      
  Through my examination of the processes here mentioned, I also understood that regardless 
of the brutality by which the Honduran government and oligarchs operate and accommodationist 
views some of the Garifuna leaders have adopted, some Garifuna activists and most of the 
Garifuna people in general remain willing to risk it all in the defense of place.  This 
demonstrates, as it has been the case among other societies struggling over place (e.g. 
decolonization in Africa, Palestine, and elsewhere), that the root of every oppressed group 
struggle and the oppression and domination unleashed by the dominant culture derive over 
resistance over place since human activities and practices formed in place.  Human activities are 
not geographical coordinates, which are imaginary.  For domination and struggle over place to 
occur, there must be a driving force.  This force resides in the economic system developed in a 
place whether locally conceived or globally interconnected or a combination of both.  In my 
view, these processes shape social relations.  The point therefore in the usage of the concept of 
place in my analysis of the Garinagu’s fragmentation in this dissertation has not been to 
romanticize place or to make their traditional cultural practices central in this project.  Other 
scholars have extensively covered the Garifuna people’s traditional cultural practices.   Instead, 
the intent was to provide a wider analytical perspective to contextualize the reproduction of place 
in relation to race and the politics of identity.                 
  The second geographical concept I discuss in this dissertation is race.  As I argue in this 
dissertation, race is a social construct with brutal implications.  First, it segments society.  The 
segmentation of society has inevitably fomented distrust among groups in seeing and 
understanding their socio-spatial conditions in ways that can be liberating.  The difficulty in 
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pursuing this path is that through ideologies and practices, the dominant culture has made race an 
integral part of society through its institutionalization, enforcing certain cultural practices, and 
constructing racial categories.  Most societies have therefore come to understand race to be a 
fundamental component of human formation, seeing one’s humanity, and defining social 
interaction.  Consequently, otherness has eclipsed cultural differences.  Second, because race has 
concealed cultural differences and one’s humanity, many members of a society have come to see 
and understand that the construction of race is not human made.  It is generally understood in this 
manner because it bears no significant impact on certain groups.  This is nowhere more apparent 
than between blacks and whites.  Most whites in the United States, regardless of socio-economic 
conditions, perceived themselves as a privileged group (Jensen 2005:115).  This is, of course, 
associated with the different stages of race and racial social segmentation developed by the 
dominant culture in the United States.  These stages include the colonial period, Reconstruction, 
and the Great Depression.  Dominating each period was the expansion of capitalism.  Through 
each period, black people responded to the brutality that accompanied each of these 
developments.   
  In Honduras, I trace the construction of race to five periods: the colonial period, the banana 
plantation economy, the economic and political marginalization of the already racist government 
and oligarchs during this period, the emergence of the mestizo intellectuals’ nationalism which 
was a response to the state’s racist discourse, and the maintenance of racism in contemporary 
Honduras society through a host of practices.  These groups’ reaction suggests that the global 
economic forces foment economic and class insecurity catapulting more rigorous forms of 
domination and oppression toward other groups.  The Garifuna leaders and the Garinagu in 
general have responded, as I have described in this dissertation, to domination and oppression 
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using the resources available to them, borrowing from other groups as evident with the Garifuna 
political activists from CONDECOGA emulating the Native Americans false sense of 
nationhood, borrowing from African American political activists, linking to institutions outside 
of Honduras, and embracing many other tactics.  Through these interconnections, most of the 
Garifuna leaders and organizations have been able to mount a fight.  However, their discourse on 
race in relation to their territory and communities on the north coast and their social interaction 
in Honduras and with other groups in the United States remain troubling.  The reason for this 
troubling racial discourse is that certain historical developments during and after the colonial era 
shaped their frame of reference but also equally important is because most are concerned with 
their presumed social mobility today.   
  Because prevailing racist practices in Honduras inform the Garifuna people’s frame of 
reference and the Honduran society as whole have not addressed racism in the same way black 
activists and scholars have done so in the United States, few of the Garifuna leaders associate 
their dispossession from their land and communities with racism.  Instead, most of the Garifuna 
leaders hold on to the illusion of inclusion.  In so doing, each group creates specific political 
perspectives that fit their narrative.  In addition, for most Garifuna people, being a patriotic 
Honduran becomes more important than challenging existing racist narratives.  Consequently, 
most Garifuna leaders have rarely paid attention to the contemporary racial discourse associated 
with Honduran politicians and Honduran society as a whole, perception of blackness, and the 
preservation of a presumed “white” Honduran society.  Instead, most Garinagu hold on to their 
frame of reference and adopt a new discourse as evident with those in the United States.  The 
Garifuna people’s spatial experiences deriving from global economic forces continue therefore to 
inform their understanding of race and shape the politics of their identity.   
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  The Garifuna people’s politics of identity has been influenced by a host of factors.  The 
European colonizers defined them as Black Caribs.  Simply put, the term Carib is an expression 
of the colonialists’ discourse just the same way the Caribbean is a conceived space.  Language 
therefore became a powerful tool that shaped the colonialists’ ideologies, although these 
ideologies were the reflection of European colonizers mindset rather than a being reality.  Under 
the Spaniards rule in Honduras, this group included the Garifuna people in their moreno and 
negro racial categories which I explain in chapter five.  Throughout the years and depending on 
geography, the Garifuna people’s identity has included indigenous, Afrohonduran, Hispanic, and 
Garifuna American.  The usage of each descriptor by the Garifuna people has been shaped by 
their politics and economic interests.  In Honduras, some Garifuna leaders adhere not only to 
Garifuna but equally to the indigenous descriptor in their attempt to defy oppression and 
domination and in their defense of place.  Yet, other Garifuna leaders embrace not only Garifuna 
but also Afrohonduran because they believe that it is their way of embracing their blackness.   
  As for the Garifuna leaders and most Garinagu in general, they have developed a penchant 
for Garifuna American.  For them, this descriptor signals inclusion into the United States 
cultural, economic, and political landscape.  It is therefore these interests that encourage them to 
embrace this new form of identity.  Other Garinagu believe that in using the Garifuna descriptor 
only, they set themselves apart as a unique ethnic group.  It also signals challenging the moreno 
and negro pejoratives in Honduras.  Their usage of Garifuna only is a response to defying 
otherness.  Using Garifuna also represents invoking their identity as each group does.  In 
reiterating the Garifuna people’s practices insofar as the politics of identity affirms Hall’s and 
Mitchell’s analysis that identity is constantly in flux.  Its fluidity is constituted by time and space 
and from ideologies and practices associated with capitalism.   
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  In using the geographical concepts presented in this dissertation and answering how the 
Garifuna people have been fragmented as a result of the Honduran government, local elites, and 
global economic forces, I strive to contribute two things to the existing scholarship about the 
Garifuna people.  First, cultural practices of domination and representation of the Garifuna 
people are couched in ideological, social, and political processes associated with capitalism.  For 
Lefebvre, for instance, practices of domination form because powerful actors “read and grasped” 
the landscape differently in comparison to other groups (1991:143).  This is what the Honduras’ 
north coast represents to the Honduran government and local oligarchs and foreign investors.  
For most Garifuna people, the landscape is imbued with meanings, history, and unrestricted 
access to resources.  Based on their discourse about Honduras’ north coast being their cultural 
identity, this is what the region represents to most Garinagu.  The physical landscape is thus 
interwoven in all manner of human conditions and social relations.  However, conflicting views 
exist among the Garifuna people.  The Garifuna middle class’s preoccupation with social 
mobility in Honduras and in the United States is more concerned with capitalizing from its 
adopted political perspectives.  These perspectives are embedded in the capitalist patriarchal 
system more so than in the Garifuna people’s cultural practices and values.   
  The Garifuna middle class’s activities have received little or no attention.  Instead, scholars 
have been most concerned with the Garifuna activities and the Garinagu people’s social 
networks in challenging spaces of oppression and domination.  While these assessments are 
important and contribute to our understanding of the Garinagu’s fragmentation, they have largely 
confined to presenting the Garifuna people as an oppressed and unique group that has maintained 
its culture in Central America.  Indeed, the Garifuna people are an oppressed group.  However, 
there must be a paradigm shift that addresses how spaces of oppression and domination the 
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Garifuna people straddled have fragmented them socially, economically, culturally, and 
politically.  As I have demonstrated in this dissertation, the Garifuna leaders and the Garinagu in 
general have responded to this fragmentation in different ways, most of which have been 
counterproductive in advancing their struggle.  Instead, most of their response is couched in 
defeatism, accommodationism, and the accumulation of tactics.  Saying this does not constitute 
that the Garifuna leaders and the Garinagu’s efforts throughout the years must not be recognized.  
My point is that the Garifuna leaders and the Garinagu as a whole must reevaluate their long-
term objectives that must include their vision and mission, where do they see themselves within 
and in relation to the Honduran society racist practices and violence, other societies 
diasporically, and how can they preserve their culture without commodifying it.  Malcolm X’s 
message might guide them.    
  In his The Ballot or the Bullet speech delivered at the Cory Methodist Church on April 3, 
1964, Malcolm X declared, “I’m not going to sit at your table and watch you eat, with nothing on 
my plate, and call myself a diner.  Sitting at the table doesn’t make you a diner, unless you eat 
some of what’s on that plate” (Breitman 1990:26).  In this masterful metaphor, Malcolm X maps 
tensions and conflicts in place by explicating the politics of place and hegemonic spatial 
practices.  Place, race, identities, and land remain central in the diasporical struggle of black 
people.  Malcolm X’s timeless analogy is indeed befitting in understanding the Garinagu’s socio-
spatial conditions in Honduras and in the United States.  The reason for this understanding is 
because regardless of the Garinagu’s presumed indigenous status in Honduras, social mobility in 
Honduras and in the United States, they straddle geographies of oppression.  
  Second, the representation of the Garifuna people during colonialism, by most scholars and 
writers including the Garinagu, and by the dominant culture in Honduras has been dominated by 
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a Eurocentric narrative.  In this project, I sought to reassess this narrative by critiquing the 
colonial master-narrative, which has gone unchallenged by scholars and by offering a new 
narrative that speaks of the Garinagu’s agency.  In not challenging scholarship generated about 
the Garinagu, their self-perception and their relation to place have been greatly shaped by the 
master-narrative.  This understanding has certainly influence their discourse about contemporary 
racial narratives in contemporary Honduran society.  This is evident in spaces of consumption 
and exclusion from place.  The dominant culture in Honduras and in other societies has 
constructed blackness to be something worth to continue exploiting and confine to a denigrating 
category.  This exploitation is represented in the commodification of the Garinagu’s culture but 
also of their bodies.  The Garinagu do not equate this representation with the oppression of 
women and the new social relation the Honduran government and local elites are developing on 
the Honduras’ north coast.  What most Garinagu see, including the oppressed women, is the 
presumed material reward offered under this patriarchal capitalist system.  I hope my analysis of 
the processes addressed in this project answered the question I set-out to answer.   
In the end, I learned that critical cultural geography and ethnography help to explain 
relations between “structure, agency and geographic context” and also guide researchers in 
uncovering the “processes and meanings that undergird sociospatial life” (Herbert 2000:550 
emphasis in original).  In this context, I uncovered not only the fragmentation of the Garifuna 
society but also came out with the understanding that this fragmentation is grounded in global 
economic forces. These forces have produced specific cultural, political, and economic practices 
and also racial and identity discourses among the Garinagu in Honduras and in the United States.  
These were some of the most compelling reasons for pursuing this project.                                
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GLOSSARY 
Garifuna Words: 
 
Afulurijani  Garinagu name for their community on Honduras’ north coast named 
Tornabé. 
 
Badayaugati        Garinagu name for their community on Honduras’ north coast named  
     Bataya. 
 
Buena Wista  Garinagu name for their community on Honduras’ north coast named 
Buena Vista. 
 
Baündada      struggle 
 
Bimetu Faluma     sweet coconut  
 
Bülagüríba     Garinagu name for their community on Honduras’ north coast named  
       Plaplaya. 
 
Kristalu and              Garinagu name for their community on Honduras’ north coast named  
Blagríba   Cristales y Rio Negro 
 
Dübügati  Garinagu name for their community on Honduras’ north coast named 
Punta Piedra. 
 
Dúfigati    Garinagu named for their community on Honduras’ north coast named 
    Triunfo de la Cruz. 
 
Durubuguti Beibei  Garinagu name for their community on Honduras’ north coast named San 
      Juan. 
 
Ereba     grilled cassava which is a staple in Garifuna’s gastronomy. 
 
Giriga  Garinagu name for their community on Honduras’ north coast named 
Santa Fé. 
 
Koyolesi  Garinagu name for their community on Honduras’ north coast named 
Coyoles. 
 
Lemesi     religious mass  
 
Ñon Ton  Garinagu name for their community on Honduras’ north coast named 
Pueblo Nuevo. 
 
Pârinchi    Garinagu name for their community on Honduras’ north coast named La  
Fé.  
 
Seremein   thank you 
 
Taibónu   Garinagu name for their community on Honduras’ north coast named  
     Thigh-bone. 
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Tibiniriba          Garinagu name for their community on Honduras’ north coast named Rio 
    Esteban. 
 
Non-Garifuna Words: 
 
Morenales   a pejorative term for Garifuna communities, which translates to people  
     with black skin. It originates from the colonial word of moreno.   
 
 
Source: Garifuna words used in this dissertation come from my own knowledge of the  
             language, The People’s Garifuna Dictionary, and Salvador Suazo’s work. 
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